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  1. Tarski Undefinability Theorem Terse Refutation.P. Olcott - manuscript
    Both Tarski and Gödel “prove” that provability can diverge from Truth. When we boil their claim down to its simplest possible essence it is really claiming that valid inference from true premises might not always derive a true consequence. This is obviously impossible.
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  2. Defining Gödel Incompleteness Away.P. Olcott - manuscript
    We can simply define Gödel 1931 Incompleteness away by redefining the meaning of the standard definition of Incompleteness: A theory T is incomplete if and only if there is some sentence φ such that (T ⊬ φ) and (T ⊬ ¬φ). This definition construes the existence of self-contradictory expressions in a formal system as proof that this formal system is incomplete because self-contradictory expressions are neither provable nor disprovable in this formal system. Since self-contradictory expressions are neither provable nor disprovable (...)
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  3. Tarski’s Convention T: Condition Beta.John Corcoran - forthcoming - South American Journal of Logic 1 (1).
    Tarski’s Convention T—presenting his notion of adequate definition of truth (sic)—contains two conditions: alpha and beta. Alpha requires that all instances of a certain T Schema be provable. Beta requires in effect the provability of ‘every truth is a sentence’. Beta formally recognizes the fact, repeatedly emphasized by Tarski, that sentences (devoid of free variable occurrences)—as opposed to pre-sentences (having free occurrences of variables)—exhaust the range of significance of is true. In Tarski’s preferred usage, it is part of the meaning (...)
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  4. Two-Method Errors: Having It Both Ways.John Corcoran & Idris Samawi Hamid - forthcoming - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic.
    ►JOHN CORCORAN AND IDRIS SAMAWI HAMID, Two-method errors: having it both ways. Philosophy, University at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY 14260-4150, USA E-mail: corcoran@buffalo.edu Philosophy, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO 80523-1781 USA E-mail: ishamid@colostate.edu Where two methods produce similar results, mixing the two sometimes creates errors we call two-method errors, TMEs: in style, syntax, semantics, pragmatics, implicature, logic, or action. This lecture analyzes examples found in technical and in non-technical contexts. One can say “Abe knows whether Ben draws” in two other (...)
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  5. Theories of Truth for Countable Languages Which Conform to Classical Logic.Seppo Heikkilä - forthcoming - Nonlinear Studies.
    Every countable language which conforms to classical logic is shown to have an extension which has a consistent definitional theory of truth. That extension has a consistent semantical theory of truth, if every sentence of the object language is valuated by its meaning either as true or as false. These theories contain both a truth predicate and a non-truth predicate. Theories are equivalent when sentences of the object lqanguage are valuated by their meanings.
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  6. The Nature of Truth (Second Edition).Michael Lynch, Jeremy Wyatt, Junyeol Kim & Nathan Kellen (eds.) - forthcoming - MIT Press.
  7. Truth and Theories of Truth.Panu Raatikainen - forthcoming - In Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge University Press.
    The concept of truth and competing philosophical theories on what truth amounts to have an important place in contemporary philosophy. The aim of this chapter is to give a synopsis of different theories of truth and the particular philosophical issues related to the concept of truth. The literature on this topic is vast, and we must necessarily be rather selective and very brief about complex questions of interpretation of various philosophers. The focus of the chapter is mainly on selected systematic (...)
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  8. Truthmakers for 1st Order Sentences - a Proposal.Friedrich Wilhelm Grafe - 2020 - Archive.Org.
    The purpose of this paper is to communicate - as a proposal - a general method of assigning a 'truthmaker' to any 1st order sentence in each of its models. The respective construct is derived from the standard model theoretic (recursive) satisfaction definition for 1st order languages and is a conservative extension thereof. The heuristics of the proposal (which has been somewhat idiosyncratic from the current point of view) and some more technical detail of the construction may be found in (...)
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  9. Conservative Deflationism?Julien Murzi & Lorenzo Rossi - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (2):535-549.
    Deflationists argue that ‘true’ is merely a logico-linguistic device for expressing blind ascriptions and infinite generalisations. For this reason, some authors have argued that deflationary truth must be conservative, i.e. that a deflationary theory of truth for a theory S must not entail sentences in S’s language that are not already entailed by S. However, it has been forcefully argued that any adequate theory of truth for S must be non-conservative and that, for this reason, truth cannot be deflationary :493–521, (...)
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  10. Modeling Truth for Semantics.Ori Simchen - 2020 - Analytic Philosophy 61 (1):28-36.
    The Tarskian notion of truth-in-a-model is the paradigm formal capture of our pre-theoretical notion of truth for semantic purposes. But what exactly makes Tarski’s construction so well suited for semantics is seldom discussed. In my Semantics, Metasemantics, Aboutness (OUP 2017) I articulate a certain requirement on the successful formal modeling of truth for semantics – “locality-per-reference” – against a background discussion of metasemantics and its relation to truth-conditional semantics. It is a requirement on any formal capture of sentential truth vis-à-vis (...)
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  11. Soames on the Logical Empiricists on Truth, Meaning, Convention, and Logical Truth.Mario Gómez-Torrente - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1357-1365.
    In the first part of this paper, I express doubts that Tarski and Carnap were guilty of some confusions about the relations between truth and meaning, attributed to them by Soames. In the second part, I consider Quine's Carrollian argument against conventionalism about logical truth, discussed only briefly and approvingly by Soames, and I explore the question whether some not obviously incorrect forms of conventionalism about logical truth, such as what I call "finitary conventionalism", are immune to Quine's argument.
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  12. Tarski on the Concept of Truth.Greg Ray - 2018 - In Michael Glanzberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Truth. Oxford, UK: pp. 695-717.
    Alfred Tarski’s work on truth has played such a central role in the discourse on truth that most coming to it for the first time have probably already heard a great deal about what is said there. Unfortunately, since the work is largely technical and Tarski was only tan- gentially philosophical, a certain incautious assimilation dominates many philosophical discussions of Tarski’s ideas, and so, examining Tarski on the concept of truth is in many ways an act of unlearning. -/- In (...)
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  13. Is There a Commonsense Semantic Conception of Truth?Joseph Ulatowski - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (2):487-500.
    Alfred Tarski’s refinement of an account of truth into a formal system that turns on the acceptance of Convention-T has had a lasting impact on philosophical logic, especially work concerning truth, meaning, and other semantic notions. In a series of studies completed from the 1930s to the 1960s, Arne Næss collected and analysed intuitive responses from non-philosophers to questions concerning truth, synonymy, certainty, and probability. Among the formulations of truth studied by Næss were practical variants of expressions of the form (...)
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  14. Truth & Transcendence: Turning the Tables on the Liar Paradox.Gila Sher - 2017 - In Bradley Armour-Garb (ed.), Reflections on the Liar. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 281-306.
    Confronting the Liar Paradox is commonly viewed as a prerequisite for developing a theory of truth. In this paper I turn the tables on this traditional conception of the relation between the two. The theorist of truth need not constrain his search for a “material” theory of truth, i.e., a theory of the philosophical nature of truth, by committing himself to one solution or another to the Liar Paradox. If he focuses on the nature of truth (leaving issues of formal (...)
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  15. Tarski’s 1944 Polemical Remarks and Naess’ “Experimental Philosophy”.Robert Barnard & Joseph Ulatowski - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (3):457-477.
    Many of Tarski’s better known papers are either about or include lengthy discussions of how to properly define various concepts: truth, logical consequence, semantic concepts, or definability. In general, these papers identify two primary conditions for successful definitions: formal correctness and material adequacy. Material adequacy requires that the concept expressed by the formal definition capture the intuitive content of truth. Our primary interest in this paper is to better understand Tarski’s thinking about material adequacy, and whether components of his view (...)
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  16. How Tarski Defined the Undefinable.Cezary Cieśliński - 2015 - European Review 23 (01):139 - 149.
    This paper describes Tarski’s project of rehabilitating the notion of truth, previously considered dubious by many philosophers. The project was realized by providing a formal truth definition, which does not employ any problematic concept.
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  17. Tarski’s Quantificational Semantics and Meinongian Object Theory Domains.Dale Jacquette - 2015 - In Alexius Meinong, the Shepherd of Non-Being. Springer Verlag.
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  18. Davidson’s Antirealism?Alexander Miller & Ali Hossein Khani - 2015 - Revista de Filosofia Aurora 27 (40):265.
    Frederic Stoutland (1982a, 1982b) has argued that a Davidsonian theory of meaning is incompatible with a realist view of truth, on which the truth-conditions of sentences consist of mind-independent states of affairs or concatenations of extra-linguistic objects. In this paper we show that Stoutland’s argument is a failure.
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  19. Truth.Wrenn Chase - 2014 - Polity.
    What is truth? Is there anything that all truths have in common that makes them true rather than false? Is truth independent of human thought, or does it depend in some way on what we believe or what we would be justified in believing? In what sense, if any, is it better for beliefs or statements to be true than to be false? In this engaging and accessible new introduction Chase Wrenn surveys a variety of theories of the nature of (...)
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  20. Explicating the Notion of Truth Within Transparent Intensional Logic.Jiri Raclavsky - 2014 - In Recent Trends in Philosophical Logic (Proceedings of Trends in Logic XI). pp. 167-177.
    The approach of Transparent Intensional Logic to truth differs significantly from rivalling approaches. The notion of truth is explicated by a three-level system of notions whereas the upper-level notions depend on the lower-level ones. Truth of possible world propositions lies in the bottom. Truth of hyperintensional entities – called constructions – which determine propositions is dependent on it. Truth of expressions depends on truth of their meanings; the meanings are explicated as constructions. The approach thus adopts a particular hyperintensional theory (...)
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  21. The Problem of Negative Existentials, Inadvertently Solved.Greg Ray - 2014 - In Manuel García-Carpintero & Genoveva Martí (eds.), Empty Representations: Reference and Non-Existence. Oxford University Press. pp. 262-274.
    The problem of negative existentials is one of the classic problems in philosophy of language. Latter-day developments in semantics resolved this problem without our help, but due to accidents of history no one noticed.
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  22. Nothing But D‐Truth.Kai F. Wehmeier - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (1):114-117.
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  23. Formulating Deflationism.Arvid Båve - 2013 - Synthese 190 (15):3287-3305.
    I here argue for a particular formulation of truth-deflationism, namely, the propositionally quantified formula, (Q) “For all p, <p> is true iff p”. The main argument consists of an enumeration of the other (five) possible formulations and criticisms thereof. Notably, Horwich’s Minimal Theory is found objectionable in that it cannot be accepted by finite beings. Other formulations err in not providing non-questionbegging, sufficiently direct derivations of the T-schema instances. I end by defending (Q) against various objections. In particular, I argue (...)
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  24. La Forma della Verità. Logica e filosofia nell'opera di Alfred Tarski.Ciro De Florio - 2013 - Italy: Mimesis.
  25. Syntactical Constraints on Definitions.Dale Jacquette - 2013 - Metaphilosophy 44 (1-2):145-156.
    This essay considers arguments for and against syntactical constraints on the proper formalization of definitions, originally owing to Alfred Tarski. It discusses and refutes an application of the constraints generalized to include a prohibition against not only object-place but also predicate-place variables in higher-order logic in a criticism of a recent effort to define the concept of heterologicality in a strengthened derivation of Grelling's paradox within type theory requirements. If the objections were correct, they would offer a more general moral (...)
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  26. Review of "Truth". [REVIEW]Benjamin W. Jarvis - 2013 - Essays in Philosophy 14 (2):13.
  27. Davidson’s Main Arguments for the Necessity of Language for Thought (In Persian).Ali Hossein Khani - 2013 - Ketab-E-Mah-E-Falsafeh 6 (68):66-77.
  28. The Tarski T-Schema is a Tautology (Literally).Edward N. Zalta - 2013 - Analysis (1):ant099.
    The Tarski T-Schema has a propositional version. If we use ϕ as a metavariable for formulas and use terms of the form that-ϕ to denote propositions, then the propositional version of the T-Schema is: that-ϕ is true if and only if ϕ. For example, that Cameron is Prime Minister is true if and only if Cameron is Prime Minister. If that-ϕ is represented formally as [λ ϕ], then the T-Schema can be represented as the 0-place case of λ-Conversion. If we (...)
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  29. Lies, Half-Truths, and Falsehoods About Tarski’s 1933 “Liar” Antinomies.John Corcoran & Joaquin Miller - 2012 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 18 (1):140-141.
    We discuss misinformation about “the liar antinomy” with special reference to Tarski’s 1933 truth-definition paper [1]. Lies are speech-acts, not merely sentences or propositions. Roughly, lies are statements of propositions not believed by their speakers. Speakers who state their false beliefs are often not lying. And speakers who state true propositions that they don’t believe are often lying—regardless of whether the non-belief is disbelief. Persons who state propositions on which they have no opinion are lying as much as those who (...)
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  30. Horsten, Leon, The Tarskian Turn: Deflationism and Axiomatic Truth, MIT Press, 2011. [REVIEW]Jan Heylen - 2012 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 74 (2):377-379.
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  31. Truth.Alexis G. Burgess & John P. Burgess - 2011 - Princeton University Press.
    This is a concise, advanced introduction to current philosophical debates about truth. A blend of philosophical and technical material, the book is organized around, but not limited to, the tendency known as deflationism, according to which there is not much to say about the nature of truth. In clear language, Burgess and Burgess cover a wide range of issues, including the nature of truth, the status of truth-value gaps, the relationship between truth and meaning, relativism and pluralism about truth, and (...)
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  32. Truth and Words, by Gary Ebbs.M. McGrath - 2011 - Mind 120 (478):520-527.
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  33. Truth-Makers and Convention T.Jan Woleński - 2011 - Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Kevin Mulligan.
    This papers discuss the place, if any, of Convention T (the condition of material adequacy of the proper definition of truth formulated by Tarski) in the truth-makers account offered by Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons and Barry Smith. It is argued that although Tarski’s requirement seems entirely acceptable in the frameworks of truth-makers theories for the first-sight, several doubts arise under a closer inspection. In particular, T-biconditionals have no clear meaning as sentences about truth-makers. Thus, truth-makers theory cannot be considered as (...)
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  34. Deflationism and the Primary Truth Bearer.Arvid Båve - 2010 - Synthese 173 (3):281 - 297.
    The paper discusses what kind of truth bearer, or truth-ascription, a deflationist should take as primary. I first present number of arguments against a sententialist view. I then present a deflationary theory which takes propositions as primary, and try to show that it deals neatly with a wide range of linguistic data. Next, I consider both the view that there is no primary truth bearer, and the most common account of sentence truth given by deflationists who take propositions as primary, (...)
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  35. Circularity or Lacunae in Tarski’s Truth-Schemata.Dale Jacquette - 2010 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 19 (3):315-326.
    Tarski avoids the liar paradox by relativizing truth and falsehood to particular languages and forbidding the predication to sentences in a language of truth or falsehood by any sentences belonging to the same language. The Tarski truth-schemata stratify an object-language and indefinitely ascending hierarchy of meta-languages in which the truth or falsehood of sentences in a language can only be asserted or denied in a higher-order meta-language. However, Tarski’s statement of the truth-schemata themselves involve general truth functions, and in particular (...)
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  36. The Reality And The Normativeness Of Truth.Robert Piłat - 2010 - Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia 5 (2):47-61.
    The subject of the paper is the issue whether the property of truth as ascribed to sentences and propositions is a real one, i.e. capable of being ascribed to entities such as physical objects, their properties, relations between them, sets of objects, properties of the sets of objects, etc. The point of departure for the analysis is Alfred Tarski’s definition of true sentence in a language L. His definition does not imply anything about the ontology of the property of truth, (...)
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  37. New Waves in Truth.Cory Wright & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.) - 2010 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
    What is truth? Philosophers are interested in a range of issues involving the concept of truth beginning with what sorts of things can be true. This is a collection of eighteen new and original research papers on truth and other alethic phenomena by twenty of the most promising young scholars working on truth today.
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  38. Jump Liars and Jourdain’s Card Via the Relativized T-Scheme.Ming Hsiung - 2009 - Studia Logica 91 (2):239-271.
    A relativized version of Tarski's T-scheme is introduced as a new principle of the truth predicate. Under the relativized T-scheme, the paradoxical objects, such as the Liar sentence and Jourdain's card sequence, are found to have certain relative contradictoriness. That is, they are contradictory only in some frames in the sense that any valuation admissible for them in these frames will lead to a contradiction. It is proved that for any positive integer n, the n-jump liar sentence is contradictory in (...)
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  39. Can One Get Bivalence From (Tarskian) Truth and Falsity?Dan López de Sa - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):pp. 273-282.
    Timothy Williamson famously offered an argument from these Tarskian principles in favor of bivalence. I show, dwelling on (Andjelkovic & Williamson, 2000), that the argument depends on a contentious formulation of the Tarskian principles about truth (and falsity), which the supervaluationist can reject without jeopardizing the Tarskian insight. In the mentioned paper, Adjelkovic and Williamson argue that, even if the appropriate formulation seems to make room for failure of bivalence in borderline cases, this appearance is illusory, once one grants an (...)
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  40. Tarski on Definition, Meaning and Truth.Douglas Patterson - 2009 - In Sandra Lapointe, Jan Wolenski, Mathieu Marion & Wioletta Miskiewicz (eds.), The Golden Age of Polish Philosophy. Kaziemierz Twardowski’s philosophical legacy. Springer. pp. 16--155.
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  41. The Slingshot Argument, Gödel's Hesitation and Tarskian Semantics.Arhat Virdi - 2009 - Prolegomena 8 (1):233-241.
    The slingshot argument is a reductio purporting to show that if there are facts at all there is only one to which all true statements correspond. If facts are not non-trivially individuable then this presumably must render the notion of fact and, by implication, theories such as the correspondence theory of truth incoherent. Church and Davidson (among others) deployed the slingshot in exoneration of the Fregean conclusion that there is a uni-referent – the ‘True’ – for all true statements. The (...)
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  42. Alternative Logics and the Role of Truth in the Interpretation of Languages.Jody Azzouni - 2008 - In Douglas Patterson (ed.), New Essays on Tarski and Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 390.
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  43. Tarski's Convention T and the Concept of Truth.Marian David - 2008 - In Douglas Patterson (ed.), New Essays on Tarski and Philosophy. Oxford Univ. Press.
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  44. Axioms for Determinateness and Truth.Solomon Feferman - 2008 - Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (2):204-217.
    elaboration of the last part of my Tarski Lecture, “Truth unbound”, UC Berkeley, 3 April 2006, and of the lecture, “A nicer formal theory of non-hierarchical truth”, Workshop on Mathematical Methods in Philosophy, Banff , 18-23 Feb. 2007.
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  45. Tarski's Conceptual Analysis of Semantical Notions.Solomon Feferman - 2008 - In Douglas Patterson (ed.), New Essays on Tarski and Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 72.
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  46. Truth.Michael Glanzberg - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Truth is one of the central subjects in philosophy. It is also one of the largest. Truth has been a topic of discussion in its own right for thousands of years. Moreover, a huge variety of issues in philosophy relate to truth, either by relying on theses about truth, or implying theses about truth.
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  47. Axiomatic Theories of Truth.Volker Halbach - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Definitional and axiomatic theories of truth -- Objects of truth -- Tarski -- Truth and set theory -- Technical preliminaries -- Comparing axiomatic theories of truth -- Disquotation -- Classical compositional truth -- Hierarchies -- Typed and type-free theories of truth -- Reasons against typing -- Axioms and rules -- Axioms for type-free truth -- Classical symmetric truth -- Kripke-Feferman -- Axiomatizing Kripke's theory in partial logic -- Grounded truth -- Alternative evaluation schemata -- Disquotation -- Classical logic -- Deflationism (...)
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  48. Liar-Like Paradox and Object Language Features.C. S. Jenkins & Daniel Nolan - 2008 - American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (1):67 - 73.
    We argue that it would seem to be a mistake to blame Liar-like paradox on certain features of the object language, since the effect can be created with very minimal object languages that contain none of the usual suspects (truth-like predicates, reference to their own truth-bearers, negation, etc.).
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  49. Quine Management Concept for the Real Views of Two Types: Intrinsic and Transcendence.Chien-kuo Mi - 2008 - Philosophy and Culture 35 (8):143-161.
    True philosophy of management concepts in the discussion is a very ambiguous in nature. Since Tarski in his real management theory in the attempt to define the truth of this predicate, the real management concepts often are two different way of coming to understand reading: one is the truth as opposed to an individual language of the predicate, and the other is the truth as a universal concept, and can be applied to different languages. In order to Quine's use of (...)
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  50. New Essays on Tarski and Philosophy.Douglas Patterson (ed.) - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
    The essays can be seen as addressing Tarski's seminal treatment of four basic questions about logical consequence. (1) How are we to understand truth, one of ...
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