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  1. added 2018-12-03
    Conservative Deflationism?Julien Murzi & Lorenzo Rossi - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-15.
    Deflationists argue that ‘true’ is merely a logico-linguistic device for expressing blind ascriptions and infinite generalisations. For this reason, some authors have argued that deflationary truth must be conservative, i.e. that a deflationary theory of truth for a theory S must not entail sentences in S’s language that are not already entailed by S. However, it has been forcefully argued that any adequate theory of truth for S must be non-conservative and that, for this reason, truth cannot be deflationary :493–521, (...)
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  2. added 2018-12-03
    Reflection Principles and the Liar in Context.Julien Murzi & Lorenzo Rossi - 2018 - Philosophers' Imprint 18 (15).
    Contextualist approaches to the Liar Paradox postulate the occurrence of a context shift in the course of the Liar reasoning. In particular, according to the contextualist proposal advanced by Charles Parsons and Michael Glanzberg, the Liar sentence L doesn’t express a true proposition in the initial context of reasoning c, but expresses a true one in a new, richer context c', where more propositions are available for expression. On the further assumption that Liar sentences involve propositional quantifiers whose domains may (...)
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  3. added 2018-10-19
    Tarski, Truth, and Semantics.Richard G. Heck Jr - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (4):533 - 554.
    John Etchemendy has argued that it is but "a fortuitous accident" that Tarski's work on truth has any signifance at all for semantics. I argue, in response, that Etchemendy and others, such as Scott Soames and Hilary Putnam, have been misled by Tarski's emphasis on definitions of truth rather than theories of truth and that, once we appreciate how Tarski understood the relation between these, we can answer Etchemendy's implicit and explicit criticisms of neo-Davidsonian semantics.
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  4. added 2018-09-20
    Truth & Transcendence: Turning the Tables on the Liar Paradox.Gila Sher - 2017 - In Bradley Armour-Garb (ed.), Reflections on the Liar. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 281-306.
    Confronting the Liar Paradox is commonly viewed as a prerequisite for developing a theory of truth. In this paper I turn the tables on this traditional conception of the relation between the two. The theorist of truth need not constrain his search for a “material” theory of truth, i.e., a theory of the philosophical nature of truth, by committing himself to one solution or another to the Liar Paradox. If he focuses on the nature of truth (leaving issues of formal (...)
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  5. added 2018-08-23
    Tarski on the Concept of Truth.Greg Ray - 2018 - In Michael Glanzberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Truth. Oxford, UK: pp. 695-717.
    Alfred Tarski’s work on truth has played such a central role in the discourse on truth that most coming to it for the first time have probably already heard a great deal about what is said there. Unfortunately, since the work is largely technical and Tarski was only tan- gentially philosophical, a certain incautious assimilation dominates many philosophical discussions of Tarski’s ideas, and so, examining Tarski on the concept of truth is in many ways an act of unlearning. -/- In (...)
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  6. added 2018-07-09
    Liar-Like Paradox and Object Language Features.C. S. Jenkins & Daniel Nolan - 2008 - American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (1):67 - 73.
    We argue that it would seem to be a mistake to blame Liar-like paradox on certain features of the object language, since the effect can be created with very minimal object languages that contain none of the usual suspects (truth-like predicates, reference to their own truth-bearers, negation, etc.).
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  7. added 2018-02-26
    Logic, Logical Form and the Disunity of Truth.Will Gamester - forthcoming - Analysis:anx165.
    Monists say that the nature of truth is invariant, whichever sentence you consider; pluralists say that the nature of truth varies between different sets of sentences. The orthodoxy is that logic and logical form favour monism: there must be a single property that is preserved in any valid inference; and any truth-functional complex must be true in the same way as its components. The orthodoxy, I argue, is mistaken. Logic and logical form impose only structural constraints on a metaphysics of (...)
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  8. added 2018-01-03
    Is There a Commonsense Semantic Conception of Truth?Joseph Ulatowski - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (2):487-500.
    Alfred Tarski’s refinement of an account of truth into a formal system that turns on the acceptance of Convention-T has had a lasting impact on philosophical logic, especially work concerning truth, meaning, and other semantic notions. In a series of studies completed from the 1930s to the 1960s, Arne Næss collected and analysed intuitive responses from non-philosophers to questions concerning truth, synonymy, certainty, and probability. Among the formulations of truth studied by Næss were practical variants of expressions of the form (...)
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  9. added 2017-11-05
    Truth, by Alan R. White. [REVIEW]V. Hope - 1970 - Philosophical Quarterly 22 (89):373.
  10. added 2017-10-17
    Horsten, Leon, The Tarskian Turn: Deflationism and Axiomatic Truth, MIT Press, 2011. [REVIEW]Jan Heylen - 2012 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 74 (2):377-379.
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  11. added 2017-06-26
    Truth and Existence.Jan Heylen & Leon Horsten - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):106-114.
    Halbach has argued that Tarski biconditionals are not ontologically conservative over classical logic, but his argument is undermined by the fact that he cannot include a theory of arithmetic, which functions as a theory of syntax. This article is an improvement on Halbach's argument. By adding the Tarski biconditionals to inclusive negative free logic and the universal closure of minimal arithmetic, which is by itself an ontologically neutral combination, one can prove that at least one thing exists. The result can (...)
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  12. added 2017-03-16
    Sobre la interpretación deflacionaria de la teoría de Tarski.Eleonora Orlando - 1997 - Análisis Filosófico 17 (1):49-74.
    This paper is centered on the semantic theory of truth, formulated by Alfred Tarski. According to some authors, this theory is to be construed as a contemporary version of the traditional correspondence theory, namely, the one that defines truth as the correspondence between language and the world. In contrast, there are others who think that Tarki´s theory reveals a deflationary conception of truth, according to which truth can be reduced to a linguistic resource for semantic ascent. Since I agree with (...)
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  13. added 2017-03-14
    Truth.Wrenn Chase - 2014 - Polity.
    What is truth? Is there anything that all truths have in common that makes them true rather than false? Is truth independent of human thought, or does it depend in some way on what we believe or what we would be justified in believing? In what sense, if any, is it better for beliefs or statements to be true than to be false? In this engaging and accessible new introduction Chase Wrenn surveys a variety of theories of the nature of (...)
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  14. added 2017-03-14
    A Metaphilosophical Analysis of the Core Idea of Deflationism.Bo Mou - 2000 - Metaphilosophy 31 (3):262-286.
    In this paper, I give a metaphilosophical analysis of the core idea of deflationism by discussing some basic conceptual and methodological issues involved in the debate between deflationism and substantivism. In so doing, I argue for three positive points. First, the crux of the dispute between deflationism and substantivism is whether or not truth is substantive in its metaphysical nature and in its explanatory role in philosophical enterprises, rather than whether or not a minimal approach regarding conceptual resources is taken (...)
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  15. added 2017-02-27
    Tarski’s 1944 Polemical Remarks and Naess’ “Experimental Philosophy”.Robert Barnard & Joseph Ulatowski - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (3):457-477.
    Many of Tarski’s better known papers are either about or include lengthy discussions of how to properly define various concepts: truth, logical consequence, semantic concepts, or definability. In general, these papers identify two primary conditions for successful definitions: formal correctness and material adequacy. Material adequacy requires that the concept expressed by the formal definition capture the intuitive content of truth. Our primary interest in this paper is to better understand Tarski’s thinking about material adequacy, and whether components of his view (...)
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  16. added 2017-02-27
    Ordinary Truth in Tarski and Næss.Joseph Ulatowski - 2016 - In Adrian Kuzniar & Joanna Odrowąż-Sypniewska (eds.), Uncovering Facts and Values. Brill. pp. 67-90.
    Alfred Tarski seems to endorse a partial conception of truth, the T-schema, which he believes might be clarified by the application of empirical methods, specifically citing the experimental results of Arne Næss (1938a). The aim of this paper is to argue that Næss’ empirical work confirmed Tarski’s semantic conception of truth, among others. In the first part, I lay out the case for believing that Tarski’s T-schema, while not the formal and generalizable Convention-T, provides a partial account of truth that (...)
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  17. added 2017-02-14
    CS Peirce and Post-Tarskian Truth.Karl-Otto Apel - 1983 - In Eugene Freeman (ed.), The Relevance of Charles Peirce. Hegeler Institute. pp. 189--223.
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  18. added 2017-02-01
    What is a Tarskian Definition of Truth?-Carpintero Manuel García - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 82 (2):113-144.
  19. added 2017-02-01
    Tarski Hierarchies.Volker Halbach - 1995 - Erkenntnis 43 (3):339 - 367.
    The general notions of object- and metalanguage are discussed and as a special case of this relation an arbitrary first order language with an infinite model is expanded by a predicate symbol T0 which is interpreted as truth predicate for . Then the expanded language is again augmented by a new truth predicate T1 for the whole language plus T0. This process is iterated into the transfinite to obtain the Tarskian hierarchy of languages. It is shown that there are natural (...)
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  20. added 2017-02-01
    A Note on Tarski's Definition of Truth.Karl R. Popper - 1955 - Mind 64 (255):388-391.
  21. added 2017-01-26
    Tarski on Definition, Meaning and Truth.Douglas Patterson - 2009 - In Sandra Lapointe, Jan Wolenski, Mathieu Marion & Wioletta Miskiewicz (eds.), The Golden Age of Polish Philosophy: Kazimierz Twardowski's Philosophical Legacy. Springer. pp. 16--155.
  22. added 2017-01-19
    Tarski and the Metalinguistic Liar.Greg Ray - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (1):55 - 80.
    I offer an interpretation of a familiar, but poorly understood portion of Tarskis work on truth – bringing to light a number of unnoticed aspects of Tarskis work. A serious misreading of this part of Tarski to be found in Scott Soames Understanding Truth is treated in detail. Soamesreading vies with the textual evidence, and would make Tarskis position inconsistent in an unsubtle way. I show that Soames does not finally have a coherent interpretation of Tarski. This is unfortunate, since (...)
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  23. added 2017-01-19
    The Enumerative Character of Tarski's Definition of Truth and its General Character in a Tarskian System.Bo Mou - 2001 - Synthese 126 (1-2):91 - 121.
    In this paper, I suggest an approach to the alleged problem with the Tarskian formal definition of truth: its enumerative character seems to make it unable to capture our pretheoretic general understanding of truth. For this purpose, after spelling out two requirements for extending an enumerative definition to new cases, I examine to what extent Tarski's Convention T provides what are needed for extending the Tarski's enumerative definition. I conclude that, though not explicitly providing what are needed, Convention T does (...)
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  24. added 2017-01-19
    Tarski, Truth and Model Theory.Peter Milne - 1999 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (2):141–167.
    As Wilfrid Hodges has observed, there is no mention of the notion truth-in-a-model in Tarski's article 'The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages'; nor does truth make many appearances in his papers on model theory from the early 1950s. In later papers from the same decade, however, this reticence is cast aside. Why should Tarski, who defined truth for formalized languages and pretty much founded model theory, have been so reluctant to speak of truth in a model? What might explain (...)
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  25. added 2017-01-18
    Tarski on “Essentially Richer” Metalanguages.David DeVidi & Graham Solomon - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (1):1-28.
    It is well known that Tarski proved a result which can be stated roughly as: no sufficiently rich, consistent, classical language can contain its own truth definition. Tarski's way around this problem is to deal with two languages at a time, an object language for which we are defining truth and a metalanguage in which the definition occurs. An obvious question then is: under what conditions can we construct a definition of truth for a given object language. Tarski claims that (...)
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  26. added 2017-01-18
    Die Idee Hinter Tarskis Definition Von Wahrheit.Dirk Greimann - 1997 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 28 (1):121-158.
    The Idea behind Tarski's Definition of Truth. In Tarski's presentations of his truth-definition, the steps of the construction are not sufficiently explained. It is not clear, on what general strategy the construction is based, what the fundamental ideas are, how some crucial steps work, and especially how the transition from the definition of satisfaction to the definition of truth should be understood. The paper shows that the account given in the model-theoretic literature, which is supported by Tarski's lemmata A and (...)
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  27. added 2016-12-08
    Tarski on the Necessity Reading of Convention T.Douglas Eden Patterson - 2006 - Synthese 151 (1):1-32.
    Tarski’s Convention T is often taken to claim that it is both sufficient and necessary for adequacy in a definition of truth that it imply instances of the T-schema where the embedded sentence translates the mentioned sentence. However, arguments against the necessity claim have recently appeared, and, furthermore, the necessity claim is actually not required for the indefinability results for which Tarski is justly famous; indeed, Tarski’s own presentation of the results in the later Undecidable Theories makes no mention of (...)
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  28. added 2016-12-08
    Theories of Truth.Frederick F. Schmitt (ed.) - 2003 - Wiley-Blackwell.
    The classic and contemporary readings in this collection represent the four most influential theories of truth – correspondence, pragmatist, coherence, and deflationary theories. A collection of classic and contemporary philosophical reflections on the nature of truth. Opens with an introduction to theories of truth, designed for readers with little or no prior knowledge of the subject. Divided into four sections on the most important theories of truth - correspondence, pragmatist, coherence, and deflationary theories. Brings together articles in the recent debate (...)
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  29. added 2016-12-08
    Tarskian Truth and the Correspondence Theory.Luis Fernández Moreno - 2001 - Synthese 126 (1):123-148.
    Tarski's theory of truth brings out the question of whether he intended his theory to be a correspondence theory of truth and whether, whatever his intentions, his theory is in fact a correspondence theory. The aim of this paper is to answer both questions. The answer to the first question depends on Tarski's relevant assertions on semantics and his conception of truth. In order to answer the second question Popper's and Davidson's interpretations of Tarski's truth theory are examined; to this (...)
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  30. added 2016-12-08
    Tarski's Theory of Truth.Hartry Field - 1972 - Journal of Philosophy 69 (13):347.
  31. added 2016-09-01
    On an Incorrect Understanding of Tarskian Truth Definitions.Manuel Garcia-Carpintero - 1997 - Philosophical Issues 8:45-56.
    Criticism of Soames' understanding of Tarskian theories of truth.
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  32. added 2016-05-18
    Truth-Makers and Convention T.Jan Woleński - 2011 - Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Kevin Mulligan.
    This papers discuss the place, if any, of Convention T (the condition of material adequacy of the proper definition of truth formulated by Tarski) in the truth-makers account offered by Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons and Barry Smith. It is argued that although Tarski’s requirement seems entirely acceptable in the frameworks of truth-makers theories for the first-sight, several doubts arise under a closer inspection. In particular, T-biconditionals have no clear meaning as sentences about truth-makers. Thus, truth-makers theory cannot be considered as (...)
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  33. added 2016-04-01
    How Tarski Defined the Undefinable.Cezary Cieśliński - 2015 - European Review 23 (01):139 - 149.
    This paper describes Tarski’s project of rehabilitating the notion of truth, previously considered dubious by many philosophers. The project was realized by providing a formal truth definition, which does not employ any problematic concept.
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  34. added 2015-12-12
    Paradoxes and Pragmatics.Hartley Slater - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 13:87-104.
    Tarski’s assessment that natural language is inconsistent on account of the Liar Paradox is shown to be incorrect: what Tarski’s theorem in fact shows is that Truth is not a property of sentences but of propositions. By using propositions rather than sentences as the bearers of Truth, semantic closure within the same language is easily obtained. Tarski’s contrary assessment was partly based on confusions about propositions and their grammatical expression. But more centrally it arose through blindness to pragmatic factors in (...)
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  35. added 2015-09-01
    Tarskian Truth and the Two Provinces of Semantics.Ricardo Santos - 2004 - Disputatio 16:26-37.
    In this paper, I argue that the cleavage between the theory of reference and the theory of meaning, which under the influence of Quine has dominated a large part of the philosophy of language of the last fifty years, is based on a misrepresentation of Tarski's achievement and on an overestimation of the scope and value of disquotation. In particular, I show that, if we accept Davidson's critique of disquotation, the same kind of reasons that Quine offered in opposition to (...)
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  36. added 2015-08-26
    The Problem of Negative Existentials, Inadvertently Solved.Greg Ray - 2014 - In Manuel García-Carpintero & Genoveva Martí (eds.), Empty Representations: Reference and Non-Existence. Oxford University Press. pp. 262-274.
    The problem of negative existentials is one of the classic problems in philosophy of language. Latter-day developments in semantics resolved this problem without our help, but due to accidents of history no one noticed.
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  37. added 2015-08-26
    Tarski's Grelling and the T-Strategy.Greg Ray - 2006 - In Bryson Brown (ed.), Truth and Probability: Essays in Honour of Hugues Leblanc. College Publications.
    Tarski's argumentative use of the liar paradox is well-known, but officially it is the Grelling paradox that has final pride of place in Tarski's argument, not the Liar at all. Tarski explicitly gives argumentation that adverts to the liar argument, but it is an alternative argument—one he only hints at and which adverts to the Grelling—which he says has the advantage of removing any empirical element. In this paper, we will examine how the Grelling might be used in place of (...)
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  38. added 2015-08-26
    Tarski, the Liar and Tarskian Truth Definitions.Greg Ray - 2002 - In Dale Jacquette (ed.), A Companion to Philosophical Logic. Blackwell. pp. 164-176.
    Alfred Tarski's work on truth has become a touchstone for a great deal of philosophical work on truth. A good grasp of it is critical for understanding the contemporary literature on truth and semantics. In this paper, I present a fresh interpretation of Tarski's view, one which aims to draw it out more fully in areas of philosophical interest.
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  39. added 2015-04-25
    What Is a Tarskian Definition of Truth?Manuel García-Carpintero - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 82 (2):113 - 144.
    Since the publication of Hartry Field’s influential paper “Tarski’s Theory of Truth” there has been an ongoing discussion about the philosophical import of Tarski’s definition. Most of the arguments have aimed to play down that import, starting with that of Field himself. He interpreted Tarski as trying to provide a physicalistic reduction of semantic concepts like truth, and concluded that Tarski had partially failed. Robert Stalnaker and Scott Soames claimed then that Field should have obtained a stronger conclusion, namely that (...)
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  40. added 2015-04-19
    Phenomenology Meets Logical Semantics: What Husserl's and Tarski's Theories of Truth Do Have in Common.Norman Sieroka - 2003 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 34 (2):116-131.
  41. added 2015-04-15
    Can One Get Bivalence From (Tarskian) Truth and Falsity?Dan López de Sa - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):pp. 273-282.
    Timothy Williamson famously offered an argument from these Tarskian principles in favor of bivalence. I show, dwelling on (Andjelkovic & Williamson, 2000), that the argument depends on a contentious formulation of the Tarskian principles about truth (and falsity), which the supervaluationist can reject without jeopardizing the Tarskian insight. In the mentioned paper, Adjelkovic and Williamson argue that, even if the appropriate formulation seems to make room for failure of bivalence in borderline cases, this appearance is illusory, once one grants an (...)
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  42. added 2015-04-14
    Review of "Ulrich Pardey, Frege on Absolute and Relative Truth". [REVIEW]Bernd Buldt - unknown
  43. added 2015-04-06
    Atomic Realism, Intuitionist Logic and Tarskian Truth.Jim Edwards - 1990 - Philosophical Quarterly 40 (158):13-26.
  44. added 2015-03-31
    Wahrheiten, die niemand kennen kann. Zu Wolfgang Künnes Verteidigung des alethischen Realismus.Geert Keil - 2005 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 59 (3):404 - 415.
    The article is a comprehensive review of Wolfgang Künne’s book CONCEPTIONS OF TRUTH OUP 2003). The review reports and discusses, in particular, Künne’s arguments for alethic realism. Künne dismisses Putnam’s and Dummett’s views that truth is epistemically constrained. He maintains that truths may exist which humans are constitutionally incapable of ever understanding, because the relevant propositions are beyond any human’s conceptual or perceptual capacities. In addition, Künne argues that some humanly comprehensible truths can never be rationally accepted. His master argument (...)
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  45. added 2015-03-24
    The Philosophical Importance of Tarski-Style Truth Theory in Davidson's Semantic Program1.Urszula Zeglen - 1996 - Dialogue and Universalism 6 (1-6):107.
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  46. added 2015-02-25
    Ellos o Nosotros?: La Disputa Por la Verdad.Gustavo Agüero - 2006 - In Carlos Balzi & César Marchesino (eds.), Hostilidad/Hospitalidad. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, Area de Filosofía Del Centro de Investigaciones de la Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades.
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  47. added 2014-04-09
    Paradox with Just Self-Reference.T. Parent - manuscript
    If a semantically open language has no constraints on self-reference, one can show there is a predicate which is both satisfied and unsatisfied by a self-referring term. The argument requires diagonalization on a definition-scheme for the predicate ‘x is Lagadonian’. (The term ‘Lagadonian’ is adapted from David Lewis). Briefly, a self-referring term is counted as “Lagadonian” if the initial variable in the schema is replaced with the term itself. But the same term is not counted as Lagadonian if this variable (...)
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  48. added 2014-04-02
    The Tarski T-Schema is a Tautology (Literally).Edward N. Zalta - 2013 - Analysis (1):ant099.
    The Tarski T-Schema has a propositional version. If we use ϕ as a metavariable for formulas and use terms of the form that-ϕ to denote propositions, then the propositional version of the T-Schema is: that-ϕ is true if and only if ϕ. For example, that Cameron is Prime Minister is true if and only if Cameron is Prime Minister. If that-ϕ is represented formally as [λ ϕ], then the T-Schema can be represented as the 0-place case of λ-Conversion. If we (...)
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  49. added 2014-04-02
    Theories, Theoretical Models, Truth.Ryszard Wójcicki - 1995 - Foundations of Science 1 (4):337-406.
    This paper was written with two aims in mind. A large part of it is just an exposition of Tarski's theory of truth. Philosophers do not agree on how Tarski's theory is related to their investigations. Some of them doubt whether that theory has any relevance to philosophical issues and in particular whether it can be applied in dealing with the problems of philosophy (theory) of science.In this paper I argue that Tarski's chief concern was the following question. Suppose a (...)
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  50. added 2014-04-02
    Putting the World Back Into Semantics.Barry Smith - 1993 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 44:91-109.
    To what in reality do the logically simple sentences with empirical content correspond? Two extreme positions can be distinguished in this regard: 'Great Fact' theories, such as are defended by Davidson; and trope-theories, which see such sentences being made the simply by those events or states to which the relevant main verbs correspond. A position midway between these two extremes is defended, one according to which sentences of the given sort are made tme by what are called 'dependence structures', or (...)
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