Tacit and Dispositional Belief

How does tacit knowledge inscribe itself into cultural and social practices? As the established distinction between tacit and explicit or discursive forms of knowledge does not explain this question, the contributions in this volume reconstruct, describe, and analyze the manifold processes by which the tacit reveals itself: They focus, for example, on metaphors, myths, and visualizations as explications of the tacit as well as on processes of embodiment. Taken together, they demonstrate that the tacit does not constitute a single or (...) unified knowledge complex, but has to be understood in its differentiated and fragmented forms. (shrink)

Según la Propositional Attitude View (PAV), un hablante es competente en su idioma en virtud de poseer actitudes proposicionales cuyo contenido es su gramática interna. En este artículo desarrollo una objeción a PAV, llamada �el reto de la integración�, originalmente propuesto por Stich (1978) y Evans (1981), y que está constituido por dos premisas: (1) las actitudes proposicionales se caracterizan por su integración inferencial, y (2) los estados que contienen información gramatical no están inferencialmente integrados. En este artículo considero y (...) rechazo las respuestas a este argumento formuladas por Dwyer y Pietroski (1996), Higginbotham (1987) y Knowles (2000). (shrink)

This essay proposes that Polanyi’s tacit knowing – specifically his conception of tacit knowing as cognitive contact with reality – should be construed as fundamentally a knowing by acquaintance – a relational knowing of reality, rather than merely the underlying subsidiary component of explicit representational knowledge. Thus construed, Polanyi’s theory that tacit knowing is foundational to all human knowing is more radical than is often supposed, for it challenges the priority status of explicit representational knowledge relative to tacit acquaintance knowledge, (...) which has been the dominant paradigm for most of the Western epistemological tradition. (shrink)

General For one’s work to be made the topic of a special issue of a journal is an enormous honour. That it is a philosophy journal makes the honour still greater since I am not a professional philosopher. Though I have no technical and scholarly training in philosophy, I have, however, learned hugely from a certain style of philosophical work, and from the start of my career in sociology, the later philosophy of Wittgenstein has been a dominant role model. Thus (...) I thank the editors for providi.. (shrink)

My book, Tacit and Explicit Knowledge, is introduced. The introduction is also helpful in explaining the book to me, the author.Mon livre, Tacit and Explicit Knowledge, est introduit. L’introduction est également utile pour m’expliquer le livre à moi-même, l’auteur.

I respond to the reviews by Henry and Lowney of my book Tacit and Explicit Knowledge. I stress the need to understand explicit knowledge if tacit knowledge is to be understood. Tacit knowledge must be divided into three kinds: relational, somatic and collective. The idea of relational tacit knowledge is keyto pulling the three kinds apart.

In order to predict and explain behavior, one cannot specify the mental state of an agent merely by saying what information she possesses. Instead one must specify what information is available to an agent relative to various purposes. Specifying mental states in this way allows us to accommodate cases of imperfect recall, cognitive accomplishments involved in logical deduction, the mental states of confused or fragmented subjects, and the difference between propositional knowledge and know-how .

Dispositionalist accounts of belief define beliefs in terms of specific sets of dispositions. In this article, I provide a blind-spot argument against these accounts. The core idea of the argument is that beliefs having the form [p and it is not manifestly believed that p] cannot be manifestly believed. This means that one cannot manifest such beliefs in one’s assertions, conscious thoughts, actions, behaviours, or any other type of activity. However, if beliefs are sets of dispositions, they must be manifestable (...) in some way. Therefore, according to my argument, beliefs are not sets of dispositions. The argument is defended against some possible objections. (shrink)

The problem of stored beliefs is that of explaining how non-occurrent, seemingly justified beliefs are indeed justified. Internalism about epistemic justification, the view that one’s mental life alone determines what one is justified in believing, allegedly cannot solve this problem. This paper provides a solution. It asks: Does having a belief that p require having a special relation to a mental representation that p? If the answer is yes, then there are no stored beliefs, and so there is no problem. (...) Drawing on extensive research in cognitive psychology, this paper argues that memory doesn’t store the representations required for stored belief, and we don’t bear the special relation to anything memory does store. On the leading “no” answer, a belief is roughly a set of dispositions. This paper argues that a justified belief is then best understood as a set of dispositions. Since these dispositions are mental, internalism can count the right stored beliefs as justified. (shrink)

A belief is stored if it is in no way before the subject’s mind. The problem of stored beliefs is that of satisfactorily explaining how the stored beliefs which seem justified are indeed justified. In this paper I challenge the two main internalist attempts to solve this problem. Internalism about epistemic justification, at a minimum, states that one’s mental life alone determines what one is justified in believing. First I dispute the attempt from epistemic conservatism, which states that believing justifies (...) retaining belief. Then I defend the attempt from dispositionalism, which assigns a justifying role to dispositions, from some key objections. But by drawing on cognitive psychological research I show that, for internalism, the problem of stored beliefs remains. (shrink)

I introduce and defend an argument against the popular view that anything falling short of knowledge falls short in value. The nature of belief and cognitive psychological research on memory, I claim, support the argument. I also show that not even the most appealing mode of knowledge is distinctively valuable.

Preservationism states that memory preserves the justification of the beliefs it preserves. More precisely: if S formed a justified belief that p at t1 and retains in memory a belief that p until t2, then S's belief that p is prima facie justified via memory at t2. Preservationism is an unchallenged orthodoxy in the epistemology of memory. Advocates include Sven Bernecker, Tyler Burge, Alvin Goldman, Gilbert Harman, Michael Huemer, Matthew McGrath, and Thomas Senor. I develop three dilemmas for it, in (...) part by drawing on research in cognitive psychology. The dilemmas centre on preservationism's implications for certain cases involving either stored beliefs, forgotten evidence, or recollection failure. Each dilemma shows that preservationism either is false or lacks key support. (shrink)

I argue that there are at least two kinds of tacit premises; describe a certain type of counterexample against the validity of arguments, and then use it to identify one kind of tacit premise. I distinguish two classes of tacit premises on the grounds that they are discovered or constructed differently, they have different roles in an argument or causal explanation, and have different logical relations to each other.

I develop and defend the view that subjects are necessarily psychologically able to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Specifically, subjects can revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence, given their current psychological mechanisms and skills. If a subject lacks this ability, then the mental state in question is not a belief, though it may be some other kind of cognitive attitude, such as a supposi-tion, an entertained thought, or a pretense. The result is a moderately revisionary (...) view of belief: while most mental states we thought were beliefs are beliefs, some mental states which we thought were beliefs are not beliefs. The argument for this view draws on two key claims: First, subjects are rationally obligated to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Second, if some subject is rationally obligated to revise one of her mental states, then that subject can revise that mental state, given her current psychological mechanisms and skills. Along the way to defending these claims, I argue that rational obligations can govern activities which reflect on one’s rational character, whether or not those activities are under one’s voluntary control. I also show how the relevant version of epistemic ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ survives an objection which plagues other variants of the principle. (shrink)

forthcoming in Journal of Philosophical Research. This paper argues against David Armstrong’s view that singular beliefs are not dispositions. It also begins to develop the view that self-conscious belief is a matter of belief revision.

The objective of the research was to check whether False Consensus Effect (FCE), shown in much research,is also valid for ontological decisions. Test participants, faced with an ontological dilemma, made a choice three times,which of the 3 item set (Cracow City, Me myself, the Universe) refers to something most real. The research conducted first among psychology students (N=116), then replicated on mathematics students (N=126) and middle-aged people (N=106). Results: 1) All groups chose the Universe most seldom (4%-11% subjects), the remaining (...) two “objects” were chosen with similar frequency, 2) FCE occurred in all groups and in reference to each choice, 3) with people who made inconsequent choices (16% of test participants), FCE was notably higher (p <.001) in comparison to people making consequent choices,4)FCE with inconsequent people turned out to be higher (p <.01) even in comparison with “the smallest minority”, people who (consequently) chose the Universe. (shrink)

Michael Polanyi and H.M. Collins contrast tacit knowledge with explicit knowledge. For Collins, secrets and other forms of “relational tacit knowledge” are tacit, but only in relation to specific circumstances and relationships. Collins treats such relational knowledge as less interesting theoretically than collective knowledge that is essentially difficult and perhaps impossible to convey through explicit formulations. In this paper I focus on relational tacit knowledge, despite its marginality in Collins’s typology, because it draws attention to conceptual ambiguities in the relationship (...) between tacit and explicit knowledge. More importantly, such ambiguities come into play as strategic resources in historical labor conflicts and in efforts to secure and preserve professional autonomy. Instead of treating tacit knowledge as a substantive possession of individuals and groups, I suggest that an empirical sociological alternative is to investigate pragmatic and polemical uses of the tacit/explicit distinction in particular circumstances of action and conflict. (shrink)

Belief-state ascription — determining what someone “knew,” “believed,” was “aware of,” etc. — is central to many areas of law. In criminal law, the distinction between knowledge and recklessness, and the use of broad jury instructions concerning other belief states, presupposes a common and stable understanding of what those belief-state terms mean. But a wealth of empirical work at the intersection of philosophy and psychology — falling under the banner of “Experimental Epistemology” — reveals how laypeople’s understandings of mens rea (...) concepts differ systematically from what scholars, courts, and perhaps legislators, have assumed. -/- As implemented, mens rea concepts are much more context-dependent and normatively evaluative than the conventional wisdom suggests, even assuming that jurors are following jury instructions to the letter. As a result, there is less difference between knowledge and recklessness than is typically assumed; jurors consistently “over”-ascribe knowledge to criminal defendants; and concepts like “belief,” “awareness,” and “conscious disregard” mean different things in different contexts, resulting in mens rea findings systematically responsive to aspects of the case traditionally considered irrelevant to the meaning of those terms. -/- This Article provides the first systematic account of the factors driving jurors’ ascriptions of the specific belief states criminal law invokes. After surveying mens rea jury instructions, introducing the Experimental Epistemology literature to the legal literature on mens rea, and examining the implications of that literature for criminal law, this Article considers ways to begin bridging the surprisingly large gap between mens rea theory and practice. (shrink)

Moleski responds to reviews of Personal Catholicism by Joseph Kroger and John Apcyznski. He argues that theology is tacit or rooted in tacit knowledge and therefore cannot be fully articulated. He portrays the Roman Catholic tradition as an interpretative framework that differs from scientific frameworks by being bound to a particular revelation made in history which is then preserved by a Specific Authority.

A series of papers on different aspects of practical knowledge by Roderick Chisholm, Rudolf Haller, J. C. Nyiri, Eva Picardi, Joachim Schulte Roger Scruton, Barry Smith and Johan Wrede.

This draft now appears (in revised form) as Chapter 6 of _Self-Reflection for the Opaque Mind_. See http://philpapers.org/rec/PARSFT-3.

This is a contribution to a symposium on Annalisa Coliva's book _The Varieties of Self-Knowledge_. I present her notion of a "commitment" and how it is used in her treatment of Moore paradoxical assertions and thoughts (e.g., "I believe that it is raining, but it is not;" "It is raining but I do not believe that it is"). The final section notes the points of convergence between her constitutivism about self-knowledge of commitments, and the constitutivism from my book _Self-Reflection for (...) the Opaque Mind_. (shrink)

In this paper I examine Harry Collins’s influential writing on tacit knowledge. In particular I turn my attention to his recent book, Tacit and Explicit Knowledge [Collins 2010], or TEK, which is arguably the most complete and systematic statement of what he means by the term “tacit knowledge”. As well as examining tacit knowledge as elaborated in this contribution, I draw out an underlying tension in Collins’s major contributions to the sociology of scientific knowledge in general between the realism underlying (...) his notion of “tacit knowledge” and the constructivism underlying his other well-known concept, “the experimenters’ regress”. In order to make this argument I pay particular attention to an aspect of his writings on tacit knowledge which I think is worthy of closer examination: namely the sorts of empirical support claimed for the features and properties of tacit knowledge to which he attends. In short I ask questions concerning some of the specific empirical examples and the conclusions he draws from them. (shrink)

First published in 2012. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Back in print for a new generation of students and scholars, this volume challenges the assumption that skepticism, rather than established belief, lies at the ...

“I shall reconsider human knowledge by starting from the fact that _we can know more than we can tell_,” writes Michael Polanyi, whose work paved the way for the likes of Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper. _The Tacit Dimension_ argues that tacit knowledge—tradition, inherited practices, implied values, and prejudgments—is a crucial part of scientific knowledge. Back in print for a new generation of students and scholars, this volume challenges the assumption that skepticism, rather than established belief, lies at the heart (...) of scientific discovery. “Polanyi’s work deserves serious attention.... [This is a] compact presentation of some of the essentials of his thought.”—_Review of Metaphysics_ “Polanyi’s work is still relevant today and a closer examination of this theory that all knowledge has personal and tacit elements... can be used to support and refute a variety of widely held approaches to knowledge management.”—_Electronic Journal of Knowledge_ "The reissuing of this remarkable book give us a new opportunity to see how far-reaching—and foundational—Michael Polanyi's ideas are, on some of the age-old questions in philosophy."—Amartya Sen, from the new Foreword. (shrink)

Michael Polanyi (1891-1976) was an eminent theorist across the fields of philosophy, physical chemistry and economics. Elected to the Royal Society and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, his contributions to research in the social sciences, and his theories on positivism and knowledge, are of critical academic importance. The three lectures included in this comprehensive volume, first published in 1959, argue for Polanyi’s principle of ‘tacit knowing’ as a fundamental component of knowledge. They were intended to accompany Polanyi’s earlier (...) work, Personal Knowledge , and as a tribute to the philosophical and educational work of Lord A. D. Lindsay. (shrink)

In this work the distinguished physical chemist and philosopher, Michael Polanyi, demonstrates that the scientist's personal participation in his knowledge, in both its discovery and its validation, is an indispensable part of science itself. Even in the exact sciences, "knowing" is an art, of which the skill of the knower, guided by his personal commitment and his passionate sense of increasing contact with reality, is a logically necessary part. In the biological and social sciences this becomes even more evident. The (...) tendency to make knowledge impersonal in our culture has split fact from value, science from humanity. Polanyi wishes to substitute for the objective, impersonal ideal of scientific detachment an alternative ideal which gives attention to the personal involvement of the knower in all acts of understanding. His book should help to restore science to its rightful place in an integrated culture, as part of the whole person's continuing endeavor to make sense of the totality of his experience. In honor of this work and his The Study of Man Polanyi was presented with the Lecomte de Noüy Award for 1959. (shrink)

In this work the distinguished physical chemist and philosopher, Michael Polanyi, demonstrates that the scientist's personal participation in his knowledge, in ...

This paper tries to express a critical point of view on the computational turn in philosophy by looking at a specific field of study: philosophy of science. The paper starts by briefly discussing the main contributions that information and communication technologies have given to the rising of computational philosophy of science, and in particular to the cognitive modelling approach. The main question then arises, concerning how computational models can cope with the presence of tacit knowledge in science. Would it be (...) possible to develop new ways of handling this specific type of knowledge, in order to incorporate it in computational models of scientific thinking? Or should tacit knowledge lead us to other approaches in using computer sciences to model scientific cognition? These questions are addressed by making reference to a detailed case study of a recent innovation development in the field of biotechnology. (shrink)

Looking out the window, I see that it's raining outside. Do I know that it’s raining outside? According to proponents of the Entailment Thesis, I do. If I see that p, I know that p. In general, the Entailment Thesis is the thesis that if S perceives that p, S knows that p. But recently, some philosophers (McDowell 2002, Turri 2010, Pritchard 2011, 2012) have argued that the Entailment Thesis is false. On their view, we can see p and not (...) know that p. In this paper, I argue that their arguments are unsuccessful. (shrink)

People often act in ways that appear incompatible with their sincere assertions. But how might we explain such cases? On the shifting view, subjects’ degrees of belief may be highly sensitive to changes in context. This paper articulates and refines this view, after defending it against recent criticisms. It details two mechanisms by which degrees of beliefs may shift.

Chapter IV has three parts. In the first, I consider another model for tacit knowledge ascriptions proposed by Graves, Katz, et. al.. This conception I argue, meets the objections levelled against the Chomskyan position. The key to this proposal is that we only ascribe tacit knowledge in cases where we have some unexplained explicit knowledge to account for. In the next section I consider and reject a number of arguments against the Graves-Katz approach. Finally, I argue that two proposed alternatives (...) to explanation by ascription of tacit knowledge are unacceptable. ;Chapter III is divided into two parts. In the first, I discuss further arguments against the notion of tacit knowledge. Although in themselves unsuccessful, these arguments point the way to what I take to be a significant objection to the Chomskyan position--specifically, the problem of constraining ascriptions of tacit knowledge. I then take up Fodor's conception of tacit knowledge as a response to this last objection. Fodor's view is that we should ascribe tacit knowledge to an organism on the basis of the internal workings of an optimal simulation of the organism. I argue that Fodor's position leads to implausible results. ;In Chapter I, I discuss the locus modernus of the tacit knowledge controversy--viz. Chomsky's Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. I then present a set of conditions of adequacy adapted from Brentano that I suggest should be satisfied by any attempt to legitimize tacit knowledge ascriptions. ;In Chapter II, I consider two sorts of theoretical objections to the view that there can be any such thing as knowledge that is tacit. The first sort rests on the view that tacit knowledge fails to meet certain a priori criteria that bona fide knowledge must satisfy. These criteria are claimed to be connected to the Freudean notion of the unconscious. I argue that these objections can be met and are ultimately based on a misunderstanding of Freud's position. The second sort of objection is based on the view that there are insurmountable methodological problems pertaining to issues of extensional equivalence that prevent us from ascribing tacit knowledge. Here I argue that the problem is no worse in this case than in ordinary cases of ascription of knowledge and belief. The chapter concludes with a discussion of Quine's position on tacit knowledge ascriptions. ;One of the central methodological claims of Chomsky's linguistics is that speakers have tacit knowledge of the underlying grammar of their language. It is on the strength of this claim that Chomsky has construed linguistics as part of cognitive psychology. The knowledge in question is said to be 'tacit' because speakers are not only unaware of having such knowledge, but they cannot become aware of it by introspection. The ascription of such knowledge to speakers is doubly controversial. From a general epistemological perspective, it involves the idea that there can be knowledge that is more or less permanently hidden from the awareness of the knower. But apart from its epistemological novelty, the tacit knowledge hypothesis also proposes a mentalist treatment of linguistic functioning as involving unconscious rule application. I defend the notion of tacit knowledge by arguing that both these views are essentially correct. My main interest, however, is in the general epistemological claim; I concentrate on its application to language because most of the relevant discussions of the issues have been made in relation to our knowledge of language. If it can be shown that we have tacit knowledge of linguistic principles, then a fortiori we have tacit knowledge. (shrink)