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  1. R. T. Allen (1981). Supererogation Revised. Sophia 20 (2):5-11.
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  2. Cynthia Anderson (1972). Supererogation and Deontological Ethics. Dissertation, The Claremont Graduate University
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  3. John P. Anderson (1997). Sophie's Choice. Southern Journal of Philosophy 35 (4):439-450.
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  4. Rhonda Anderson, Non-Obligatory Forgiveness: Supererogatory or Impermissible?
    Using the categories established by David Heyd's work on supererogation, this article explores the concept of forgiveness. Heyd's distinction between dutiful and supererogatory forms of forgiveness is questionable because he, in common with many other philosophers, views any act of forgiveness, whether stemming from duty or supererogatory forbearance, as morally admirable. Such a view can be supported only if one ignores the way in which forgiveness is sensitive to context. Not every act of forgiveness is permissible. In some situations, forgiveness (...)
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  5. Alfred Archer (2016). Divine Moral Goodness, Supererogation and The Euthyphro Dilemma. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 79 (2):147-160.
    How can we make sense of God’s moral goodness if God cannot be subject to moral obligations? This question is troubling for divine command theorists, as if we cannot make sense of God’s moral goodness then it seems hard to see how God’s commands could be morally good. Alston argues that the concept of supererogation solves this problem. If we accept the existence of acts that are morally good but not morally required then we should accept that there is no (...)
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  6. Alfred Archer (2016). Do We Need to Make Room for Quasi-Supererogation? Journal of Value Inquiry 50 (2):341-351.
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  7. Alfred Archer (2016). The Supererogatory and How Not To Accommodate It: A Reply to Dorsey. Utilitas 28 (2):179-188.
    It is plausible to think that there exist acts of supererogation. It also seems plausible that there is a close connection between what we are morally required to do and what it would be morally good to do. Despite being independently plausible these two claims are hard to reconcile. My aim in this article will be to respond to a recent solution to this puzzle proposed by Dale Dorsey. Dorsey's solution to this problem is to posit a new account of (...)
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  8. Alfred Archer (2016). Motivational Judgement Internalism and The Problem of Supererogation. Journal of Philosophical Research 41:601-621.
    Motivational judgement internalists hold that there is a necessary connection between moral judgments and motivation. There is, though, an important lack of clarity in the literature about the types of moral evaluation the theory is supposed to cover. It is rarely made clear whether the theory is intended to cover all moral judgements or whether the claim covers only a subset of such judgements. In this paper I will investigate which moral judgements internalists should hold their theory to apply to. (...)
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  9. Alfred Archer (2016). Moral Obligation, Self-Interest and The Transitivity Problem. Utilitas 28 (4):441-464.
    Is the relation ‘is a morally permissible alternative to’ transitive? The answer seems to be a straightforward yes. If Act B is a morally permissible alternative to Act A and Act C is a morally permissible alternative to B then how could C fail to be a morally permissible alternative to A? However, as both Dale Dorsey and Frances Kamm point out, there are cases where this transitivity appears problematic. My aim in this paper is to provide a solution to (...)
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  10. Alfred Archer (2016). Are Acts of Supererogation Always Praiseworthy? Theoria 82 (3):238-255.
    It is commonly assumed that praiseworthiness should form part of the analysis of supererogation. I will argue that this view should be rejected. I will start by arguing that, at least on some views of the connection between moral value and praiseworthiness, it does not follow from the fact that acts of supererogation go beyond what is required by duty that they will always be praiseworthy to perform. I will then consider and dismiss what I will call the Argument from (...)
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  11. Alfred Archer (2016). Supererogation, Sacrifice, and the Limits of Duty. Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (3):333-354.
    It is often claimed that all acts of supererogation involve sacrifice. This claim is made because it is thought that it is the level of sacrifice involved that prevents these acts from being morally required. In this paper, I will argue against this claim. I will start by making a distinction between two ways of understanding the claim that all acts of supererogation involve sacrifice. I will then examine some purported counterexamples to the view that supererogation always involves sacrifice and (...)
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  12. Alfred Archer (2015). Saints, Heroes and Moral Necessity. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 77:105-124.
    Many people who perform paradigmatic examples of acts of supererogation claim that they could not have done otherwise. In this paper I will argue that these self-reports from moral exemplars present a challenge to the traditional view of supererogation as involving agential sacrifice. I will argue that the claims made by moral exemplars are plausibly understood as what Bernard Williams calls a ‘practical necessity’. I will then argue that this makes it implausible to view these acts as involving agential sacrifice.
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  13. Alfred Archer (2014). Forcing Cohen To Abandon Forced Supererogation. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
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  14. Alfred Archer (2013). Supererogation and Intentions of the Agent. Philosophia 41 (2):447-462.
    It has been claimed, by David Heyd, that in order for an act to count as supererogatory the agent performing the act must possess altruistic intentions (1982 p.115). This requirement, Heyd claims, allows us to make sense of the meritorious nature of acts of supererogation. In this paper I will investigate whether there is good reason to accept that this requirement is a necessary condition of supererogation. I will argue that such a reason can be found in cases where two (...)
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  15. Alfred Thomas Mckay Archer, Beyond Duty: An Examination and Defence of Supererogation.
    Many accept that there are some acts that are ‘supererogatory’ or ‘beyond the call of duty’. Risking one’s life to save others or dedicating one’s life to helping the needy are often thought to be examples of such acts. Accepting the possibility of acts of this sort raises interesting problems for moral philosophy, as many moral theories appear to leave no room for the supererogatory. While these problems are increasingly recognized in moral philosophy, there remain a number of debates that (...)
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  16. Alfred Archer & Michael Ridge (2015). The Heroism Paradox: Another Paradox of Supererogation. Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1575-1592.
    Philosophers are by now familiar with “the” paradox of supererogation. This paradox arises out of the idea that it can never be permissible to do something morally inferior to another available option, yet acts of supererogation seem to presuppose this. This paradox is not our topic in this paper. We mention it only to set it to one side and explain our subtitle. In this paper we introduce and explore another paradox of supererogation, one which also deserves serious philosophical attention. (...)
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  17. Antonio Argandona (2001). Management and Acting 'Beyond the Call of Duty'. Business Ethics 10 (4):320-330.
    This paper presents a real‐life case, taken from political history and related by Vaclav Havel, President of the Czech Republic. It tells of the way in which three times in that country’s history its leaders opted for a ‘more realistic’ strategy rather than a ‘more ethical’ strategy . The case enables the relationship between heroism , management and leadership to be analysed. Particular emphasis is placed on the study of the morality of the ‘more ethical’ decision, on the evaluation of (...)
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  18. Robin Attfield (1979). Supererogation and Double Standards. Mind 88 (352):481-499.
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  19. Neera Kapur Badhwar (1985). Friendship, Justice and Supererogation. American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (2):123 - 131.
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  20. Deborah R. Barnbaum (2008). Supererogation in Clinical Research. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 11 (3):343-349.
    ‘Supererogation’ is the notion of going beyond the call of duty. The concept of supererogation has received scrutiny in ethical theory, as well as clinical bioethics. Yet, there has been little attention paid to supererogation in research ethics. Supererogation is examined in this paper from three perspectives: (1) a summary of two analyses of ‘supererogation’ in moral theory, as well as an examination as to whether acts of supererogation exist; (2) a discussion of supererogation in clinical practice, including arguments that (...)
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  21. Marcia Baron (2016). A Kantian Take on the Supererogatory. Journal of Applied Philosophy 33 (4):347-362.
    This article presents a Kantian alternative to the mainstream approach in ethics concerning the phenomena that are widely thought to require a category of the supererogatory. My view is that the phenomena do not require this category of imperfect duties. Elsewhere I have written on Kant on this topic; here I shift my focus away from interpretive issues and consider the pros and cons of the Kantian approach. What background assumptions would lean one to favour the Kantian approach and what (...)
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  22. Marcia Baron (1998). Imperfect Duties And Supererogatory Acts. Jahrbuch für Recht Und Ethik 6.
    In this essay I rethink a view that I developed in my Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology , concerning how ethical theory should handle the phenomena that are standardly classified as supererogatory acts. The view I elaborated rejects the standard contemporary picture, according to which ethics needs to draw a line separating duty from what is "beyond duty"--the supererogatory. On the Kantian picture, beneficent acts are not beyond duty, for we are required to help others, but we are not required (...)
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  23. Marcia Baron (1987). Kantian Ethics and Supererogation. Journal of Philosophy 84 (5):237-262.
    ...believe that his theory asks too much, demanding total devotion to morality and treating everything worth doing (and perhaps more) as a duty. But, despite their differences, the two sets of...
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  24. Marcia Baron (1987). Kantian Ethics and Supererogation. Journal of Philosophy 84 (5):237.
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  25. Claire Benn (2014). What is Wrong with Promising to Supererogate. Philosophia 42 (1):55-61.
    There has been some debate as to whether or not it is possible to keep a promise, and thus fulfil a duty, to supererogate. In this paper, I argue, in agreement with Jason Kawall, that such promises cannot be kept. However, I disagree with Kawall’s diagnosis of the problem and provide an alternative account. In the first section, I examine the debate between Kawall and David Heyd, who rejects Kawall’s claim that promises to supererogate cannot be kept. I disagree with (...)
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  26. Yotam Benziman (2014). The Ethics of Common Decency. Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (1):87-94.
    Let’s begin with a few examples. The queue at the supermarket is long. My shopping cart is full of groceries. You are standing behind me, and your cart has only two or three items in it. I let you go ahead of me so that you can finish your shopping quickly.A stranger in the street approaches you and asks you if you can light his cigarette. As a matter of course, you do.David Heyd, Supererogation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. (...)
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  27. Andreas Bieringer (2011). Heroes and Saints in the Literature as Partners' Dialogue for a Renewed Understanding of Liturgy. Disputatio Philosophica 12 (1):89-96.
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  28. Johan Brännmark (2006). From Virtue to Decency. Metaphilosophy 37 (5):589-604.
    In her work on virtue ethics Rosalind Hursthouse has formulated an Aristotelian criterion of rightness that understands rightness in terms of what the virtuous person would do. It is argued here that this kind of criterion does not allow enough room for the category of the supererogatory and that right and wrong should rather be understood in terms of the characteristic behavior of decent persons. Furthermore, it is suggested that this kind of approach has the added advantage of allowing one (...)
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  29. Matthias Brinkmann (2015). Disjunctive Duties and Supererogatory Sets of Actions. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 77:67-86.
    I develop a ‘duty-plus’ approach to supererogation based on a simple intuition: if I am required to do x or y, doing x and y is a candidate for, though not necessarily, supererogation. This is an appealing view to take, located midway between two extreme positions, supererogationism and rigorism. I give a precise statement of the view through the notion of disjunctive duties, and discuss the commitments a duty-plus theorist should make, independent from the Kantian context in which this position (...)
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  30. Lorenne M. Burchill (1965). In Defence of Saints and Heroes. Philosophy 40 (152):152 - 157.
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  31. Vanessa Carbonell (2015). Differential Demands. In Marcel van Ackeren & Michael Kuhler (eds.), The Limits of Moral Obligation: Moral Demandingness and Ought Implies Can. Routledge 36-50.
    If the traditional problem of demandingness is that a theory demands too much of all agents, for example by asking them to maximize utility in every decision, then we should ask whether there is a related problem of “differential demandingness”, when a theory places vastly different demands on different agents. I argue that even according to common-sense morality, the demands faced by particular agents depend on a variety of contingent factors. These include the general circumstances, the compliance of others, the (...)
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  32. Vanessa Carbonell (2015). Sacrifices of Self. Journal of Ethics 19 (1):53-72.
    We emerge from certain activities with an altered sense of self. Whether returning from a warzone or from an experience as common as caring for an aging parent, one might remark, “I’m not the same person I was.” I argue that such transformations are relevant to debates about what morality requires of us. To undergo an alteration in one’s self is to make a special kind of sacrifice, a sacrifice of self. Since projects can be more or less morally obligatory (...)
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  33. Vanessa Carbonell (2013). What We Know and What We Owe. Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 3.
    Knowledge is necessary for certain moral obligations. In learning something new, one sometimes triggers a moral obligation. This paper argues that the existence of these knowledge-based obligations poses a problem for the view that we are not only free to choose the course of our own lives, including our careers and personal projects, but also free to change our minds and quit at any time to pursue something else. For if our choice of life path has generated knowledge-based moral obligations (...)
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  34. Vanessa Carbonell (2012). The Ratcheting-Up Effect. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):228-254.
    I argue for the existence of a ‘ratcheting-up effect’: the behavior of moral saints serves to increase the level of moral obligation the rest of us face. What we are morally obligated to do is constrained by what it would be reasonable for us to believe we are morally obligated to do. Moral saints provide us with a special kind of evidence that bears on what we can reasonably believe about our obligations. They do this by modeling the level of (...)
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  35. R. M. Chisholm (1963). Supererogation and Offence: A Conceptual Scheme for Ethics. Ratio 5 (1):1.
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  36. Roderick M. Chisholm & Ernest Sosa (1966). Intrinsic Preferability and the Problem of Supererogation. Synthese 16 (3-4):321 - 331.
    We first summarize and comment upon a 'calculus of intrinsic preferability' which we have presented in detail elsewhere. 1 Then we set forth 'the problem of supererogation' - a problem which, according to some, has presented difficulties for deontic logic. And, finally, we propose a moral or deontic interpretation of the calculus of intrinsic preferability which, we believe, enables us to solve the problem of supererogation.
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  37. Yogendra Chopra (1963). Professor Urmson on 'Saints and Heroes'. Philosophy 38 (144):160 - 166.
    In a paper entitled ‘Saints and Heroes’ 1 Professor J. O. Urmson has criticised ‘the trichotomy of duties, indifferent actions, and wrongdoing’ , commonly found in moral philosophy, on the ground that it fails to cover an important class of actions, of which saintly and heroic actions are ‘conspicuous” but by no means the only examples. I am inclined to think that this trichotomy is defensible, and that at least it deserves a much longer run for its money than Urmson (...)
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  38. Michael Clark (1978). The Meritorious And The Mandatory. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 79:23-33.
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  39. Shlomo Cohen (2015). Forced Supererogation. European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):1006-1024.
    There is a disturbing kind of situation that presents agents with only two possibilities of moral action—one especially praiseworthy, the other condemnable. I describe such scenarios and argue that moral action in them exhibits a unique set of parameters: performing the commendable action is especially praiseworthy; not performing is not blameworthy; not performing is wrong. This set of parameters is distinct from those which characterize either moral obligation or supererogation. It is accordingly claimed that it defines a distinct, yet unrecognized, (...)
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  40. Tim Connolly (2013). Sagehood and Supererogation in the Analects. Journal of Chinese Philosophy 40 (2):269-286.
    The Confucian ethical tradition emphasizes unceasing progress toward the goal of sagehood, and so it is generally opposed to the idea of supererogation, as this implies that we may be satisfied with attaining some sub-sagely level of morality. The one possible exception to this anti-supererogationist stance, however, turns out to be Confucius himself, who in the Analects appears to downplay sagehood and instead focus on the goal of junzi. Yet given that Confucius stresses ceaseless cultivation as much as anyone else (...)
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  41. Greg Conti (2014). Jean Barbeyrac, Supererogation, and the Search for a Safe Religion. Modern Intellectual History:1-31.
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  42. J. Cottingham (1984). HEYD, D. "Supererogation. Its Status in Ethical Theory". [REVIEW] Mind 93:619.
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  43. Christopher Cowley (2015). Introduction: The Agents, Acts and Attitudes of Supererogation. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 77:1-23.
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  44. Christopher Cowley (ed.) (2015). Supererogation: Volume 77. Cambridge University Press.
    According to its simplest definition, supererogation means freely and intentionally doing good beyond the requirements of duty. A more complex definition incorporates the responses of third parties: the supererogatory act is one that is praiseworthy if performed, but not blameworthy if omitted, as long as one does one's duty. This collection of essays, based on papers delivered at the Royal Institute of Philosophy's Annual Conference in Dublin in June 2014, explores a broad range of philosophical problems that stem from various (...)
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  45. Olga-Maria Christina Cruz (2003). An Evaluation of the Modest Hero Objection and Stringency as a Solution in the Debate Over Supererogation. Dissertation, The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary
    This dissertation identifies and evaluates a commonly-raised objection to the inclusion of supererogation as a category of moral action. The 'modest hero' objection maintains that since the moral agent praised for a supererogatory act tends to respond modestly, that she was merely "doing her duty," the bar of duty is likely so high as to exclude supererogatory acts altogether. This dissertation argues that the modest hero phenomenon is not so troublesome for supererogation as has been largely assumed; that the concept (...)
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  46. Barry Curtis (1981). The Supererogatory, the Foolish and the Morally Required. Journal of Value Inquiry 15 (4):311-318.
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  47. Jonathan Dancy (1993). Beyond the Call of Duty: Supererogation, Obligation and Offence. Philosophical Books 34 (1):48-49.
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  48. Jonathan Dancy (1983). D. Heyd, "Supererogation". Philosophical Quarterly 33 (133):405.
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  49. H. De Dijn (1983). Heyd, D., Supererogation. Its Status in Ethical Theory. [REVIEW] Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45:671.
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  50. N. J. H. Dent (1983). Supererogation. Philosophical Books 24 (2):65-70.
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