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  1. added 2020-04-29
    Fictionalism of Anticipation.Raimundas Vidunas - manuscript
    A promising recent approach for understanding complex phenomena is recognition of anticipatory behavior of living organisms, social organizations. The anticipatory, predictive action permits learning, novelty seeking, rich experiential existence. I argue that the established frameworks of anticipation, adaptation, or learning imply overly passive roles of anticipatory agents, and that a fictionalist, or even a mythological vocabulary would reflect the core of anticipatory behavior better than representational or future references. Cognizing beings enact not just their model of the world, but own (...)
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  2. added 2019-12-25
    Occurrent States.Gary Bartlett - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (1):1-17.
    The distinction between occurrent and non-occurrent mental states is frequently appealed to by contemporary philosophers, but it has never been explicated in any significant detail. In the literature, two accounts of the distinction are commonly presupposed. One is that occurrent states are conscious states. The other is that non-occurrent states are dispositional states, and thus that occurrent states are manifestations of dispositions. I argue that neither of these accounts is adequate, and therefore that another account is needed. I propose that (...)
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  3. added 2019-12-19
    Know How and Skill: The Puzzles of Priority and Equivalence.Yuri Cath - forthcoming - In Ellen Fridland & Carlotta Pavese (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Skill and Expertise. Routledge.
    This chapter explores the relationship between knowing-how and skill, as well other success-in-action notions like dispositions and abilities. I offer a new view of knowledge-how which combines elements of both intellectualism and Ryleanism. According to this view, knowing how to perform an action is both a kind of knowing-that (in accord with intellectualism) and a complex multi-track dispositional state (in accord with Ryle’s view of knowing-how). I argue that this new view—what I call practical attitude intellectualism—offers an attractive set of (...)
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  4. added 2019-06-06
    Tacit Knowledge and Realism and Constructivism in the Writings of Harry Collins.Trevor Pinch - 2013 - Philosophia Scientiae 17 (3):41-54.
    Dans cet article, j’examine les écrits influents de Harry Collins consacrés à la connaissance tacite. Je me penche en particulier sur son récent livre, Tacit and Explicit Knowledge [Collins 2010] ou TEK, qui est sans doute l’exposé le plus complet et le plus systématique de la manière dont Collins conçoit la connaissance tacite. Tout en examinant la connaissance tacite telle qu’elle est développée dans cette contribution, je dégage, au sein des contributions majeures de Collins à la sociologie de la connaissance (...)
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  5. added 2019-06-06
    Refining the Tacit.Harry Collins - 2013 - Philosophia Scientiae 17 (3):155-178.
    General For one’s work to be made the topic of a special issue of a journal is an enormous honour. That it is a philosophy journal makes the honour still greater since I am not a professional philosopher. Though I have no technical and scholarly training in philosophy, I have, however, learned hugely from a certain style of philosophical work, and from the start of my career in sociology, the later philosophy of Wittgenstein has been a dominant role model. Thus (...)
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  6. added 2019-06-06
    Analysing Tacit Knowledge: Response to Henry and Lowney.Harry Collins - 2011 - Tradition and Discovery 38 (1):38-42.
    I respond to the reviews by Henry and Lowney of my book Tacit and Explicit Knowledge. I stress the need to understand explicit knowledge if tacit knowledge is to be understood. Tacit knowledge must be divided into three kinds: relational, somatic and collective. The idea of relational tacit knowledge is keyto pulling the three kinds apart.
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  7. added 2019-06-06
    Construing Polanyi’s Tacit Knowing as Knowing by Acquaintance Rather Than Knowing by Representation: Some Implications.Dale Cannon - 2002 - Tradition and Discovery 29 (2):26-43.
    This essay proposes that Polanyi’s tacit knowing – specifically his conception of tacit knowing as cognitive contact with reality – should be construed as fundamentally a knowing by acquaintance – a relational knowing of reality, rather than merely the underlying subsidiary component of explicit representational knowledge. Thus construed, Polanyi’s theory that tacit knowing is foundational to all human knowing is more radical than is often supposed, for it challenges the priority status of explicit representational knowledge relative to tacit acquaintance knowledge, (...)
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  8. added 2019-06-05
    The Tacit Dimension. --.Michael Polanyi & Amartya Sen - 1966 - Chicago, IL: University of Chicago.
    Suitable for students and scholars, this title challenges the assumption that skepticism, rather than established belief, lies at the heart of scientific discovery.
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  9. added 2019-04-30
    Tacit Knowledge/Knowing and the Problem of Articulation.Zhenhua Yu - 2003 - Tradition and Discovery 30 (2):11-22.
  10. added 2019-03-07
    Belief as the Power to Judge.Nicholas Koziolek - forthcoming - Topoi:1-10.
    A number of metaphysicians of powers have argued that we need to distinguish the actualization of a power from the effects of that actualization. This distinction, I argue, has important consequences for the dispositional theory of belief. In particular, it suggests that dispositionalists have in effect been trying to define belief, not in terms of its actualization, but instead in terms of the effects of its actualization. As a general rule, however, powers are to be defined in terms of their (...)
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  11. added 2018-10-01
    Tacit Knowledge and Its Antonyms.Tim Thornton - 2013 - Philosophia Scientiæ 17 (3):93-106.
    Harry Collins’s Tacit and Explicit Knowledge characterises tacit knowledge through a number of antonyms: explicit, explicable, and then explicable via elaboration, transformation, mechanization and explanation and, most fundamentally, what can be communicated via “strings”. But his account blurs the distinction between knowledge and what knowledge can be of and has a number of counter-intuitive consequences. This is the result of his adoption of strings themselves rather than the use of words or signs as the mark of what is explicit and, (...)
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  12. added 2018-09-20
    Reputation and Group Dispositions.Andrés Páez - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (3):469-484.
    In many contexts, such as business, science and law, it is essential to determine whether a company, a product or a person in fact has the reputation attributed to it, regardless of whether that reputation has been rightly earned. In this paper I offer two necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the attribution of a reputation to a subject within a social group. The first one concerns the way in which reputational information is spread among the members of the relevant (...)
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  13. added 2018-07-25
    Phenomenal Dispositions.Henry Ian Schiller - forthcoming - Synthese:1-12.
    In this paper, I argue against a dispositional account of the intentionality of belief states that has been endorsed by proponents of phenomenal intentionality. Specifically, I argue that the best characterization of a dispositional account of intentionality is one that takes beliefs to be dispositions to undergo occurrent judgments. I argue that there are cases where an agent believes that p, but fails to have a disposition to judge that p.
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  14. added 2018-07-18
    Colivan Commitment, Vis-À-Vis Moore’s Paradox.Ted Parent - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (2):323-333.
    This is a contribution to a symposium on Annalisa Coliva's book _The Varieties of Self-Knowledge_. I present her notion of a "commitment" and how it is used in her treatment of Moore paradoxical assertions and thoughts (e.g., "I believe that it is raining, but it is not;" "It is raining but I do not believe that it is"). The final section notes the points of convergence between her constitutivism about self-knowledge of commitments, and the constitutivism from my book _Self-Reflection for (...)
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  15. added 2018-06-12
    If You Can't Change What You Believe, You Don't Believe It.Grace Helton - forthcoming - Noûs.
    I develop and defend the view that subjects are necessarily psychologically able to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Specifically, subjects can revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence, given their current psychological mechanisms and skills. If a subject lacks this ability, then the mental state in question is not a belief, though it may be some other kind of cognitive attitude, such as a supposi-tion, an entertained thought, or a pretense. The result is a moderately revisionary (...)
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  16. added 2018-06-01
    Tacit Knowledge Meets Analytic Kantianism.Stephen Turner - 2014 - Tradition and Discovery 41 (1):33-47.
    Neil Gascoigne and Tim Thornton’s Tacit Knowledge is an attempt to find a place for tacit knowledge as “knowledge” within the limits of analytic epistemology. They do so by reference to Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson’s analysis of the term “way” and by the McDowell-like claim that reference to the tacitly rooted “way” of doing something exhausts the knowledge aspect of tacit knowledge, which preserves the notion of tacit knowledge, while excluding most of Michael Polanyi’s examples, and rendering Hubert Dreyfus’s (...)
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  17. added 2018-02-22
    Eliminating the Problem of Stored Beliefs.Matthew Frise - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (1):63-79.
    The problem of stored beliefs is that of explaining how non-occurrent, seemingly justified beliefs are indeed justified. Internalism about epistemic justification, the view that one’s mental life alone determines what one is justified in believing, allegedly cannot solve this problem. This paper provides a solution. It asks: Does having a belief that p require having a special relation to a mental representation that p? If the answer is yes, then there are no stored beliefs, and so there is no problem. (...)
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  18. added 2018-02-17
    Counterexamples and Tacit Premises.Claude Gratton - 2000 - Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 20 (1):9-22.
    I argue that there are at least two kinds of tacit premises; describe a certain type of counterexample against the validity of arguments, and then use it to identify one kind of tacit premise. I distinguish two classes of tacit premises on the grounds that they are discovered or constructed differently, they have different roles in an argument or causal explanation, and have different logical relations to each other.
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  19. added 2018-01-06
    Tacit Knowledge.Jerry Howard Samet - 1980 - Dissertation, City University of New York
    Chapter IV has three parts. In the first, I consider another model for tacit knowledge ascriptions proposed by Graves, Katz, et. al.. This conception I argue, meets the objections levelled against the Chomskyan position. The key to this proposal is that we only ascribe tacit knowledge in cases where we have some unexplained explicit knowledge to account for. In the next section I consider and reject a number of arguments against the Graves-Katz approach. Finally, I argue that two proposed alternatives (...)
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  20. added 2017-09-28
    Marketing Management and Polanyi's Theory of Tacit Knowing.Jere Moorman - 2007 - Appraisal 6.
  21. added 2017-09-28
    Abstract - Humor and Michael Polanyi's Theory of Tacit Knowing.Jere Moorman - 1983 - Tradition and Discovery 11 (2):23-23.
  22. added 2017-07-12
    Michael Polanyi: Tacit Knowledge, Articulation and Economics.Pedro Blas Gonzalez - 2012 - Philosophy for Business 75.
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  23. added 2017-07-12
    The Case for Tacit Knowledge.Jerry H. Gill - 1971 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):49-59.
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  24. added 2017-03-01
    Insincerity.Andreas Stokke - 2014 - Noûs 48 (3):496-520.
    This paper argues for an account of insincerity in speech according to which an utterance is insincere if and only if it communicates something that does not correspond to the speaker's conscious attitudes. Two main topics are addressed: the relation between insincerity and the saying-meaning distinction, and the mental attitude underlying insincere speech. The account is applied to both assertoric and non-assertoric utterances of declarative sentences, and to utterances of non-declarative sentences. It is shown how the account gives the right (...)
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  25. added 2017-02-15
    Editorial Introduction: Collins and Tacit Knowledge.Léna Soler & Sjoerd Zwart - 2013 - Philosophia Scientiae 17 (3):5-23.
  26. added 2017-02-15
    Tacit Knowledge and Beliefs.Dunja Tihomirović-Jutronić - 1991 - Theoria 34 (1):19-28.
  27. added 2017-02-14
    At the Margins of Tacit Knowledge.Michael Lynch - 2013 - Philosophia Scientiæ 17 (3):55-73.
    Michael Polanyi and H.M. Collins contrast tacit knowledge with explicit knowledge. For Collins, secrets and other forms of “relational tacit knowledge” are tacit, but only in relation to specific circumstances and relationships. Collins treats such relational knowledge as less interesting theoretically than collective knowledge that is essentially difficult and perhaps impossible to convey through explicit formulations. In this paper I focus on relational tacit knowledge, despite its marginality in Collins’s typology, because it draws attention to conceptual ambiguities in the relationship (...)
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  28. added 2017-02-14
    Tacit Knowledge.R. Watson - 2006 - Theory, Culture and Society 23 (2-3):208-210.
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  29. added 2017-02-14
    The Tacit Dimension.P. M. C. Davies - 1968 - Philosophical Studies (Dublin) 17:222-234.
    For all his peculiarities, man is not the only animal who knows. But he is, as far as it is possible to judge, the only animal who knows that he knows, and who seeks to understand the nature and meaning of the act of knowing itself. Michael Polanyi has been engaged in this search for more than twenty years, and the book here under review is an ‘interim report’ on the development of his thought since the publication of Personal Knowledge (...)
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  30. added 2017-02-14
    The Study of Man (Routledge Revivals): The Lindsay Memorial Lectures 1958.Michael Polanyi - 1959 - Routledge.
    Michael Polanyi (1891-1976) was an eminent theorist across the fields of philosophy, physical chemistry and economics. Elected to the Royal Society and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, his contributions to research in the social sciences, and his theories on positivism and knowledge, are of critical academic importance. The three lectures included in this comprehensive volume, first published in 1959, argue for Polanyi’s principle of ‘tacit knowing’ as a fundamental component of knowledge. They were intended to accompany Polanyi’s earlier (...)
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  31. added 2017-02-13
    Cognitive Aspects of Tacit Knowledge and Cultural Diversity.Riccardo Viale & Andrea Pozzali - 2007 - In L. Magnani & P. Li (eds.), Model-Based Reasoning in Science, Technology, and Medicine. Springer. pp. 229--244.
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  32. added 2017-02-13
    Tacit Knowledge in Teacher Education.Gabriele Lakomski - 1997 - In David N. Aspin (ed.), Logical Empiricism and Post₋Empiricism in Educational Discourse. [Distributed by] Thorold's Africana Books.
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  33. added 2017-02-10
    Evangelical Catholicism and the Tacit Dimension of Theology.Marty Moleski - 2001 - Tradition and Discovery 28 (1):31-32.
    Moleski responds to reviews of Personal Catholicism by Joseph Kroger and John Apcyznski. He argues that theology is tacit or rooted in tacit knowledge and therefore cannot be fully articulated. He portrays the Roman Catholic tradition as an interpretative framework that differs from scientific frameworks by being bound to a particular revelation made in history which is then preserved by a Specific Authority.
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  34. added 2017-02-07
    Can Tacit Knowledge Fit Into a Computer Model of Scientific Cognitive Processes? The Case of Biotechnology.Andrea Pozzali - 2007 - Mind and Society 6 (2):211-224.
    This paper tries to express a critical point of view on the computational turn in philosophy by looking at a specific field of study: philosophy of science. The paper starts by briefly discussing the main contributions that information and communication technologies have given to the rising of computational philosophy of science, and in particular to the cognitive modelling approach. The main question then arises, concerning how computational models can cope with the presence of tacit knowledge in science. Would it be (...)
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  35. added 2017-02-03
    Tacit Aspects of Experimental Practices: What Epistemological Consequences?Léna Soler - unknown
    Among the new objects of interest emerged from the study of science in action, an important one is what has been categorized under the heading of the “tacit”: tacit knowledge, the tacit dimension of scientific practices. Harry Collins, in particular, insisted that irreducibly tacit presuppositions and corporal skills are inevitably involved in experimental practices, and that these tacit resources play an essential role in the stabilization of scientific achievements. The aim of this talk is to discuss some epistemological implications of (...)
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  36. added 2017-01-29
    Journeyman to Master: The Passing on of Tacit Knowledge.Bob Brownhill - 2001 - Appraisal 3.
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  37. added 2017-01-17
    Intercorporeity, Movement and Tacit Knowledge.Undine Eberlein (ed.) - 2016
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  38. added 2017-01-15
    Revealing Tacit Knowledge: Embodiment and Explication.Frank Adloff (ed.) - 2014 - Cambridge University Press.
    How does tacit knowledge inscribe itself into cultural and social practices? As the established distinction between tacit and explicit or discursive forms of knowledge does not explain this question, the contributions in this volume reconstruct, describe, and analyze the manifold processes by which the tacit reveals itself: They focus, for example, on metaphors, myths, and visualizations as explications of the tacit as well as on processes of embodiment. Taken together, they demonstrate that the tacit does not constitute a single or (...)
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  39. added 2017-01-15
    Refining the Tacit.Harry Collins - 2013 - Philosophia Scientae 17:155-178.
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  40. added 2017-01-15
    At the Margins of Tacit Knowledge.Michael Lynch - 2013 - Philosophia Scientae 17:55-73.
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  41. added 2016-12-07
    Preservationism in the Epistemology of Memory.Matthew Frise - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (268).
    Preservationism states that memory preserves the justification of the beliefs it preserves. More precisely: if S formed a justified belief that p at t1 and retains in memory a belief that p until t2, then S's belief that p is prima facie justified via memory at t2. Preservationism is an unchallenged orthodoxy in the epistemology of memory. Advocates include Sven Bernecker, Tyler Burge, Alvin Goldman, Gilbert Harman, Michael Huemer, Matthew McGrath, and Thomas Senor. I develop three dilemmas for it, in (...)
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  42. added 2016-12-05
    Tacit Knowledg and the Problem of Computer Modelling Cognitive Processes in Science.Stephen Turner - 1989 - In Steve Fuller (ed.), The Cognitive Turn: Sociological and Psychological Perspectives on Science. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    In what follows I propose to bring out certain methodological properties of projects of modelling the tacit realm that bear on the kinds of modelling done in connection with scientific cognition by computer as well as by ethnomethodological sociologists, both of whom must make some claims about the tacit in the course of their efforts to model cognition. The same issues, I will suggest, bear on the project of a cognitive psychology of science as well.
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  43. added 2016-11-28
    The Study of Man.Michael Polanyi - 1959 - London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
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  44. added 2016-11-15
    Personal Knowledge.Michael Polanyi - 2010 - Routledge.
    First published in 2012. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
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  45. added 2016-11-15
    Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy.Michael Polanyi - 1958 - University of Chicago Press.
    In this work the distinguished physical chemist and philosopher, Michael Polanyi, demonstrates that the scientist's personal participation in his knowledge, in both its discovery and its validation, is an indispensable part of science itself. Even in the exact sciences, "knowing" is an art, of which the skill of the knower, guided by his personal commitment and his passionate sense of increasing contact with reality, is a logically necessary part. In the biological and social sciences this becomes even more evident. The (...)
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  46. added 2016-11-15
    Personal Knowledge.Michael Polanyi - 1958 - Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
    In this work the distinguished physical chemist and philosopher, Michael Polanyi, demonstrates that the scientist's personal participation in his knowledge, in ...
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  47. added 2016-09-19
    Neil Gascoigne and Tim Thornton, Tacit Knowledge, Durham: Acumen, 2013, 210 Pp., £18.99 , ISBN 1844655466; £55 , ISBN 1844655458. [REVIEW]Julien Dutant - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (4):621-623.
  48. added 2016-08-27
    On the False Ontological Consensus.Mudyń Krzysztof - 2015 - Polish Psychological Bulletin 46 (2):160-173.
    The objective of the research was to check whether False Consensus Effect (FCE), shown in much research,is also valid for ontological decisions. Test participants, faced with an ontological dilemma, made a choice three times,which of the 3 item set (Cracow City, Me myself, the Universe) refers to something most real. The research conducted first among psychology students (N=116), then replicated on mathematics students (N=126) and middle-aged people (N=106). Results: 1) All groups chose the Universe most seldom (4%-11% subjects), the remaining (...)
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  49. added 2016-05-21
    Internalism and the Problem of Stored Beliefs.Matthew Frise - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (2):285-304.
    A belief is stored if it is in no way before the subject’s mind. The problem of stored beliefs is that of satisfactorily explaining how the stored beliefs which seem justified are indeed justified. In this paper I challenge the two main internalist attempts to solve this problem. Internalism about epistemic justification, at a minimum, states that one’s mental life alone determines what one is justified in believing. First I dispute the attempt from epistemic conservatism, which states that believing justifies (...)
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  50. added 2016-05-18
    Belief States in Criminal Law.James A. Macleod - forthcoming - Oklahoma Law Review 68.
    Belief-state ascription — determining what someone “knew,” “believed,” was “aware of,” etc. — is central to many areas of law. In criminal law, the distinction between knowledge and recklessness, and the use of broad jury instructions concerning other belief states, presupposes a common and stable understanding of what those belief-state terms mean. But a wealth of empirical work at the intersection of philosophy and psychology — falling under the banner of “Experimental Epistemology” — reveals how laypeople’s understandings of mens rea (...)
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