Surrogate Motherhood

Surrogacy involves a private agreement whereby a woman who gestates a child attempts to surrender her (putative) moral right to become the parent of that child such that another person (or persons), of the woman’s choice, can acquire it. Since people lack the normative power to privately transfer custody, attempts to do so are illegitimate, and the law should reflect this fact.

In the future, full ectogestation – in which artificial placenta technology would be used to carry out the entirety of gestation – could be an alternative to human pregnancy. This article analyzes some underexplored objections to ectogestation which relate to the possibility for new and continuing forms of social oppression. In particular, we examine whether ectogestation could be linked to an unwarranted de-valuing of certain aspects of female reproductive embodiment, or exacerbate objectionable kinds of scrutiny over the reproductive choices of (...) gestating persons. Without discounting the potential benefits of full ectogestation, we conclude that the socially oppressive potential of ectogestation, on top of other concerns, warrants further critical ethical reflection. (shrink)

Transformations in the biological, medical and legal processes of infertility, substantial modifications in family structure and the advancement of methods and techniques of reproductive technology will affect the next step in both legal and medical terms to address the regulation of bioethics and law in Kosovo. There is a need to establish perspectives in both ethical and professional terms, since the Republic of Kosovo is in the process of drafting a Civil Code. Many of these issues have been raised and (...) addressed during the review and evaluation of family law in the context of harmonisation and inclusion of this law in the Civil Code of the Republic of Kosovo. During the several meetings of official members with different interest groups regarding family law, the need has been raised to regulate family law to be included in the Civil Code for motherhood and fatherhood in the case of reproduction with biomedical assistance, as well as for the birth contract as a donation for another person (so-called surrogate motherhood). These bioethical and legal issues indicate the urgent need for legal harmonisation of a multidimensional platform specifically based on the principles of public health and universal human rights Conclusion. These bio-ethical and legal interferences indicate the urgent need for legal harmonization of a multidimensional platform specifically designed based on the principles of public health and universal human rights. (shrink)

We explain libertarian thought about family and children, including controversial issues in need of serious attention. To begin our discussion of marriage, we distinguish between procedural and substantive contractarian approaches to marriage, each endorsed by various libertarians. Advocates of both approaches agree that it is a contract that makes a marriage, not a license, but disagree about whether there are moral limits to the substance of the contract with only advocates of the substantive approach accepting such. Either approach, though, offers (...) advantages over the current licensing system, so we discuss paths from that to a contractarian system. We also discuss the concept of marriage itself, the ages of consent for marriage, sexual activity, and reproduction, as well as how marriages can be dissolved, and coercion that sometimes occurs in marriage. We then turn to children. We first discuss reproductive freedom and then discuss the moral relationship between children and parents, especially considering stewardship, propertarian, and best interests approaches (we also touch on anti-natalism). One of the biggest issues facing parents is how to properly raise and educate children; we discuss this in depth and consider the sort of schooling that should be offered in a free society. Since children lack the requisite ability to consent, they cannot choose their education; how to respond to this is of the utmost importance for libertarians. As we note, the same issue of consent looms large for many forms medical treatment of children. (shrink)

The common liberal understanding of reproductive autonomy – characterized by free choice and a principle of non-interference – serves as a useful way to analyse the normative appeal of having certain choices open to people in the reproductive realm, especially for issues like abortion rights. However, this liberal reading of reproductive autonomy only offers us a limited ethical understanding of what is at stake in many kinds of reproductive choices, particularly when it comes to different uses of reproductive technologies and (...) third-party reproduction. This is because the liberal framework does not fully capture who benefits from which reproductive options, the extent of the risks and harms involved in various reproductive interventions, and the reasons for why people are driven to make certain reproductive choices. (shrink)

Ellie Anderson had always known that she wanted to have children. Her mother, Louise, was aware of this wish. Ellie was designated male at birth, but according to news sources, identified as a girl from the age of three. She was hoping to undergo gender reassignment surgery at 18, but died unexpectedly at only 16, leaving Louise grappling not only with the grief of losing her daughter, but with a complex legal problem. Ellie had had her sperm frozen before starting (...) hormone treatment, specifically so that she would retain the chance of becoming a parent after her gender reassignment. Ellie had considered what might happen to the sperm if she died and was adamant that her children should be brought into the world. She made her mother promise to ensure that this would happen. But according to UK law, Ellie’s mother has no legal right to retain her sperm, or to use it to fulfil Ellie’s wishes. In this paper, we raise several key ethical questions on this case, namely: does a refusal to bring Ellie’s children into the world wrong her posthumously? Is Ellie’s mother morally entitled to use her daughter’s sperm as Ellie wished? Should the fact that Ellie was a minor at the time of her death or the fact that she was transgendered undermine her wish to have children? Can Ellie become a parent posthumously? We consider how these complex ethical questions could be approached. (shrink)

Ectogenesis, or “artificial womb technology,” has been heralded by some, such as prominent feminist Shulamith Firestone, as a way to liberate women. In this chapter, we challenge this view by offering an alternative analysis of the technology as relying upon and perpetuating a problematic model of pregnancy which, rather than liberating women, serves to devalue them. We look to metaphysics as the abstract study of reality to elucidate how the entities in a pregnancy are related to one another. We consider (...) two models of the metaphysics of pregnancy: (1) the Parthood Model, whereby the fetus is a part of what/who gestates it; and (2) and the Fetal Container Model, whereby the gestator is a container for the fetus. We suggest that under the assumption of the Fetal Container Model, we are more likely to think that any container will suffice for gestation, even an artificial one. In contrast, under the assumption of the Parthood Model, we are less likely to treat the gestator as interchangeable or replaceable, given the parthood relationship between gestator and fetus. This chapter argues that ectogenesis is conceptually linked to the Fetal Container Model and advocates a more cautious approach in promoting ectogenesis as a tool for women’s liberation. (shrink)

There is a broad philosophical consensus that both children’s and prospective parents’ interests are relevant to the justification of a right to parent. Against this view, I argue that it is impermissible to sacrifice children’s interests for the sake of advancing adults’ interest in childrearing. Therefore, the allocation of the moral right to parent should track the child’s, and not the potential parent’s, interest. This revisionary thesis is moderated by two additional qualifications. First, parents lack the moral right to exclude (...) others from associating with the child. Second, children usually come into the world as part of a relationship with their gestational mother; often, this relationship deserves protection. (shrink)

Cases of non-traditional family-making offer a rich seam for thinking about normative parenthood. Gamete donors are genetically related to the resulting offspring but are not thought to be normative parents. Gestational surrogates are also typically not thought to be normative parents, despite having gestated a child. Adoptive parents are typically thought to be normative parents even though they are neither genetically nor gestationally related to their child. Philosophers have paid attention to these kinds of cases. But they have not paid (...) attention to what the people who have engaged in these forms of family-making have to say about what they’re doing and, more specifically, how they answer the questions: “Who is the normative parent? And why?” Paying attention to their answers reveals two things. First, accounts of parenthood from people involved in two forms of non-traditional family-making – reproduction with gestational surrogacy and reproduction with donated eggs – are mutually inconsistent. This is not surprising. What is surprising is that the contradictory aspects of the views evince a common commitment to, as I shall put it, naturalizing parenthood. The central goal of this paper is to explain what that means, but rough idea is that in naturalizing parenthood, prospective parents aim to put the features that make someone a normative parent beyond the reach of human agency. I conclude by briefly suggesting that we should think of the grounds of normative parenthood – and the very task of theorizing about the grounds of normative parenthood – in a way that avoids the need to naturalize altogether. (shrink)

Review of Sheela Saravanan's 2018 book .

In the case of surrogacy, it is not new biotechnologies themselves that have challenged well-established principles in law and ethics, but rather political and social phenomena such as commodification of women’s reproductive tissue and labour, demands to allow new ways of forming families and (before Covid-19, at least) the comparative ease of international travel that enabled cross-border surrogacy to develop into a market valued at up to $2 billion annually in India alone as of 2016 (Dickenson 2016, citing an estimate (...) from The Indian National Commission for Women). This phenomenon stands the usual truth on its head: it is not new technologies but new pressures that have challenged the existing law and ethics of surrogate motherhood. (shrink)

Transhumanism is a movement that seeks to transcend certain limits inherent in the human condition as we know it. However, does it justify leaving aside the dignity of current human beings to fulfill the desire to increase human potential and improve the human being as such to obtain other human beings? Does it justify passing over the dignity of women in order to obtain new human beings through fertilization? To answer these questions we have made a sweep over the ideas (...) of transhumanism that drives this type of techniques, to later understand the vision that women have in the use of in vitro fertilization, the hidden discrimination under these procedures and the clarification of the true emancipation and restoration of women’s rights in rela- tion to the use of in vitro fertilization. -/- El transhumanismo es un movimiento que busca trascender ciertos límites inherentes a la condición humana como la conocemos. Sin embargo, ¿justifica dejar de lado la dignidad de los seres humanos actuales por cumplir el deseo de aumentar el potencial humano y mejorar al ser humano como tal para obtener otros seres humanos?, ¿justifica pasar por encima de la dignidad de una mujer para obtener nuevos seres humanos a través de la fertilización in vitro? Para responder a estas preguntas hemos hecho un barrido sobre las ideas del transhumanismo que impulsa este tipo de técnicas, para luego comprender la visión que se tiene de la mujer en el uso de la fertilización in vitro, la discriminación oculta bajo estos procedimientos y la aclaración de la verdadera emancipación y restablecimiento de los derechos de la mujer en relación con el uso de la fertilización in vitro. (shrink)

Based on a critical interpretative review of existing qualitative research investigating accounts of ‘lived experience’ of surrogates and intended parents from a relational perspective, this article proposes a typology of surrogacy arrangements. The review is based on the analysis of 39 articles, which belong to a range of different disciplines (mostly sociology, social psychology, anthropology, ethnology, and gender studies). The number of interviews in each study range from as few as seven to over one hundred. Countries covered include Australia, Canada, (...) Greece, India, Iran, Israel, Italy, Mexico, Norway, Russia, Sweden, UK, Ukraine, and the USA. Most studies focus only on surrogacy practices in one country (although often with intended parents from other countries), and some include several countries (e.g. interviewees from several countries or fieldwork in different field-sites). The proposed typology goes beyond the division between altruistic versus commercial, and traditional versus gestational surrogacy, in order to inform further research and to contribute to bioethical and policy debates on surrogacy in a transnational context. Four types of relations are identifiable: open, restricted, structured, and enmeshed. The criteria which influence these relationships are: the frequency and character of contact pre- and post-birth; expectations of both parties; the type of exchange involved in surrogacy arrangements; and cultural, legal, and economic contexts. The theoretical contribution of the article is to further the development of a relational justice approach to surrogacy. (shrink)

Is the wish to be biologically related to your children legitimate? Here, I respond to an argument in support of a negative answer to this question according to which a preference towards having children one is biologically related to is analogous to a preference towards associating with members of one’s own race. I reject this analogy, mainly on the grounds that only the latter constitutes discrimination; still, I conclude that indeed a preference towards children one is biologically related to is (...) morally illegitimate because, in the context of parental love, biological considerations are normatively irrelevant. (shrink)

As with most other areas of reproduction, surrogacy is highly regulated. But the legislation and policies on surrogacy are written in such ways that make large (and possibly mistaken) assumptions about the metaphysical relationship between the mother and the fetus – whether the fetus is a part of, or contained by, the mother. It is the purpose of this chapter to highlight these assumptions, and to demonstrate the impact that alternative metaphysical views can have on our conceptualization of surrogacy. With (...) that in mind, I recommend that our public policies on surrogacy be at least neutral or otherwise responsive to metaphysics rather than presupposing it, such that the regulation and legislation of surrogacy will be metaphysically informed. (shrink)

Common sense morality and legislations around the world ascribe normative relevance to biological connections between parents and children. Procreators who meet a modest standard of parental competence are believed to have a right to rear the children they brought into the world. I explore various attempts to justify this belief and find most of these attempts lacking. I distinguish between two kinds of biological connections between parents and children: the genetic link and the gestational link. I argue that the second (...) can better justify a right to rear. (shrink)

English-speaking research on morally right decisions in a healthcare context over the past three decades has been dominated by two major perspectives, namely, the Four Principles, of which the principle of respect for autonomy has been most salient, and the ethic of care, often presented as a rival to not only a focus on autonomy but also a reliance on principles more generally. In my contribution, I present a novel ethic applicable to bioethics, particularly as it concerns human procreation, that (...) I argue is a promising alternative to these two approaches. According to this new moral theory, an act is right just insofar as it treats people’s capacity to commune with respect, where communing is a matter of identifying with others and exhibiting solidarity with them. This ethic is inspired by relational ideals of communion and harmony from the African philosophical tradition, but is shown to be attractive to a broad, indeed global, audience, with regard to its implications for the morality of reproduction. (shrink)

The recent spectacular progress in assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) has resulted in new ethical dilemmas. Though women occupy a central role in the reproductive process, within the ART paradigm, the importance accorded to the embryo commonly surpasses that given to the mother. This commentary questions the increasing tendency to position the embryonic subject in an antagonistic relation with the mother. I examine how the mother’s reproductive autonomy is compromised in relation to that of her embryo and argue in favour of (...) doing away with the subject-object dyad between them, particularly in the contexts of surrogacy and abortion. I also engage with the Surrogacy (Regulation) Bill, 2016. A critical discussion of the privacy judgment passed by the Supreme Court of India helps examine how personal autonomy of the body and mind extends to include the reproductive autonomy of women as well. (shrink)

This book delves deeply into modern surrogacy arrangements, responding to both practical and ethical critiques by offering a radically new model for surrogate motherhood. Current practice distinguishes between two models of surrogacy – the altruistic model and the commercial model, both of which present social, ethical, and conceptual challenges. This book proposes a novel arrangement for surrogate motherhood – the professional model. Inspired by professions, such as nursing, teaching, and social work, the professional model acknowledges the caring motives that surrogate (...) mothers have while at the same time compensating them for their work. Walker and Van Zyl adopt an evidence-based approach to explain that the professional model enables trust between intended parents and surrogates, provides professional support at every stage of the relationship, affords legal protections against exploitation and commodification, and recognizes the rights and interests of all parties, including the intended baby. The model applies to both transnational and domestic surrogacy and will be of great interest to policy makers, social researchers, bioethicists, legal scholars, fertility professionals, clinicians, and graduate students in psychology, philosophy, medicine and ethics. (shrink)

Ought parents, in general, to value being biologically tied to their children? Is it important, in particular, that both parents be biologically tied to their children? I will address these fundamental questions by looking at a fairly new practice within IVF treatments, so-called IVF-with-ROPA ( Reception of Oocytes from Partner ), which allows lesbian couples to „share motherhood‟ with one partner providing the eggs while the other becomes pregnant. I believe that IVF-with-ROPA is, just like other IVF treatments, morally permissible; (...) but here I argue that the increased biological ties which IVF-with-ROPA allows for do not have any particular value beside the satisfaction of a legitimate wish, because there is no intrinsic value in a biological tie between parents and children; further, I argue that equality within parental projects cannot be achieved by redistributing biological ties. (shrink)

Lisa Furberg har argumenterat för att altruistiskt surrogatmödraskap kan anses moraliskt problematiskt utifrån en perfektionistisk teori om det goda livet. I följande svar riktar jag ett antal invändningar mot Furbergs resonemang.

Surrogate motherhood is treated as a form of adoption in many countries: the birth mother and her partner are presumed to be the parents of the child, while the intended parents have to adopt the baby once it is born. Other than compensation for expenses related to the pregnancy, payment to surrogates is not permitted. We believe that the failure to compensate surrogate mothers for their labour as well as the significant risks they undertake is both unfair and exploitative. We (...) accept that introducing payment for surrogates would create a significant tension in the adoption model. However, we recommend rejecting the adoption model altogether rather than continuing to prohibit compensation to surrogates. (shrink)

A diagnosis of fetal abnormality presents parents with a difficult – even tragic – moral dilemma. Where this diagnosis is made in the context of surrogate motherhood there is an added difficulty, namely that it is not obvious who should be involved in making decisions about abortion, for the person who would normally have the right to decide – the pregnant woman – does not intend to raise the child. This raises the question: To what extent, if at all, should (...) the intended parents be involved in decision-making? In commercial surrogacy it is thought that as part of the contractual agreement the intended parents acquire the right to make this decision. By contrast, in altruistic surrogacy the pregnant woman retains the right to make these decisions, but the intended parents are free to decide not to adopt the child. We argue that both these strategies are morally unsound, and that the problems encountered serve to highlight more fundamental defects within the commercial and altruistic models, as well as in the legal and institutional frameworks that support them. We argue in favour of the professional model, which acknowledges the rights and responsibilities of both parties and provides a legal and institutional framework that supports good decision-making. In particular, the professional model acknowledges the surrogate's right to decide whether to undergo an abortion, and the intended parents' obligation to accept legal custody of the child. While not solving all the problems that arise in surrogacy, the model provides a framework that supports good decision-making. (shrink)

It has been a common claim that surrogacy is morally problematic since it involves harm to the child or the surrogate—the harm argument. Due to a growing body of empirical research, the harm argument has seen a decrease in popularity, as there seems to be little evidence of harmful consequences of surrogacy. In this article, two revised versions of the harm argument are developed. It is argued that the two suggested versions of the harm argument survive the current criticism against (...) the standard harm argument. The first version argues that the child is harmed by being separated from the gestational mother. The second version directs attention to the fact that surrogacy involves great incentives to keep the gestational mother’s level of maternal-fetal attachment low, which tend to increase the risk of harm to the child. While neither of the two arguments is conclusive regarding the moral status of surrogacy, both constitute important considerations that are often ignored. (shrink)

What is wrong with anonymous surrogacy and gamete donation? Many feminists have argued that these practices are inherently exploitative or alienating. Yet, one can easily conceive of a world where donating a sperm or egg, and getting pregnant on behalf of someone else are considered highly valuable professional services, which are highly-paid and part of well regulated industries. In this ideal world, no one becomes a gamete donor or a surrogate out of economic necessity or desperation, but because there is (...) a genuine fit between their conception of the good and the fact that procreation requires collective action. In this paper, I argue that what makes these practices morally wrong even under ideal conditions is the lack of intimacy between parties in the procreative chain. (shrink)

The book discusses the development of reproductive medicine from the perspective of the parent-child relationship. -/- A könyv a reprodukciós medicina fejlődését vizsgálja a szülői felelősség szempontjából.

South African law currently forbids those seeking to arrange a surrogate motherhood agreement from creating a child that will not be genetically related to at least one of them. For a surrogacy contract to be legally valid, there must be a ‘genetic link’ between the child created through a surrogate and the parents who will raise it. Currently, this law is being challenged in the High Court of South Africa, and in this article I critically explore salient ethical facets of (...) the dispute. I argue that the law is unjust and should be revised. (shrink)

Critics of transnational commercial surrogacy frequently call our attention to the race, class, and cultural background of surrogates in the global South. Consider the following sampling from the critics: "the women having babies for rich Westerners have been pimped by their husbands and are powerless to resist" (Bindel 2011); our "rules of decency seem to differ when the women in question are living in abject poverty half a world away" (Warner 2008); and we should worry that "women of color are (...) easier to commodify" (Smerdon 2008, 51-52). Critics suggest—rightly, in my view—that the race, class, and culture of Southern surrogates matter to the moral acceptability of transnational surrogacy. But how, precisely, do .. (shrink)

Commercial surrogacy arrangements now cross borders; this paper aims to reevaluate the traditional moral concerns regarding the practice against the added ethical dimension of global injustice. I begin by considering the claim that global surrogacy serves to satisfy the positive reproductive rights of infertile first-world women. I then go on to consider three powerful challenges to this claim. The first holds that commercial surrogacy involves the commodification of a good that should not be valued in market terms, the second that (...) it involves the exploitation of the labor of disadvantaged women, and the third that it depends on the illegitimate privileging of positive rights over negative rights. I reject the first of these challenges and argue that global surrogacy arrangements are indeed exploitative on the dual basis of what I call intracontractual injustice and intercontractual coercion. The latter, I contend, depends on a preexisting negative rights violation, which cannot be permitted for the sake of satisfying another's positive reproductive entitlement. I conclude not in favor of a global ban but with suggestions on how developing nations that permit commercial surrogacy might better protect the negative reproductive rights of their female citizens, thereby making them less vulnerable to exploitation. (shrink)

It has become common to distinguish between altruistic and commercial contract motherhood (or ‘surrogacy’). Altruistic arrangements are based on the ‘gift relationship’: a woman is motivated by altruism to have a baby for an infertile couple, who are free to reciprocate as they see fit. By contrast, in commercial arrangements both parties are motivated by personal gain to enter a legally enforceable agreement, which stipulates that the contract mother or ‘surrogate’ is to bear a child for the intending parents in (...) exchange for a fee. She is required to undergo medical examinations and to refrain from behaviour that could harm the foetus. The intending parents are the child's legal parents from the outset. The parties to the contract can, but are not expected to, maintain contact after the transaction is completed. We argue that contract motherhood should not be organized according to the norms of the gift relationship, and that contract mothers should be compensated for their labour. However, we accept that there are good reasons for rejecting the commercial model as a suitable framework for contract pregnancy, and argue, instead, in favour of viewing it as a profession. (shrink)

This book examines, through a multi-disciplinary lens, the possibilities offered by relationships and family forms that challenge the nuclear family ideal, and some of the arguments that recommend or disqualify these as legitimate units in our societies. That children should be conceived naturally, born to and raised by their two young, heterosexual, married to each other, genetic parents; that this relationship between parents is also the ideal relationship between romantic or sexual partners; and that romance and sexual intimacy ought to (...) be at the core of our closest personal relationships - all these elements converge towards the ideal of the nuclear family. The authors consider a range of relationship and family structures that depart from this ideal: polyamory and polygamy, single and polyparenting, parenting by gay and lesbian couples, as well as families created through current and prospective modes of assisted human reproduction such as surrogate motherhood, donor insemination, and reproductive cloning. (shrink)

Benatar’s central argument for antinatalism develops an asymmetry between the pain and pleasure in a potential life. I am going to present an alternative route to the antinatalist conclusion. I argue that duties require victims and that as a result there is no duty to create the pleasures contained within a prospective life but a duty not to create any of its sufferings. My argument can supplement Benatar’s, but it also enjoys some advantages: it achieves a better fit with our (...) intuitions; it does not require us to acknowledge that life is a harm, or that a world devoid of life is a good thing; and it is easy to see why it does not have any pro-mortalist implications. (shrink)

In this ethnography of transnational commercial surrogacy In a small clinic In India, the narratives of two sets of womenInvolved In this new form of reproductive travel - the transnational clients and the surrogates themselves - are evaluated. How do these women negotiate the culturally anomalous nature of transnational surrogacy within the unusual setting of India? It Is demonstrated that while both sets of women downplay the economic aspect of surrogacy by drawing on predictable cultural tools like 'gift', 'sisterhood' and (...) 'mission', they use these tools In completely unexpected ways. Previous ethnographies of surrogacy In other parts of the world have revealed that women Involved In surrogacy use these narratives to downplay the contractual nature of their relationship with each other. Ironically, when used In the context of transnational surrogacy 1n India, these narratives further highlight and often reify the Inequalities based on class, race and nationality between the clients and suppliers of reproductive tourism In India. (shrink)

My project here is to argue for situating moral judgments about Indian surrogacy in the context of Reproductive Justice. I begin by crafting the best picture of Indian surrogacy available to me while marking some worries I have about discursive colonialism and epistemic honesty. Western feminists' responses to contract pregnancy fall loosely into two interrelated moments: post-Baby M discussions that focus on the morality of surrogacy work in Western contexts, and feminist biomedical ethnographies that focus on the lived dimensions of (...) reproductive technologies and how they are embodied and negotiated in specific cultural contexts. Both approaches have their shortcomings. Uncritically extending Western moral frameworks (for example, liberal feminist political values) to Indian surrogacy work raises the specter of discursive colonialism; with it, worries arise about how Western normative traditions can distort, erase, or misread non-Western subjects' lived experiences. Feminist biomedical ethnographic approaches correct this, but raise the specter of a weak moral absenteeism; with it, concerns arise about under-theorizing the structural harms and injustices shaping surrogacy worker's lives. I suggest that we might reduce these shortcomings by framing normative and ethnographic engagement with global surrogacy as questions of reproductive justice. (shrink)

Most people take it for granted that it's morally permissible to have children. They may raise questions about the number of children it's responsible to have or whether it's permissible to reproduce when there's a strong risk of serious disability. But in general, having children is considered a good thing to do, something that's morally permissible in most cases (perhaps even obligatory).

The issue of surrogacy has received a great deal of attention in the West ever since the famous Baby M case in the latter part of the 1980s. Ethicists, psychologists, and legal experts have struggled with the meanings and implications of this practice, especially in its commercial form. In contemporary times, however, the phenomenon of surrogacy has assumed new dimensions as it travels across national borders in the context of globalization. As a transnational phenomenon, it is now marketed as an (...) attractive part of "Reproductive Tourism," for the most part, by various clinics and organizations located in the global south to some of the so-called "First World nations."Until now, most of the philosophical literature. (shrink)

Many critics of commercial surrogate motherhood argue that it violates the rights of children. In this paper, I respond to several versions of this objection. The most common version claims that surrogacy involves child‐selling. I argue that while proponents of surrogacy have generally failed to provide an adequate response to this objection, it can be overcome. After showing that the two most prominent arguments for the child‐selling objection fail, I explain how the commissioning couple can acquire parental rights by paying (...) the surrogate only for her reproductive labor. My explanation appeals to the idea that parental rights are acquired by those who have claims over the reproductive labor that produces the child, not necessarily by those who actually perform the labor. This account clarifies how commercial surrogacy differs from commercial adoption. In the final section of the paper, I consider and reject three further child‐based objections to commercial surrogacy: that it establishes a market in children's attributes, that it requires courts to stray from the best interests standard in determining custodial rights, and that it requires the surrogate to neglect her parental responsibilities. Since each of these objections fails, children's rights probably do not pose an obstacle to the acceptability of commercial surrogacy arrangements. (shrink)

Gestational surrogacy as a treatment for infertility is being practised in some well-known medical institutions in Tehran and some other cities in Iran. While the majority of Muslims in the world are Sunni, the majority of Iranians are Shiite. Most Sunni scholars do not permit surrogate motherhood, since it involves introducing the sperm of a man into the uterus of a woman to whom he is not married. Most Shiite scholars, however, have issued jurisprudential decrees (fatwas) that allow surrogate motherhood (...) as a treatment for infertility, albeit only for legal couples. They regard this practice as transferring an embryo or fetus from one womb to another, which is not forbidden in Shiite jurisprudence. Nevertheless, there are some controversies concerning some issues such as kinship and inheritance. The main ethical concern of Iran’s experience with gestational surrogacy is the monetary relation between the intended couple and the surrogate mother. While monetary remuneration is practised in Iran and allowed by religious authorities, it seems to suffer from ethical problems. This article proposes that this kind of monetary relation should be modified and limited to reimbursement of normal costs. Such modification requires new legislation and religious decrees. (shrink)

In the United States at this time, no uniform federal law exists regarding commercial surrogacy, and state statutory schemes vary vastly, ranging from criminalization to legal recognition with contract enforcement. The authors examine how commercial surrogacy agencies utilize the Internet as a means for attracting parents and surrogates by employing emotional cultural rhetoric. By inducing both parents and surrogates to their jurisdiction, agencies circumvent vast discrepancies in state statutory regulative schemes and create a distinct interstate business, absent an efficient regulatory (...) framework or legal recourse in some circumstances. The authors propose a uniform federal regulatory scheme premised upon regulating interstate business transactions to create accountability and legal remedies for both the parents and the surrogate. (shrink)

This article aims to lay out the ‘for money’ and ‘for dignity’ arguments that feminist ethicists have given about the reproductive labour women perform in providing oocytes or in getting pregnant for others. Feminist arguments about the morality of these two practices overlap significantly because, from a feminist perspective, the morally relevant facts about them are quite similar. Still, there are dissimilarities, stemming from the obvious fact that one practice involves giving up oocytes while the other involves giving up a (...) baby after a pregnancy. Some arguments by feminists reflect this core difference, in that they apply specifically to one practice but not to the other. The article highlights when the relevance of a particular argument differs for these different reproductive practices. (shrink)

In recent years, a number of writers dealingwith questions over parenthood that arisein the context of reproductive technologies andsurrogate motherhood, have appealed to thenotion of ``intentional parenthood''. Basingtheir argument on liberal values such asindividual autonomy, the freedom to entercontracts, the right to privacy, and individualself-fulfilment, they argue that contractuallystated intentions, rather than genetic orgestational relationships, should form thebasis of parental rights. Against this I arguethat parental rights do not derive fromcontractual agreements, but are based in theirobligations towards the child. I (...) then examinethe nature of the obligations that the variousparties have towards the child both pre- andpostnatally. (shrink)

Reproductive techniques and practices, ranging from ordinary birth-control measures and artificial insemination to embryo transfer and surrogate motherhood, have greatly enhanced our range of reproductive choices. As a consequence, they pose a number of difficult moral and legal questions with regard to the formation of a family and our conception of parenthood. A view that is becoming increasingly common is that parental rights and responsibilities should not be based on genetic relationships but should instead be seen as arising from agreements (...) or contracts between individuals. Accordingly, a man who consents to his wife's artificial insemination by donor (AID) and not the sperm donor, is the legal father of the child; in surrogacy agreements, the intending mother, and not the surrogate, has the right to raise the resulting child. While agreeing that biology should not form the basis for assigning legal parenthood, I argue that the theory of intentional parenthood, despite being put forward as a liberal theory, is geared toward or will have the function of protecting the nuclear family and inhibiting the formation of alternative family forms. (shrink)

Various authors, for instance Elizabeth Anderson, Rosemary Tong, Mary Warnock and Margaret Brazier have argued that commercial surrogate motherhood is exploitative and that it should be prohibited. Their arguments are unconvincing. Exploitation is a more complex notion than it is usually presented as being. Unequal bargaining power can be a cause of exploitation but the exercise of unequal bargaining power is not inevitably or inherently exploitative. Exploitation concerns unfair and/or unjust strategies - rather than the exercise of power as such. (...) Commercial surrogate motherhood is not necessarily exploitative. Furthermore, not all transactions which are exploitative should be made illegal. (shrink)

McLachlan and Swales dispute my arguments against commercial surrogatemotherhood. In reply, I argue that commercial surrogate contractsobjectionably commodify children because they regardparental rights over children not as trusts, to be allocated in the bestinterests of the child, but as like property rights, to be allocatedat the will o the parents. They also express disrespect for mothers, bycompromising their inalienable right to act in the best interest of theirchildren, when this interest calls for mothers to assert a custody rightin their children.

The introduction of contraceptive technologies hasresulted in the separation of sex and procreation. Theintroduction of new reproductive technologies (mainlyIVF and embryo transfer) has led not only to theseparation of procreation and sex, but also to there-definition of the terms mother and family.For the purpose of this essay, I will distinguishbetween:1. the genetic mother – the donor of the egg;2. the gestational mother – she who bears and gives birth to the baby;3. the social mother – the woman who raises the (...) child.This essay will deal only with the form of gestationalsurrogacy in which the genetic parents intend to bethe social parents, and the surrogate mother has nogenetic relationship to the child she bears anddelivers. I will raise questions regarding medicalethical aspects of surrogacy and the obligation(s) ofthe physician(s) to the parties involved. I will arguethat the gestational surrogate is a womb to rent,that there is great similarity between gestationalcommercial surrogacy and organ transplant marketing.Furthermore, despite claims to freedom of choice andfree marketing, I will claim that gestationalsurrogacy is a form of prostitution and slavery,exploitation of the poor and needy by those who arebetter off. The right to be a parent, although notconstitutional, is intuitive and deeply rooted.However, the issue remains whether this rightoverrules all other rights, and at what price to theparties involved. I will finally raise the followingprovocative question to society: In the interim periodbetween today''s limited technology and tomorrow''sextra-corporeal gestation technology (ectogenesis),should utilizing females in PVS (persistent vehetativestate) for gestational surrogacy be sociallyacceptable/permissible – provided they have leftpermission in writing? (shrink)