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  1. added 2019-12-03
    Ramsification and the Ramifications of Prior's Puzzle.Justin D'Ambrosio - manuscript
    Ramsification is a well-known method of defining theoretical terms that figures centrally in a wide range of debates in metaphysics. Prior's puzzle is the puzzle of why, given the assumption that that-clauses denote propositions, substitution of "the proposition that P" for "that P" within the complements of many propositional attitude verbs sometimes fails to preserve truth, and other times fails to preserve grammaticality. On the surface, Ramsification and Prior's puzzle appear to have little to do with each other. But Prior's (...)
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  2. added 2019-11-12
    How I Really Say What You Think.José Manuel Viejo - forthcoming - Axiomathes:1-27.
    The apparently obviously true doctrine of opacity has been thought to be inconsistent with two others, to which many philosophers of language are also attracted: the referentialist account of the semantics of proper names and indexicals, on the one hand, and the principle of semantic innocence, on the other. I discuss here one of the most popular strategies for resolving the apparent inconsistency, namely Mark Richard’s theory of belief ascriptions, and raise three problems for it. Finally, I propose an alternative (...)
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  3. added 2019-10-25
    Prior's Puzzle Generalized.Justin D'Ambrosio - manuscript
    Prior's puzzle is the puzzle of why, given the assumption that that-clauses denote propositions, substitution of "the proposition that P" for "that P" within the complements of many propositional attitude verbs is invalid. I show that there are two variants on Prior's puzzle---a quantificational variant and a pronominal variant---that have the same source and warrant the same solution as the original puzzle. I then show that neither the original puzzle nor its variants are specific to that-clauses or propositional attitude verbs. (...)
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  4. added 2019-08-16
    Sense and Meaning.João Branquinho - 2005 - In Cognition and Content. Lisboa, Portugal:
    This paper discusses some relations between the notion of Fregean sense and the notion of linguistic meaning. It argues that these notions come apart from one another even in the case of non-indexical expressions. In particular, synonymous non-indexical expressions may be assigned different Fregean senses with respect to certain contexts of use.
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  5. added 2019-06-06
    Substitutivity and the Coherence of Quantifying In.Graeme Forbes - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (3):337-372.
    This paper is about the cluster of issues that orbit a well-known thesis of Quine’s, as it applies to attitude ascriptions.
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  6. added 2019-02-22
    Quine’s Poor Tom.Tristan Grøtvedt Haze - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (1):5-16.
    Section 31 of Quine's Word and Object contains an eyebrow-raising argument, purporting to show that if an agent, Tom, believes one truth and one falsity and has some basic logical acumen, and if belief contexts are always transparent, then Tom believes everything. Over the decades this argument has been debated inconclusively. In this paper I clarify the situation and show that the trouble stems from bad presentation on Quine’s part.
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  7. added 2018-07-02
    Hopes, Fears, and Other Grammatical Scarecrows.Jacob M. Nebel - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (1):63-105.
    The standard view of "believes" and other propositional attitude verbs is that such verbs express relations between agents and propositions. A sentence of the form “S believes that p” is true just in case S stands in the belief-relation to the proposition that p; this proposition is the referent of the complement clause "that p." On this view, we would expect the clausal complements of propositional attitude verbs to be freely intersubstitutable with their corresponding proposition descriptions—e.g., "the proposition that p"—as (...)
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  8. added 2018-06-01
    The Principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals Requires No Restrictions.Ari Maunu - 2019 - Synthese 196 (1):239-246.
    There is a certain argument against the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals, or the thesis that whatever is true of a thing is true of anything identical with that thing. In this argument, PInI is used together with the self-evident principle of the necessity of self-identity to reach the conclusion, which is held to be paradoxical and, thus, fatal to PInI. My purpose is to show that the argument in question does not have this consequence. Further, I argue that (...)
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  9. added 2018-06-01
    On a Misguided Argument for the Necessity of Identity.Ari Maunu - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Research 43:241-248.
    There is a certain popular argument, deriving from Ruth Barcan and Saul Kripke, from the conjunction of the Principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals (PInI, for short) and the Principle of the Necessity of Self-Identity to the Thesis of the Necessity of Identity. My purpose is to show that this argument does not work, not at least in the form it is often presented. I also give a correct formulation of the argument and point out that PInI is not even (...)
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  10. added 2018-02-17
    Substitution, Simple Sentences, and Sex Scandals.Jennifer M. Saul - 1999 - Analysis 59 (2):106-112.
  11. added 2017-11-13
    Content, the Possible and the Impossible.Felappi Giulia - 2017 - Analysis 77 (3):648-658.
    What are contents? The answer provided by the possible worlds approach is that contents are sets of possible worlds. This approach incurs serious problems and to solve them Jago suggests, in The Impossible, to get rid of the ‘possible’ bit and allowing some impossible worlds to be part of the game. In this note, I briefly consider the metaphysics behind Jago’s account and then focus on whether Jago is right in thinking that his worlds and his worlds only can do (...)
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  12. added 2017-05-06
    Descriptions and Non-Doxastic Attitude Ascriptions.Wojciech Rostworowski - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (6):1311-1331.
    This paper addresses a certain objection to the quantificational theory of definite descriptions. According to this objection, the quantificational account cannot provide correct interpretations of definite descriptions embedded in the non-doxastic attitude ascriptions and therefore ought to be rejected. In brief, the objection says that the quantificational theory is committed to the view that a sentence of the form “The F is G” is equivalent to the claim that there is a unique F and it is G, while the ascription (...)
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  13. added 2017-01-26
    Disquotation and Substitutivity, Bryan Frances.Yuri Barn - 2000 - The Monist 83 (3).
  14. added 2017-01-26
    Identity and Substitutivity.Richard Cartwright - 1971 - In Milton Karl Munitz (ed.), Identity and Individuation. New York: New York University Press. pp. 119--133.
  15. added 2017-01-25
    Substitutivity.Blum Alex - 1997 - Logique Et Analyse 40:249-253.
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  16. added 2017-01-22
    A Note on the Substitutivity of Notes.G. Bar-Elli - 1980 - Analysis 41 (1):27 - 32.
  17. added 2017-01-22
    "Jonesese" and Substitutivity.A. C. Genova - 1971 - Analysis 31 (3):96 - 103.
  18. added 2017-01-22
    On Substitutivity Criteria.Donald J. Hillman - 1960 - Analysis 21 (3):54 - 58.
  19. added 2017-01-21
    Substitutivity and Side Effects.Graeme Forbes - unknown
     (e.g., Quine ), the main symptom of the unintelligibility of de re modal language is said to be the failure of coreferential “singular terms” to interchange salva veritate within the scope of modal operators. From this it is supposed to follow..
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  20. added 2017-01-19
    Saving Substitutivity in Simple Sentences.Joseph G. Moore - 1999 - Analysis 59 (2):91–105.
  21. added 2017-01-19
    How Much Substitutivity?Graeme Forbes - 1997 - Analysis 57 (2):109–113.
  22. added 2017-01-19
    Substitutivity and the Causal Connective.Terence Horgan - 1982 - Philosophical Studies 42 (1):47 - 52.
  23. added 2017-01-19
    Linsky on Substitutivity.Robert W. Beard - 1967 - Philosophical Studies 18 (1-2):17 - 19.
  24. added 2016-12-08
    Substitutivity, Obstinacy, and the Case of Giorgione.Stefano Predelli - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (1):5-21.
    In this essay, I propose an analysis of Quine’s example ’Giorgione was so-called because of his size’, grounded on the idea of an obstinate demonstrative. In the first sections, I discuss the advantages and drawbacks of the demonstrative and logophoric treatments of ‘so called’, I highlight certain parallelisms with Davidson’s paratactic view of quotation, and I introduce independent considerations in favor of the idea of an obstinate demonstrative. In the second half of my essay, I apply this notion to Quine’s (...)
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  25. added 2016-09-27
    Reply to Forbes.Jennifer M. Saul - 1997 - Analysis 57 (2):114–118.
  26. added 2016-07-18
    Semantics for Opaque Contexts.Kirk Ludwig & Greg Ray - 1998 - Philosophical Perspectives 12:141-66.
    In this paper, we outline an approach to giving extensional truth-theoretic semantics for what have traditionally been seen as opaque sentential contexts. We outline an approach to providing a compositional truth-theoretic semantics for opaque contexts which does not require quantifying over intensional entities of any kind, and meets standard objections to such accounts. The account we present aims to meet the following desiderata on a semantic theory T for opaque contexts: (D1) T can be formulated in a first-order extensional language; (...)
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  27. added 2016-05-27
    Aboutness and Substitutivity.Genoveva Marti - 1989 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 14 (1):127-139.
    The following Principle of Substitutivity holds for the former, but not for the latter sentence: (PS) The truth value of (the proposition expressed by) a sentence that contains an occurrence of t1 remains constant when t2 is substituted for t1, provided that t1 and t2 are codesignative singular terms. It is an undeniable fact that different sentences behave differently when it comes to which substitutions preserve their truth value. What is curious is that this fact has been presented by the (...)
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  28. added 2016-05-11
    Relational Belief Reports.François Recanati - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 100 (3):255-272.
  29. added 2016-05-11
    Oratio Obliqua, Oratio Recta: An Essay on Metarepresentation.Francois Recanati - 2000 - MIT Press.
    Among the entities that can be mentally or linguistically represented are mental and linguistic representations themselves. That is, we can think and talk about speech and thought. This phenomenon is known as metarepresentation. An example is "Authors believe that people read books." -/- In this book François Recanati discusses the structure of metarepresentation from a variety of perspectives. According to him, metarepresentations have a dual structure: their content includes the content of the object-representation (people reading books) as well as the (...)
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  30. added 2016-05-11
    The Iconicity of Metarepresentations.François Recanati - 2000 - In Dan Sperber (ed.), Meta-Representations: a Multidisciplinary Perspective. Oxford University Press. pp. 311-360.
  31. added 2016-05-11
    Quasi-Singular Propositions: The Semantics of Belief Reports.François Recanati & Mark Crimmins - 1995 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 69 (1):175 - 209.
  32. added 2016-01-03
    Opacity.David Kaplan - 1986 - In Lewis Edwin Hahn & Paul Arthur Schilpp (eds.), The Philosophy of W. V. Quine. Open Court. pp. 229-289.
  33. added 2015-09-06
    An Enlightenment Problem for Millianism.Tiddy Smith - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (1):173-179.
    According to a Millian theory of names, co-referring names are intersubstitutable salva veritate in all contexts, including the that-clauses of belief reports. This leads the Millian to famously argue, among other things, that if Lois Lane believes that Superman can fly then she also believes that Clark Kent can fly. Although the Millian provides an ingenious account that explains our strong anti-substitution intuitions in such cases, this paper argues that the Millian account leads to a new problem of enlightenment in (...)
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  34. added 2015-04-14
    The Four Puzzles of Reference.Bryan Frances - manuscript
  35. added 2015-04-13
    The New Leibniz's Law Arguments for Pluralism.Bryan Frances - 2006 - Mind 115 (460):1007-1022.
    For years philosophers argued for the existence of distinct yet materially coincident things by appealing to modal and temporal properties. For instance, the statue was made on Monday and could not survive being flattened; the lump of clay was made months before and can survive flattening. Such arguments have been thoroughly examined. Kit Fine has proposed a new set of arguments using the same template. I offer a critical evaluation of what I take to be his central lines of reasoning.
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  36. added 2015-04-13
    Arguing for Frege's Fundamental Principle.Bryan Frances - 1998 - Mind and Language 13 (3):341–346.
    Saul Kripke's puzzle about belief demonstrates the lack of soundness of the traditional argument for the Fregean fundamental principle that the sentences 'S believes that a is F' and 'S believes that b is F' can differ in truth value even if a = b. This principle is a crucial premise in the traditional Fregean argument for the existence of semantically relevant senses, individuative elements of beliefs that are sensitive to our varying conceptions of what the beliefs are about. Joseph (...)
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  37. added 2015-04-05
    Substitutivity.Genoveva Marti - 1989 - Dissertation, Stanford University
    This dissertation examines critically the assumptions of extensionalism and the traditional doctrine of substitutivity, according to which codesignativeness or coextensionality of terms should be a sufficient condition to guarantee intersubstitution of expression salva veritate. First, the discussion focuses on the traditional justifications of the extensionalist principles of substitutivity. The following alleged sources of support for extensionalism are examined: the claim that the extensionalist approach to substitutivity relies on fundamental principles outside the domain of semantics, like the Law of Indiscernibility of (...)
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  38. added 2015-03-28
    Quine and the Principle of Substitutivity.Dolores Miller - 1985 - Dissertation, University of Kansas
    I trace the principles known as the indiscernibility of identicals, "Leibniz's Law", and the principle of substitutivity, beginning with Aristotle, through Leibniz, Frege, and Russell, and culminating in Quine. I argue that the indiscernibility of identicals is an ontological principle and the principle of substitutivity is a linguistic principle. I discuss the relations and conflations of the principles and various attempts to defend the principle of substitutivity from apparent counter-examples, focussing on Quine's attempt to use the principle as a criterion (...)
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  39. added 2015-03-23
    Does the Principle of Substitutivity Rest on a Mistake?Ruth Barcan Marcus - 1975 - In Alan Ross Anderson, Ruth Barcan Marcus, R. M. Martin & Frederic B. Fitch (eds.), The Logical Enterprise. Yale University Press.
  40. added 2015-03-02
    Beyond Singular Propositions?Scott Soames - 1995 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):515 - 549.
    Propositional attitudes, like believing and asserting, are relations between agents and propositions. Agents are individuals who do the believing and asserting; propositions are things that are believed and asserted. Propositional attitude ascriptions are sentences that ascribe propositional attitudes to agents. For example, a propositional attitude ascription α believes, or asserts, that S is true iff the referent of a bears the relation of believing, or asserting, to the proposition expressed by s. The questions I will address have to do with (...)
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  41. added 2015-01-06
    A Pragmatic Defense of Millianism.Arvid Båve - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (2):271 - 289.
    A new kind of defense of the Millian theory of names is given, which explains intuitive counter-examples as depending on pragmatic effects of the relevant sentences, by direct application of Grice’s and Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance Theory and uncontroversial assumptions. I begin by arguing that synonyms are always intersubstitutable, despite Mates’ considerations, and then apply the method to names. Then, a fairly large sample of cases concerning names are dealt with in related ways. It is argued that the method, as (...)
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  42. added 2014-03-31
    Opacity, Belief and Analyticity.Consuelo Preti - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 66 (3):297 - 306.
    Contrary to appearances, semantic innocence can be claimed for a Fregean account of the semantics of expressions in indirect discourse. Given externalism about meaning, an expression that refers to its ordinary sense in an opaque context refers, ultimately, to its "references"; for, on this view, the reference of an expression directly determines its meaning. Externalism seems to have similar consequences for the truth-conditions of analytic sentences. If reference determines meaning, how can we distinguish a class of sentences as true in (...)
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  43. added 2014-03-30
    Defending Millian Theories.Bryan Frances - 1998 - Mind 107 (428):703-728.
    In this article I offer a three-pronged defense of Millian theories, all of which share the rough idea that all there is to a proper name is its referent, so it has no additional sense. I first give what I believe to be the first correct analysis of Kripke’s puzzle and its anti-Fregean lessons. The main lesson is that the Fregean’s arguments against Millianism and for the existence of semantically relevant senses (that is, individuative elements of propositions or belief contents (...)
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  44. added 2014-03-30
    Pragmatics and Singular Reference.Anne Bezuidenhout - 1996 - Mind and Language 11 (2):133-159.
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  45. added 2014-03-29
    Understanding Belief Reports.David Braun - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (4):555-595.
    In this paper, I defend a well-known theory of belief reports from an important objection. The theory is Russellianism, sometimes also called `neo-Russellianism', `Millianism', `the direct reference theory', `the "Fido"-Fido theory', or `the naive theory'. The objection concernssubstitution of co-referring names in belief sentences. Russellianism implies that any two belief sentences, that differ only in containing distinct co-referring names, express the same proposition (in any given context). Since `Hesperus' and `Phosphorus' both refer to the planet Venus, this view implies that (...)
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  46. added 2014-03-24
    A Problem with De Re Belief Ascriptions, with a Consequence to Substitutivity.Ari Maunu - 2002 - Philosophia 29 (1-4):411-421.
    It is shown that the coherence of de re belief ascriptions is doubtful in view of certain plausible principles. Subsequently, it is argued, the standard argument against substitutivity in de dicto ascriptions loses some of its power. Also, some possible reactions to these results are considered.
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  47. added 2014-03-22
    Believing in Words.Herman Cappelen & Josh Dever - 2001 - Synthese 127 (3):279 - 301.
    The semantic puzzles posed by propositional attitude contexts have, since Frege, been understood primarily in terms of certain substitution puzzles. We will take as paradigmatic of such substitution puzzles cases in which two coreferential proper names cannot be intersubstituted salva veritate in the context of an attitude verb. Thus, for example, the following sentences differ in truth value: (1) Lois Lane believes Superman can fly. (2) Lois Lane believes Clark Kent can fly. despite the fact that "Superman" and "Clark Kent" (...)
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  48. added 2014-03-21
    Who's Afraid of Substitutivity?Stefano Predelli - 2000 - Noûs 34 (3):455–467.
    In this paper I discuss two influential analyzes of belief reports, John Perry's and Marc Crimmins's "Contextual View," and Scott Soames's and Nathan Salmon's "Radical View". It is often alleged that the "Contextual View," unlike the "Radical View," is able to account for the apparent invalidity of arguments involving the substitution of coreferential names. I counter that the "Contextual View" and the "Radical View" are on a par with the respect to our intuitions regarding failures of substitutivity.
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  49. added 2014-03-20
    The Problem of Puzzling Pairs.Michael Nelson - 2004 - Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (3):319 - 350.
  50. added 2014-03-18
    Puzzling Pairs.Michael Nelson - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):109 - 119.
    Propositional attitude ascribing sentences seem to give rise to failures of substitution. Is this phenomena best accounted for semantically, by constructing a semantics for propositional attitude ascribing sentences that invalidates the Substitution Principle, or pragmatically? In this paper I argue against semantic accounts of such phenomena. I argue that any semantic theory that respects all our apparent substitution failure intuitions will entail that the noun-phrase position outside the scope of the attitude verb is not open to substitution salva veritate, which (...)
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