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  1. Revealing Tacit Knowledge: Embodiment and Explication.Frank Adloff (ed.) - 2014 - Cambridge University Press.
    How does tacit knowledge inscribe itself into cultural and social practices? As the established distinction between tacit and explicit or discursive forms of knowledge does not explain this question, the contributions in this volume reconstruct, describe, and analyze the manifold processes by which the tacit reveals itself: They focus, for example, on metaphors, myths, and visualizations as explications of the tacit as well as on processes of embodiment. Taken together, they demonstrate that the tacit does not constitute a single or (...)
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  2. Dispositional Beliefs and Dispositions to Believe.Robert Audi - 1994 - Noûs 28 (4):419-34.
  3. Linguistic Knowledge and Cognitive Integration.Edison Barrios - 2012 - Critica 44 (130):35-67.
    Según la Propositional Attitude View (PAV), un hablante es competente en su idioma en virtud de poseer actitudes proposicionales cuyo contenido es su gramática interna. En este artículo desarrollo una objeción a PAV, llamada �el reto de la integración�, originalmente propuesto por Stich (1978) y Evans (1981), y que está constituido por dos premisas: (1) las actitudes proposicionales se caracterizan por su integración inferencial, y (2) los estados que contienen información gramatical no están inferencialmente integrados. En este artículo considero y (...)
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  4. Journeyman to Master: The Passing on of Tacit Knowledge.Bob Brownhill - 2001 - Appraisal 3.
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  5. Construing Polanyi’s Tacit Knowing as Knowing by Acquaintance Rather Than Knowing by Representation.Dale Cannon - 2002 - Tradition and Discovery 29 (2):26-43.
    This essay proposes that Polanyi’s tacit knowing – specifically his conception of tacit knowing as cognitive contact with reality – should be construed as fundamentally a knowing by acquaintance – a relational knowing of reality, rather than merely the underlying subsidiary component of explicit representational knowledge. Thus construed, Polanyi’s theory that tacit knowing is foundational to all human knowing is more radical than is often supposed, for it challenges the priority status of explicit representational knowledge relative to tacit acquaintance knowledge, (...)
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  6. Refining the Tacit.Harry Collins - 2013 - Philosophia Scientiæ 17 (3):155-178.
    General For one’s work to be made the topic of a special issue of a journal is an enormous honour. That it is a philosophy journal makes the honour still greater since I am not a professional philosopher. Though I have no technical and scholarly training in philosophy, I have, however, learned hugely from a certain style of philosophical work, and from the start of my career in sociology, the later philosophy of Wittgenstein has been a dominant role model. Thus (...)
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  7. Refining the Tacit.Harry Collins - 2013 - Philosophia Scientae 17:155-178.
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  8. Building an Antenna for Tacit Knowledge.Harry Collins - 2013 - Philosophia Scientiae 17 (3):25-39.
    My book, Tacit and Explicit Knowledge, is introduced. The introduction is also helpful in explaining the book to me, the author.Mon livre, Tacit and Explicit Knowledge, est introduit. L’introduction est également utile pour m’expliquer le livre à moi-même, l’auteur.
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  9. Analysing Tacit Knowledge.Harry Collins - 2011 - Tradition and Discovery 38 (1):38-42.
    I respond to the reviews by Henry and Lowney of my book Tacit and Explicit Knowledge. I stress the need to understand explicit knowledge if tacit knowledge is to be understood. Tacit knowledge must be divided into three kinds: relational, somatic and collective. The idea of relational tacit knowledge is keyto pulling the three kinds apart.
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  10. Tacitness and Virtual Beliefs.Mark Crimmins - 1992 - Mind and Language 7 (3):240-63.
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  11. The Tacit Dimension.P. M. C. Davies - 1968 - Philosophical Studies 17:222-234.
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  12. Neil Gascoigne and Tim Thornton, Tacit Knowledge, Durham: Acumen, 2013, 210 Pp., £18.99 , ISBN 1844655466; £55 , ISBN 1844655458. [REVIEW]Julien Dutant - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (4):621-623.
  13. Intercorporeity, Movement and Tacit Knowledge.Undine Eberlein (ed.) - 2016
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  14. Fragmentation and Information Access.Adam Elga & Agustin Rayo - manuscript
    In order to predict and explain behavior, one cannot specify the mental state of an agent merely by saying what information she possesses. Instead one must specify what information is available to an agent relative to various purposes. Specifying mental states in this way allows us to accommodate cases of imperfect recall, cognitive accomplishments involved in logical deduction, the mental states of confused or fragmented subjects, and the difference between propositional knowledge and know-how .
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  15. A Blind-Spot Argument Against Dispositionalist Accounts of Belief.Davide Fassio - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (1):71-81.
    Dispositionalist accounts of belief define beliefs in terms of specific sets of dispositions. In this article, I provide a blind-spot argument against these accounts. The core idea of the argument is that beliefs having the form [p and it is not manifestly believed that p] cannot be manifestly believed. This means that one cannot manifest such beliefs in one’s assertions, conscious thoughts, actions, behaviours, or any other type of activity. However, if beliefs are sets of dispositions, they must be manifestable (...)
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  16. Eliminating the Problem of Stored Beliefs.Matthew Frise - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (1):63-79.
    The problem of stored beliefs is that of explaining how non-occurrent, seemingly justified beliefs are indeed justified. Internalism about epistemic justification, the view that one’s mental life alone determines what one is justified in believing, allegedly cannot solve this problem. This paper provides a solution. It asks: Does having a belief that p require having a special relation to a mental representation that p? If the answer is yes, then there are no stored beliefs, and so there is no problem. (...)
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  17. Internalism and the Problem of Stored Beliefs.Matthew Frise - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (2):285-304.
    A belief is stored if it is in no way before the subject’s mind. The problem of stored beliefs is that of satisfactorily explaining how the stored beliefs which seem justified are indeed justified. In this paper I challenge the two main internalist attempts to solve this problem. Internalism about epistemic justification, at a minimum, states that one’s mental life alone determines what one is justified in believing. First I dispute the attempt from epistemic conservatism, which states that believing justifies (...)
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  18. No Need to Know.Matthew Frise - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):391-401.
    I introduce and defend an argument against the popular view that anything falling short of knowledge falls short in value. The nature of belief and cognitive psychological research on memory, I claim, support the argument. I also show that not even the most appealing mode of knowledge is distinctively valuable.
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  19. Preservationism in the Epistemology of Memory.Matthew Frise - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (268).
    Preservationism states that memory preserves the justification of the beliefs it preserves. More precisely: if S formed a justified belief that p at t1 and retains in memory a belief that p until t2, then S's belief that p is prima facie justified via memory at t2. Preservationism is an unchallenged orthodoxy in the epistemology of memory. Advocates include Sven Bernecker, Tyler Burge, Alvin Goldman, Gilbert Harman, Michael Huemer, Matthew McGrath, and Thomas Senor. I develop three dilemmas for it, in (...)
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  20. Of Split Brains and Tacit Knowing.Jerry H. Gill - 1980 - International Philosophical Quarterly 20 (March):49-58.
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  21. The Case for Tacit Knowledge.Jerry H. Gill - 1971 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):49-59.
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  22. Michael Polanyi: Tacit Knowledge, Articulation and Economics.Pedro Blas Gonzalez - 2012 - Philosophy for Business 75.
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  23. Counterexamples and Tacit Premises.Claude Gratton - 2000 - Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 20 (1):9-22.
    I argue that there are at least two kinds of tacit premises; describe a certain type of counterexample against the validity of arguments, and then use it to identify one kind of tacit premise. I distinguish two classes of tacit premises on the grounds that they are discovered or constructed differently, they have different roles in an argument or causal explanation, and have different logical relations to each other.
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  24. If You Can't Change What You Believe, You Don't Believe It.Grace Helton - forthcoming - Noûs.
    I develop and defend the view that subjects are necessarily psychologically able to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Specifically, subjects can revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence, given their current psychological mechanisms and skills. If a subject lacks this ability, then the mental state in question is not a belief, though it may be some other kind of cognitive attitude, such as a supposi-tion, an entertained thought, or a pretense. The result is a moderately revisionary (...)
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  25. Demonstrative Belief and Dispositions.David Hunter - manuscript
    forthcoming in Journal of Philosophical Research. This paper argues against David Armstrong’s view that singular beliefs are not dispositions. It also begins to develop the view that self-conscious belief is a matter of belief revision.
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  26. Mind-Brain Identity and the Nature of States.David Hunter - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):366 – 376.
  27. On the False Ontological Consensus.Mudyń Krzysztof - 2015 - Polish Psychological Bulletin 46 (2):160-173.
    The objective of the research was to check whether False Consensus Effect (FCE), shown in much research,is also valid for ontological decisions. Test participants, faced with an ontological dilemma, made a choice three times,which of the 3 item set (Cracow City, Me myself, the Universe) refers to something most real. The research conducted first among psychology students (N=116), then replicated on mathematics students (N=126) and middle-aged people (N=106). Results: 1) All groups chose the Universe most seldom (4%-11% subjects), the remaining (...)
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  28. Tacit Knowledge in Teacher Education.Gabriele Lakomski - 1997 - In David N. Aspin (ed.), Logical Empiricism and Post₋Empiricism in Educational Discourse. [Distributed by] Thorold's Africana Books.
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  29. At the Margins of Tacit Knowledge.Michael Lynch - 2013 - Philosophia Scientiæ 17 (3):55-73.
    Michael Polanyi and H.M. Collins contrast tacit knowledge with explicit knowledge. For Collins, secrets and other forms of “relational tacit knowledge” are tacit, but only in relation to specific circumstances and relationships. Collins treats such relational knowledge as less interesting theoretically than collective knowledge that is essentially difficult and perhaps impossible to convey through explicit formulations. In this paper I focus on relational tacit knowledge, despite its marginality in Collins’s typology, because it draws attention to conceptual ambiguities in the relationship (...)
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  30. At the Margins of Tacit Knowledge.Michael Lynch - 2013 - Philosophia Scientae 17:55-73.
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  31. Belief States in Criminal Law.James A. Macleod - forthcoming - Oklahoma Law Review 68.
    Belief-state ascription — determining what someone “knew,” “believed,” was “aware of,” etc. — is central to many areas of law. In criminal law, the distinction between knowledge and recklessness, and the use of broad jury instructions concerning other belief states, presupposes a common and stable understanding of what those belief-state terms mean. But a wealth of empirical work at the intersection of philosophy and psychology — falling under the banner of “Experimental Epistemology” — reveals how laypeople’s understandings of mens rea (...)
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  32. Evangelical Catholicism and the Tacit Dimension of Theology.Marty Moleski - 2001 - Tradition and Discovery 28 (1):31-32.
    Moleski responds to reviews of Personal Catholicism by Joseph Kroger and John Apcyznski. He argues that theology is tacit or rooted in tacit knowledge and therefore cannot be fully articulated. He portrays the Roman Catholic tradition as an interpretative framework that differs from scientific frameworks by being bound to a particular revelation made in history which is then preserved by a Specific Authority.
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  33. Marketing Management and Polanyi's Theory of Tacit Knowing.Jere Moorman - 2007 - Appraisal 6.
  34. Abstract - Humor and Michael Polanyi's Theory of Tacit Knowing.Jere Moorman - 1983 - Tradition and Discovery 11 (2):23-23.
  35. Practical Knowledge: Outlines of a Theory of Traditions and Skills.J. C. Nyíri & Barry Smith (eds.) - 1988 - Croom Helm.
    A series of papers on different aspects of practical knowledge by Roderick Chisholm, Rudolf Haller, J. C. Nyiri, Eva Picardi, Joachim Schulte Roger Scruton, Barry Smith and Johan Wrede.
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  36. Reputation and Group Dispositions.Andrés Páez - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (3):469-484.
    In many contexts, such as business, science and law, it is essential to determine whether a company, a product or a person in fact has the reputation attributed to it, regardless of whether that reputation has been rightly earned. In this paper I offer two necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the attribution of a reputation to a subject within a social group. The first one concerns the way in which reputational information is spread among the members of the relevant (...)
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  37. Content Externalism and Equivocal Inference.T. Parent - manuscript
    This draft now appears (in revised form) as Chapter 6 of _Self-Reflection for the Opaque Mind_. See http://philpapers.org/rec/PARSFT-3.
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  38. Colivan Commitment, Vis-À-Vis Moore’s Paradox.Ted Parent - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-11.
    This is a contribution to a symposium on Annalisa Coliva's book _The Varieties of Self-Knowledge_. I present her notion of a "commitment" and how it is used in her treatment of Moore paradoxical assertions and thoughts (e.g., "I believe that it is raining, but it is not;" "It is raining but I do not believe that it is"). The final section notes the points of convergence between her constitutivism about self-knowledge of commitments, and the constitutivism from my book _Self-Reflection for (...)
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  39. Tacit Knowledge and Realism and Constructivism in the Writings of Harry Collins.Trevor Pinch - 2013 - Philosophia Scientiæ 17 (3):41-54.
    In this paper I examine Harry Collins’s influential writing on tacit knowledge. In particular I turn my attention to his recent book, Tacit and Explicit Knowledge [Collins 2010], or TEK, which is arguably the most complete and systematic statement of what he means by the term “tacit knowledge”. As well as examining tacit knowledge as elaborated in this contribution, I draw out an underlying tension in Collins’s major contributions to the sociology of scientific knowledge in general between the realism underlying (...)
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  40. Personal Knowledge.Michael Polanyi - 2010 - Routledge.
    First published in 2012. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
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  41. The Tacit Dimension.Michael Polanyi - 1966 - London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
    Back in print for a new generation of students and scholars, this volume challenges the assumption that skepticism, rather than established belief, lies at the ...
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  42. The Tacit Dimension. --.Michael Polanyi - 1966 - Doubleday.
    “I shall reconsider human knowledge by starting from the fact that _we can know more than we can tell_,” writes Michael Polanyi, whose work paved the way for the likes of Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper. _The Tacit Dimension_ argues that tacit knowledge—tradition, inherited practices, implied values, and prejudgments—is a crucial part of scientific knowledge. Back in print for a new generation of students and scholars, this volume challenges the assumption that skepticism, rather than established belief, lies at the heart (...)
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  43. The Study of Man.Michael Polanyi - 1959 - London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
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  44. The Study of Man (Routledge Revivals): The Lindsay Memorial Lectures 1958.Michael Polanyi - 1959 - Routledge.
    Michael Polanyi (1891-1976) was an eminent theorist across the fields of philosophy, physical chemistry and economics. Elected to the Royal Society and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, his contributions to research in the social sciences, and his theories on positivism and knowledge, are of critical academic importance. The three lectures included in this comprehensive volume, first published in 1959, argue for Polanyi’s principle of ‘tacit knowing’ as a fundamental component of knowledge. They were intended to accompany Polanyi’s earlier (...)
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  45. Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy.Michael Polanyi - 1958 - University of Chicago Press.
    In this work the distinguished physical chemist and philosopher, Michael Polanyi, demonstrates that the scientist's personal participation in his knowledge, in both its discovery and its validation, is an indispensable part of science itself. Even in the exact sciences, "knowing" is an art, of which the skill of the knower, guided by his personal commitment and his passionate sense of increasing contact with reality, is a logically necessary part. In the biological and social sciences this becomes even more evident. The (...)
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  46. Personal Knowledge.Michael Polanyi - 1958 - Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
    In this work the distinguished physical chemist and philosopher, Michael Polanyi, demonstrates that the scientist's personal participation in his knowledge, in ...
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  47. Can Tacit Knowledge Fit Into a Computer Model of Scientific Cognitive Processes? The Case of Biotechnology.Andrea Pozzali - 2007 - Mind and Society 6 (2):211-224.
    This paper tries to express a critical point of view on the computational turn in philosophy by looking at a specific field of study: philosophy of science. The paper starts by briefly discussing the main contributions that information and communication technologies have given to the rising of computational philosophy of science, and in particular to the cognitive modelling approach. The main question then arises, concerning how computational models can cope with the presence of tacit knowledge in science. Would it be (...)
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  48. Reliance, Trust, and Belief.Peter Railton - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):122-150.
  49. Luck, Propositional Perception, and the Entailment Thesis.Chris Ranalli - 2014 - Synthese 191 (6):1223-1247.
    Looking out the window, I see that it's raining outside. Do I know that it’s raining outside? According to proponents of the Entailment Thesis, I do. If I see that p, I know that p. In general, the Entailment Thesis is the thesis that if S perceives that p, S knows that p. But recently, some philosophers (McDowell 2002, Turri 2010, Pritchard 2011, 2012) have argued that the Entailment Thesis is false. On their view, we can see p and not (...)
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  50. How Might Degrees of Belief Shift? On Action Conflicting with Professed Beliefs.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):732-742.
    People often act in ways that appear incompatible with their sincere assertions. But how might we explain such cases? On the shifting view, subjects’ degrees of belief may be highly sensitive to changes in context. This paper articulates and refines this view, after defending it against recent criticisms. It details two mechanisms by which degrees of beliefs may shift.
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