Technology Ethics

AgeTech refers to a growing sector that is advancing the use of technologies, such as information and communication technologies (ICTs), mobile technologies, robotics, wearables and smart home systems to enhance the lives of older adults. Although AgeTech can be seen as an opportunity for empowering older people and enhance their overall quality of life, crucial ethical issues have to be addressed. The articles in this topical collection focus on these and other ethical questions, particularly in respect to key emerging technologies (...) of AI and robotics. The overall aim is to explore the multifaceted ethical landscape of emerging AgeTech and to provide frameworks and strategies for ethically-appropriate technologies that support the health, well-being, and quality of life of older adults. (shrink)

Can technology resolve social problems by reducing them to engineering challenges? In the 1960s, Alvin Weinberg answered yes, popularizing the term “techno-fix” in the process. The concept was immediately criticized and over time evolved into a disparaging term—a synonym for unrealistic technological proposals and their advocates. As the debate progressed, skepticism grew to include condemnation of a related term: “techno-solutionism.” Despite extensive criticism, both “techno-fix” and “techno-solutionism” remain ill-defined concepts. In this article, we provide more precise definitions and clearly distinguish (...) between techno-fixes and techno-solutionism through conceptual engineering. By refining these concepts, we aim to advance the discussion and lay the groundwork for more productive analyses of the role of technology in solving social problems. (shrink)

From the perspective of digital ethics, this book chapter outlines a model for dealing with the challenges posed by digital media environments in a responsible and appropriate manner. This concept is based on preliminary considerations on “digital citizenship”. At a time when digital technologies - the “data-sphere” - are being increasingly implemented and intensified, the question of humans' roles and skills in using these digital technologies in a sensible and meaningful way is becoming more and more urgent. In the age (...) of European Enlightenment, Western societies had already assigned a central role to people's maturity, which was to be achieved fundamentally through literacy and education in order to create free individuals and, ultimately, citizens capable of making decisions. In contrast, in the current age of digitality, characterized by networking and immersion that has prevailed since the 1990s, many people experience and participate in such life-worlds primarily as consumers. In this role, they increasingly appear as economic objects that are constantly encouraged to produce data sets. Social networking sites and applications of generative artificial intelligence in particular exert a certain pull, the functioning of which many people are at best instrumentally proficient in, but not reflexively. Against this background, Zöllner's article outlines the contours of the concept of "digital citizenship" from an ethical perspective. This form of citizenship should enable people to lead a free life in digital and networked environments in which they are not merely subject to the exploitation interests of digital corporations. (shrink)

This paper is a study of the decisions that researchers take during the execution of a research plan: their researcher discretion. Flexible research methods are generally seen as undesirable, and many methodologists urge to eliminate these so-called ‘researcher degrees of freedom’ from the research practice. However, what this looks like in practice is unclear. Based on twelve months of ethnographic fieldwork in two end-of-life research groups in which we observed research practice, conducted interviews, and collected documents, we explore when researchers (...) are required to make decisions, and what these decisions entail.An abductive analysis of this data showed that researchers are constantly required to further interpret research plans, indicating that there is no clear division between planning and plan execution. This discretion emerges either when a research protocol is underdetermined or overdetermined, in which case they need to operationalise or adapt the plans respectively. In addition, we found that many of these instances of researcher discretion are exercised implicitly. Within the research groups it was occasionally not clear which topic merited an active decision, or which action could retroactively be categorised as one.Our ethnographic study of research practice suggests that researcher discretion is an integral and inevitable aspect of research practice, as many elements of a research protocol will either need to be further operationalised or adapted during its execution. Moreover, it may be difficult for researchers to identify their own discretion, limiting their effectivity in transparency. (shrink)

What is a fair distribution of risk? This chapter will look into three separate, but related, aspects of fairness in risk distributions. Firstly, I will locate the object of fairness when it comes to risk distribution. In contrast to distributions of goods, which we want to both increase and distribute fairly, risks are something we want to decrease and distribute fairly. The question of fairness in risk distributions is the question of how to combine these two partially conflicting claims; to (...) fairness on the one hand and to risk reduction on the other. Secondly, I will take a closer look at what an equal distribution of chances for harm might be. I will point to the problem that the very idea of distributing probabilities entails. Thirdly, I address the question of when deviations from equal distributions of risks may be justified and how such inequalities can be addressed in a fair way. It will be suggested that the locus of fairness of risk should be sought in two steps: (1) the justification of particular risky activities, where the level of risk and the spread of that risk is taken into account, and (2) that any resulting higher risk for certain groups or individuals should be addressed through a combination of consent, precaution, and compensation, seeking to even out unfair exposure. (shrink)

The use of the open publishing is expected to be the dominant model in the future. However, along with the use of this model, predatory journals are increasingly appearing. In the current study, the awareness of researchers in Jordan about predatory journals and the strategies utilized to avoid them was investigated. The study included 558 researchers from Jordan. A total of 34.0% of the participants reported a high ability to identify predatory journals, while 27.0% reported a low ability to identify (...) predatory journals. Most participants (64.0%) apply “Think. Check. Submit.” strategy to avoid predatory journals. However, 11.9% of the sample reported being a victim of a predatory journal. Multinomial regression analysis showed gender, number of publications, using Beall’s list of predatory journals, and applying “Think. Check. Submit.” strategy were predictors of the high ability to identify predatory journals. Participants reported using databases such as Scopus, Clarivate, membership in the publishing ethics committee, and DOAJ to validate the journal before publication. Finally, most participants (88.4%) agreed to attend a training module on how to identify predatory journals. In conclusion, Jordanian researchers use valid strategies to avoid predatory journals. Implementing a training module may enhance researchers’ ability to identify predatory journals. (shrink)

The rapid advancement of digital health innovation, including Artificial Intelligence (AI), is transforming healthcare. The growing role the European Union (EU) plays in regulating the use of AI in healthcare renders national laws insufficient to safeguard patients from unique AIrelated risks. This underscores the urgent need for the recognition of a canon of patients' rights in the scope of EU law. This paper proposes the blueprint for an EU Charter for Digital Patients' Rights, consolidating and adapting existing rights for patients (...) to address these specific challenges. Traditional patients' rights such as the right to privacy and the right to informed consent are interpreted in light of the challenges posed by AI. It also proposes novel rights for patients, such as the right not to be subject to automated medical decision-making and the right to meaningful human contact. This paper highlights the EU's central role in protecting patients' rights and outlines strategies for effective implementation. This comprehensive approach aims to address the current shortcomings and enhance the legal framework governing digital health in Europe. (shrink)

Engineers make decisions with global impacts and empathy can motivate ethical reasoning and behavior that is sensitive to the needs and perspectives of stakeholders across the globe. Microethics and macroethics offer two frames of reference for engineering ethics education, but different dimensions of empathy play distinct roles in micro- and macroethics. Microethics emphasizes individual responsibility and interpersonal relationships whereas macroethics emphasizes societal obligations and impacts. While empathy can support ethical reasoning and behavior for each, in this paper I argue that (...) affective empathy plays a primary (but not exclusive) role in microethics whereas cognitive empathy plays a primary role in macroethics. Gilligan’s and Kohlberg’s theories of moral development are used to further depict how affective empathy aligns with care (depicted as an interpersonal phenomenon) and how cognitive empathy aligns with justice (depicted as a systems-focused phenomenon), thus positioning these ethical principles as playing primary (but again, not exclusive) roles in micro- and macro-ethics, respectively. Building on these ideas, this study generates a framework that describes and visualizes how empathy manifests across six frames of reference, each of which are increasingly macro-ethical in nature: self, team, operators, participants, bystanders, and future generations. The paper describes how proxy stakeholders can be identified, developed, and leveraged to empathize with stakeholder groups. Taken together, the manuscript seeks to clarify the role of empathy in engineering ethics and can enable engineering students to better empathize with the range of stakeholders impacted by engineering decisions, ranging from one’s self to stakeholders across the globe. The intrapersonal understandings and motivations that students generate by empathizing across six frames of reference can facilitate ethical reasoning processes and behaviors that are more inclusive and comprehensive. (shrink)

This paper aims to engineer the concept of biomimetic design for its application in agricultural technology as an innovation strategy to sustain non-human species’ adaptation to today’s rapid environmental changes. By questioning the alleged intrinsic morality of biomimicry, a formulation of it is sought that goes beyond the sharp distinction between nature as inspiration and the human field of application of biomimetic technologies. After reviewing the main literature on Responsible Innovation, we support Vincent Blok’s “eco-centric” perspective on biomimicry, which considers (...) the human and natural worlds as indistinguishable parts of a shared Earth. We propose this approach as a complement to the “evomimetic” critique, which warns biomimetic research against the limits of adaptationism. By merging these two reframing of the biomimicry concept, we thus pave the way for a new understanding of the use of human-inspired technology (such as artificial intelligence) to help the “evolution” of domesticated species into (semi)autonomous natural-technological hybrids. In particular, the examples we consider concern the potential of AI-enabled robotic bases in technological beekeeping. (shrink)

Safe-by-Design (SbD) is a new concept that urges the developers of novel technologies to integrate safety early on in their design process. A SbD approach could—in theory—support the development of safer products and assist a responsible transition to the bioeconomy, via the deployment of safer bio-based and biotechnological alternatives. Despite its prominence in policy discourse, SbD is yet to gain traction in research and innovation practice. In this paper, we examine a frequently stated objection to the initiative of SbD, namely (...) the position that SbD is already common practice in research and industry. We draw upon observations from two case studies: one, a study on the applicability of SbD in the context of bio-based circular materials and, two, a study on stakeholder perceptions of SbD in biotechnology. Interviewed practitioners in both case studies make claims to a strong safety culture in their respective fields and have difficulties differentiating a SbD approach from existing safety practices. Two variations of this argument are discussed: early attentiveness to safety as a strictly formalised practice and early attentiveness as implicit practice. We analyse these perceptions using the theoretical lens of safety culture and contrast them to the aims of SbD. Our analysis indicates that professional identity and professional pride may explain some of the resistance to the initiative of SbD. Nevertheless, SbD could still be advantageous by a) emphasising multidisciplinary approaches to safety and b) offering a (reflective) frame via which implicit attentiveness to safety becomes explicit. (shrink)

We address an open problem in the philosophy of artificial intelligence (AI): how to justify the epistemic attitudes we have towards the trustworthiness of AI systems. The problem is important, as providing reasons to believe that AI systems are worthy of trust is key to appropriately rely on these systems in human-AI interactions. In our approach, we consider the trustworthiness of an AI as a time-relative, composite property of the system with two distinct facets. One is the actual trustworthiness of (...) the AI and the other is the perceived trustworthiness of the system as assessed by its users while interacting with it. We show that credences, namely, beliefs we hold with a degree of confidence, are the appropriate attitude for capturing the facets of the trustworthiness of an AI over time. Then, we introduce a reliabilistic account providing justification to the credences in the trustworthiness of AI, which we derive from Tang’s probabilistic theory of justified credence. Our account stipulates that a credence in the trustworthiness of an AI system is justified if and only if it is caused by an assessment process that tends to result in a high proportion of credences for which the actual and perceived trustworthiness of the AI are calibrated. This approach informs research on the ethics of AI and human-AI interactions by providing actionable recommendations on how to measure the reliability of the process through which users perceive the trustworthiness of the system, investigating its calibration to the actual levels of trustworthiness of the AI as well as users’ appropriate reliance on the system. (shrink)

In this paper, we suggest that personalized LLMs trained on information written by or otherwise pertaining to an individual could serve as artificial moral advisors (AMAs) that account for the dynamic nature of personal morality. These LLM-based AMAs would harness users’ past and present data to infer and make explicit their sometimes-shifting values and preferences, thereby fostering self-knowledge. Further, these systems may also assist in processes of self-creation, by helping users reflect on the kind of person they want to be (...) and the actions and goals necessary for so becoming. The feasibility of LLMs providing such personalized moral insights remains uncertain pending further technical development. Nevertheless, we argue that this approach addresses limitations in existing AMA proposals reliant on either predetermined values or introspective self-knowledge. (shrink)

El texto aborda cómo la interacción entre tecnología y sociedad, sobre todo desde el contexto del determinismo tecnológico, ha configurado el entorno humano desde la prehistoria hasta la contemporaneidad. La tecnología no es solo una herramienta, sino un agente activo que afecta y reconfigura las dinámicas sociales, además de estar influenciada por valores y decisiones humanas. En este sentido, se subraya la necesidad de una ética tecnológica que garantice que los avances sirvan al bienestar humano y promuevan la justicia social. (...) Esta ética aplicada, que emergió como respuesta a los impactos negativos de los avances tecnológicos, explora dimensiones complejas y multifacéticas de decisiones morales influenciadas por la racionalidad humana. Además, se enfatiza la responsabilidad compartida de ingenieros, sectores industriales y sociedad para guiar la tecnología hacia un futuro sostenible, promoviendo una relación armoniosa entre los valores humanos y el desarrollo tecnológico. (shrink)

Die Beiträge in diesem Band spiegeln den Stand der Reflexions- und Forschungsprozesse an der Fakultät Gestaltung der TH Würzburg-Schweinfurt, der HBKsaar und der New Design University in St. Pölten. Sie repräsentieren einen Prozess der Aufklärung, dessen Prüfstein Walter Benjamins Frage ist, wie sich ›die Art und Weise der Sinneswahrnehmung‹ geschichtlich gewachsener Kollektive durch neue Medientechnologien verändert.

This chapter provides a philosophical overview of different approaches to age and aging. I challenge the belief that our age is always determined by the amount of time we have existed: chronology. I propose there are different views on age and aging. Biological age, which can be estimated based on epigenetics, might be more useful and important concept than chronological age. I suggest that sometimes some people should be allowed to change their legal age to reduce the harms that come (...) from unjust assumptions related to old age. Changing legal age could also be used to fight ageism, discrimination based on age. (shrink)

I suggest that shaping knowers of facts implies the teaching of intellectual virtues. To justify this claim, I do not appeal to the intrinsic value of epistemic goods such as truth or knowledge. Instead, I suggest that we have political reasons to teach intellectual virtues to high school and college students. The current epistemic environment – especially that found on social media – is not conducive to good democratic decision-making, but acquiring intellectual virtues can prepare students to make good political (...) decisions and increase the epistemic potential of democracy. For this reason, we should envision intellectual virtues as civic virtues, that is, excellencies that relate to the democratic process and that can help individuals become good citizens. (shrink)

Attempts to influence people’s beliefs through misinformation have a long history. In the age of social media, however, there is a growing fear that the circulation of false or misleading claims will be more impactful than ever now that sophisticated technological means are available to those who desire to spread them. Should democratic societies worry about misinformation? If so, is it possible and desirable for them to control its spread by regulating it? This chapter offers an answer to these questions. (...) First, I propose a definition of misinformation and explain how it proliferates in online contexts. Second, I consider four reasons to worry about misinformation by discussing its likely impact on people’s political opinions, emotions, physical safety and personal autonomy. Third, I assess three strategies for regulating misinformation—individual self-regulation, platform-based innovations and governmental action—and suggest that the most effective ones are those that spare human agents from having to successively review individual pieces of content. (shrink)

According to recent discussions, trolls attempt to spark the anger of internet users by feigning engagement in serious conversations with unsuspecting targets who are turned into objects of ridicule in front of a complicit audience. In this chapter, I extend the traditional definition of trolling to non-conversational endeavours. In my view, trolling is the deceptive disruption of joint action regardless of whether such action is conversational or non-conversational in nature. In conjunction, I propose an account of the moral wrong in (...) trolling according to which trolls hinder the pursuit of valuable human goods such as knowledge, mutual understanding, friendship, empathy and play by deceptively engaging their targets in spurious forms of joint action. To illustrate these claims, I consider a recent case of non-conversational. (shrink)

To address societal challenges, research and innovation approaches, involving a wide range of actors, are increasingly promoted by policy communities. This paper explores the practice of Quadruple Helix collaborations for responsible innovation and how these implement the theoretical ambition of including actors from different societal sectors in innovation, including actors from the fields of arts, media and civil society, which is conceptualized as the Fourth Helix in this concept. Referring to cross-sector collaboration literature and based on an empirical investigation, we (...) explore which actors, representing the Fourth Helix, actually engage in innovation collaborations, how this engagement plays out in practice, and the institutional and systemic dynamics involved in output and value creation. We rely on data from three Social Labs in Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands, which constitute qualitative, change-oriented research processes, where we researched and engaged with actors from cases constituting- or aiming for a Quadruple Helix collaboration. This was accompanied by a desktop study including qualitative interviews of 51 further cases. We find that the actual engagement of actors from civil society is fragile and that forces beyond Quadruple Helix cases impact these quite firmly in some cases. (shrink)

The online dating application has in recent years become a major avenue for meeting potential partners. But while the digital public sphere has gained the attention of political philosophers, a systematic normative evaluation of issues arising in the ‘digital sexual sphere’ is lacking. I provide a philosophical framework for assessing dating app corporation conduct, capturing why people use these apps and their experience so often is unsatisfactory. Identifying dating apps as agents intervening in a social institution necessary for the reproduction (...) of society, with immense power over people's lives, I ask if they exercise their power in line with individuals’ interests. Acknowledging that people have claims to non-interference, equal standing, and choice improvement relating to intimacy, I find that the traditional, non-digital, sexual sphere poses problems to their realisation, especially for sexual minorities. In this context, apps’ potential for justice in the sexual sphere is immense, but unfulfilled. (shrink)

Citizen science (CS) is an umbrella term for research with a significant amount of contributions from volunteers. Those volunteers can occupy a hybrid role, being both ‘researcher’ and ‘subject’ at the same time. This has repercussions for questions about responsibility and credit, e.g. pertaining to the issue of authorship. In this paper, we first review some existing guidelines for authorship and their applicability to CS. Second, we assess the claim that the guidelines from the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors (...) (ICMJE), known as ‘the Vancouver guidelines’, may lead to exclusion of deserving citizen scientists as authors. We maintain that the idea of including citizen scientists as authors is supported by at least two arguments: transparency and fairness. Third, we argue that it might be plausible to include groups as authors in CS. Fourth and finally, we offer a heuristic list of seven recommendations to be considered when deciding about whom to include as an author of a CS publication. (shrink)

Originally published in 1986, this volume of six essays by one of Canada's most influential philosophers offers absorbing reflections on the extent to which technology has shaped the way we live now.

Langdon Winner is the Thomas Phelan Chair of Humanities and Social Sciences in the Department of Science and Technology Studies at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, New York. He has a blog and tweets liberally. First published in 1986, The Whale and the Reactor has been assigned for years. This edition includes a passionately argued new chapter entitled Beyond Techno-narcissism as well as a new Preface and a postscript describing the now planned decommissioning of the Diablo Canyon reactor in California.

“Moral imagination” is the capacity to register that one’s perspective on a decision-making situation is limited, and to imagine alternative perspectives that reveal new considerations or approaches. We have developed a Moral Imagination approach that aims to drive a culture of responsible innovation, ethical awareness, deliberation, decision-making, and commitment in organizations developing new technologies. We here present a case study that illustrates one key aspect of our approach – the technomoral scenario – as we have applied it in our work (...) with product and engineering teams. Technomoral scenarios are fictional narratives that raise ethical issues surrounding the interaction between emerging technologies and society. Through facilitated role-playing and discussion, participants are prompted to examine their own intentions, articulate justifications for actions, and consider the impact of decisions on various stakeholders. This process helps developers to re-envision their choices and responsibilities, ultimately contributing to a culture of responsible innovation. (shrink)

The development of artificial perception technologies has surpassed the limitations of human natural senses, expanding humanity's perspectives on the world and self-awareness. However, it has simultaneously introduced new ethical challenges. These emerging challenges necessitate a philosophical reexamination of concepts such as 'nature,' 'artificial,' and ' invasiveness ' to better address associated issues. The advancement of artificial perception technologies not only involves scientific and practical applications but also profoundly influences human values, social ethics, and the future trajectory of human civilization. Amidst (...) the current transformation and transition in modes of cognition, reevaluating the relationship between technology and humanity becomes a crucial task. (shrink)

Artificial Cognition (AC) has provoked a great deal of controversy in recent years. Concerns over its development have revolved around the questions of whether or not a moral status may be ascribed to AC and, if so, how could it be characterized? This paper provides an analysis of consciousness as a means to query the moral status of AC. This method suggests that the question of moral status of artificial cognition depends upon the level of development of consciousness achieved. As (...) a means by which to distinguish among different levels of technological capabilities, we propose a scale of AC statuses in the relationship with natural cognition of humans: no status, low status, equal status and high status. This research draws from classical theories of ethics, in particular utilitarianism and deontology, to explain the differences and shortcomings of the four propositions. The philosophical arguments presented serve to challenge common assumptions about natural cognition of human relationships with AC as well as to suggest that future technological advances should be directed toward the achievement of a position of equality in those relationships. This shows that artificial cognition has no moral status at present, but could have the same moral status as natural cognition of human beings in the future. (shrink)

This book puts Ricœur's work at the center of contemporary philosophical thinking concerning technology. It investigates his project of critical hermeneutics, the growing ethical and political impacts of technologies on the modern lifeworld, and ways of analyzing global sociotechnical systems such as the Internet.

One of the main differences between science and engineering is that engineering is not just about better understanding the world but also about changing it. Many engineers believe that such change improves, or at least should improve, the world. In this sense engineering is an inherently morally motivated activity. Changing the world for the better is, however, no easy task and also not one that can be achieved on the basis of engineering knowledge alone. It also requires, among other things, (...) ethical reflection and knowledge. This book aims at contributing to such reflection and knowledge, not just in a theoretical sense but also more practically. This book takes an innovative approach to engineering ethics in several respects. It provides a rather unique approach to ethical decision-making: the ethical cycle. This approach is illustrated by an abundance of cases studies and examples, not only from the US but also from Europe and the rest of the world. The book is also innovative in paying more attention than most traditional introductions in engineering ethics to such topics as ethics in engineering design, the organizational context of engineering, the distribution of responsibility, sustainability, and new technologies such as nanotechnology. There is an increasing attention to ethics in the engineering curricula. Engineers are supposed not only to carry out their work competently and skillfully but also to be aware of the broader ethical and social implications of engineering and to be able to reflect on these. According to the Engineering Criteria 2000 of the Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET) in the US, engineering graduates must have "an understanding of professional and ethical responsibility" and "the broad education necessary to understand the impact of engineering solutions in a global and societal context" (Herkert 1999). This book provides an undergraduate introduction to ethics in engineering and technology. It helps students to acquire the competences mentioned in the ABET criteria or comparable criteria formulated in other countries. More specifically, this book helps students to acquire the following moral competencies. (shrink)

Any moral algorithm for autonomous vehicles must provide a practical solution to moral problems of the trolley type, in which all possible courses of action will result in damage, injury, or death. This article discusses a hitherto neglected variety of this type of problem, based on a recent psychological study whose results are reported here. It argues that the most adequate solution to this problem will be achieved by a moral algorithm that is based on Confucian ethics. In addition to (...) this philosophical and psychological discussion, the article outlines the mathematics, engineering, and legal implementation of a possible Confucian algorithm. The proposed Confucian algorithm is based on the idea of making it possible to set an autonomous vehicle to allow an increased level of protection for selected people. It is shown that the proposed algorithm can be implemented alongside other moral algorithms, using either the framework of personal ethics settings or that of mandatory ethics settings. (shrink)

This volume explores the broad and rich spectrum of contemporary phenomenological engagement with digital technologies. By focusing on plural forms of the digital, it offers a robust and flexible framework for contemporary phenomenological investigations in the digital age. It contends that the impact of digital technologies on the lifeworld involves both the emergence of novel fields of lived experience in need of phenomenological analysis and the transformation of the method and attitude of phenomenologically oriented philosophers towards the world. The chapters (...) cover topics including immersion in virtual environments, the impact of digital cognitive devices on our perception of time, the invisibility of digital technologies in the lifeworld, the new extension of reality rendered possible by the employment of digital devices, how new technologies affect our intimacy and sexual body, the new methodological paradigm for phenomenological research prompted by digital technologies, the additive upshot of virtual imaginary, the intersection of the real and the virtual in augmented reality experiences, the structures of perception in the regime of digitally generated environments, how it feels like to empathize with others in a regime of virtual reality, process of en-rolling in the constitution of a virtual subject, the transformation of virtual reality into conspiratorial reality by means of on-line media platforms, and the problem of the extent to which technological environments impact human cognitive and perceptual experience. Phenomenologies of the Digital Age will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in phenomenology, philosophy of technology, science & technology studies, and media studies. (shrink)

Despite the importance of discussions over the epistemic role that artificially intelligent decision support systems ought to play, there is currently a lack of these discussions in both the AI literature and the epistemology literature. My goal in this paper is to rectify this by proposing an account of the epistemic role of AI decision support systems in medicine and discussing what this epistemic role means with regard to how these systems ought to be utilized. In particular, I argue that (...) AI decision support systems are not epistemic superiors, inferiors, or peers. Instead, I recommend that they be classified in an epistemic category of their own, as “epistemic nudges.” With my proposed account of the epistemic role of AI decision support systems, I aim to provide answers the following two questions: 1. How ought disagreements between a clinician and an AI decision support system be handled? 2. How ought responsibility and accountability be allocated when an AI decision support system used by a human clinician in decision-making results in harm? (shrink)

Attention is the basis of our free will, allowing us to direct our minds as we choose. Technology poses a threat to this individual agency, writes Carolyn Dicey Jennings, but may also yield new rewards. Social media harnesses our attention for incentives that aren’t our own, sublimating it into the interests of the group. We are trading our individual power for collective power, and we need to understand the risks and benefits of doing this.

Danaher (2016) has argued that increasing robotization can lead to retribution gaps: Situations in which the normative fact that nobody can be justly held responsible for a harmful outcome stands in conflict with our retributivist moral dispositions. In this paper, we report a cross-cultural empirical study based on Sparrow’s (2007) famous example of an autonomous weapon system committing a war crime, which was conducted with participants from the US, Japan and Germany. We find that (1) people manifest a considerable willingness (...) to hold autonomous systems morally responsible, (2) partially exculpate human agents when interacting with such systems, and that more generally (3) the possibility of normative responsibility gaps is indeed at odds with people’s pronounced retributivist inclinations. We discuss what these results mean for potential implications of the retribution gap and other positions in the responsibility gap literature. (shrink)

To facilitate engineering students’ understanding of engineering ethics and support instructors in developing course content, this study introduces an innovative educational tool drawing inspiration from the Rubik’s Cube metaphor. This Engineering Ethics Knowledge Rubik’s Cube (EEKRC) integrates six key aspects—ethical theories, codes of ethics, ethical issues, engineering disciplines, stakeholders, and life cycle—identified through an analysis of engineering ethics textbooks and courses across the United States, Singapore, and China. This analysis underpins the selection of the six aspects, reflecting the shared and (...) unique elements of engineering ethics education in these regions. In an engineering ethics course, the EEKRC serves multiple functions: it provides visual support for grasping engineering ethics concepts, acts as a pedagogical guide for both experienced and inexperienced educators in course design, offers a complementary assessment method for evaluating students learning outcomes, and assists as a reference for students engaging in ethical analysis. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that patient preferences concerning human physical attributes associated with race, culture, and gender should be excluded from public healthcare robot design. On one hand, healthcare should be (objective, universal) needs oriented. On the other hand, patient well-being (the aim of healthcare) is, in concrete ways, tied to preferences, as is patient satisfaction (a core WHO value). The shift toward patient-centered healthcare places patient preferences into the spotlight. Accordingly, the design of healthcare technology cannot simply disregard (...) patient preferences, even those which are potentially morally problematic. A method for handling these at the design level is thus imperative. By way of uncontroversial starting points, I argue that the priority of the public healthcare system is the fulfillment of patients’ therapeutic needs, among which certain potentially morally problematic preferences may be counted. There are further ethical considerations, however, which, taken together, suggest that the potential benefits of upholding these preferences are outweighed by the potential harms. (shrink)