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  1. Finding Meaning From Mutability: Making Sense and Deriving Significance Through Counterfactual Thinking.D. Galinsky Adam, A. Liljenquist Katie, L. Kray Laura & J. Roese Neal - 2005 - In David R. Mandel, Denis J. Hilton & Patrizia Catellani (eds.), The Psychology of Counterfactual Thinking. Routledge.
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  2. Remarks on Wishes and Counterfactuals.Ernest W. Adams - 1998 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (3):191–196.
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  3. Out of the Closet.A. Ahmed - 2011 - Analysis 71 (1):77-85.
  4. Symposium: Subjunctive Conditionals.Peter Alexander & Mary Hesse - 1962 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 36:185 - 214.
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  5. The Pragmatist's Troubles With Bivalence and Counterfactuals.Sean Allen-Hermanson - 2001 - Dialogue 40 (4):669-90.
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  6. Counterfactuals, Correlatives, and Disjunction.Luis Alonso-Ovalle - 2009 - Linguistics and Philosophy 32 (2):207-244.
    The natural interpretation of counterfactuals with disjunctive antecedents involves selecting from each of the disjuncts the worlds that come closest to the world of evaluation. It has been long noticed that capturing this interpretation poses a problem for a minimal change semantics for counterfactuals, because selecting the closest worlds from each disjunct requires accessing the denotation of the disjuncts from the denotation of the disjunctive antecedent, which the standard boolean analysis of or does not allow (Creary and Hill, Philosophy of (...)
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  7. A Note on Subjunctive and Counterfactual Conditionals.Alan Ross Anderson - 1951 - Analysis 12 (2):35 - 38.
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  8. On Similarity in Counterfactuals.Ana Arregui - 2009 - Linguistics and Philosophy 32 (3):245-278.
    This paper investigates the interpretation of counterfactual conditionals. The main goal of the paper is to provide an account of the semantic role of similarity in the evaluation of counterfactuals. The paper proposes an analysis according to which counterfactuals are treated as predications “ de re ” over past situations in the actual world. The relevant situations enter semantic composition via the interpretation of tense. Counterfactuals are treated as law-like conditionals with de re predication over particular facts. Similarity with respect (...)
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  9. Were, Would, Might and a Compositional Account of Counterfactuals.N. Asher & E. McCready - 2007 - Journal of Semantics 24 (2):93-129.
    This paper has two purposes. We first give a new dynamic account of epistemic modal operators that account for both their test-like behaviour with respect to whole information states and their capacity to induce quantificational dependencies across worlds (modal subordination). We then use this theory, together with an analysis of conditionals and irrealis moods, to give a fully compositional semantics of indicative and counterfactual conditionals. In our analysis, the distinction between counterfactual and indicative conditionals follows directly from the interaction between (...)
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  10. Counterfactuals and Subjunctive Conditionals.M. R. Ayers - 1965 - Mind 74 (295):347-364.
    The author maintains that there is no special problem about the verification or analysis of counterfactual or unfulfilled conditional statements. there is no special problem about the verification or analysis of subjunctive conditionals. it exhausts the peculiar philosophical interest of these two classes of statement to explain why no philosopher ought to think them peculiarly interesting, and to explain why so many do. the author states that it should not be supposed that if he achieves his aim, all the difficulties (...)
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  11. The Subjunctive Conditional as Relevant Implication.John Bacon - 1971 - Philosophia 1 (1-2):61-80.
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  12. Counterfactuals, Probabilistic Counterfactuals and Causation.S. Barker - 1999 - Mind 108 (431):427-469.
    It seems to be generally accepted that (a) counterfactual conditionals are to be analysed in terms of possible worlds and inter-world relations of similarity and (b) causation is conceptually prior to counterfactuals. I argue here that both (a) and (b) are false. The argument against (a) is not a general metaphysical or epistemological one but simply that, structurally speaking, possible worlds theories are wrong: this is revealed when we try to extend them to cover the case of probabilistic counterfactuals. Indeed (...)
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  13. Can Counterfactuals Really Be About Possible Worlds?Stephen Barker - 2011 - Noûs 45 (3):557-576.
    The standard view about counterfactuals is that a counterfactual (A > C) is true if and only if the A-worlds most similar to the actual world @ are C-worlds. I argue that the worlds conception of counterfactuals is wrong. I assume that counterfactuals have non-trivial truth-values under physical determinism. I show that the possible-worlds approach cannot explain many embeddings of the form (P > (Q > R)), which intuitively are perfectly assertable, and which must be true if the contingent falsity (...)
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  14. Even, Still and Counterfactuals.Stephen Barker - 1991 - Linguistics and Philosophy 14 (1):1 - 38.
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  15. Counterfactual Entailment.David Barnett - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (1pt1):73-97.
    Counterfactual Entailment is the view that a counterfactual conditional is true just in case its antecedent entails its consequent. I present an argument for Counterfactual Entailment, and I develop a strategy for explaining away apparent counterexamples to the view. The strategy appeals to the suppositional view of counterfactuals, on which a counterfactual is essentially a statement, made relative to the supposition of its antecedent, of its consequent.
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  16. Zif Would Have Been If: A Suppositional View of Counterfactuals.David Barnett - 2010 - Noûs 44 (2):269-304.
    Let us call a statement of the form ‘If A was, is, or will be the case, then C was, is, or will be the case’ an indicative conditional. And let us call a statement of the form ‘If A had been, were, or were to be the case, then C would have been, would be, or would come to be the case’ a subjunctive, or counterfactual, conditional.
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  17. The Myth of the Categorical Counterfactual.David Barnett - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (2):281 - 296.
    I aim to show that standard theories of counterfactuals are mistaken, not in detail, but in principle, and I aim to say what form a tenable theory must take. Standard theories entail a categorical interpretation of counterfactuals, on which to state that, if it were that A, it would be that C is to state something, not relative to any supposition or hypothesis, but categorically. On the rival suppositional interpretation, to state that, if it were that A, it would be (...)
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  18. "Non-Accidental" and Counterfactual Sentences.Elizabeth Lane Beardsley - 1949 - Journal of Philosophy 46 (18):573-591.
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  19. Counterfactual Thinking.Sarah R. Beck, KevinJ Riggs & Patrick Burns - 2011 - In Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Sarah R. Beck (eds.), Understanding Counterfactuals, Understanding Causation. Oxford University Press. pp. 110.
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  20. Counterfactuals and Temporal Direction.Jonathan Bennett - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (1):57-91.
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  21. Counterfactuals And Possible Worlds.Jonathan Bennett - 1974 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (December):381-402.
  22. How to Evaluate Counterfactuals in the Quantum World.Tomasz Bigaj - 2013 - Synthese 190 (4):619-637.
    In the article I discuss possible amendments and corrections to Lewis’s semantics for counterfactuals that are necessary in order to account for the indeterministic and non-local character of the quantum world. I argue that Lewis’s criteria of similarity between possible worlds produce incorrect valuations for alternate-outcome counterfactuals in the EPR case. Later I discuss an alternative semantics which rejects the notion of miraculous events and relies entirely on the comparison of the agreement with respect to individual facts. However, a controversy (...)
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  23. Subjunctive Reasoning.John Bigelow - 1980 - Linguistics and Philosophy 4 (1):129-139.
    Subjunctives have always posed a severe threat to truth-conditional semantics and the correspondence theory of truth. If we are ever forced to fall into some sort of coherence theory of truth, then the problem of subjunctives is very likely to be the first thing which makes this plain. It is instructive to work through the details of Pollock's very thorough working-out of a kind of coherence theory for subjunctives.I find Pollock's book a kind of cautionary tale for coherence theorists. The (...)
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  24. Conditionals as Attitude Reports.Maria Bittner - manuscript
    Most theories of conditionals and attitudes do not analyze either phenomenon in terms of the other. A few view attitude reports as a species of conditionals (e.g. Stalnaker 1984, Heim 1992). Based on evidence from Kalaallisut, this paper argues for the opposite thesis: conditionals are a species of attitude reports. The argument builds on prior findings that conditionals are modal topic-comment structures (e.g. Haiman 1978, Bittner 2001), and that in mood-based Kalaallisut English future (e.g. Ole will win) translates into a (...)
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  25. A Metalinguistic Interpretation of Counterfactual Conditionals.N. A. Blue - 1981 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 10 (2):179 - 200.
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  26. Sequential Counterfactuals, Cotenability and Temporal Becoming.Luc Bovens - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 90 (1):79-101.
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  27. Interventionist Counterfactuals.Rachael Briggs - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (1):139-166.
    A number of recent authors (Galles and Pearl, Found Sci 3 (1):151–182, 1998; Hiddleston, Noûs 39 (4):232–257, 2005; Halpern, J Artif Intell Res 12:317–337, 2000) advocate a causal modeling semantics for counterfactuals. But the precise logical significance of the causal modeling semantics remains murky. Particularly important, yet particularly under-explored, is its relationship to the similarity-based semantics for counterfactuals developed by Lewis (Counterfactuals. Harvard University Press, 1973b). The causal modeling semantics is both an account of the truth conditions of counterfactuals, and (...)
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  28. Counterfactual Conditionals.Robert Brown & John Watling - 1952 - Mind 61 (242):222-233.
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  29. Causal Preemption and Counterfactuals.Martin Bunzl - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 37 (2):115 - 124.
  30. Precis of the Rational Imagination: How People Create Alternatives to Reality.Ruth Mj Byrne - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5):439-452.
    The human imagination remains one of the last uncharted terrains of the mind. People often imagine how events might have turned out something had been different. The of reality, those aspects more readily changed, indicate that counterfactual thoughts are guided by the same principles as rational thoughts. In the past, rationality and imagination have been viewed as opposites. But research has shown that rational thought is more imaginative than cognitive scientists had supposed. In The Rational Imagination, I argue that imaginative (...)
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  31. Boundary in Context.John W. Carroll - 2005 - Acta Analytica 20 (1):43-54.
    A contextualist account of modal assertions is sketched that makes their truth sensitive to the presuppositions of the conversation. Support for the account is mustered by considering its application to the context-sensitivity of assertions of subjunctive conditional sentences, explanation sentences, and knowledge sentences.
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  32. When the Social Context Frames the Case: Counterfactuals in the Courtroom.Patrizia Catellani & Patrizia Milesi - 2005 - In David R. Mandel, Denis J. Hilton & Patrizia Catellani (eds.), The Psychology of Counterfactual Thinking. Routledge.
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  33. The Tyranny of the Subjunctive.David J. Chalmers - manuscript
    (1a) If Prince Albert Victor killed those people, he is Jack the Ripper (and Jack the Ripper killed those people). (1b) If Prince Albert Victor had killed those people, Jack the Ripper wouldn't have (and Prince Albert wouldn't have been Jack the Ripper).
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  34. Counterfactuals in Science and Engineering.Sanjay Chandrasekharan & Nancy J. Nersessian - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):454-455.
    The notion of mutation is applicable to the generation of novel designs and solutions in engineering and science. This suggests that engineers and scientists have to work against the biases identified in counterfactual thinking. Therefore, imagination appears a lot less rational than claimed in the target article.
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  35. Goodman and Parry on Counterfactuals.Oswaldo Chateaubriand Filho - 2012 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 15 (3).
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  36. Law Statements and Counterfactual Inference.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1954 - Analysis 15 (5):97 - 105.
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  37. The Contrary-to-Fact Conditional.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1946 - Mind 55 (220):289-307.
  38. Safety and the True–True Problem.Jon Cogburn & Jeffrey W. Roland - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (2):246-267.
    Standard accounts of semantics for counterfactuals confront the true–true problem: when the antecedent and consequent of a counterfactual are both actually true, the counterfactual is automatically true. This problem presents a challenge to safety-based accounts of knowledge. In this paper, drawing on work by Angelika Kratzer, Alan Penczek, and Duncan Pritchard, we propose a revised understanding of semantics for counterfactuals utilizing machinery from generalized quantifier theory which enables safety theorists to meet the challenge of the true–true problem.
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  39. A Relation of Counterfactual Conditionals to Statements of What Makes Sense.Jonathan Cohen - 1954 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 55:45 - 82.
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  40. Counterfactuals and the Applications of Mathematics.Stuart Cornwell - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 66 (1):73 - 87.
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  41. Counterfactuals for Free.Richard Creath - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 57 (1):95 - 101.
    Quine does not like counterfactuals. He thinks them unclear, and so he eschews them. It is enough, he thinks, for science to say of what it is that it is and that it is all that is. There is no need to say of what is not that it is not, or even worse, to say of what is not what it would be if ...
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  42. Comparative World Similarity and What is Held Fixed in Counterfactuals.C. B. Cross - 2011 - Analysis 71 (1):91-96.
    Berit Brogaard and Joe Salerno (Counterfactuals and Context, ANALYSIS 68 (2008): 39-46) argue that the standard Stalnaker-Lewis counterexamples to hypothetical syllogism, strengthening the antecedent, and contraposition trade on a failure to hold fixed the context in which truth values are determined for the premises and conclusion in each counterexample. I argue that no contextual fallacy is committed in the standard counterexamples, and I offer a different view of what it is for a fact to be held fixed by a counterfactual (...)
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  43. Embedded Counterfactuals and Possible Worlds Semantics.Charles B. Cross - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):665-673.
    Stephen Barker argues that a possible worlds semantics for the counterfactual conditional of the sort proposed by Stalnaker and Lewis cannot accommodate certain examples in which determinism is true and a counterfactual Q > R is false, but where, for some P, the compound counterfactual P > is true. I argue that the completeness theorem for Lewis’s system VC of counterfactual logic shows that Stalnaker–Lewis semantics does accommodate Barker’s example, and I argue that its doing so should be understood as (...)
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  44. On Subjunctive Conditionals.J. C. D'Alessio - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (10):306-310.
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  45. An Analysis of the Subjunctive Conditional.Charles B. Daniels & James B. Freeman - 1980 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 21 (4):639-655.
  46. Professor Halberstadt on Counterfactual Conditionals and Modality.J. De Greef - 1973 - International Logic Review 7:126.
    Following halberstadt ("int. log. rev." 1970, i) a counterfactual may be meaningless, the antecedent being syntactically faulty. the author thinks this to be pointless, since indicative and subjunctive mood may, in certain cases, present no apparent difference. halberstadt does not distinguish between subjunctive and counterfactual conditionals. the author thinks that this distinction is needed, and proposes a time factor as distinctive factor. so, the counterfactual 'i a had been the case, b would have happened' is expressible as 'if, at time (...)
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  47. Mr. Goodman on Relevant Conditions and the Counterfactual.Cora Diamond - 1959 - Philosophical Studies 10 (3):42 - 45.
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  48. Counterfactual Conditionals.B. J. Diggs - 1952 - Mind 61 (244):513-527.
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  49. Similarity and Cotenability.Vladan Djordjevic - 2013 - Synthese 190 (4):681-691.
    In this paper I present some difficulties for Lewis’s and similar theories of counterfactuals, and suggest that the problem lies in the notion of absolute similarity. In order to explain the problem, I discuss the relation between Lewis’s and Goodman’s theory, and show that the two theories are not related in the way Lewis thought they were.
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  50. Goodman's Only World.Vladan Djordjevic - 2012 - In Majda Trobok, Nenad Miscevic & Berislav Zarnic (eds.), Between Logic and Reality: Modeling Inference, Action and Understanding. Springer. pp. 269.
    An incorrect interpretation of Goodman’s theory of counterfactuals is persistently being offered in the literature. I find that strange. Even more so since the incorrectness is rather obvious. In this paper I try to figure out why is that happening. First I try to explain what Goodman did say, which of his claims are ignored, and what he did not say but is sometimes ascribed to him. I emphasize one of the bad features of the interpretation: it gives counterfactuals some (...)
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