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  1. What is a Tarskian Definition of Truth?-Carpintero Manuel García - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 82 (2):113-144.
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  2. Ellos o Nosotros?: La Disputa Por la Verdad.Gustavo Agüero - 2006 - In Carlos Balzi & César Marchesino (eds.), Hostilidad/Hospitalidad. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, Area de Filosofía Del Centro de Investigaciones de la Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades.
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  3. CS Peirce and Post-Tarskian Truth.Karl-Otto Apel - 1983 - In Eugene Freeman (ed.), The Relevance of Charles Peirce. Hegeler Institute. pp. 189--223.
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  4. Tarski, Quine, and the Transcendence of the Vernacular “True”.Jody Azzouni - 2004 - Synthese 142 (3):273 - 288.
    It is argued that the blind ascriptive role for the word true, its use, that is, in conjunction with descriptions of classes of sentences or with proper names of sentences (but not quote-names), is one which applies indiscriminately to sentences regardless of whether these are in languages we speak, can understand, or can translate into sentences that we do speak (and understand). Formal analogues of the ordinary word true as they arise in Tarskis seminal work, and in others, cannot replicate (...)
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  5. Tarski’s 1944 Polemical Remarks and Naess’ “Experimental Philosophy”.Robert Barnard & Joseph Ulatowski - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (3):457-477.
    Many of Tarski’s better known papers are either about or include lengthy discussions of how to properly define various concepts: truth, logical consequence, semantic concepts, or definability. In general, these papers identify two primary conditions for successful definitions: formal correctness and material adequacy. Material adequacy requires that the concept expressed by the formal definition capture the intuitive content of truth. Our primary interest in this paper is to better understand Tarski’s thinking about material adequacy, and whether components of his view (...)
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  6. Putting the World Back Into Semantics.Smith Barry - 1993 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 44:91-109.
    To what in reality do tme logically simple sentences with empirical content correspond? Two extreme positions can be distinguished in this regard: 'Great Fact' theories, such as are defended by Davidson; and trope-theories, which see such sentences being made the simply by those events or states to which the relevant main verbs correspond. A position midway between these two extremes is defended, one according to which sentences of the given sort are made tme by what are called 'dependence structures', or (...)
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  7. Formulating Deflationism.Arvid Båve - 2013 - Synthese 190 (15):3287-3305.
    I here argue for a particular formulation of truth-deflationism, namely, the propositionally quantified formula, (Q) “For all p, <p> is true iff p”. The main argument consists of an enumeration of the other (five) possible formulations and criticisms thereof. Notably, Horwich’s Minimal Theory is found objectionable in that it cannot be accepted by finite beings. Other formulations err in not providing non-questionbegging, sufficiently direct derivations of the T-schema instances. I end by defending (Q) against various objections. In particular, I argue (...)
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  8. Deflationism and the Primary Truth Bearer.Arvid Båve - 2010 - Synthese 173 (3):281 - 297.
    The paper discusses what kind of truth bearer, or truth-ascription, a deflationist should take as primary. I first present number of arguments against a sententialist view. I then present a deflationary theory which takes propositions as primary, and try to show that it deals neatly with a wide range of linguistic data. Next, I consider both the view that there is no primary truth bearer, and the most common account of sentence truth given by deflationists who take propositions as primary, (...)
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  9. Review of "Ulrich Pardey, Frege on Absolute and Relative Truth". [REVIEW]Bernd Buldt - unknown
  10. Notes on Formal Theories of Truth.Andrea Cantini - 1989 - Zeitshrift für Mathematische Logik Und Grundlagen der Mathematik 35 (1):97--130.
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  11. Truth.Wrenn Chase - 2014 - Polity.
    What is truth? Is there anything that all truths have in common that makes them true rather than false? Is truth independent of human thought, or does it depend in some way on what we believe or what we would be justified in believing? In what sense, if any, is it better for beliefs or statements to be true than to be false? In this engaging and accessible new introduction Chase Wrenn surveys a variety of theories of the nature of (...)
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  12. Ist die Wahrheitsdefinition Tarskis philosophisch uninteressant? Die semantische Wahrheitsdefinition, Verifikationismus und Begriffsempirismus.Arkadiusz Chrudzimski - 2001 - Conceptus: Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie 34 (84):33-45.
    Der semantischen Wahrheitsdefinition Tarskis wird of vorgeworfen, dass sie philosophisch uninteressant sei. Sie sei informativ leer, weil sie mit jeder erdenklichen Ansicht bezüglich der Natur der Wahrheit zu vereinbaren sei. Wir wollen zeigen, dass diese Meinung unhaltbar ist. Tarskis semantische Wahrheitsdefinition lässt sich im Besonderen mit den Versuchen der Epistemisierung und Pragmatisierung des Wahrheitsbegriffs nicht vereinbaren. (Vorausgesetzt, dass diese Versuche wirklich den Wahrheitsbegriff und nicht den Realitätsbegriff betreffen.) Darüber hinaus ist die Tatsache, dass Tarskis Definition eine Unterscheidung von Sprach¬ebenen voraus¬setzt, (...)
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  13. How Tarski Defined the Undefinable.Cezary Cieśliński - 2015 - European Review 23 (01):139 - 149.
    This paper describes Tarski’s project of rehabilitating the notion of truth, previously considered dubious by many philosophers. The project was realized by providing a formal truth definition, which does not employ any problematic concept.
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  14. Semantic Truth Theories.Yael Cohen - 1994 - Magnes Press, Hebrew University.
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  15. Tarski's Convention T and the Concept of Truth.Marian David - 2008 - In Douglas Patterson (ed.), New Essays on Tarski and Philosophy. Oxford Univ. Press.
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  16. Theories of Truth.Marian David - 2004 - In I. Niiniluoto, M. Sintonen & J. Wolenski (eds.), Handbook of Epistemology. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 331--414.
  17. Truth and Meaning.Donald Davidson - 1967 - Synthese 17 (1):304-323.
  18. Can One Get Bivalence From (Tarskian) Truth and Falsity?de Sa Dan López - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):pp. 273-282.
    Timothy Williamson famously offered an argument from these Tarskian principles in favor of bivalence. I show, dwelling on (Andjelkovic & Williamson, 2000), that the argument depends on a contentious formulation of the Tarskian principles about truth (and falsity), which the supervaluationist can reject without jeopardizing the Tarskian insight. In the mentioned paper, Adjelkovic and Williamson argue that, even if the appropriate formulation seems to make room for failure of bivalence in borderline cases, this appearance is illusory, once one grants an (...)
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  19. Tarski on “Essentially Richer” Metalanguages.David DeVidi & Graham Solomon - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (1):1-28.
    It is well known that Tarski proved a result which can be stated roughly as: no sufficiently rich, consistent, classical language can contain its own truth definition. Tarski's way around this problem is to deal with two languages at a time, an object language for which we are defining truth and a metalanguage in which the definition occurs. An obvious question then is: under what conditions can we construct a definition of truth for a given object language. Tarski claims that (...)
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  20. Atomic Realism, Intuitionist Logic and Tarskian Truth.Jim Edwards - 1990 - Philosophical Quarterly 40 (158):13-26.
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  21. Tarski on Truth and Logical Consequence.John Etchemendy - 1988 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (1):51-79.
  22. Tarski's Conceptual Analysis of Semantical Notions.Solomon Feferman - 2008 - In Douglas Patterson (ed.), New Essays on Tarski and Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 72.
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  23. Tarskian Truth and the Correspondence Theory.Fernández Moreno Luis - 2001 - Synthese 126 (1):123-148.
    Tarski's theory of truth brings out the question of whether he intended his theory to be a correspondence theory of truth and whether, whatever his intentions, his theory is in fact a correspondence theory. The aim of this paper is to answer both questions. The answer to the first question depends on Tarski's relevant assertions on semantics and his conception of truth. In order to answer the second question Popper's and Davidson's interpretations of Tarski's truth theory are examined; to this (...)
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  24. Tarski's Theory of Truth.Hartry Field - 1972 - Journal of Philosophy 69 (13):347.
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  25. The Disjunction and Existence Properties for Axiomatic Systems of Truth.Harvey Friedman & Michael Sheard - 1987 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 40 (1):1--10.
    In a language for arithmetic with a predicate T, intended to mean “ x is the Gödel number of a true sentence”, a set S of axioms and rules of inference has the truth disjunction property if whenever S ⊢ T ∨ T, either S ⊢ T or S ⊢ T. Similarly, S has the truth existence property if whenever S ⊢ ∃χ T ), there is some n such that S ⊢ T ). Continuing previous work, we establish whether (...)
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  26. On an Incorrect Understanding of Tarskian Truth Definitions.Manuel García-Carpintero - 1997 - Philosophical Issues 8:45-56.
    Criticism of Soames' understanding of Tarskian theories of truth.
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  27. What Is a Tarskian Definition of Truth?Manuel García-Carpintero - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 82 (2):113 - 144.
    Since the publication of Hartry Field’s influential paper “Tarski’s Theory of Truth” there has been an ongoing discussion about the philosophical import of Tarski’s definition. Most of the arguments have aimed to play down that import, starting with that of Field himself. He interpreted Tarski as trying to provide a physicalistic reduction of semantic concepts like truth, and concluded that Tarski had partially failed. Robert Stalnaker and Scott Soames claimed then that Field should have obtained a stronger conclusion, namely that (...)
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  28. Truth.Michael Glanzberg - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Truth is one of the central subjects in philosophy. It is also one of the largest. Truth has been a topic of discussion in its own right for thousands of years. Moreover, a huge variety of issues in philosophy relate to truth, either by relying on theses about truth, or implying theses about truth.
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  29. Truth, Reflection, and Hierarchies.Michael Glanzberg - 2004 - Synthese 142 (3):289 - 315.
    A common objection to hierarchical approaches to truth is that they fragment the concept of truth. This paper defends hierarchical approaches in general against the objection of fragmentation. It argues that the fragmentation required is familiar and unprob-lematic, via a comparison with mathematical proof. Furthermore, it offers an explanation of the source and nature of the fragmentation of truth. Fragmentation arises because the concept exhibits a kind of failure of closure under reflection. This paper offers a more precise characterization of (...)
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  30. Logical Truth and Tarskian Logical Truth.Mario Gómez-torrente - 1998 - Synthese 117 (3):375-408.
    This paper examines the question of the extensional correctness of Tarskian definitions of logical truth and logical consequence. I identify a few different informal properties which are necessary for a sentence to be an informal logical truth and look at whether they are necessary properties of Tarskian logical truths. I examine arguments by John Etchemendy and Vann McGee to the effect that some of those properties are not necessary properties of some Tarskian logical truths, and find them unconvincing. I stress (...)
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  31. Die Idee Hinter Tarskis Definition Von Wahrheit.Dirk Greimann - 1997 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 28 (1):121-158.
    The Idea behind Tarski's Definition of Truth. In Tarski's presentations of his truth-definition, the steps of the construction are not sufficiently explained. It is not clear, on what general strategy the construction is based, what the fundamental ideas are, how some crucial steps work, and especially how the transition from the definition of satisfaction to the definition of truth should be understood. The paper shows that the account given in the model-theoretic literature, which is supported by Tarski's lemmata A and (...)
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  32. Is It True What They Say About Tarski?Susan Haack - 1976 - Philosophy 51 (197):323 - 336.
    Popper welcomes Tarski's theory of truth as a vindication of the ‘objective or absolute or correspondence theory of truth’: -/- Tarski's greatest achievement, and the real significance of his theory for the philosophy of the empirical sciences, is that he rehabilitated the correspondence theory of absolute or objective truth … He vindicated the free use of the intuitive idea of truth as correspondence to the facts ….
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  33. Axiomatic Theories of Truth.Volker Halbach - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Definitional and axiomatic theories of truth -- Objects of truth -- Tarski -- Truth and set theory -- Technical preliminaries -- Comparing axiomatic theories of truth -- Disquotation -- Classical compositional truth -- Hierarchies -- Typed and type-free theories of truth -- Reasons against typing -- Axioms and rules -- Axioms for type-free truth -- Classical symmetric truth -- Kripke-Feferman -- Axiomatizing Kripke's theory in partial logic -- Grounded truth -- Alternative evaluation schemata -- Disquotation -- Classical logic -- Deflationism (...)
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  34. Tarskian and Kripkean Truth.Volker Halbach - 1997 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (1):69-80.
    A theory of the transfinite Tarskian hierarchy of languages is outlined and compared to a notion of partial truth by Kripke. It is shown that the hierarchy can be embedded into Kripke's minimal fixed point model. From this results on the expressive power of both approaches are obtained.
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  35. Tarski Hierarchies.Volker Halbach - 1995 - Erkenntnis 43 (3):339 - 367.
    The general notions of object- and metalanguage are discussed and as a special case of this relation an arbitrary first order language with an infinite model is expanded by a predicate symbol T0 which is interpreted as truth predicate for . Then the expanded language is again augmented by a new truth predicate T1 for the whole language plus T0. This process is iterated into the transfinite to obtain the Tarskian hierarchy of languages. It is shown that there are natural (...)
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  36. A System of Complete and Consistent Truth.Volker Halbach - 1994 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 35 (1):311--27.
    To the axioms of Peano arithmetic formulated in a language with an additional unary predicate symbol T we add the rules of necessitation and conecessitation T and axioms stating that T commutes with the logical connectives and quantifiers. By a result of McGee this theory is -inconsistent, but it can be approximated by models obtained by a kind of rule-of-revision semantics. Furthermore we prove that FS is equivalent to a system already studied by Friedman and Sheard and give an analysis (...)
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  37. Axiomatizing Kripke's Theory of Truth.Volker Halbach & Leon Horsten - 2006 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 71 (2):677 - 712.
    We investigate axiomatizations of Kripke's theory of truth based on the Strong Kleene evaluation scheme for treating sentences lacking a truth value. Feferman's axiomatization KF formulated in classical logic is an indirect approach, because it is not sound with respect to Kripke's semantics in the straightforward sense: only the sentences that can be proved to be true in KF are valid in Kripke's partial models. Reinhardt proposed to focus just on the sentences that can be proved to be true in (...)
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  38. Tarski, Truth, and Semantics.Richard Heck - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (4):533-554.
    John Etchemendy has argued that it is but "a fortuitous accident" that Tarski's work on truth has any signifance at all for semantics. I argue, in response, that Etchemendy and others, such as Scott Soames and Hilary Putnam, have been misled by Tarski's emphasis on definitions of truth rather than theories of truth and that, once we appreciate how Tarski understood the relation between these, we can answer Etchemendy's implicit and explicit criticisms of neo-Davidsonian semantics.
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  39. Horsten, Leon, The Tarskian Turn: Deflationism and Axiomatic Truth, MIT Press, 2011. [REVIEW]Jan Heylen - 2012 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 74 (2):377-379.
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  40. Truth and Existence.Jan Heylen & Leon Horsten - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):106-114.
    Halbach has argued that Tarski biconditionals are not ontologically conservative over classical logic, but his argument is undermined by the fact that he cannot include a theory of arithmetic, which functions as a theory of syntax. This article is an improvement on Halbach's argument. By adding the Tarski biconditionals to inclusive negative free logic and the universal closure of minimal arithmetic, which is by itself an ontologically neutral combination, one can prove that at least one thing exists. The result can (...)
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  41. A Counterexample to Tarski-Type Truth-Definitions as Applied to Natural Languages.Jaakko Hintikka - 1975 - Philosophia 5 (3):207-212.
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  42. The Semantic Theory of Truth: Field's Incompleteness Objection.Glen Hoffmann - 2007 - Philosophia 35 (2):161-170.
    According to Field’s influential incompleteness objection, Tarski’s semantic theory of truth is unsatisfactory since the definition that forms its basis is incomplete in two distinct senses: (1) it is physicalistically inadequate, and for this reason, (2) it is conceptually deficient. In this paper, I defend the semantic theory of truth against the incompleteness objection by conceding (1) but rejecting (2). After arguing that Davidson and McDowell’s reply to the incompleteness objection fails to pass muster, I argue that, within the constraints (...)
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  43. Truth, by Alan R. White. [REVIEW]V. Hope - 1970 - Philosophical Quarterly 22 (89):373.
  44. Theories of Truth.P. Horwich - 1994 - Dartmouth.
  45. Circularity or Lacunae in Tarski's Truth-Schemata.Dale Jacquette - 2010 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 19 (3):315-326.
    Tarski avoids the liar paradox by relativizing truth and falsehood to particular languages and forbidding the predication to sentences in a language of truth or falsehood by any sentences belonging to the same language. The Tarski truth-schemata stratify an object-language and indefinitely ascending hierarchy of meta-languages in which the truth or falsehood of sentences in a language can only be asserted or denied in a higher-order meta-language. However, Tarski’s statement of the truth-schemata themselves involve general truth functions, and in particular (...)
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  46. Did Hobbes Have a Semantic Theory of Truth?W. R. Jondeg - 1990 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 28 (1).
  47. Wahrheiten, die niemand kennen kann. Zu Wolfgang Künnes Verteidigung des alethischen Realismus.Geert Keil - 2005 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 59 (3):404 - 415.
    The article is a comprehensive review of Wolfgang Künne’s book CONCEPTIONS OF TRUTH OUP 2003). The review reports and discusses, in particular, Künne’s arguments for alethic realism. Künne dismisses Putnam’s and Dummett’s views that truth is epistemically constrained. He maintains that truths may exist which humans are constitutionally incapable of ever understanding, because the relevant propositions are beyond any human’s conceptual or perceptual capacities. In addition, Künne argues that some humanly comprehensible truths can never be rationally accepted. His master argument (...)
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  48. Theories of Truth: A Critical Introduction.R. L. Kirkham - 1992 - MIT Press.
  49. Soviet Philosophy and the Semantic Definition of Truth.Guido Küng - 1965 - Studies in East European Thought 5 (1-2):51-56.
  50. Conceptions of Truth.Wolfgang Künne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
    Truth is one of the most debated topics in philosophy; Wolfgang Kunne presents a comprehensive critical examination of all major theories, from Aristotle to the present day. He argues that it is possible to give a satisfactory 'modest' account of truth without invoking problematic notions like correspondence, fact, or meaning. The clarity of exposition and the wealth of examples will make Conceptions of Truth an invaluable and stimulating guide for advanced students and scholars.
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