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  1. A Metaphysical Solution to the All-or-Nothing Problem.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    In this paper, I present a metaphysical solution to the all-or-nothing problem, which rejects the description of the choices in favour of lower-level descriptions.
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  2. Farewell to Arms? The All-or-Nothing Problem Again.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    Joe Horton’s all-or-nothing problem concerns a situation in which it is morally permissible to do nothing and to save two people but not to save only one. This description seems to entail that we should do nothing rather than save only one. I object to Horton’s solution and challenge a principle he draws attention to, which is required to generate the problem but which Horton regards as beyond dispute.
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  3. Does the Anthropocene Require Us to Be Saints?Bennett Gilbert - manuscript
    The question of the moral demands that humans, posthumans, and nonhumans in the Anthropocene put up on persons now living generally takes the form of supererogatory demands—that is, moral obligations with a perfectionist structure leading to obligations “above and beyond the call of duty” and extreme individual and collective sacrifice. David Roden construes this by deontology; Toby Ord, following Derek Parfit, by consequentualism. Such obligations are akin to the martyrdom of saints: but must our expectations of the Anthropocene necessarily lead (...)
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  4. Finlay's Radical Altruism.Gerald Hull - manuscript
    The question “Why should I be moral?” has long haunted normative ethics. How one answers it depends critically upon one’s understanding of morality, self-interest, and the relation between them. Stephen Finlay, in “Too Much Morality”, challenges the conventional interpretation of morality in terms of mutual fellowship, offering instead the “radical” view that it demands complete altruistic self-abnegation: the abandonment of one’s own interests in favor of those of any “anonymous” other. He ameliorates this with the proviso that there is no (...)
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  5. All Reasons Are Moral.Daniel Muñoz - manuscript
    Morality doesn't always require our best. Prudent acts and heroic sacrifices are optional, not obligatory. To explain this, some philosophers claim that reasons of self-interest must have a special "non-moral" significance. A better explanation, I argue, is that we have prerogatives based in rights.
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  6. Chapter 5: Dual-Ranking Act-Consequentialism: Reasons, Morality, and Overridingness.Douglas W. Portmore - manuscript
    This is Chapter 5 of my Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality. In this chapter, I argue that those who wish to accommodate typical instances of supererogation and agent-centered options must deny that moral reasons are morally overriding and accept both that the reason that agents have to promote their own self-interest is a non-moral reason and that this reason can, and sometimes does, prevent the moral reason that they have to sacrifice their self-interest so as to do more to (...)
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  7. The Optionality of Supererogatory Acts Is Just What You Think It Is: A Reply to Benn.Iskra Fileva & Jon Tresan - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
    As standardly understood, for an act to be optional is for it to be permissible but not required. Supererogatory acts are commonly taken to be optional in this way. In “Supererogation, Optionality and Cost”, Claire Benn rejects this common view: she argues that optionality so understood—permissible but not required—cannot be the sort of optionality involved in supererogation. As an alternative, she offers a novel account of the optionality of supererogatory acts: the “comparative cost” account. In this paper, we rebut Benn’s (...)
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  8. Must We Be Perfect?: A Case Against Supererogation.Megan Fritts & Calum Miller - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63.
    In this paper we offer an argument against supererogation and in favour of moral perfectionism. We argue three primary points: 1) That the putative moral category is not generated by any of the main normative ethical systems, and it is difficult to find space for it in these systems at all; 2) That the primary support for supererogation is based on intuitions, which can be undercut by various other pieces of evidence; and 3) That there are better reasons to favour (...)
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  9. Pacifists Are Admirable Only If They're Right.Blake Hereth - forthcoming - Public Affairs Quarterly.
    The recent explosion of philosophical papers on Confederate and Colonialist statues centers on a central question: When, if ever, is it permissible to admire a person? This paper contends it’s not just Confederates and slavers whose reputations are on the line, but also pacifists like Martin Luther King, Jr., and Daisy Bates whose commitments to pacifism meant they were unwilling to save others using defensive violence, including others they talked into endangering themselves for the sake of racial equality. Other things (...)
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  10. The Ethics of Partiality.Benjamin Lange - forthcoming - Philosophy Compass:1-23.
    Partiality is the special concern that we display for ourselves and other people with whom we stand in some special personal relationship. It is a central theme in moral philosophy, both ancient and modern. Questions about the justification of partiality arise in the context of enquiry into several moral topics, including the good life and the role in it of our personal commitments; the demands of impartial morality, equality, and other moral ideals; and commonsense ideas about supererogation. This paper provides (...)
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  11. Permissiveness in Morality and Epistemology.Han Li & Bradford Saad - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Morality is intrapersonally permissive: cases abound in which an agent has more than one morally permitted option. In contrast, there is a dearth of cases in which an agent has more than one epistemically permitted response to her evidence. Given the structural parallels between morality and epistemology, why do sources of moral permissiveness fail to have parallel permissive effects in the epistemic domain? This asymmetry between morality and epistemology cries out for explanation. The paper's task is to offer an answer (...)
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  12. Impartiality, Eudaimonic Encroachment, and the Boundaries of Morality.Errol Lord - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics.
    Many hold that morality is essentially impartial. Many also hold that partiality is justified. Susan Wolf argues that these commitments push us towards downgrading morality's practical significance. Here I argue that there is a way of pushing morality's boundaries in a partialist direction in a way that respects Wolf's insights.
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  13. Resuscitation During the Pandemic: Optional Obligation? Or Supererogation?Jonathan Perkins, Mark Hamilton, Charlotte Canniff, Craig Gannon, Marianne Illsley, Paul Murray, Kate Scribbins, Martin Stockwell, Justin Wilson & Ann Gallagher - forthcoming - Sage Publications: Clinical Ethics.
    Clinical Ethics, Ahead of Print. This paper is a response to a recent BMJ Blog: ‘The duty to treat: where do the limits lie?’ Members of the Surrey Heartlands Integrated Care Service Clinical Ethics Group reflected on arguments in the Blog in relation to resuscitation during the COVID-19 pandemic.Clinicians have had to contend with ever-changing and conflicting guidance from the Resuscitation Council UK and Public Health England regarding personal protective equipment requirements in resuscitation situations. St John Ambulance had different guidance (...)
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  14. Supererogation.Douglas W. Portmore - forthcoming - In J. E. Crimmins & D. C. Long (eds.), Encyclopedia of Utilitarianism.
    This is a general introduction to supererogation in relation to utilitarianism.
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  15. The Rules of Rescue: Cost, Distance, and Effective Altruism.Theron Pummer - forthcoming - New York: Oxford University Press.
    This is a book about duties to help others. When do you have to sacrifice life and limb, time and money, to prevent harm to others? When must you save more people rather than fewer? These questions arise in emergencies involving nearby strangers who are drowning or trapped in burning buildings. But they also arise in our everyday lives, in which we have constant opportunities to give time or money to help distant strangers in need of food, shelter, or medical (...)
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  16. Being Rational Enough: Maximizing, Satisficing, and Degrees of Rationality.Wes Siscoe - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    Against the maximizing conception of practical rationality, Michael Slote has argued that rationality does not always require choosing what is most rational. Instead, it can sometimes be rational to do something that is less-than-fully rational. In this paper, I will argue that maximizers have a ready response to Slote’s position. Roy Sorensen has argued that ‘rational’ is an absolute term, suggesting that it is not possible to be rational without being completely rational. Sorensen’s view is confirmed by the fact that, (...)
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  17. Reasons, Competition, and Latitude.Justin Snedegar - forthcoming - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 16. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    The overall moral status of an option—whether it is required, permissible, forbidden, or something we really should do—is explained by competition between the contributory reasons bearing on that option and the alternatives. A familiar challenge for accounts of this competition is to explain the existence of latitude: there are usually multiple permissible options, rather than a single required option. One strategy is to appeal to distinctions between reasons that compete in different ways. Philosophers have introduced various kinds of non-requiring reasons (...)
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  18. The Dual Scale Model of Weighing Reasons.Chris Tucker - forthcoming - Noûs.
    The metaphor of weighing reasons brings to mind a single (double-pan balance) scale. The reasons for φ go in one pan and the reasons for ~φ go in the other. The relative weights, as indicated by the relative heights of the two pans of the scale, determine the deontic status of φ. This model is simple and intuitive, but it cannot capture what it is to weigh reasons correctly. A reason pushes the φ pan down toward permissibility (has justifying weight) (...)
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  19. Too Far Beyond the Call of Duty: Moral Rationalism and Weighing Reasons.Chris Tucker - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-24.
    The standard account of supererogation holds that Liv is not morally required to jump on a grenade, thereby sacrificing her life, to save the lives of five soldiers. Many proponents defend the standard account by appealing to moral rationalism about requirement. These same proponents hold that Bernie is morally permitted to jump on a grenade, thereby sacrificing his life, to spare someone a mild burn. I argue that this position is unstable, at least as moral rationalism is ordinarily defended. The (...)
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  20. Weighing Reasons Against.Chris Tucker - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics.
    Ethicists increasingly reject the scale as a useful metaphor for weighing reasons. Yet they generally retain the metaphor of a reason’s weight. This combination is incoherent. The metaphor of weight entails a very specific scale-based model of weighing reasons, Dual Scale. Justin Snedegar worries that scale-based models of weighing reasons can’t properly weigh reasons against an option. I show that there are, in fact, two different reasons for/against distinctions, and I provide an account of the relationship between the various kinds (...)
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  21. Parity, Moral Options, and the Weights of Reasons.Chris Tucker - forthcoming - Noûs.
    The (moral) permissibility of an act is determined by the relative weights of reasons, or so I assume. But how many weights does a reason have? Weight Monism is the idea that reasons have a single weight value. There is just the weight of reasons. The simplest versions hold that the weight of each reason is either weightier than, less weighty than, or equal to every other reason. We’ll see that this simple view leads to paradox in at least two (...)
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  22. Utilitarianism, Altruism, and Consent.Meacham Christopher - 2022 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 21 (1).
    A number of criticisms of Utilitarianism – such as “nearest and dearest” objections, “demandingness” objections, and “altruistic” objections – arise because Utilitarianism doesn’t permit partially or wholly disregarding the utility of certain subjects. A number of authors, including Sider, Portmore and Vessel, have responded to these objections by suggesting we adopt “dual-maximizing” theories which provide a way to incorporate disregarding. And in response to “altruistic” objections in particular – objections noting that it seems permissible to make utility- decreasing sacrifices – (...)
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  23. Vocation to Love: Supererogation in Aquinas.James Dominic Rooney - 2022 - International Journal of Systematic Theology 24 (2):156-172.
    Thomas Aquinas’ account of religious vocation has been interpreted as involving a qualified duty, where ordinary people fall short of living up to the moral ideal of becoming a monk or nun. Such an account of religious vocation makes a hash of Aquinas’ thought and misses important aspects of his ethics. Aquinas holds that religious life is praiseworthy, but not morally required, because there are multiple sources of normativity. I conclude by proposing that, while elements of Aquinas’ notion of supererogation (...)
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  24. Rational Supererogation and Epistemic Permissivism.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):571-591.
    A number of authors have defended permissivism by appealing to rational supererogation, the thought that some doxastic states might be rationally permissible even though there are other, more rational beliefs available. If this is correct, then there are situations that allow for multiple rational doxastic responses, even if some of those responses are rationally suboptimal. In this paper, I will argue that this is the wrong approach to defending permissivism—there are no doxastic states that are rationally supererogatory. By the lights (...)
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  25. Morally-Demanding Infinite Responsibility: The Supererogatory Attitude of Levinasian Normativity.Julio Andrade - 2021 - Springer Verlag.
    This book presents a conceptual mapping of supererogation in the analytic moral philosophical tradition. It first asks whether supererogation can be conceptualised in the absence of obligation or duty and then makes the case that it can be. It does so by enlisting the resources of the continental tradition, specifically using the work of Emmanuel Levinas and his notion of infinite responsibility. In so doing the book contributes to the ongoing efforts to create a common ethical terminology between the analytic (...)
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  26. A Critical Note on Sporting Supererogation.Steffen Borge - 2021 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 48 (2):247-261.
    Alfred Archer recently argued that there is good reason to think that sporting supererogation exists. In the present paper, I take a closer look at Archer’s two key cases from association football...
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  27. A Defense of Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2021 - Episteme 18 (2):313–327.
    Permissivism is the view that there are evidential situations that rationally permit more than one attitude toward a proposition. In this paper, I argue for Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism (IaBP): that there are evidential situations in which a single agent can rationally adopt more than one belief-attitude toward a proposition. I give two positive arguments for IaBP; the first involves epistemic supererogation and the second involves doubt. Then, I should how these arguments give intrapersonal permissivists a distinct response to the toggling (...)
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  28. From Rights to Prerogatives.Daniel Muñoz - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):608-623.
    Deontologists believe in two key exceptions to the duty to promote the good: restrictions forbid us from harming others, and prerogatives permit us not to harm ourselves. How are restrictions and prerogatives related? A promising answer is that they share a source in rights. I argue that prerogatives cannot be grounded in familiar kinds of rights, only in something much stranger: waivable rights against oneself.
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  29. Three Paradoxes of Supererogation.Daniel Muñoz - 2021 - Noûs 55 (3):699-716.
    Supererogatory acts—good deeds “beyond the call of duty”—are a part of moral common sense, but conceptually puzzling. I propose a unified solution to three of the most infamous puzzles: the classic Paradox of Supererogation (if it’s so good, why isn’t it just obligatory?), Horton’s All or Nothing Problem, and Kamm’s Intransitivity Paradox. I conclude that supererogation makes sense if, and only if, the grounds of rightness are multi-dimensional and comparative.
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  30. Exploitation and Effective Altruism.Daniel Muñoz - 2021 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 20 (4):409-423.
    How could it be wrong to exploit—say, by paying sweatshop wages—if the exploited party benefits? How could it be wrong to do something gratuitously bad—like giving to a wasteful charity—if that is better than permissibly doing nothing? Joe Horton argues that these puzzles, known as the Exploitation Problem and All or Nothing Problem, have no unified answer. I propose one and pose a challenge for Horton’s take on the Exploitation Problem.
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  31. Supererogation and Conditional Obligation.Daniel Muñoz & Theron Pummer - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 2021:1-15.
    There are plenty of classic paradoxes about conditional obligations, like the duty to be gentle if one is to murder, and about “supererogatory” deeds beyond the call of duty. But little has been said about the intersection of these topics. We develop the first general account of conditional supererogation, with the power to solve familiar puzzles as well as several that we introduce. Our account, moreover, flows from two familiar ideas: that conditionals restrict quantification and that supererogation emerges from a (...)
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  32. Impermissible yet Praiseworthy.Theron Pummer - 2021 - Ethics 131 (4):697-726.
    It is commonly held that unexcused impermissible acts are necessarily blameworthy, not praiseworthy. I argue that unexcused impermissible acts can not only be pro tanto praiseworthy, but overall praiseworthy—and even more so than permissible alternatives. For example, there are cases in which it is impermissible to at great cost to yourself rescue fewer rather than more strangers, yet overall praiseworthy, and more so than permissibly rescuing no one. I develop a general framework illuminating how praiseworthiness can so radically come apart (...)
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  33. Samariter*innen in Weiß?Marie-Luise Raters - 2021 - In Roland Kipke, Nele Röttger, Johanna Wagner & Almut Kristine V. Wedelstaedt (eds.), Zusammendenken: Festschrift Für Ralf Stoecker. Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden. pp. 89-115.
    Ausgehend von einem NRW-Gesetzesentwurf vom 5. April 2020 wird die moralphilosophische Frage einer Nothilfepflicht für die Gesundheitsarbeiter*innen einer pandemischen Zeit diskutiert. Methodischer Leitfaden sind Ralf Stoeckers Fragen zu ‚Samariter-Situationen‘. Nach einer Einleitung wird eine allgemeine moralische Nothilfepflicht verteidigt. Weil eine Triage zwar keine verbotene Hilfeleistung, aber ein moralisches Dilemma ist, kann es keine Pflicht zur Triage geben. Falls Gesundheitsarbeiter*innen hohe persönliche Risiken eingehen müssen, können sie ebenfalls nicht verpflichtet werden: Ein Einsatz wäre bewundernswerte Supererogation.
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  34. Von Gutmenschen, guten Menschen und geflüchteten Menschen: Dankbarkeit als Supererogation oder Pflicht?Marie-Luise Raters - 2021 - Zeitschrift Für Ethik Und Moralphilosophie 4 (1):121-141.
    ZusammenfassungViele Menschen erwarten Dankbarkeit von den Geflüchteten, die in Europa aufgenommen werden. Nun kann mit dem Satz „Geflüchtete sollen dankbar sein“ eine moralische Pflicht oder ein Ratschlag gemeint sein. Mein Essay zeigt in einem ersten Schritt, dass es keine Pflicht zur Dankbarkeit geben kann. Dankbarkeit ist vielmehr Supererogation, nämlich eine moralisch wertvolle Handlungsweise, die keine Pflicht sein kann. Das gilt auch für Geflüchtete. Anschließend zeige ich, dass Dankbarkeit als sympathischer Ausdruck einer Tugendhaltung jedermann anzuraten ist. Wer sich für erwiesene Wohltaten (...)
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  35. What is morality?Kieran Setiya - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (4):1113-1133.
    Argues, against Anscombe, that Aristotle had the concept of morality as an interpersonal normative order: morality is justice in general. For an action to be wrong is not for it to warrant blame, or to wrong another person, but to be something one should not do that one has no right to do. In the absence of rights, morality makes no sense.
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  36. Supererogation and Consequentialism.Alfred Archer - 2020 - In Douglas W. Portmore (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism. New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
    The thought that acts of supererogation exist presents a challenge to all normative ethical theories. This chapter will provide an overview of the consequentialist responses to this challenge. I will begin by explaining the problem that supererogation presents for consequentialism. I will then explore consequentialist attempts to deny the existence of acts of supererogation. Next, I will examine a range of act consequentialist attempts to accommodate supererogation: including satisficing consequentialism, dual-ranking act consequentialism and an anti-rationalist form of consequentialism. Finally, I (...)
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  37. A Theory of Value and Obligation.Robin Attfield - 2020 - Routledge.
    Originally published in 1987 and re-issued in 2020 with a new Preface, this book presents and elaborates interrelated solutions to a number of problems in moral philosophy, from the location of intrinsic value and the nature of a worthwhile life, via the limits of obligation and the nature of justice, to the status of moral utterances. After developing a biocentric account of moral standing, the author locates worthwhile life in the development of the generic capacities of a creature, whether human (...)
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  38. Supererogation and Sequence.Adam Bales & Claire Benn - 2020 - Synthese 198 (8):7763-7780.
    Morally supererogatory acts are those that go above and beyond the call of duty. More specifically: they are acts that, on any individual occasion, are good to do and also both permissible to do and permissible to refrain from doing. We challenge the way in which discussions of supererogation typically consider our choices and actions in isolation. Instead we consider sequences of supererogatory acts and omissions and show that some such sequences are themselves problematic. This gives rise to the following (...)
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  39. The Rationally Supererogatory.Claire Benn & Adam Bales - 2020 - Mind 129 (515):917-938.
    The notion of supererogation—going above and beyond the call of duty—is typically discussed in a moral context. However, in this paper we argue for the existence of rationally supererogatory actions: that is, actions that go above and beyond the call of rational duty. In order to establish the existence of such actions, we first need to overcome the so-called paradox of supererogation: we need to provide some explanation for why, if some act is rationally optimal, it is not the case (...)
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  40. Il massimo necessario. L'etica alla prova dell'amore.Stefano Biancu - 2020 - Milano MI, Italia: Mimesis.
    Pur essendo generalmente valutate in termini moralmente positivi, alcune azioni e attitudini morali non sono considerate come strettamente dovute, né tantomeno esigibili: si tratta delle attitudini e delle azioni che rientrano nell’ambito, vasto e molteplice, dell’amore. La tradizione morale ha coniato un termine tecnico per indicarle: “supererogatorio” (o “supererogazione”). Rispetto al minimo necessario di ciò che non può e non deve mancare – l’ambito di ciò che è appunto esigibile – il supererogatorio confi gura un “massimo”: va oltre ciò che (...)
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  41. A Question of Obligation.Cheshire Calhoun - 2020 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 37 (1):44-50.
    This essay engages with Sarah Buss's 2019 annual lecture for the Society for Applied Philosophy: "Some Musings About the Limits of an Ethics That Can Be Applied – A Response to a Question About Courage and Convictions That Confronted the Author When She Woke Up on November 9, 2016." She reflects on whether one is obligated to take great risks in the face of grave injustice. I suggest shifting the normative question from “Am I obligated?” to “Is there something of (...)
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  42. Other‐Sacrificing Options.Benjamin Lange - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (3):612-629.
    I argue that you can be permitted to discount the interests of your adversaries even though doing so would be impartially suboptimal. This means that, in addition to the kinds of moral options that the literature traditionally recognises, there exist what I call other-sacrificing options. I explore the idea that you cannot discount the interests of your adversaries as much as you can favour the interests of your intimates; if this is correct, then there is an asymmetry between negative partiality (...)
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  43. Nietzsche on the Banishment of Supererogation by Luther and its Influence on Modern Ethical Life and Moral Theorizing.Rogério Lopes - 2020 - In Helmut Heit & Andreas Urs Sommer (eds.), Nietzsche Und Die Reformation. De Gruyter. pp. 331-348.
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  44. How to Be a Deontic Buck-Passer.Euan K. H. Metz - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3193-3211.
    Deontic, as opposed to evaluative buck-passing theories seem to be easier to accept, since there appears to be an intimate connection between deontic properties, such as ‘ought’, ‘requirement’, and ‘permission’ on the one hand, and normative reasons on the other. However, it is far from obvious what, precisely, the connection consists in, and this topic has suffered from a paucity of discussion. This paper seeks to address that paucity by providing a novel deontic buck-passing view, one that avoids the pitfalls (...)
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  45. Infinite options, intransitive value, and supererogation.Daniel Muñoz - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):2063-2075.
    Supererogatory acts are those that lie “beyond the call of duty.” There are two standard ways to define this idea more precisely. Although the definitions are often seen as equivalent, I argue that they can diverge when options are infinite, or when there are cycles of better options; moreover, each definition is acceptable in only one case. I consider two ways out of this dilemma.
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  46. Die Kraft des Exempels: Eine Kantische Perspektive Auf Das Problem der Supererogation.Katharina Naumann - 2020 - De Gruyter.
    Es ist ein verbreitetes Phänomen unserer moralischen Urteilspraxis, dass wir herausragende moralische Handlungen bisweilen als moralisch wertvoll und dennoch nicht als moralisch geboten beurteilen, d.i. als supererogatorisch. Für die kantische Ethik stellt diese Beobachtung eine Herausforderung dar. Nicht nur verfügt sie nicht über eine Kategorie der Supererogation, vielmehr scheinen die wenigen Stellen, an denen sich Kant explizit mit moralisch herausragendem Handeln befasst, auf den ersten Blick dafür zu sprechen, dass eine solche Urteilspraxis schlicht als fehlerhaft zurückzuweisen ist. Dagegen arbeitet die (...)
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  47. Is Nonviolence and Pacifism in Christian and Buddhist Ethics Obligatory or Supererogatory?L. Keith Neigenfind - 2020 - Buddhist-Christian Studies 40 (1):387-401.
    It is well documented and widely recognized that both Buddhism and Christianity have common themes of nonviolence, pacifism, and peace found throughout their teachings. In the beginning, the adherents of these two faiths consistently held to a strong form of pacifism and nonviolence. Yet as time progressed and the religions continued in their development, nonviolence and pacifism ceased to be normative practices for Christians and Buddhists. Although in our modern context the core teachings have remained consistent, on a practical level, (...)
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  48. Review of The Ethics of Giving: Philosophers’ Perspectives on Philanthropy. [REVIEW]Theron Pummer - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):426-429.
    The Ethics of Giving: Philosophers’ Perspectives on Philanthropy. Edited by Woodruff Paul.
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  49. Das Tue Ich Nicht, Weil Es Nicht Pflicht Ist. Das Argument der Supererogation Und Sein Unanständigkeitsproblem.Marie-Luise Raters - 2020 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 74 (1):80-104.
    Most arguments of Applied Ethics are well analyzed. An exception is the argument 'I do not do this because it is not my duty'. It makes sense to call the argument the 'argument of supererogation' : Since J. Urmson's essay Saints and Heroes of 1958, those actions are called 'supererogations' which are not supposed to be duties. The argument is widely used not only in Applied Ethics, but also in ordinary moral everyday life. Nevertheless, there is a need of investigation (...)
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  50. Ich tat doch nur meine Pflicht! Das Heroismus-Paradox der Supererogation.Marie-Luise Raters - 2020 - Zeitschrift Für Praktische Philosophie 7 (1):43-68.
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