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1 — 50 / 58
  1. added 2020-06-04
    The World Just Is The Way It Is.David Builes - forthcoming - The Monist.
    What is the relationship between objects and properties? According to a standard view, there are primitive individuals (or ‘particulars’, or ‘substrata’) that ‘instantiate’ or ‘have’ various properties. According to a rival view, objects are mere ‘bundles’ of properties. While there are a number of reasons to be skeptical of primitive individuals, there are also a number of challenges that the bundle theorist faces. The goal of this paper is to formulate a view about the relationship between objects and properties that (...)
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  2. added 2020-03-06
    Plain Paritculars.Ernani Magalhaes - 2015 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 92:87-108.
    Are concrete objects in some sense made up of the properties they exemplify? A distinguished tradition holds they are. I begin by defending the distinction: there is a real and not just semantic distinction between asserting and denying that concrete objects have their properties as parts. I then argue in favor of the view that concrete objects are not made up of their parts. First, this view has less ontological baggage than its opponent. Next, the supposed advantages of the alternative (...)
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  3. added 2019-10-08
    A Bundle Theory of Words.J. T. M. Miller - 2019 - Synthese:1-18.
    It has been a common assumption that words are substances that instantiate or have properties. In this paper, I question the assumption that our ontology of words requires posting substances by outlining a bundle theory of words, wherein words are bundles of various sorts of properties (such as semantic, phonetic, orthographic, and grammatical properties). I argue that this view can better account for certain phenomena than substance theories, is ontologically more parsimonious, and coheres with claims in linguistics.
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  4. added 2019-10-03
    Strong Pluralism, Coincident Objects and Haecceitism.Karol Lenart & Artur Szachniewicz - forthcoming - Axiomathes:1-24.
    According to strong pluralism, objects distinct by virtue of their modal properties can coincide. The most common objection towards such view invokes the so-called Grounding Problem according to which the strong pluralist needs to explain what the grounds are for supposed modal differences between the coincidents. As recognized in the literature, the failure to provide an answer to the Grounding Problem critically undermines the plausibility of strong pluralism. Moreover, there are strong reasons to believe that strong pluralists cannot provide an (...)
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  5. added 2019-09-20
    Introverted Metaphysics: How We Get Our Grip on the Ultimate Nature of Objects, Properties, and Causation.Uriah Kriegel - 2019 - Metaphilosophy 50 (5):688-707.
    This paper pulls together three debates fundamental in metaphysics and proposes a novel unified approach to them. The three debates are (i) between bundle theory and substrate theory about the nature of objects, (ii) dispositionalism and categoricalism about the nature of properties, and (iii) regularity theory and production theory about the nature of causation. The first part of the paper (§§2-4) suggests that although these debates are metaphysical, the considerations motivating the competing approaches in each debate tend to be epistemological. (...)
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  6. added 2019-09-13
    Abstract and Concrete Individuals and Projection.Jiri Raclavsky - 2017 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 24 (supplementary):74-88.
    Two kinds of individuals are distinguished: abstract and concrete. Whereas abstract individuals belong to our conceptual sphere, concrete individuals (i.e. particulars) individuate the world of matter. A subject investigating the external world projects abstract individuals onto concrete ones. The proposal offers a solution to various metaphysical and epistemological puzzles concerned with individuals, e.g., the Ship of Theseus, the Polish Logician, problems with reidentification, or proper names.
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  7. added 2017-06-24
    Minimal Aristotelian Ontology.Luc Schneider - 2017 - Cosmos + Taxis 4 (4):27-37.
  8. added 2017-03-06
    Particulars and Their Qualities.Douglas C. Long - 1979 - In Michael Loux (ed.), Universals and Particulars: Readings in Ontology. Doubleday. pp. 264-84.
    See Abstract under this title of the journal article below.
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  9. added 2017-03-05
    Particulars and Their Qualities.Douglas C. Long - 1968 - Philosophical Quarterly 18 (72).
    The traditional analysis of substances in terms of qualities which are supported by a "substratum" was rejected by conscientious empiricists like Berkeley, Hume and Russell on the grounds that only qualities, not the substratum, could be experienced. To these philosophers the proper alternative seemed obvious. One simply eliminates the "unknowable" element in which qualities are alleged to inhere. In Russell's words, "What would commonly be called a 'thing' is nothing but a bundle of coexisting qualities such as redness, hardness, etc."' (...)
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  10. added 2016-12-08
    Relational and Substantival Ontologies, and the Nature and the Role of Primitives in Ontological Theories.Jiri Benovsky - 2010 - Erkenntnis 73 (1):101-121.
    Several metaphysical debates have typically been modeled as oppositions between a relationist approach and a substantivalist approach. Such debates include the Bundle Theory and the Substratum Theory about ordinary material objects, the Bundle (Humean) Theory and the Substance (Cartesian) Theory of the Self, and Relationism and Substantivalism about time. In all three debates, the substantivalist side typically insists that in order to provide a good treatment of the subject-matter of the theory (time, Self, material objects), it is necessary to postulate (...)
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  11. added 2016-12-08
    Against Bare Particulars A Response to Moreland and Pickavance.D. W. Mertz - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):14-20.
    In a recent article [Mertz 2001] in this journal I argued for the virtues of a realist ontology of relation instances (unit attributes). A major strength of this ontology is an assay of ontic ('material') predication that yields an account of individuation without the necessity of positing and defending 'bare particulars'. The crucial insight is that it is the unifying agency or combinatorial aspect of a relation instance as predicable that is for ontology the principium individuationis [Mertz 2002; 1996]. Or (...)
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  12. added 2016-12-08
    Theories of Individuation: A Reconsideration of Bare Particulars.P. J. Moreland - 1998 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (3):251-263.
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  13. added 2016-06-15
    From Ontology of Interaction to Semiotics of Education.Eetu Pikkarainen - 2013 - In K. Tirri, E. Hanhimäki & E. Kuusisto (eds.), Interaction in Educational Domains. Sense Publishers. pp. 51-62.
    In this article I try to show that the most deep level ontology can have rich meaning for our understanding of such practical and everyday phenomena as education and interaction. With this deep level ontology I mean the problem of universals. Starting from famous traditional stances of realism and nominalism, which both are for the modern theories of growth and Bildung, I continue to the third and more recently developed ontological theory, trope theory according to which the properties (qualities, relations (...)
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  14. added 2016-02-26
    The Bundle Theory and the Substratum Theory: Deadly Enemies or Twin Brothers?Jiri Benovsky - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (2):175-190.
    In this paper, I explore several versions of the bundle theory and the substratum theory and compare them, with the surprising result that it seems to be true that they are equivalent (in a sense of 'equivalent' to be specified). In order to see whether this is correct or not, I go through several steps : first, I examine different versions of the bundle theory with tropes and compare them to the substratum theory with tropes by going through various standard (...)
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  15. added 2016-01-16
    Les propriétés du vide et de l’espace-temps.Baptiste Le Bihan - 2016 - Philosophiques 43 (1):49-66.
    Les propriétés matérielles sont généralement appréhendées comme les propriétés d’une substance matérielle : cette chemise possède la propriété d’être bleue, cette chaussure la propriété d’être en bon état. Pourtant, on peut trouver plusieurs raisons de douter que les propriétés soient nécessairement les propriétés d’une substance matérielle, à la fois en métaphysique avec la théorie du faisceau, et en physique contemporaine à travers les notions d’énergie du vide et de champ. Or, si les propriétés ne sont pas les propriétés de substances (...)
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  16. added 2015-09-29
    Tropes as Character-Grounders.Robert K. Garcia - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):499-515.
    There is a largely unrecognized ambiguity concerning the nature of a trope. Disambiguation throws into relief two fundamentally different conceptions of a trope and provides two ways to understand and develop each metaphysical theory that put tropes to use. In this paper I consider the relative merits that result from differences concerning a trope’s ability to ground the character of ordinary objects. I argue that on each conception of a trope, there are unique implications and challenges concerning character-grounding.
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  17. added 2015-08-24
    Load Bare-Ing Particulars.Nathan Wildman - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1419-1434.
    Bare particularism is a constituent ontology according to which substances—concrete, particular objects like people, tables, and tomatoes—are complex entities constituted by their properties and their bare particulars. Yet, aside from this description, much about bare particularism is fundamentally unclear. In this paper, I attempt to clarify this muddle by elucidating the key metaphysical commitments underpinning any plausible formulation of the position. So the aim here is primarily catechismal rather than evangelical—I don’t intend to convert anyone to bare particularism, but, by (...)
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  18. added 2015-07-01
    Is Trope Theory a Divided House?Robert K. Garcia - 2015 - In Gabriele Galluzzo Michael Loux (ed.), The Problem of Universals in Contemporary Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. pp. 133-155.
    In this paper I explore Michael Loux’s important distinction between “tropes” and “tropers”. First, I argue that the distinction throws into relief an ambiguity and discrepancy in the literature, revealing two fundamentally different versions of trope theory. Second, I argue that the distinction brings into focus unique challenges facing each of the resulting trope theories, thus calling into question an alleged advantage of trope theory—that by uniquely occupying the middle ground between its rivals, trope theory is able to recover and (...)
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  19. added 2015-05-15
    Two Ways to Particularize a Property.Robert K. Garcia - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (4):635-652.
    Trope theory is an increasingly prominent contender in contemporary debates about the existence and nature of properties. But it suffers from ambiguity concerning the nature of a trope. Disambiguation reveals two fundamentally different concepts of a trope: modifier tropes and module tropes. These types of tropes are unequally suited for metaphysical work. Modifier tropes have advantages concerning powers, relations, and fundamental determinables, whereas module tropes have advantages concerning perception, causation, character-grounding, and the ontology of substance. Thus, the choice between modifier (...)
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  20. added 2015-03-26
    On Being and Being Presented.Herbert Hochberg - 1965 - Philosophy of Science 32 (2):123-136.
    Some philosophers have claimed that one must be acquainted with the elements of one's ontology. Also, believing that substrata and universals are required in an adequate ontology, these philosophers have claimed acquaintance with such objects. This paper attempts to analyze what is involved in such claims and to argue that they result from a number of confusions. The paper deals largely with the claim that substrata, or bare particulars, are presented since numerical difference is a simple fact that is presented. (...)
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  21. added 2015-03-17
    Particulars: Bare, Naked, and Nude.Robert Baker - 1967 - Noûs 1 (2):211-212.
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  22. added 2015-03-17
    Particulars--Bare and Qualified.William P. Alston - 1954 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 15 (2):253-258.
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  23. added 2014-10-09
    La natura e l'identità degli oggetti materiali.Achille C. Varzi - 2007 - In Annalisa Coliva (ed.), Filosofia analitica. Temi e problemi. Carocci Editore. pp. 17–56.
    A critical survey of the main metaphysical theories concerning the nature of material objects (substratum theories, bundle theories, substance theories, stuff theories) and their identity conditions, both synchronic (monist vs. pluralist theories) and diachronic (three-dimensionalism, four-dimensionalism, sequentialism).
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  24. added 2014-04-02
    Can a Single Property Be Both Dispositional and Categorical? The “Partial Consideration Strategy”, Partially Considered.Robert Schroer - 2013 - Metaphysica 14 (1):63-77.
    One controversial position in the debate over dispositional and categorical properties maintains that our concepts of these properties are the result of partially considering unitary properties that are both dispositional and categorical. As one of its defenders (Heil 2005, p. 351) admits, this position is typically met with “incredulous stares”. In this paper, I examine whether such a reaction is warranted. This thesis about properties is an instance of what I call “the Partial Consideration Strategy”—i.e., the strategy of claiming that (...)
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  25. added 2014-04-02
    The Brave New Bare Particularism.Richard Davis - 2004 - Modern Schoolman 81 (4):267-273.
    Initially introduced to the philosophical world as elusive, we-know-notwhats—substrata underlying the properties had or exemplified by things, but themselves bereft of properties—bare particulars have been dismissed as undetectable, unnecessary, and even incoherent. Hardly a warm welcome. It appears, however, that times are changing. In a recent series of articles, for example, J. P. Moreland has argued that “bare particulars are crucial entities in any adequate overall theory of individuation”;’ that is, concrete particulars cannot be individuated without them. In the same (...)
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  26. added 2014-03-22
    Locations.John Hawthorne & Theodore Sider - 2002 - Philosophical Topics 30 (1):53-76.
    Think of “locations” very abstractly, as positions in a space, any space. Temporal locations are positions in time; spatial locations are positions in (physical) space; particulars are locations in quality space. Should we reify locations? Are locations entities? Spatiotemporal relation- alists say there are no such things as spatiotemporal locations; the fundamental spatial and temporal facts involve no locations as objects, only the instantiation of spatial and temporal relations. The denial of locations in quality space is the bundle theory, according (...)
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  27. added 2014-03-19
    Substance, Attribute, and Mode in Spinoza.Martin Lin - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (2):144–153.
    Some of Spinoza's most well‐known doctrines concern what kinds of beings there are and how they are related to each other. For example, he claims that: (1) there is only one substance; (2) this substance has infinitely many attributes; (3) this substance is God or nature; (4) each of these attributes express the divine essence; and (5) all else is a mode of the one substance. These claims have so astonished many of his readers that some of them have surely (...)
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  28. added 2014-03-19
    "Bare Particulars".Theodore Sider - 2006 - Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):387–397.
    One often hears a complaint about “bare particulars”. This complaint has bugged me for years. I know it bugs others too, but no one seems to have vented in print, so that is what I propose to do. (I hope also to say a few constructive things along the way.) The complaint is aimed at the substratum theory, which says that particulars are, in a certain sense, separate from their universals. If universals and particulars are separate, connected to each other (...)
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  29. added 2014-03-13
    On Spacetime, Points, and Bare Particulars.Martin Schmidt - 2008 - Metaphysica 9 (1):69-77.
    In his paper Bare Particulars, T. Sider claims that one of the most plausible candidates for bare particulars are spacetime points. The aim of this paper is to shed light on Sider’s reasoning and its consequences. There are three concepts of spacetime points that allow their identification with bare particulars. One of them, Moderate structural realism, is considered to be the most adequate due its appropriate approach to spacetime metric and moderate view of mereological simples. However, it pushes the Substratum (...)
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  30. added 2014-03-12
    'Partially Clad' Bare Particulars Exposed.Richard Brian Davis - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):534 – 548.
    In a recent series of articles, J. P. Moreland has attempted to revive the idea that bare particulars are indispensable for individuating concrete particulars. The success of the project turns on Moreland's proposal that while bare particulars are indeed 'partially clad'--that is, exemplify at least some properties--they are nevertheless 'bare' in that they lack internal constituents. I argue that 'partially clad' bare particulars (PCBPs) are impervious not only to traditional objections, but also those recently urged in this journal by D. (...)
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  31. added 2014-03-11
    Bare Particulars and Constituent Ontology.Robert K. Garcia - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (2):149-159.
    My general aim in this paper is to shed light on the controversial concept of a bare particular. I do so by arguing that bare particulars are best understood in terms of the individuative work they do within the framework of a realist constituent ontology. I argue that outside such a framework, it is not clear that the notion of a bare particular is either motivated or coherent. This is suggested by reflection on standard objections to bare particulars. However, within (...)
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  32. added 2014-03-09
    The Self : A Humean Bundle and/or a Cartesian Substance ?Jiri Benovsky - 2009 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 5 (1):7 - 19.
    Is the self a substance, as Descartes thought, or is it 'only' a bundle of perceptions, as Hume thought ? In this paper I will examine these two views, especially with respect to two central features that have played a central role in the discussion, both of which can be quickly and usefully explained if one puts them as an objection to the bundle view. First, friends of the substance view have insisted that only if one conceives of the self (...)
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  33. added 2014-03-06
    Substrata and Properties: From Bare Particulars to Supersubstantivalism?Matteo Morganti - 2011 - Metaphysica 12 (2):183-195.
    An argument to the effect that, under a few reasonable assumptions, the bare particular ontology is best understood in terms of supersubstativalism: objects are identical to regions of space(-time) and properties directly inhere in space(-time) points or region as their bearers.
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  34. added 2014-03-04
    The Relationist and Substantivalist Theories of Time: Foes or Friends?Jiri Benovsky - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):491-506.
    Abstract: There are two traditionally rival views about the nature of time: substantivalism that takes time to be a substance that exists independently of events located in it, and relationism that takes time to be constructed out of events. In this paper, first, I want to make some progress with respect to the debate between these two views, and I do this mainly by examining the strategies they use to face the possibilities of ‘empty time’ and ‘time without change’. As (...)
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  35. added 2014-03-04
    Presentism, Persistence and Composition.Ernâni Magalhães - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (4):509-523.
    Pace Benovsky's ‘Presentism and Persistence,’ presentism is compatible with perdurantism, tropes and bundle-of-universals theories of persisting objects. I demonstrate how the resemblance, causation and precedence relations that tie stages together can be accommodated within an ersatzer presentist framework. The presentist account of these relations is then used to delineate a presentist-friendly account of the inter-temporal composition required for making worms out of stages. The defense of presentist trope theory shows how properties with indexes other than t may be said to (...)
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  36. added 2014-02-10
    The Problem of Free Mass: Must Properties Cluster?Jonathan Schaffer - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):125–138.
    Properties come in clusters. It seems impossible, for instance, that a mass could float free, unattached to any other property. David Armstrong takes this as a reductio of the bundle theory and an argument for substrata, while Peter Simons and Arda Denkel reply by supplementing the bundle theory with accounts of property interdependencies. I argue against both views. Virtually all plausible ontologies turn out to be committed to the existence of free masses.
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  37. added 2013-07-22
    Mere Individuators — Why the Theory of Bare Particulars Is Coherent but Implausible.Henrik Rydéhn - 2013 - In Christer Svennerlind, Jan Almäng & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Johanssonian Investigations. Essays in Honour of Ingvar Johansson on His Seventieth Birthday. Ontos Verlag. pp. 5--448.
    The claim that there are bare particulars — individuals possessing no properties — is a highly controversial thesis in metaphysics. It has been heavily criticized and is often thought to be subject to a number of decisive counterarguments, some of which aim to show that there is something incoherent about the very idea of a bare particular. I believe that the theory of bare particulars can, given certain modifications, be defended from such accusations. But the fact that a theory is (...)
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  38. added 2012-07-03
    Objects and Discreteness in Mumford’s Realist Lawlessness.Sharon R. Ford - manuscript
    In this paper, I argue that Mumford's Realist Lawlessness account of powers leads to ontological Holism. Consequently, this calls for a deflated conception of haecceity, intrinsicality and discreteness.
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  39. added 2012-07-03
    What Fundamental Properties Suffice to Account for the Manifest World? Powerful Structure.Sharon R. Ford - 2010 - Dissertation, University of Queensland
    This Thesis engages with contemporary philosophical controversies about the nature of dispositional properties or powers and the relationship they have to their non-dispositional counterparts. The focus concerns fundamentality. In particular, I seek to answer the question, ‘What fundamental properties suffice to account for the manifest world?’ The answer I defend is that fundamental categorical properties need not be invoked in order to derive a viable explanation for the manifest world. My stance is a field-theoretic view which describes the world as (...)
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  40. added 2011-07-21
    Words, Pictures and Ontology: A Commentary on John Heil's From an Ontological Point of View.Heather Dyke - 2007 - SWIF Philosophy of Mind Review 6:31-41.
    The title of John Heil’s book From an Ontological Point of View is, of course, an adaptation of the title of Quine’s influential collection of essays From a Logical Point of View, published fifty years earlier in 1953. Quine’s book marked the beginning of a sea change in philosophy, away from ordinary language, armchair philosophising involving introspective examination of concepts, towards a more rigorous, analytical and scientific approach to answering philosophical questions. Heil’s book will, I think, mark the beginning of (...)
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  41. added 2011-07-21
    Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2002 - Clarendon Press.
    Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra offers a fresh philosophical account of properties. How is it that two different things (such as two red roses) can share the same property (redness)? According to resemblance nominalism, things have their properties in virtue of resembling other things. This unfashionable view is championed with clarity and rigor.
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  42. added 2011-07-21
    Universals and Scientific Realism: A Theory of Universals Vol. II.David M. Armstrong - 1978 - Cambridge University Press.
  43. added 2011-07-21
    Universals and Scientific Realism: Nominalism and Realism Vol. I.David M. Armstrong - 1978 - Cambridge University Press.
  44. added 2011-06-09
    In Defence of 'Partially Clad' Bare Particulars.Timothy Pickavance - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):155 – 158.
    In a recent article in this journal, Richard Brian Davis argues that 'bare particulars [as defended by J. P. Moreland] face several serious shortcomings'[2003: 547]. I argue that Davis's two principal criticisms fall flat.
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  45. added 2011-06-09
    A Puzzle for Particulars?David S. Brown & Richard Brian Davis - 2008 - Axiomathes 18 (1):49-65.
    In this paper we examine a puzzle recently posed by Aaron Preston for the traditional realist assay of property (quality) instances. Consider Socrates (a red round spot) and red1—Socrates’ redness. For the traditional realist, both of these entities are concrete particulars. Further, both involve redness being `tied to’ the same bare individuator. But then it appears that red1 is duplicated in its ‘thicker’ particular (Socrates), so that it can’t be predicated of Socrates without redundancy. According to Preston, this suggests that (...)
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  46. added 2011-06-09
    Is Socrates A Predicate?Richard Brian Davis - 2006 - Metaphysica 7 (2).
    In his Moderate Realism and Its Logic (Yale, 1996), Donald Mertz argues that the traditional ontology of nonpredicable substances and predicable universals is beset by “intractable problems,” “harbors an insidious error,” and constitutes a “stumbling block” for the ontologist. By contrast, a onecategory ontology consisting of relation instances (and combinations thereof) is sustainable, and indeed the only way of avoiding commitment to bare particulars. The success of the project turns on Mertz’s claim that every relation instance has a linking aspect, (...)
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  47. added 2011-06-09
    Meaning, Individuals, and the Problem of Bare Particulars: A Study in Husserl's Ideas. [REVIEW]Gary L. Cesarz - 1985 - Husserl Studies 2 (2):157-168.
  48. added 2011-06-09
    Bare Particulars and Acquaintance: A Reply to Mr. Trentman.Kenneth Barber - 1967 - Dialogue 5 (4):580-583.
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  49. added 2011-06-09
    Recognition, Naming and Bare Particulars.John Trentman - 1966 - Dialogue 5 (1):19-30.
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  50. added 2011-06-09
    Another Look at Bare Particulars.Edwin B. Allaire - 1965 - Philosophical Studies 16 (1-2):16 - 21.
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