Subjectivity and Objectivity, Misc

Alongside the increasing popularity of digital, ‘social’ media platforms, has been the emergence of self-styled digital life-coaches, many of whom seek to propagate their knowledge of and interests in a variety of topics through online social networks (such as, Facebook, Youtube, Instagram, etc.). With many of these ‘social influencers’ garnering a large online following, their popularity, social significance and cultural impact offers important insights into the place and purpose of the subject in our digital media environment. Accordingly, this chapter will (...) examine the proliferation of digital media technologies, which, on the one hand, propose the dissolution of the subject (wearable technology, technological singularity, etc.), while on the other, provide new opportunities for discovering, ‘sharing’ and/or improving one’s ‘inner-Self’ (digital media gurus, online health and fitness regimes, etc.). It is in considering how the effects of this ‘digital subject’ redefines traditional (Cartesian) conceptions, that the relative significance of ‘Digital Guru Media’ (DGM) can be drawn. In particular, explicit attention is given to examining how our engagements with social media can be considered in relation to Lacan’s (2002) notion of the big Other and its relevance in introducing, examining and, possibly, subverting, the digital media guru. (shrink)

I argue against the claim -- advocated by Albert Einstein, Bernard Williams, and Ted Sider, among others -- that a description is objective only if it says how the world is in itself. Instead, I argue for the claim -- inspired by comments of Niels Bohr -- that a family of descriptions is objective only if they co-vary with their respective descriptive contexts. Moreover, I claim that "there is a shared objective reality" simply means that it is possible to satisfy (...) this kind of covariance requirement. (shrink)

Can young children such as 3-year-olds represent the world objectively? Some prominent developmental psychologists (Perner, Tomasello) assume so. I argue that this view is susceptible to a prima facie powerful objection: to represent objectively, one must be able to represent not only features of the entities represented but also features of objectification itself, which 3-year-olds can’t do yet. Drawing on Tyler Burge’s work on perceptual constancy, I provide a response to this objection and motivate a distinction between three different kinds (...) of objectivity. This distinction helps advance current research on both objectivity and teleological action explanations in young children. (shrink)

This is a brief exploration of the notion of an objective fact. The form of objectivity at issue is distinct from epistemic objectivity or objectivity about truth. It is an ontological form of objectivity. Objective facts may obtain whether or not we know, believe or are aware of them. They depend upon objects, for example, on the properties that objects have or the relationships into which objects enter. Setting scepticism to one side, there is a perfectly mundane sense in which (...) we may come to have knowledge or fail to have knowledge of such facts. We must perceive objective facts from a perspective, but this does not enter into the facts. Nor does the fact that we must describe facts using language mean that facts are language-dependent. (shrink)

Neste artigo pretendo evidenciar como a relação entre sujeito anímico e sujeito espiritual é fundamental para a compreensão da intersubjetividade e do mundo da vida (Lebenswelt). Em Ideias II, Husserl explica como, a partir do eu, sujeito e objeto são constituídos no mundo: natureza, alma e espírito. Estes três estratos do sendo são conhecidos a partir da atitude teorética e da atitude espiritual e, no processo, se dá a explicitação do eu. Numa atitude teorética, temos constituição da natureza, para o (...) que o corpo (Körper/Leib) é fundamental. Em seguida, a constituição de objetos de natureza anímica, humana ou animal, incluindo a autopercepção. Assumindo a atitude espiritual, o outro é percebido (Urpräsenz), inicialmente, como corpo junto às coisas e, ao lado desta percepção, há uma apercepção (Appräsenz) dos horizontes co-dados. Há uma identidade entre o corpo alheio e o meu, é o momento da empatia (Einfühlung). O mundo constituído a partir de uma atitude naturalista ou teórica é uma redução do mundo circundante (Umwelt), mas o mundo cotidiano da atitude personalista ou espiritual lhe antecede, o mundo vital (Lebenswelt). É, portanto, através da atitude personalista ou espiritual, que se constitui uma comunidade de sujeitos espirituais. (shrink)

Objectivity is a key concept both in how we talk about science in everyday life and in the philosophy of science. This Element explores various ways in which recent philosophers of science have thought about the nature, value and achievability of objectivity. The first section explains the general trend in recent philosophy of science away from a notion of objectivity as a 'view from nowhere' to a focus on the relationship between objectivity and trust. Section 2 discusses the relationship between (...) objectivity and recent arguments attacking the viability or desirability of 'value free' science. Section 3 outlines Longino's influential 'social' account of objectivity, suggesting some worries about drawing too strong a link between epistemic and ethical virtues. Section 4 turns to the value of objectivity, exploring concerns that notions of objectivity are politically problematic, and cautiously advocating in response a view of objectivity in terms of invariance. (shrink)

While the idea of art as self-expression can sound old-fashioned, it remains widespread—especially if the relevant ‘selves’ can be social collectives, not just individual artists. But self-expression can collapse into individualistic or anthropocentric self-involvement. And compelling successor ideals for artists are not obvious. In this light, I develop a counter-ideal of creative receptivity to basic features of the external world, or artistic objectivity. Objective artists are not trying to express themselves or reach collective self-knowledge. However, they are also not disinterested (...) or emotionless. They can be unmoved by personal feelings and human concerns, but they are still receptive—just attuned to the more elemental forces that creatively inspire them. I elaborate this ideal in dialogue with John Ruskin’s influential critique of the pathetic fallacy. By contextualizing Ruskin’s view vis-à-vis Romantic and Modernist poetics, post-Kantian aesthetics, modern environmental art, and contemporary theories of expressiveness, I show how it indirectly motivates my account. (shrink)

This paper takes as its point of departure recent research into the possibility that human beings can perceive single photons. In order to appreciate what quantum perception may entail, we first explore several of the leading interpretations of quantum mechanics, then consider an alternative view based on the ontological phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Martin Heidegger. Next, the philosophical analysis is brought into sharper focus by employing a perceptual model, the Necker cube, augmented by the topology of the Klein bottle. (...) This paves the way for addressing in greater depth the paper’s central question: Just what would it take to observe the quantum reality of the photon? In formulating an answer, we examine the nature of scientific objectivity itself, along with the paradoxical properties of light. The conclusion reached is that quantum perception requires a new kind of observation, one in which the observer of the photon adopts a concretely self-reflexive observational posture that brings her into close ontological relationship with the observed. (shrink)

“It is probably justified in requiring a transformation of the image of the real world as it has been constructed in the last 300 years… [for] now it seems to work no longer. One must therefore go back 300 years and reflect on how one could have proceeded differently at that time, and how the whole subsequent development would then be modified. No wonder that puts us into boundless confusion!” :: a letter from Schrödinger to Einstein in 1950 -/- The (...) theme of the new book, Idols of the Mind vs True Reality by Bhakti Madhava Puri, Ph.D. is concerned with the clear exposition of the pivotal conceptions and misconceptions of Galileo’s and others’ ideas that produced the subsequent development of what would become modern mathematized science. -/- The confusions and almost complete ignorance that exist today regarding something so fundamental as consciousness is immediately cleared up when the obvious errors are seen in the ad hoc presumptions of the original founders of modern science who were blindsided by the metaphysical ontologies that held sway during their lives, but to which we no longer adhere, thanks to the development of philosophy beyond that period. We trace this progress out in a concise way in the book. -/- The modern mind, thanks to science education, is focused on the one-sided empirical approach to knowledge by sensuous perception, but this fails to account for the role of subjective cognition or conception – the role of consciousness in such perceptions. This artificial separation of the original unity-in-difference between conception and content has been rendered impossible to broach because of the historical metaphysical tradition of dualism firmly held by the fathers of modern science such as Galileo and Descartes. -/- The presumed impossible gap between subject and object is bridged once we realize that the object is what the subject knows it to be. This does not reduce the object to the subject as the abstract idealists (monists) naively are only too hasty to presume as an immediate identity (oneness). Mediation is involved; there are both difference and identity at play. It is merely lazy un-thinking that ignores the intricate dynamic in the mediating activity that is the heart and life of consciousness. The main purpose of the book is to restore the central importance of the conceptual moment that is integral to science and which makes it truly worthy of the name Science or scientific knowledge. (shrink)

REVIEW (1): "Jeff Kochan’s book offers both an original reading of Martin Heidegger’s early writings on science and a powerful defense of the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) research program. Science as Social Existence weaves together a compelling argument for the thesis that SSK and Heidegger’s existential phenomenology should be thought of as mutually supporting research programs." (Julian Kiverstein, in Isis) ---- REVIEW (2): "I cannot in the space of this review do justice to the richness and range of Kochan's (...) discussion [...]. There is a great deal in this foundational portion of Kochan's discussion that I find tremendously interesting and engaging [...]." (David R. Cerbone, in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science) ---- REVIEW (3): "Science as Social Existence will be of interest not only to Heidegger scholars but to anyone engaged in science and technology studies. [...] This is an informative and original book. Kochan should be praised for his clear, pleasant-to-read prose." (Michael Butler, in CHOICE). (shrink)

Social studies of science have often treated natural field sites as extensions of the laboratory. But this overlooks the unique specificities of field sites. While lab sites are usually private spaces with carefully controlled borders, field sites are more typically public spaces with fluid boundaries and diverse inhabitants. Field scientists must therefore often adapt their work to the demands and interests of local agents. I propose to address the difference between lab and field in sociological terms, as a difference in (...) style. A field style treats epistemic alterity as a resource rather than an obstacle for objective knowledge production. A sociological stylistics of the field should thus explain how objective science can co-exist with radical conceptual difference. I discuss examples from the Canadian North, focussing on collaborations between state wildlife biologists and managers, on the one hand, and local Aboriginal Elders and hunters, on the other. I argue that a sociological stylistics of the field can help us to better understand how radically diverse agents may collaborate across cultures in the successful production of reliable natural knowledge. (shrink)

A persistent puzzle for philosophers of science is the well-documented appeal made by scientists to their aesthetic emotions in the course of scientific research. Emotions are usually viewed as irremediably subjective, and thus of no epistemological interest. Yet, by denying an epistemic role for scientists’ emotional dispositions, philosophers find themselves in the awkward position of ignoring phenomena which scientists themselves often insist are of importance. This paper suggests a possible solution to this puzzle by challenging the wholesale identification of emotion (...) with subjectivity. The proposed method is a naturalistic and externalist one, calling for empirical investigation into the intersubjective processes by which scientists’ emotional dispositions become refined and attuned to specific objects of attention. The proposal is developed through a critical discussion of Michael Polanyi’s theory of scientific passions, as well as plant geneticist Barbara McClintock’s celebrated “feeling for the organism.”. (shrink)

Consciousness in the form of sense-certainty wants to apprehend its particular object as being-there (existing). But as demonstrated in previous articles in this series, the only truth of sense-certainty is merely that something is, and because everything is, being is universal. Here it will be shown that perception is the consciousness of the universal as the truth of a particular being. And because universality is the very principle of perception, both object and the I are also universal. Because this universality (...) is arrived at through a mediating process or thinking, it is not just an immediate ‘happening’ as is found in sense-certainty - rather, it proves to be a logically necessitated content. (shrink)

In Sense-certainty, the being of the particular object of sense was found to belong to the universality - of consciousness. This relationship between the universal truth of the object and its sensuous determinate particularity is called the Thing of Perception, basically a Thing and its perceived properties. However, in perception it was concluded that the particular Thing is ultimately resolved into the unconditioned universality of the Understanding. Thus in both Sense-certainty and Perception the particular object or Thing proves to be (...) essentially universality. It is important to recollect the development that has taken place up to this point, i.e., the various moments and movements of thinking that constitute the activity, or dynamic essence, of what is called, in totality, consciousness or knowing. The full explication of what consciousness is in its completely developed form has not yet been reached, but only what may broadly be referred to as the first three stages (Sense-certainty, Perception, Understanding) in the complete activity that will be necessary and sufficient to adequately comprehend consciousness. When the movement of consciousness is completed, the development will continue onward to the stages of Self-consciousness, Reason, and Spirit. (shrink)

There are two sides to perceptual consciousness: consciousness and the Thing. Thus far the various thought-components constituent of theThing (the various moments of the Concept of Thing) have been observed. Now it is necessary to consider what thoughts consciousness, itself, experiences in the act of perceiving.

During the latter half of the twentieth century, many philosophers in Europe and America turned towards social pragmatist and holistic accounts of concepts and theories. In this paper, I make the case that many forms of relativism—moral and otherwise—that emerge from this turn are misguided. While we must always operate from some framework of practices in which things may serve as reasons for us, most forms of relativism in recent decades have more boldly granted us immunity from external rational scrutiny. (...) I argue that this strong form of relativism is possible only with sharp divisions between communities of speakers that I call “strict boundaries” and that these are implausible. We are left with the possibility of social pragmatist theories that do not entail strong relativism. (shrink)

The object of study is consciousness. The activity of consciousness is called knowing. The study of a subject may only begin with immediacy, because a beginning implies that there is no prior mediation, i.e. no explicit differences or determinations. Such a beginning is mere being — what immediately is. Being as such is pure generality. Since consciousness is not a physical object that appears before the eyes like a tree, it has to be treated as an object of thought or, (...) as it is said, “before the mind’s eye.” When consciousness apprehends itself as an object, then the objective consciousness must be in the form of something immediate. Thus apprehension is in a purely receptive mode without intervention of explicit thinking or comprehension. So the first passive observation of immediate consciousness as an object reveals a consciousness that simply is. The knowing activity of this immediate consciousness is also immediate so that what it knows is immediate knowledge. Because of this immediacy (non-differentiation) there is no distinction made between consciousness and what it knows. A consciousness thus absorbed in the wealth of the world, i.e. in what it sees, hears, smells, touches and tastes, is sensuous consciousness or sense-certainty. The word ‘certainty’ implies immediate knowledge that something is. Thus sensuous certainty of something means that it is, and no further thought determination interrupts that immediate knowledge. “That” refers only to indeterminate being, whereas “what” refers to the determination of that being — these are two distinct indexicals. So here in sense-certainty only that is implied. Consciousness itself is just another immediate ‘this’ opposed to all the other immediate individual ‘thises’ that are encountered by the senses. This immediate consciousness is called “I.” Certainty is the connection between “I” and its object, but this connection or mediation is transparent (invisible) to or not known by sense-certainty in its immediacy. (shrink)

The objective here will be to take the subject (ego) and object (thing) that are held fixed, separate and in opposition to each other by the understanding and explicitly show them to be dialectically related in the dynamical movement of thinking. The dialectical movement of thought was explained by example in the propositional statement, S is P. The movement of the unified Concept as a whole, in which the fixed subject and object are considered as mere moments, constitutes the basic (...) underlying dynamic truth or reality. And the totality of the movements and moments in this dialectical relationship constitute the self-determining Concept. The thinking is involved in this dynamic movement of the Concept is called conceptual thinking. It is left to us to demonstrate that this thinking belongs to the Concept and not to the ego. We can understand this intuitively at this point by realizing that in the dialectical relationship of the propositional form, S is P, the object becomes as fluid and active as the subject or ego. Therefore it is not a mere egoic activity. (shrink)

Progress in philosophy means to understand and accept one point and from there go on to develop the next. The whole is made up of many parts just as a building is composed of many floors – we cannot take out one or more of the beginning floors and expect that the building can thereby be erected. The overall system of Hegel’s philosophy requires an understanding of each of the parts within it, especially the beginning steps. In the earlier articles (...) on this subject the essential point has been made that the subjective and objective aspects of reality cannot be understood separately from each other. There is no meaning to concept without that of which it is the concept, as much as there is no meaning to an object without a subject. With that basic and simple principle of the “distinct but inseparable” notion of the two, further progress was made to the details of the relationship between subject and object. The subject-predicate proposition was introduced to show how thinking takes on a dialectical nature and described this dialectical unity as being the first basic form in understanding the Concept as a dynamic unity of subject and object. Further determinations lay hidden in this structure which have not yet been made explicit for understanding. Only some general ideas or an outline for a basic understanding of what the basic principles are has been presented thus far. A more detailed comprehension is required to go further. The experiences that consciousness goes through in its development in learning about itself display the entire system of the truth of consciousness or the realm of spirit. These are not mere abstract thoughts but appear in relation to consciousness as actual shapes or stages of itself. The development of these determinate moments constitutes consciousness as a whole in its true existence. At that point in the developement of consciousness when it is no longer burdened with itself as that which appears to exist merely for it and as an other, its alien nature is overcome and appearance becomes identical to its own essence. This marks the entrance to the platform of the genuine science of spirit in which consciousness grasps its own essence or is absolute knowing. (shrink)

Argumentative thinking has two aspects, viz. positive and negative. Such thinking effectively ignores the content since the actual object is considered “out there” beyond the subjective thinking that is going on “in here” or inside oneself or the finite mind. No explicit connection is established between the subjective and objective worlds or realms. This type of thinking is of necessity concerned only with its own knowing or with itself, thus Hegel calls this vanity. In this sense it is indifferent to (...) what is outside it, thus it is abstract thought – thought that is stripped from its actual content. This difference or indifference is the negative aspect of argumentative thinking. In addition, we may understand it positively as a union/unity with an “I think” or thinking ego conjoined immediately to an objective content. The objective content is supposed to be the truth that the subjective thinking is to discover or recreate for itself in its subjectivity. One understands the truth when thinking subjectivity is identical with the objective content. However, this identity is not one of substantial identity but formal only. In other words, subjective understanding and objective actuality may be the same in form but are essentially different in substance – one in the medium of thought, the other in the medium of being. A correspondence is merely assumed between these two. (shrink)

One of the most important instances of distinct but inseparable entities is that of subject and object. When we carefully think about them, we realize that one term implies the other. In other words, a subject cannot possibly exist without a corresponding object otherwise we would never be able to talk about “subject.” In a similar way, an object can only be called an object because it is in relation to a subject. All opposites will in fact exhibit this same (...) interdependence when we carefully think about them. For example, we could not speak of “blindness” if there were no one who could see. The word “blind” would never have any reason for its existence unless someone had the ability to see. Light and darkness, sleep and waking, day and night, etc. all such terms have meaning only in relation to their opposition to one another. Thus we conclude that this opposition is essential to the existence of either term. We can look at existence as a polar reality or polarity. One side rises or falls with the other. There is no possible way that one side can exist without the other. (shrink)

We may call this the problem of thought and being, where thought represents the subjective and being the objective component in this interactive event. In order to resolve this problem we have to look more carefully at the situation to make sure we understand what is going on more clearly. Let us take the example of "seeing" as something that may be easier to understand. Between (1) "seeing" and the (2) "thing seen" we may at first think we have two (...) independent things. I have my subjective seeing capacity and there are objects in the world which are subject to my seeing capacity. Are these two really independent? Does it make any sense to speak of "things seen" unless the "seeing" capacity is already operating on them? Can we talk of an experience in such a way that what was experienced is different from the experience of it? We mean them to be different, their difference is not being denied. But are they independent or separable from one another? Whether we consider knowing, thinking, or whatever subjective activity we may come up with, it cannot be separated from the objective element that it is operating on. This interdependence of subjective and objective elements is crucial. Basically it is a situation where we have distinct elements inseparably connected to one another. This is not an extraordinary situation. It is rather most commonplace when we think about it. The sunshine is different from the Sun. No one would argue that when the Sun is shining in your room that the Sun is in your room. Distinct they are, but it would not be possible to separate the sunshine from the Sun and still have it be what we call the Sun. The point we are making is that Reality is not simply a matter of sensuous experience. Thought or conception is intimately tied up with our perception of Reality. As Kant explained, intuitions (perceptions) without conceptions are blind (indeterminate) and conceptions without intuitions are empty. Reality is a composite unity of both. (shrink)

Hegel considers the Concept (in German Begriffe) to be a spiritual entity - the soul, if you will, of a thing. Looked at in another way it may be considered (although not precisely) like the essence of a thing. It is what makes the thing whatever it is. Thus if we took the Concept of a room (let’s say “roomness”) away from a thing we would no longer have a room but something else. In this sense the Concept is essential (...) to the being of anything. As soon as we determine “what” a thing is we are involved with its Concept. The Concept is the “whatness” of things. (shrink)

Niels Bohr gave us the model of the atom as having a central nucleus around which electrons were circulating in stable orbits. He also gave us the complementarity principle that states that the mutually exclusive wave and corpuscular nature of light were not merely contradictory but complementary descriptions. Field theory considers light as a continuous wave phenomenon with a wavelength and frequency, while quantum theory considers its corpuscular nature as a discrete packet of energy called a photon. Thus we actually (...) have an opposition of a continuous-discontinuous description concerning the fundamental nature of light. In line with what we have been discussing about the nature of reality as having an intrinsic polar nature, we have yet another confirmation at even the atomic level of investigation. This harks back to Kant’s “Critique of Pure Reason” where in his second antinomy he tried to show that the continuous and discontinuous descriptions of the cosmos were both possible although they were mutually exclusive of each other. Kant tried to demonstrate that this was a limitation of the way we think about the world, i.e. a defect of reason since the world is obviously content to go on as a single reality regardless of how we understand it. But we are showing here that our understanding of the world does not have to be antagonistic to it if we understand it properly. For Kant, opposites merely exclude one another. We are claiming that not only do they exclude each other but also they depend upon each other for either to exist at all. (shrink)

This paper examines the anti-psychologism of Paul Natorp, a Marburg School Neo-Kantian. It identifies both Natorp’s principle argument against psychologism and the views underlying the argument that give it its force. Natorp’s argument depends for its success on his view that certain scientific laws constitute the intersubjective content of knowledge. That view in turn depends on Natorp’s conception of subjectivity, so it is only against the background of his conception of subjectivity that his reasons for rejecting psychologism make sense. This (...) interpretation of Natorp suggests that attention paid to late nineteenth century theories of subjectivity and philosophy of psychology could improve our understanding of the emergence of anti-psychologism in that period.Keywords: Paul Natorp; Marburg School; Neo-Kantianism; Psychologism; Subjectivity. (shrink)

The relationship between 'subjective' and 'objective' features of social reality (and between 'subjectivist' and 'objectivist' sociological approaches) remains problematic within social thought. Phenomenology is often taken as a paradigmatic example of subjectivist sociology, since it supposedly places exclusive emphasis on actors' 'subjective' interpretations, thereby neglecting 'objective' social structures. In this article, we question whether phenomenology is usefully understood as falling on either side of the standard divides, arguing that phenomenology's conception of 'subjective' experience of social reality includes many features taken (...) to be 'objective' elements of it. We illustrate our argument by a critical examination of Jean Lave's attempt to differentiate social practice theory from phenomenology. We show that many theoretical positions that want to overcome the subjective—objective dualism retain an objectivist conception of the 'subjective' features of social reality. (shrink)

In this essay, I respond to Tim Lewens's proposal that realists and Strong Programme theorists can find common ground in reliabilism. I agree with Lewens, but point to difficulties in his argument. Chief among these is his assumption that reliabilism is incompatible with the Strong Programme's principle of symmetry. I argue that the two are, in fact, compatible, and that Lewens misses this fact because he wrongly supposes that reliabilism entails naturalism. The Strong Programme can fully accommodate a reliabilism which (...) has been freed from its inessential ties to naturalism. Unlike naturalistic epistemologists, the Strong Programme's sociologistic reliabilist insists that all scientific facts are the product of both natural and social causal phenomena. Anticipating objections, I draw on Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations to explain how the sociologistic reliabilist can account for standard intuitions about the objective elements of knowledge. I also explain how the Strong Programme theorist can distinguish between a belief's seeming reliable and its being reliable. (shrink)

El presente trabajo analiza al ser humano desde dos dimensiones, la persona y la libertad con el objetivo de ofrecer una idea de humanidad fundada en la construcción de la persona desde su libertad.

The article presents an interpretation of certain aspects of John Dewey’s psychological works. The interpretation aims to show that Dewey’s framework speaks directly to certain problems that the discipline of psychology faces today. In particular the reflexive problem, the fact that psychology as an array of discursive practices has served to constitute forms of human subjectivity in Western cultures. Psychology has served to produce or transform its subject-matter. It is shown first that Dewey was aware of the reflexive problem, and (...) found that it needed to be addressed. Next, three concepts of Dewey’s psychology are drawn in: subjectivity, habit and morality. Dewey is interpreted as articulating what we today would call a practice-orientated approach to psychology, in which moral and practical reasoning is seen as a dimension of all knowledge and action. Subjectivity is understood as a function emerging with complex interaction. Finally, a Deweyan approach to how psychology and other social sciences can cope with, and make positive use of, the reflexive problem, is outlined. By acknowledging their existence in the world they study, i.e. by becoming moral sciences that realize their moral and political implications, the social sciences can become problem-solving instruments that serve to help create a democratic public, a community as an actual social idea. It is pointed out that Dewey had an attractive view both of psychology – the subject-matter and of Psychology – the discipline and its practices – and ventured on the rare attempt at explicating how they are connected in what he called Great Societies, what we today would call post- or late-modernity, and how Psychology can help to constitute Great Communities in which human beings might flourish. (shrink)

The second International Knowledge and Discourse Conference, held at the University of Hong Kong in June 2002, was the forum for the long-awaited debate between Bruno Latour and Steve Fuller. Bruno Latour counts beyond two. He places the blame for the emphasis in academia on the subject-object distinction on Kant. Latour wants academics to acknowledge that things act, and suggests we look at other traditions, e.g. the Chinese, for alternatives to the subject-object dichotomy. Steve Fuller concentrated on the moral project (...) of science, which is to draw a distinction between the human and the non-human and, to highlight the fact that, as the culmination of the sciences, social science has a particular responsibility to make this distinction. He accused Bruno Latour of evading the moral issue. The debate can be read as a reiteration of the postions of Bruno Latour and Steve Fuller on the question of heterogeneity at the theoretical level, but it did not address the topic at the practical or research level. (shrink)

Romantic Naturphilosophie has been at the centre of almost every account of early nineteenth-century sciences, be it as an obstacle or as an aid for scientific advancement. The following paper suggests a change of perspective. I seek to read Naturphilosophie as one manifestation among others of a more general concern with the question of how experience enables the subject to acquire knowledge about objects. To illustrate such an approach, I focus on Johannes Muller's early work. Here one finds two contrasting (...) images of microscopical observation, its set-up, and the observer: the embryological study of 1830 demands a 'philosophical grasp' of the appearances. In contrast, the investigations of blood of 1832 are presented as a series of controlled experiments. I argue that an interpretation of this contrast in terms of an appropriation and casting aside of Naturphilosophie is not altogether convincing. Instead, both images of microscopy are manifestations of a more general problem, namely, the problem of exactly how subject and object came together in experience. I show how this concern not only shaped the methodological sensibilities particular to Muller's embryology and the investigation of bodily liquids but also provided the epistemological principles and the target for his sense-physiological experiments. It bound Muller's work together with Naturphilosophie and linked Naturphilosophie with other contemporaneous projects in philosophy. All of these enterprises sought to contribute to ongoing debates about how experience allowed the subject to acquire knowledge about the world. (shrink)

In "What is it Like to be a Bat?" Thomas Nagel argues that we cannot imagine what it is like to be a bat or presently understand how physicalism might be true. Both arguments have been seriously misunderstood. I defend them against various objections, point out a problem with the argument against physicalism, and show how the problem can be solved.

Der Artikel verfolgt, in welcher Weise Johann Gottlieb Fichte mit seiner Wissenschaftslehre die Diskussion um das Wesen der Natur in ihrem Verhältnis zum Subjekt beeinflusst. Dabei wird besonders sein Ansatz zur Fassung der Subjektivität und der Dialektisierung der Erkenntnisbeziehung zwischen Subjekt und Objekt herausgearbeitet. Dabei wird Fichtes Beitrag zur Entwicklung einer modernen dialektischen Methode gewürdigt. -/- The article follows the way in which Johann Gottlieb Fichte influences the discussion about the essence of nature in its relationship to the subject with (...) his science theory. His approach to the definition of subjectivity and the dialectization of the cognitive relationship between subject and object will be worked out in particular. Fichte's contribution to the development of a modern dialectical method is acknowledged. -/- В статье показано, как Иоганн Готлиб Фихте влияет на дискуссию о сущности природы в ее отношении к предмету своей научной теорией. В частности, вырабатывается его подход к определению субъективности и диалектизации познавательных отношений между субъектом и объектом. Признан вклад Фихте в развитие современного диалектического метода. -/- El artículo sigue la forma en que Johann Gottlieb Fichte incide en la discusión sobre la esencia de la naturaleza en su relación con el sujeto con su teoría de la ciencia. En particular, se trabaja su aproximación a la definición de subjetividad y la dialéctica de la relación cognitiva entre sujeto y objeto. Se reconoce la contribución de Fichte al desarrollo de un método dialéctico moderno. (shrink)

Conditions are set forth which, if satisfied, would provide a rational basis for believing, even in a context in which observation is theory-laden, that (1) the two theories are rivals and (2) one of them enjoys observational support that is superior to that enjoyed by the other.

Tomasello offers an evolutionary, palaeoanthropological account of the human origin of objects and objectivity. Husserl gives a phenomenological account of the constitution of objects by intersubjectivity. Comparing the two, I claim that Tomasello’s “naturalized” approach closely parallels Husserl’s transcendental approach.