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  1. From Proto-Sceptic to Sceptic in Sextus' Outlines of Pyrrhonism.Robb Dunphy - forthcoming - Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science.
    This is an account of Sceptical investigation as it is presented by Sextus Empiricus. I focus attention on the motivation behind the Sceptic’s investigation, the goal of that investigation, and on the development Sextus describes from proto-Sceptical to Sceptical investigator. I suggest that recent accounts of the Sceptic’s investigative practice do not make sufficient sense of the fact that the Sceptic finds a relief from disturbance by way of suspending judgement, nor of the apparent continuity between proto-Sceptical and Sceptical investigation. (...)
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  2. The Varieties of Agnosticism.Filippo Ferrari & Luca Incurvati - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    We provide a framework for understanding agnosticism. The framework accounts for the varieties of agnosticism while vindicating the unity of the phenomenon. This combination of unity and plurality is achieved by taking the varieties of agnosticism to be represented by several agnostic stances, all of which share a common core provided by what we call the minimal agnostic attitude. We illustrate the fruitfulness of the framework by showing how it can be applied to several philosophical debates. In particular, several philosophical (...)
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  3. On the Epistemic Costs of Frienship: Against the Encroachment View.Catherine Rioux - forthcoming - Episteme.
    I defend the thesis that friendship can constitutively require epistemic irrationality against a recent, forceful challenge, raised by proponents of moral and pragmatic encroachment. Defenders of the "encroachment strategy" argue that exemplary friends who are especially slow to believe that their friends have acted wrongly are simply sensitive to the high prudential or moral costs of falsely believing in their friends' guilt. Drawing on psychological work on epistemic motivation (and in particular on the notion of "need for closure"), I propose (...)
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  4. Profiling, Neutrality and Social Equality.Lewis D. Ross - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    Traditional views on which beliefs are subject only to purely epistemic assessment can reject demographic profiling, even when based on seemingly robust evidence. This is because the moral failures involved in demographic profiling can be located in the decision not to suspend judgement, rather than supposing that beliefs themselves are a locus of moral evaluation. A key moral reason to suspend judgement when faced with adverse demographic evidence is to promote social equality—this explains why positive profiling is dubious in addition (...)
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  5. Pro Tem Rationality.Julia Staffel - forthcoming - Philosophical Perspectives 35.
    Epistemologists routinely distinguish between two kinds of justification or rationality – the propositional and the doxastic kind – in order to characterize importantly different ways in which an attitude can be justified or rational for a person. I argue that these notions, as they are commonly understood, are well suited to capture rationality judgments about the attitudes that agents reach as conclusions of their reasoning. Yet, these notions are ill-suited to capture rationality judgments about attitudes that agents form while their (...)
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  6. On Suspending Properly.Kurt Sylvan & Errol Lord - forthcoming - In Luis Oliveria & Paul Silva (eds.), Propositional and Doxastic Justification. Routledge.
    We argue for a novel view of suspending judgment properly--i.e., suspending judgment in an ex post justified way. In so doing we argue for a Kantian virtue-theoretic view of epistemic normativity and against teleological virtue-theoretic accounts.
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  7. A Dilemma for Higher-Level Suspension.Eyal Tal - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association.
    Is it ever rational to suspend judgment about whether a particular doxastic attitude of ours is rational? An agent who suspends about whether her attitude is rational has serious doubts that it is. These doubts place a special burden on the agent, namely, to justify maintaining her chosen attitude over others. A dilemma arises. Providing justification for maintaining the chosen attitude would commit the agent to considering the attitude rational—contrary to her suspension on the matter. Alternatively, in the absence of (...)
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  8. Agnosticism as Settled Indecision.Verena Wagner - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
    In this paper, I spell out a descriptive account of agnosticism that captures the intuitive view that a subject enters the mental state of agnosticism via an act or event called suspension. I will argue that agnosticism is a complex mental state, and that the formation of an attitude is the relevant act or event by which a subject commits to indecision regarding some matter. I will suggest a `two-component analysis' that addresses two aspects that jointly account for the settled (...)
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  9. The Aim of Belief and Suspended Belief.C. J. Atkinson - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (4):581-606.
    In this paper, I discuss whether different interpretations of the ‘aim’ of belief—both the teleological and normative interpretations—have the resources to explain certain descriptive and normative features of suspended belief (suspension). I argue that, despite the recent efforts of theorists to extend these theories to account for suspension, they ultimately fail. The implication is that we must either develop alternative theories of belief that can account for suspension, or we must abandon the assumption that these theories ought to be able (...)
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  10. Being Neutral: Agnosticism, Inquiry and the Suspension of Judgment.Matthew McGrath - 2021 - Noûs 55 (2):463-484.
    Epistemologists often claim that in addition to belief and disbelief there is a third, neutral, doxastic attitude. Various terms are used: ‘suspending judgment’, ‘withholding’, ‘agnosticism’. It is also common to claim that the factors relevant to the justification of these attitudes are epistemic in the narrow sense of being factors that bear on the strength or weakness of one’s epistemic position with respect to the target proposition. This paper addresses two challenges to such traditionalism about doxastic attitudes. The first concerns (...)
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  11. Against Suspending Judgement in the Virtue of Testimonial Justice.Sarah Veñegas - 2021 - Suri: Journal of the Philosophical Association of the Philippines 9 (1):42-59.
    Consider the case wherein a person refuses to listen to a woman’s testimony of leadership, due to the belief that women are incompetent. This is testimonial injustice. It involves the hearer’s prejudicial belief over the speaker’s socially imagined identity. This injustice creates lasting kinds of harms to one’s epistemic self-respect and freedom, as the hearer gives a decreased credibility level to the speaker. In Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing, Miranda Fricker proposes the virtue of testimonial justice, which (...)
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  12. What Is Wrong With Agnostic Belief?Yuval Avnur - 2020 - In Agnosticism: Explorations in Philosophy and Religious Thought. pp. Ch 2.
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  13. Constitutive Reasons and the Suspension of Judgement.Whitney Lilly - 2019 - Dialogue 58 (2):215-224.
    This paper identifies a puzzle that emerges when recent work on the suspension of judgement is integrated with evidentialist solutions to the wrong kind of reasons problem: it looks like there is no such thing as a reason to suspend judgement. Two possible responses to this puzzle are considered: one recharacterizes the suspension of judgement as a mental action, and the other recharacterizes it as a second-order attitude. It is argued that these responses sidestep the puzzle only with unacceptable compromise (...)
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  14. Probabilistic Knowledge.Sarah Moss - 2018 - Oxford University Press.
    Traditional philosophical discussions of knowledge have focused on the epistemic status of full beliefs. In this book, Moss argues that in addition to full beliefs, credences can constitute knowledge. For instance, your .4 credence that it is raining outside can constitute knowledge, in just the same way that your full beliefs can. In addition, you can know that it might be raining, and that if it is raining then it is probably cloudy, where this knowledge is not knowledge of propositions, (...)
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