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  1. added 2018-09-06
    Counterfactual Fallacies.Andrea Iacona - 2011 - Humana Mente 4 (19).
  2. added 2018-03-29
    Circularities in the Analysis of Counterfactuals.Tor Sandqvist - 2003 - Studia Logica 73 (2):281-298.
    Expanding on a discussion by Hansson, this paper treats of Goodman's and Lewis' accounts of counterfactual conditionals, comparing the senses in which these theories may be accused of circularity. While I do maintain that in this respect Lewis has an edge over Goodman, the paper's aim is not so much to reach a firm conclusion as to disentangle some previously conflated aspects of the issue. It is also suggested that the importance of avoiding circularity may vary depending on the philosophical (...)
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  3. added 2018-02-16
    An Indexical Theory of Conditionals.Ken Warmbrod - 1981 - Dialogue 20 (4):644-664.
    Language theorists have recently come to have an increasing appreciation for the fact that context contributes heavily in determining our interpretation of what is said. Indeed, it now seems clear that no complete understanding of a natural language is possible without some account of the way in which context affects our interpretation of discourse. In this paper, I will attempt to explore one facet of the language – context relationship, namely, the relation between conditionals and context. The first part of (...)
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  4. added 2017-12-25
    The Necessity of Mathematics.Juhani Yli‐Vakkuri & John Hawthorne - 2018 - Noûs 52.
    Some have argued for a division of epistemic labor in which mathematicians supply truths and philosophers supply their necessity. We argue that this is wrong: mathematics is committed to its own necessity. Counterfactuals play a starring role.
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  5. added 2017-11-08
    On Counterfactual Reasoning.Carl Erik Kühl - manuscript
    Counterfactual reasoning has always played a role in human life. We ask questions like, “Could it have been different?”, “Under which conditions might/would it have been different?”, “What would have happened if…?” If we don’t find an answer, i.e. what we accept as an answer, we may start reasoning. Reasoning means introducing still new information/assumptions, new questions, new answers to new questions etc. From a formal point of view, it may be compared with stepwise moving towards a destination in a (...)
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  6. added 2017-06-09
    Counterfactual Skepticism and Multidimensional Semantics.H. Orri Stefánsson - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (5):875-898.
    It has recently been argued that indeterminacy and indeterminism make most ordinary counterfactuals false. I argue that a plausible way to avoid such counterfactual skepticism is to postulate the existence of primitive modal facts that serve as truth-makers for counterfactual claims. Moreover, I defend a new theory of ‘might’ counterfactuals, and develop assertability and knowledge criteria to suit such unobservable ‘counterfacts’.
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  7. added 2017-06-04
    In Defense of Brogaard-Salerno Stricture.Matheus Silva - forthcoming - The Reasoner 11 (7).
    Brogaard and Salerno (2008) argued that counter-examples to contraposition, strengthening the antecedent, and hypothetical syllogism involving subjunctive conditionals only seem to work because they involve a contextual fallacy where the context assumed in the premise(s) is illicitly shifted in the conclusion. To avoid such counter-examples they have proposed that the context must remain fixed when evaluating an argument for validity. That is the Brogaard-Salerno Stricture. Tristan Haze (2016), however, has recently objected that intuitively valid argumentative forms such as conjunction introduction (...)
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  8. added 2017-05-12
    Was Quine Right About Subjunctive Conditionals?Adam Rieger - 2017 - The Monist 100 (2):180-193.
    Given his hostility to intensional locutions, it is not surprising that Quine was suspicious of the subjunctive conditional. Although he admitted its usefulness as a heuristic device, in order to introduce dispositional terms, he held that it had no place in a finished scientific theory. In this paper I argue in support of something like Quine’s position. Many contemporary philosophers are unreflectively realist about subjunctives, regarding them as having objective truth values. I contest this. “Moderate realist” theorists, such as Lewis (...)
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  9. added 2017-03-30
    The Asymmetry of Counterfactual Dependence.Christian Loew - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (3):436-455.
    A certain type of counterfactual is thought to be intimately related to causation, control, and explanation. The time asymmetry of these phenomena therefore plausibly arises from a time asymmetry of counterfactual dependence. But why is counterfactual dependence time asymmetric? The most influential account of the time asymmetry of counterfactual dependence is David Albert’s account, which posits a new, time-asymmetric fundamental physical law, the so-called “past hypothesis.” Albert argues that the time asymmetry of counterfactual dependence arises from holding fixed the past (...)
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  10. added 2017-03-23
    Counterfactual Antecedent Falsity and the Epistemic Sensitivity of Counterfactuals.Brian Leahy - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):45-69.
    Why do utterances of counterfactual conditionals typically, but not universally, convey the message that their antecedents are false? I demonstrate that two common theoretical commitments–commitment to the existence of scalar implicature and of informative presupposition—can be supplemented with an independently motivated theory of the presuppositions of competing conditional alternatives to jointly predict this information when and only when it appears. The view works best if indicative and counterfactual conditionals have a closely related semantics, so I conclude by undermining two familiar (...)
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  11. added 2017-02-15
    Counterfactuals and Causal Relevance.Igal Kvart - 1991 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72 (4):314-337.
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  12. added 2017-02-14
    Counterfactual Thinking.Sarah R. Beck, KevinJ Riggs & Patrick Burns - 2011 - In Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Sarah R. Beck (eds.), Understanding Counterfactuals, Understanding Causation. Oxford University Press. pp. 110.
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  13. added 2017-02-14
    Causal Asymmetry, Counterfactual Decisions and Entropy.Mathias Frisch - 2006 - In Borchert (ed.), Philosophy of Science. Macmillan. pp. 72--5.
  14. added 2017-02-13
    About Þ Belief Þ Counterfactual.J. Perner - 2000 - In P. Mitchell & Kevin J. Riggs (eds.), Children's Reasoning and the Mind. Psychology Press/Taylor & Francis. pp. 367--400.
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  15. added 2017-02-11
    A Probabilistic Semantics for Counterfactuals. Part B.Hannes Leitgeb - 2012 - Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (1):85-121.
    This is part B of a paper in which we defend a semantics for counterfactuals which is probabilistic in the sense that the truth condition for counterfactuals refers to a probability measure. Because of its probabilistic nature, it allows a counterfactual to be true even in the presence of relevant -worlds, as long such exceptions are not too widely spread. The semantics is made precise and studied in different versions which are related to each other by representation theorems. Despite its (...)
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  16. added 2017-02-11
    Thinking Developmentally About Counterfactual Possibilities.Kevin J. Riggs & Sarah R. Beck - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):463-463.
    Byrne implies that working memory development underpins children's ability to represent counterfactuals as possibilities at 3 to 4 years of age. Recent findings suggest that (1) developments in the ability to consider alternatives to reality in children of this age are underpinned by improvements in inhibitory control, not working memory, and (2) children do not develop an understanding of counterfactuals as possibilities until mid-childhood.
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  17. added 2017-02-11
    Precis of the Rational Imagination: How People Create Alternatives to Reality.Ruth Mj Byrne - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5):439-452.
    The human imagination remains one of the last uncharted terrains of the mind. People often imagine how events might have turned out something had been different. The of reality, those aspects more readily changed, indicate that counterfactual thoughts are guided by the same principles as rational thoughts. In the past, rationality and imagination have been viewed as opposites. But research has shown that rational thought is more imaginative than cognitive scientists had supposed. In The Rational Imagination, I argue that imaginative (...)
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  18. added 2017-02-11
    Professor Halberstadt on Counterfactual Conditionals and Modality.J. De Greef - 1973 - International Logic Review 7:126.
    Following halberstadt ("int. log. rev." 1970, i) a counterfactual may be meaningless, the antecedent being syntactically faulty. the author thinks this to be pointless, since indicative and subjunctive mood may, in certain cases, present no apparent difference. halberstadt does not distinguish between subjunctive and counterfactual conditionals. the author thinks that this distinction is needed, and proposes a time factor as distinctive factor. so, the counterfactual 'i a had been the case, b would have happened' is expressible as 'if, at time (...)
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  19. added 2017-02-09
    Transformations of the Subjunctive.Karsten Harries - 1980 - Thought: Fordham University Quarterly 55 (3):283-294.
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  20. added 2017-02-09
    Obligation as Expressed by the Subjunctive.H. C. Nutting - 1899 - The Classical Review 13 (01):32-34.
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  21. added 2017-02-09
    A Negleoted Use of the Latin Subjunctive.H. C. Elmer - 1898 - The Classical Review 12 (04):199-205.
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  22. added 2017-02-09
    The Prospective Subjunctive and Optative.J. Donovan - 1894 - The Classical Review 8 (04):145-.
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  23. added 2017-02-09
    The Prospective Subjunctive.E. A. Sonnenschein - 1893 - The Classical Review 7 (1-2):7-11.
  24. added 2017-02-09
    The 'Prospective Subjunctive.'.W. R. Inge - 1893 - The Classical Review 7 (04):148-149.
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  25. added 2017-02-08
    Finding Meaning From Mutability: Making Sense and Deriving Significance Through Counterfactual Thinking.D. Galinsky Adam, A. Liljenquist Katie, L. Kray Laura & J. Roese Neal - 2005 - In David R. Mandel, Denis J. Hilton & Patrizia Catellani (eds.), The Psychology of Counterfactual Thinking. Routledge.
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  26. added 2017-02-08
    When a Small Difference Makes a Big Difference: Counterfactual Thinking and Luck.Karl Halvor Teigen - 2005 - In David R. Mandel, Denis J. Hilton & Patrizia Catellani (eds.), The Psychology of Counterfactual Thinking. Routledge.
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  27. added 2017-02-07
    Is Reasoning From Counterfactual Antecedents Evidence for Counterfactual Reasoning?Josef Perner & Eva Rafetseder - 2010 - Thinking and Reasoning 16 (2):131-155.
    In most developmental studies the only error children could make on counterfactual tasks was to answer with the current state of affairs. It was concluded that children who did not show this error are able to reason counterfactually. However, children might have avoided this error by using basic conditional reasoning (Rafetseder, Cristi-Vargas, & Perner, 2010). Basic conditional reasoning takes background assumptions represented as conditionals about how the world works. If an antecedent of one of these conditionals is provided by the (...)
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  28. added 2017-02-02
    Effect of Counterfactual and Factual Thinking on Causal Judgements.David R. Mandel - 2003 - Thinking and Reasoning 9 (3):245 – 265.
    The significance of counterfactual thinking in the causal judgement process has been emphasized for nearly two decades, yet no previous research has directly compared the relative effect of thinking counterfactually versus factually on causal judgement. Three experiments examined this comparison by manipulating the task frame used to focus participants' thinking about a target event. Prior to making judgements about causality, preventability, blame, and control, participants were directed to think about a target actor either in counterfactual terms (what the actor could (...)
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  29. added 2017-01-27
    The Effect of Controllability and Causality on Counterfactual Thinking.Caren A. Frosch, Suzanne M. Egan & Emily N. Hancock - 2015 - Thinking and Reasoning 21 (3):317-340.
    Previous research on counterfactual thoughts about prevention suggests that people tend to focus on enabling rather than causing events and controllable rather than uncontrollable events. Two experiments explore whether counterfactual thinking about enablers is distinct from counterfactual thinking about controllable events. We presented participants with scenarios in which a cause and an enabler contributed to a negative outcome. We systematically manipulated the controllability of the cause and the enabler and asked participants to generate counterfactuals. The results indicate that when only (...)
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  30. added 2017-01-25
    Counterfactuals and Tracking – A Reply to Smith.Lars Bo Gundersen - 2005 - SATS 6 (2):172-186.
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  31. added 2017-01-24
    Beyond Rationality: Counterfactual Thinking and Behavior Regulation.Kai Epstude & Neal J. Roese - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):457-458.
    Counterfactual thinking may be described as disciplined, realistic, and rational, but we move a step further to describe a theoretical perspective centering on behavior regulation. According to this perspective, counterfactual thinking primarily centers on coordination of ongoing behavior. In short, most thoughts in daily life center on the acquisition of goals; hence, counterfactual thinking may be illuminated by considering the large literature on goal cognition.
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  32. added 2017-01-24
    What We Imagine Versus How We Imagine, and a Problem for Explaining Counterfactual Thoughts with Causal Ones.Winston Chang Herrmann - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):455-456.
    Causal and counterfactual thoughts are bound together in Byrne's theory of human imagination. We think there are two issues in her theory that deserve clarification. First, Byrne describes which counterfactual possibilities we think of, but she leaves unexplained the mechanisms by which we generate these possibilities. Second, her exploration of and enablers gives two different predictions of which counterfactuals we think of in causal scenarios. On one account, we think of the counterfactuals which we have control over. On the other, (...)
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  33. added 2017-01-24
    Counterfactuals Need Not Be Comparative: The Case of “As If”.Keith D. Markman & Matthew N. McMullen - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):461-462.
    Byrne (2005) assumes that counterfactual thinking requires a comparison of facts with an imagined alternative. In our view, however, this assumption is unnecessarily restrictive. We argue that individuals do not necessarily engage in counterfactual simulations exclusively to evaluate factual reality. Instead, comparative evaluation is often suspended in favor of experiencing the counterfactual simulation as if it were real.
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  34. added 2017-01-23
    Should the May-Potential Use of the Subjunctive Be Recognized in Latin ?H. C. Elmer - 1900 - The Classical Review 14 (04):219-222.
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  35. added 2017-01-22
    Counterfactual Thoughts About Experienced, Observed, and Narrated Events.Stefania Pighin, Ruth M. J. Byrne, Donatella Ferrante, Michel Gonzalez & Vittorio Girotto - 2011 - Thinking and Reasoning 17 (2):197 - 211.
    Four studies show that observers and readers imagine different alternatives to reality. When participants read a story about a protagonist who chose the more difficult of two tasks and failed, their counterfactual thoughts focused on the easier, unchosen task. But when they observed the performance of an individual who chose and failed the more difficult task, participants' counterfactual thoughts focused on alternative ways to solve the chosen task, as did the thoughts of individuals who acted out the event. We conclude (...)
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  36. added 2017-01-22
    Law Statements and Counterfactual Inference.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1954 - Analysis 15 (5):97 - 105.
  37. added 2017-01-21
    Going to the Other Extreme: Counterfactual Thinking Leads to Polarised Judgements.Jens Andreas Terum, Alf Børre Kanten & Karl Halvor Teigen - 2011 - Thinking and Reasoning 17 (1):1-29.
  38. added 2017-01-21
    Entropy and Counterfactual Asymmetry.Douglas Neil Kutach - 2001 - Dissertation, Rutgers the State University of New Jersey - New Brunswick
    I assess the thesis that counterfactual asymmetries are explained by an asymmetry of the global entropy at the temporal boundaries of the universe by developing a new semantic element for counterfactuals called objective assertibility and a method of evaluating counterfactuals that constrains consideration to possibilities where the early universe has low entropy. The resulting theory vindicates the common practice of holding the past mostly fixed under counterfactual supposition while at the same time allowing the counterfactual's antecedent to obtain by a (...)
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  39. added 2017-01-16
    Causal Chains and Counterfactual.William K. Goosens - 1979 - Journal of Philosophy 76 (9):489-495.
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  40. added 2017-01-15
    Goodman and Parry on Counterfactuals.Oswaldo Chateaubriand Filho - 2012 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 15 (3).
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  41. added 2016-12-08
    The Metaphysical Consequences of Counterfactual Skepticism.Nina Emery - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):399-432.
    A series of recent arguments purport to show that most counterfactuals of the form if A had happened then C would have happened are not true. These arguments pose a challenge to those of us who think that counterfactual discourse is a useful part of ordinary conversation, of philosophical reasoning, and of scientific inquiry. Either we find a way to revise the semantics for counterfactuals in order to avoid these arguments, or we find a way to ensure that the relevant (...)
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  42. added 2016-12-08
    Comparative World Similarity and What is Held Fixed in Counterfactuals.C. B. Cross - 2011 - Analysis 71 (1):91-96.
    Berit Brogaard and Joe Salerno (Counterfactuals and Context, ANALYSIS 68 (2008): 39-46) argue that the standard Stalnaker-Lewis counterexamples to hypothetical syllogism, strengthening the antecedent, and contraposition trade on a failure to hold fixed the context in which truth values are determined for the premises and conclusion in each counterexample. I argue that no contextual fallacy is committed in the standard counterexamples, and I offer a different view of what it is for a fact to be held fixed by a counterfactual (...)
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  43. added 2016-12-08
    Counterfactuals and Epistemic Probability.R. Otte - 2006 - Synthese 152 (1):81-93.
    Philosophers have often attempted to use counterfactual conditionals to analyze probability. This article focuses on counterfactual analyzes of epistemic probability by Alvin Plantinga and Peter van Inwagen. I argue that a certain type of counterfactual situation creates problems for these analyses. I then argue that Plantinga's intuition about the role of warrant in epistemic probability is mistaken. Both van Inwagen's and Plantinga's intuitions about epistemic probability are flawed.
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  44. added 2016-12-08
    Counterfactuals as Short Stories.Seahwa Kim & Cei Maslen - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 129 (1):81-117.
  45. added 2016-12-05
    Dispositions All the Way Round.R. Holton - 1999 - Analysis 59 (1):9-14.
    Simon Blackburn has argued that science finds only dispositional properties. If true, this is surprising: we think of the world as containing categorical properties too. But Blackburn thinks that our difficulties go further than this: that the idea of a world containing just dispositional properties is not simply surprising, but incoherent. The problem is made clear, he argues, when we have a counterfactual analysis of dispositions, and then understand counterfactuals in terms of possible worlds.
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  46. added 2016-11-10
    Might/Would Duality and The Probabilities of Counterfactuals.Michael J. Shaffer - 2018 - Logique and Analyse 242:119-124.
    In this paper it is shown that Lewis' MWD (might/would duality) and imaging principles lead to wildly implausible probability assignments for would counterfactuals.
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  47. added 2016-03-31
    Out of the Closet.A. Ahmed - 2011 - Analysis 71 (1):77-85.
  48. added 2016-03-12
    Suppose, Suppose.Adam Morton - 1993 - Analysis 53 (1):61 - 64.
    I give reasons stemming from the nature of narrative thinking why two-antecedent conditionals, most naturally expressed as "Suppose A. Suppose moreover B. Then C" the two antecedents play different roles. I formalise this idea with a two-dimensional similarity relation between possible worlds.
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  49. added 2016-03-11
    Indicative Versus Subjunctive in Future Conditionals.A. Morton - 2004 - Analysis 64 (4):289-293.
    I give cases where the contrast between "if Shakespeare had not written Hamlet someone else would have" and "if Shakespeare did not write Hamlet and someone else did"is found in future tense sentences. This is often denied.
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  50. added 2016-03-06
    Against the Brogaard-Salerno Stricture.Tristan Haze - 2016 - The Reasoner 10 (4):29-30.
    'It is widely agreed that contraposition, strengthening the antecedent and hypothetical syllogism fail for subjunctive conditionals', write Brogaard and Salerno in (2008: Counterfactuals and context, Analysis 68.1, 39–46). In that article they argue that the putative counterexamples to these principles are actually no threat, on the grounds that they involve a certain kind of illicit contextual shift. -/- Here I argue that this particular kind of contextual shift, if it is properly so called, is not generally illicit, and that therefore (...)
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