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  1. Philosophy and the Modern Mind: A Philosophical Critique of Modern Western Civilization.E. M. Adams - 1975 - University of North Carolina Press.
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  2. The Neo-Idealist Defense of Subjectivity.A. Arato - 1974 - Télos 1974 (21):108-161.
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  3. 8 Objectivity and the Growth of Knowledge.Margaret S. Archer - 2004 - In Andrew Collier, Margaret Scotford Archer & William Outhwaite (eds.), Defending Objectivity: Essays in Honour of Andrew Collier. Routledge. pp. 117.
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  4. Review: Objectivity and the Internal-External Reasons Controversy: A Study of Paul K. Moser's Philosophy After Objectivity. [REVIEW]Robert Audi - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2):395 - 400.
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  5. Concepts, Introspection, and Phenomenal Consciousness: An Information-Theoretical Approach.Murat Aydede & Guven Guzeldere - 2005 - Noûs 39 (2):197-255.
    This essay is a sustained attempt to bring new light to some of the perennial problems in philosophy of mind surrounding phenomenal consciousness and introspection through developing an account of sensory and phenomenal concepts. Building on the information-theoretic framework of Dretske (1981), we present an informational psychosemantics as it applies to what we call sensory concepts, concepts that apply, roughly, to so-called secondary qualities of objects. We show that these concepts have a special informational character and semantic structure that closely (...)
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  6. Método e estilo, subjetividade e conhecimento nos ensaios de Montaigne.Celso Martins Azar Filho - 2012 - Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia 53 (126):559-578.
    A característica mais notável da filosofia renascentista foi também o que tornou sua assimilação pela história da filosofia tão difícil: a interação entre forma e conteúdo, entre ideia e sua expressão. Tal resulta da tentativa de realizar outra inter-relação que lhe é ainda mais essencial: aquela entre teoria e prática, pensamento e ação. Nos Ensaios de Montaigne, o método constitui antes de tudo um estilo de vida: a linguagem é aí o meio pelo qual a implicação entre mundos externos e (...)
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  7. Theory of the Subject.Alain Badiou - 2009 - Continuum.
    The place of the subjective -- Everything that is of a whole constitutes an obstacle to it insofar as it is included in it -- Action, manor of the subject -- The real is the impasse of formalization : formalization is the locus of the passing-into-force of the real -- Hegel : "the activity of force is essentially activity reacting against itself" -- Subjective and objective -- The subject under the signifiers of the exception -- Of force as disappearance, whose (...)
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  8. Equality and Partiality by Thomas Nagel.J. Baker - 1993 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 1 (1):129-133.
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  9. Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2007 - In Georg Gasser (ed.), How Successful is Naturalism? Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Ontos Verlag.
    The first-person perspective is a challenge to naturalism. Naturalistic theories are relentlessly third-personal. The first-person perspective is, well, first-personal; it is the perspective from which one thinks of oneself as oneself* without the aid of any third-person name, description, demonstrative or other referential device. The exercise of the capacity to think of oneself in this first-personal way is the necessary condition of all our self-knowledge, indeed of all our self-consciousness. As important as the first-person perspective is, many philosophers have not (...)
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  10. The First-Person Perspective: A Test for Naturalism.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1998 - American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (4):327-348.
    Self-consciousness, many philosophers agree, is essential to being a person. There is not so much agreement, however, about how to understand what self-consciousness is. Philosophers in the field of cognitive science tend to write off self-consciousness as unproblematic. According to such philosophers, the real difficulty for the cognitive scientist is phenomenal consciousness--the fact that we have states that feel a certain way. If we had a grip on phenomenal consciousness, they think, self-consciousness could be easily handled by functionalist models. For (...)
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  11. There’s Something About Mary. [REVIEW]Derek Ball - 2014 - The Philosophers' Magazine 64:119-121.
  12. Hard, Harder, Hardest.Katalin Balog - manuscript
    In this paper I discuss three problems of consciousness. The first two have been dubbed the “Hard Problem” and the “Harder Problem”. The third problem has received less attention and I will call it the “Hardest Problem”. The Hard Problem is a metaphysical and explanatory problem concerning the nature of conscious states. The Harder Problem is epistemological, and it concerns whether we can know, given physicalism, whether some creature physically different from us is conscious. The Hardest Problem is a problem (...)
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  13. Phenomenal Concepts.Kati Balog - 2009 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
    This article is about the special, subjective concepts we apply to experience, called “phenomenal concepts”. They are of special interest in a number of ways. First, they refer to phenomenal experiences, and the qualitative character of those experiences whose metaphysical status is hotly debated. Conscious experience strike many philosophers as philosophically problematic and difficult to accommodate within a physicalistic metaphysics. Second, PCs are widely thought to be special and unique among concepts. The sense that there is something special about PCs (...)
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  14. Thomas Nagel's Revival in Teleological Thinking.Ophelia Benson - 2013 - Philosophers' Magazine 60 (-1):24 - 25.
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  15. Materialism and the Subjectivity of Experience.Reinaldo Bernal - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (1):39-49.
    The phenomenal properties of conscious mental states happen to be exclusively accessible from the first-person perspective. Consequently, some philosophers consider their existence to be incompatible with materialist metaphysics. In this paper I criticise one particular argument that is based on the idea that for something to be real it must (at least in principle) be accessible from an intersubjective perspective. I argue that the exclusively subjective access to phenomenal contents can be explained by the very particular nature of the epistemological (...)
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  16. Le fossé explicatif dans les énoncés psycho-physiques et la subjectivité de la conscience.Reinaldo J. Bernal - 2014 - In Jean-Marie Chevalier Benoît Gaultier (ed.), Connaître. Questions d'épistémologie contemporaine. Editions d'Ithaque. pp. 73-92.
    Kripke [1972] a présenté un argument très influent contre le physicalisme, basé sur l’idée suivante : les énoncés psycho-physiques—ceux qui identifient les phénomènes psychologiques de l’expérience à des phénomènes physiques—sont, s’ils sont vrais, nécessairement vrais. Pourtant, ils semblent être contingents. Par la suite, Levine [1983] a prétendu que l’apparence de contingence était due à un «fossé explicatif » qui se trouve dans ces énoncés : les phénomènes physiques ne semblent pas rendre compte de l’existence et des caractéristiques des phénomènes psychologiques. (...)
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  17. Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality.André Berten - 1993 - Revue Philosophique De Louvain 91 (92):707-710.
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  18. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience.John Bickle (ed.) - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
    The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience is a state-of-the-art collection of interdisciplinary research spanning philosophy (of science, mind, and ...
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  19. A marca do vazio: reflexões sobre a subjetividade em Blaise Pascal.T. Birchal - 1993 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 88:50-69.
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  20. A Point of View on Points of View.John I. Biro - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (1):3-12.
    A number of writers have deployed the notion of a point of view as a key to the allegedly theory-resistant subjective aspect of experience. I examine that notion more closely than is usually done and find that it cannot support the anti-objectivist's case. Experience may indeed have an irreducibly subjective aspect, but the notion of a point of view cannot be used to show that it does.
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  21. Consciousness and Objectivity.John I. Biro - 1993 - In Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Blackwell.
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  22. Consciousness and Subjectivity.John I. Biro - 1991 - Philosophical Issues 1:113-133.
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  23. A New Foundation for the Social Sciences? Searle's Misreading of Durkheim.Jørn Bjerre - 2015 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (1):53-82.
    The aim of John Searle’s philosophy of society is to provide a foundation for the social sciences. Arguing that the study of social reality needs to be based on a philosophy of language, Searle claims that sociology has little to offer since no sociologist ever took language seriously. Attacking Durkheim head-on, Searle not only claims that Durkheim’s project differs from his own but also that Durkheim’s sociology has serious shortcomings. Opposing Searle, this paper argues that Durkheim’s account of social reality (...)
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  24. Can Science Explain Consciousness? Toward a Solution to the 'Hard Problem'.Dan J. Bruiger - manuscript
    For diverse reasons, the problem of phenomenal consciousness is persistently challenging. Mental terms are characteristically ambiguous, researchers have philosophical biases, secondary qualities are excluded from objective description, and philosophers love to argue. Adhering to a regime of efficient causes and third-person descriptions, science as it has been defined has no place for subjectivity or teleology. A solution to the “hard problem” of consciousness will require a radical approach: to take the point of view of the cognitive system itself. To facilitate (...)
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  25. Introspective Knowledge of Experience and its Role in Consciousness Studies.Jesse Butler - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (2):128-145.
    In response to Petitmengin and Bitbol's recent account of first-person methodologies in the study of consciousness, I provide a revised model of our introspective knowledge of our own conscious experience. This model, which I call the existential constitution model of phenomenal knowledge, avoids the problems that Petitmengin and Bitbol identify with standard observational models of introspection while also avoiding an underlying metaphorical misconception in their own proximity model, which misconstrues first-person knowledge of consciousness in terms of a dichotomous epistemic relationship. (...)
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  26. Poinsot Versus Peirce on Merging with Reality by Sharing a Quality.Marc Champagne - 2015 - Versus: Quaderni di Studi Semiotici 120:31–43.
    C. S. Peirce introduced the term “icon” for sign-vehicles that signify their objects in virtue of some shared quality. This qualitative kinship, however, threatens to collapse the relata of the sign into one and the same thing. Accordingly, the late medieval philosopher of signs John Poinsot held that, “no matter how perfect, a concept [...] always retains a distinction, therefore, between the thing signified and itself signifying.” Poinsot is touted by his present-day advocates as a realist, but I believe that, (...)
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  27. Some Convergences and Divergences in the Realism of Charles Peirce and Ayn Rand.Marc Champagne - 2006 - Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 8 (1):19-39.
    Structured around Charles S. Peirce's three-fold categorical scheme, this article proposes a comparative study of Ayn Rand and Peirce's realist views in general metaphysics. Rand's stance is seen as diverging with Peirce's argument from asymptotic representation but converging with arguments from brute relation and neutral category. It is argued that, by dismissing traditional subject-object dualisms, Rand and Peirce both propose iconoclastic construals of what it means to be real, dismissals made all the more noteworthy by the fact each chose to (...)
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  28. A View From Anywhere: Prospects for an Objective Understanding of Consciousness.Ronald L. Chrisley - 2001 - In Paavo Pylkkanen & Tere Vaden (eds.), Dimensions of Conscious Experience. John Benjamins.
    It is by now commonly agreed that the proper study of consciousness requires a multidisciplinary approach which focuses on the varieties and dimensions of conscious experience from different angles. This book, which is based on a workshop held at the University of Skövde, Sweden, provides a microcosm of the emerging discipline of consciousness studies and focuses on some important but neglected aspects of consciousness. The book brings together philosophy, psychology, cognitive neuroscience, linguistics, cognitive and computer science, biology, physics, art and (...)
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  29. Subjectivity and the First Person: Some Reflections.Andrea Christofidou - 1999 - Philosophical Inquiry 21 (3-4):1-27.
  30. Shadows of Consciousness: The Problem of Phenomenal Properties.Jason Costanzo - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (4):1-15.
    The aim of this essay is to show that phenomenal properties are contentless modes of appearances of representational properties. The essay initiates with examination of the first-person perspective of the conscious observer according to which a “reference to I” with respect to the observation of experience is determined. A distinction is then drawn between the conscious observer and experience as observed, according to which, three distinct modifications of experience are delineated. These modifications are then analyzed with respect to the content (...)
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  31. Objectivity in Experimental Inquiry.Sylvia Lea Culp - 1992 - Dissertation, University of California, San Diego
    As an alternative to the relativistic anti-objectivism that has been directed toward experimental science, I develop an account of objectivity in experimental inquiry. I argue for experimental testing procedures, gleaned from experimental practice, that can make the impact of the world strong enough for objectively establishing claims about the world. These procedures, I argue, can be used in the evaluation of any experimental inquiry to determine the extent to which intersubjective presuppositions in particular, shared theoretical presuppositions, are eliminated. ;It is (...)
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  32. The Evolution of the Psychical Element: George Herbert Mead at the University of Chicago: Lecture Notes by H. Heath Bawden 1899–1900: Introduction. [REVIEW]Kevin S. Decker - 2008 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 44 (3):pp. 469-479.
    George Herbert Mead's early lectures at the University of Chicago are more important to understanding the genesis of his views in social psychology than some commentators, such as Hans Joas, have emphasized. Mead's lecture series "The Evolution of the Psychical Element," preserved through the notes of student H. Heath Bawden, demonstrate his devotion to Hegelianism as a method of thinking and how this influenced his non-reductionistic approach to functional psychology. In addition, Mead's breadth of historical knowledge as well as his (...)
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  33. Subjectivity, Work, and Action.Christophe Dejours - 2006 - Critical Horizons 7 (1):45-62.
    This essay is intended to explore relations between work and subjectivity (that is, what concerns the individual subject: his or her suffering, pleasure, personal development, and so on). To this end, we shall draw on a body of theory and clinical practice that has been developing in France for some twenty years under the name of the `psychodynamics of work' and ask the three following questions. What is work? This question might seem trivial, but the clinical analysis of the relationship (...)
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  34. Review of Nagel, Other Minds. [REVIEW]Daniel C. Dennett - unknown
    The institution of book reviews, flawed though it may be, still performs a crucial service of resource enhancement for a discipline, funneling informed attention to at least some of the best among a superfluity of publications. During the last quarter century, Thomas Nagel's book reviews and critical essays have played a major role, shaping opinion, and thereby shaping the field. Now he has gathered his favorites in a collection, ten in philosophy of mind, and a dozen in ethics and political (...)
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  35. Review of Fodor, Psychosemantics. [REVIEW]Daniel C. Dennett - 1988 - Philosophical Explorations 85:384-389.
    In Word and Object, Quine acknowledged the "practical indispensability" in daily life of the intentional idioms of belief and desire but disparaged such talk as an "essentially dramatic idiom" rather than something from which real science could be made in any straightforward way.Endnote 1 Many who agree on little else have agreed with Quine about this, and have gone on to suggest one or another indirect way for science to accommodate folk psychology: Sellars, Davidson, Putnam, Rorty, Stich, the Churchlands, Schiffer (...)
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  36. A Connecticut Yalie in King Descartes' Court.Eric Dietrich & Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 2002 - Newsletter of Cognitive Science Society (Now Defunct).
    What is consciousness? Of course, each of us knows, privately, what consciousness is. And we each think, for basically irresistible reasons, that all other conscious humans by and large have experiences like ours. So we conclude that we all know what consciousness is. It's the felt experiences of our lives. But that is not the answer we, as cognitive scientists, seek in asking our question. We all want to know what physical process consciousness is and why it produces this very (...)
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  37. Nagel's Concept of Science.Jude Dougherty - 1966 - Philosophy Today 10 (3):212.
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  38. The Philosophy of Phenomenal Consciousness.Zoe Drayson - 2015 - In The Constitution of Phenomenal Consciousness. Amsterdam: pp. 273-292.
    A primer on the philosophical issues relating to phenomenal consciousness, part of a collection of new papers by scientists and philosophers on the constitution of consciousness.
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  39. Does Consciousness Exist Independently of Present Time and Present Time Independently of Consciousness.Birgitta Dresp-Langley & Jean Durup - 2012 - Open Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):45-49.
    While some are currently debating whether time may or may not be an illusion, others keep devoting their time to the science of consciousness. Time as such may be seen as a physical or a subjective variable, and the limitations in our capacity of perceiving and analyzing temporal order and change in physical events definitely constrain our understanding of consciousness which, in return, constrains our conceptual under-standing of time. Temporal codes generated in the brain have been considered as the key (...)
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  40. Review of Thomas Nagel., Equality and Partiality.Rem B. Edwards - 1994 - International Studies in Philosophy 26 (2):136-137.
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  41. Objectivity and the Perspective of Consciousness.Naomi M. Eilan - 1997 - European Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):235-250.
  42. NAGEL, T., "Mortal Questions". [REVIEW]R. Elliott - 1980 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58:415.
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  43. Phenomenal Concepts.Andreas Elpidorou - 2015 - Oxford Bibliographies Online.
    Phenomenal concepts are the concepts that we deploy when – but arguably not only when – we introspectively examine, focus on, or take notice of the phenomenal character of our experiences. They refer to phenomenal properties (or qualities) and they do so in a subjective (first-personal) and direct (non-relational) manner. It is through the use of such concepts that the phenomenal character of our experiences is made salient to us. Discourse about the nature of phenomenal concepts plays an important role (...)
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  44. Other Minds and the Origins of Consciousness.Ted Everett - 2014/2015 - Anthropology and Philosophy 11.
    Why are we conscious? What does consciousness enable us to do that cannot be done by zombies in the dark? This paper argues that introspective consciousness probably co-evolved as a "spandrel" along with our more useful ability to represent the mental states of other people. The first part of the paper defines and motivates a conception of consciousness as a kind of "double vision" – the perception of how things seem to us as well as what they are – along (...)
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  45. The Impossibility of the Last Word: Thomas Nagel's Concealed Perspective.Richard Findler - 2006 - The European Legacy 11 (4):425-428.
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  46. The Subjective Appearance of Cyrenaic Pathe.Gail Fine - 2004 - In V. Karasmanis (ed.), Socrates: 2400 Hundred Years Since His Death. European Cultural Center of Delphi.
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  47. Subjectivity, Objectivity, and Nagel on Consciousness.Jeffrey E. Foss - 1993 - Dialogue 32 (4):725-36.
  48. Subjective Experience and Points of View.Robert Francescotti - 1993 - Journal of Philosophical Research 18:25-36.
    Thomas Nagel contends that facts regarding the qualitative character of conscious experience can be grasped from only a single point of view. This feature, he claims, is what renders conscious experience subjective in character, and it is what makes facts about the qualitative experience subjective facts. While much has been written regarding the ontological implications of the ‘point of view account’ relatively Iittle has been said on whether the account itself successfully defines the subjectivity of the mental. In this paper, (...)
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  49. Going Nowhere: Nagel on Normative Objectivity.Marilyn Friedman - 1990 - Philosophy 65 (254):501 - 509.
  50. Going Nowhere: Nagel on Normative Objectivity: Discussion.Marilyn Friedman - 1990 - Philosophy 65 (254):501-509.
    In The View from Nowhere , Thomas Nagel develops a theory of practical reasoning which attempts to give the personal, or subjective, point of view its due2 while still insisting on the objectivity of ethics. On the objective side, Nagel affirms that there are truths about values and reasons for action which are independent of the ways in which reasons and values appear to us, independent of our own particular beliefs and inclinations . The objective foundation for these truths consists (...)
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