Technology Ethics

In this chapter, we analyse the debate around the implementation of responsible research and innovation (RRI) in Higher Education, Funding and Research Centres (HEFRCs). We will illustrate some proposals about how to implement RRI in HERFCs in a good way. Open and inclusive governance is key to fruitful implementation of RRI in these organizations. Governance in this context refers to ways of steering processes in a desirable direction, in this case in the direction of responsible research and innovation that is (...) ethically acceptable and socially desirable. We will present and assess different models of governance and aim to provide ethical governance of research and innovation (R&I) inspired by the most convincing ideas emerged in the current debate. (shrink)

Contemporary Bioethics: Themes and Dilemmas by Željko Kaluđerović is a thought-provoking exploration of the ethical challenges posed by modern science and technology. ​ From genetic modifications and human cloning to the rights of non-human living beings and the impact of globalization, the book tackles pressing issues that shape our future. With a blend of philosophical insight and practical analysis, Kaluđerović invites readers to reflect on the moral complexities of scientific advancements and their implications for humanity, society, and the environment. ​ (...) Perfect for scholars, students, and anyone interested in the intersection of ethics and innovation, this book offers a compelling guide to navigating the dilemmas of our rapidly changing world. (shrink)

The medical field is highly susceptible to research misconduct, making research integrity in medical universities and colleges crucial for its prevention and management. While both Chinese and international researchers have conducted extensive studies on fostering research integrity in higher education institutions, comparative analyses focusing specifically on medical universities and colleges in China remain insufficient. To address this gap, this study examines the state of research integrity construction in 83 Chinese public medical universities/colleges during 2020 and 2024, exploring the underlying factors (...) influencing this development. The findings indicate that research integrity initiatives in Chinese medical universities and colleges are predominantly reactive, driven by compliance with government regulations and mandated tasks, rather than proactive, guided by intrinsic awareness and moral commitment. These results underscore the need to go beyond addressing Two-Points to emphasize Key-Points, advocating for a greater role of scientific autonomy in shaping research integrity, as opposed to reliance on government oversight. (shrink)

The use of artificial intelligence in healthcare contexts is highly controversial for the (bio)ethical conundrums it creates. One of the main problems arising from its implementation is the lack of transparency of machine learning algorithms, which is thought to impede the patient’s autonomous choice regarding their medical decisions. If the patient is unable to clearly understand why and how an AI algorithm reached certain medical decision, their autonomy is being hovered. However, there are alternatives to prevent the negative impact of (...) AI opacity in shared (healthcare professional–patient) decision-making processes, and benefit from the high accuracy of such systems. Despite these ethical issues, this paper advocates for its usage and also defends the positive role that it could have in enhancing patients’ autonomy. I advocate for a system where the implementation of AI is only partial, and humans will remain in control of oversighting algorithm interpretation of medical images and patients’ data. (shrink)

This chapter seeks to articulate the ethically developmental potential of work, both in terms of the intrinsic satisfactions of the very best activities, and because of the recognition structures work can provide. We do so by exploring the goods of work in the context of the discussion concerning technological unemployment. One response to the possibility of technological unemployment is provided by the anti-work perspective, the plausibility of which rests in large part on its capacity to do justice to the impoverished (...) nature of much contemporary work. Drawing on MacIntyre’s concept of practices we argue, however, that the concept of good work is better equipped to sustain the recognition structures that facilitate the achievement of excellence in those practices. Thus, good work can be viewed, somewhat ironically, as being powerfully conducive to our efforts to prepare ourselves for a world in which leisure is more socially central. (shrink)

With a distinctive theoretical framework combining Aristotle, Marx, and Alasdair MacIntyre, the essays in this volume ask how forms of artificial intelligence and technologies of automation in digital capitalism affect human flourishing, and what meaningful work looks like under these conditions. -/- As technology advances, how do we decide what activities should be automated? Is the end of work through automation actually desirable? If a good life is the life of activity employing our rational, imaginative, and creative powers, what does (...) it mean to say that future societies will be post-work societies? Rather than simply embracing the possibilities of automation to eliminate work, this collection considers that meaningful work is integral to the good life. -/- Human Flourishing in the Age of Digital Capitalism contains eight essays from scholars in the UK, Europe and USA, reflecting on the philosophical and ethical dimensions of technology and political theory. Contributions cover topics such as algorithmic management, the feared ‘superintelligence’ of machines, the concept of good work, and the alienating consequences of technology for workers. This timely and novel intervention in the automation debate will be of interest to anyone considering new technologies from the perspective of normative ethics and the critique of political economy. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) systems connected to sensor-laden devices are becoming pervasive, which has notable implications for a range of AI risks, including to privacy, the environment, autonomy and more. There is therefore a growing need for increased accountability around the responsible development and deployment of these technologies. Here we highlight the dimensions of risk associated with AI systems that arise from the material affordances of sensors and their underlying calculative models. We propose a sensor-sensitive framework for diagnosing these risks, complementing (...) existing approaches such as the US National Institute of Standards and Technology AI Risk Management Framework and the European Union AI Act, and discuss its implementation. We conclude by advocating for increased attention to the materiality of algorithmic systems, and of on-device AI sensors in particular, and highlight the need for development of a sensor design paradigm that empowers users and communities and leads to a future of increased fairness, accountability and transparency. (shrink)

This paper describes the motivations and some directions for bringing insights and methods from moral and cultural psychology to bear on how engineering ethics is conceived, taught, and assessed. Therefore, the audience for this paper is not only engineering ethics educators and researchers but also administrators and organizations concerned with ethical behaviors. Engineering ethics has typically been conceived and taught as a branch of professional and applied ethics with pedagogical aims, where students and practitioners learn about professional codes and/or Western (...) ethical theories and then apply these resources to address issues presented in case studies about engineering and/or technology. As a result, accreditation and professional bodies have generally adopted ethical reasoning skills and/or moral knowledge as learning outcomes. However, this paper argues that such frameworks are psychologically “irrealist” and culturally biased: it is not clear that ethical judgments or behaviors are primarily the result of applying principles, or that ethical concerns captured in professional codes or Western ethical theories do or should reflect the engineering ethical concerns of global populations. Individuals from Western educated industrialized rich democratic cultures are outliers on various psychological and social constructs, including self-concepts, thought styles, and ethical concerns. However, engineering is more cross cultural and international than ever before, with engineers and technologies spanning multiple cultures and countries. For instance, different national regulations and cultural values can come into conflict while performing engineering work. Additionally, ethical judgments may also result from intuitions, closer to emotions than reflective thought, and behaviors can be affected by unconscious, social, and environmental factors. To address these issues, this paper surveys work in engineering ethics education and assessment to date, shortcomings within these approaches, and how insights and methods from moral and cultural psychology could be used to improve engineering ethics education and assessment, making them more culturally responsive and psychologically realist at the same time. (shrink)

Violent video games are not always or perhaps even typically used for recruitment by extremist groups, even when extremists produce their own games. Nevertheless, when not used for recruitment, they have a clear propaganda function, including that of “normalising” extremism behind the façade of a familiar first-person shooter format. There is some evidence that success in violent video games may distinguish players and make them liable to in-person approaches from extremists on game-adjacent platforms. These approaches may radicalize players who are (...) looking for social connection, and may, in a few cases, turn them into real-world fighters. Extremist games also give people with extremist inclinations the opportunity to act them out online. The transition from game violence to real violence is not guaranteed, but extremists encourage it, sometimes through tactical communication over gaming devices, sometimes by using game audio and text for the expression of hate. There are strong and obvious moral objections to this use of games and game-adjacent platforms, and to enlisting games for the common extremist objective of weakening liberal democracy. (shrink)

One characteristic of socially disruptive technologies is that they have the potential to cause uncertainty about the application conditions of a concept i.e., they are conceptually disruptive. Humanoid robots have done just this, as evidenced by discussions about whether, and under what conditions, humanoid robots could be classified as, for example, moral agents, moral patients, or legal and/or moral persons. This paper frames the disruptive effect of humanoid robots differently by taking the discussion beyond that of classificatory concerns. It does (...) so by showing that humanoid robots are socially disruptive because they also transform how we experience and understand the world. Through inviting us to relate to a technological artefact as if it is human, humanoid robots have a profound impact upon the way in which we relate to different elements of our world. Specifically, I focus on three types of human relational experiences, and how the norms that surround them may be transformed by humanoid robots: (1) human-technology relations; (2) human-human relations; and (3) human-self relations. Anticipating the ways in which humanoid robots may change society is important given that once a technology is entrenched, it is difficult to counteract negative impacts. Therefore, we should try to anticipate them while we can still do something to prevent them. Since humanoid robots are currently relatively rudimentary, yet there is incentive to invest more in their development, it is now a good time to think carefully about how this technology may impact us. (shrink)

People sometimes behave differently depending on whether they are interacting online (by email, social media, etc.) vs. interacting in person. Four studies test the hypothesis that when an agent’s behavior is different online vs. in person, people think that the online behavior is less reflective of who the agent truly is deep down. Study 1 found that the very same behavior is regarded as less reflective of the true self when it is performed online. Study 2 showed that this effect (...) is not merely a matter of perceived impression management. Study 3 found that there is a general tendency such that behavior is seen as more reflective of the true self when it is performed in an environment regarded as “natural.” In Study 4, a manipulation that led participants to see online behavior as more natural had a downstream effect on the degree to which this behavior was seen as reflecting the true self. Taken together, these results suggest that people’s judgments about online behavior are not simply a reflection of idiosyncratic facts about the online sphere in particular but are instead driven in part by a far more general psychological process involving perceptions of naturalness. (shrink)

It is plausible that in the future synthetic DNA (synDNA) technology could enable the creation of non-viable embryos for research, potentially bypassing ethical objections to embryo experimentation. This article explores how the technology might work, the ethical concerns it might mitigate, and the challenges that remain.

In this paper, I will argue that the responsibility gap arising from new AI systems is reducible to the problem of many hands and collective agency. Systematic analysis of the agential dimension of AI will lead me to outline a disjunctive between the two problems. Either we reduce individual responsibility gaps to the many hands, or we abandon the individual dimension and accept the possibility of responsible collective agencies. Depending on which conception of AI agency we begin with, the responsibility (...) gap will boil down to one of these two moral problems. Moreover, I will adduce that this conclusion reveals an underlying weakness in AI ethics: the lack of attention to the question of the disciplinary boundaries of AI ethics. This absence has made it difficult to identify the specifics of the responsibility gap arising from new AI systems as compared to the responsibility gaps of other applied ethics. Lastly, I will be concerned with outlining these specific aspects. (shrink)

Oppressed people face microaggressions in medicine. Extant discussions of microaggressions in medicine primarily focus on verbal and behavioral microaggressions, which typically have perpetrators. For example, in clinical medicine, acts of verbal and behavioral microaggressions can arise from patient-provider interactions, with healthcare providers such as physicians and nurses as perpetrators. However, in clinical medicine, patients can also be victims to environmental microaggressions, which typically are not acts and do not have perpetrators. My goal is to call attention to the existence of (...) environmental microaggressions in medicine in the forms of ordinary medical objects and spaces, such as forehead thermometers that are more likely to miss fevers in Black patients and medical imaging devices that do not fit the bodies of fat patients. With these examples, I argue that environmental microaggressions in medicine, in the form of oppressive medical objects and spaces, sustain oppression by shaping patterns of thought and action and exemplify a form of attributional ambiguity without any perpetrator. (shrink)

The concept of dignity is proliferating in ethical, legal, and policy discussions of AI, yet dignity is an elusive term with multiple philosophical interpretations. The authors argue that the unspecific and uncritical employment of the notion of dignity can be counterproductive for AI ethics.

This paper proposes The theory of the Pivot of the Dao (Daoshulun,DSL), aiming to investigate certain issues through the lens of recursivity and non-recursivity. The paper is divided into two main sections: -/- The first section systematically expounds the theoretical foundation of the D-P framework, defining the dialectical relationship between recursivity (P) and non-recursivity (D). Through five core propositions, DSL asserts that the essence of hierarchical evolution lies in the eternal game of recursive chains. -/- The second section explores DSL’s (...) division of rationality, the ethics of artificial intelligence (AI) under DSL, and an interpretation of the latent laws governing scientific development. -/- The D-P framework offers a unified explanation for the hierarchical interactions, limitations, and evolutionary patterns of complex systems. Its methodological discussions encompass AI ethics, philosophy of science, and social governance. -/- © 蒋柯帆 2025. This is a preprint version licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0). This version supersedes all previous versions uploaded prior to March 13, 2025, which did not carry an explicit license. You are free to share and adapt this material for non-commercial purposes, provided you give appropriate credit to the author. For commercial use, please contact the author. If you need to make any adjustments to the existing categories, please notify me by email in advance so we can coordinate accordingly. (shrink)

This paper discusses how automated vehicles ambiguously mediate the ethi-cal value of human autonomy. By offering a criticism of the hype surrounding the issue, it suggests that different forms of driving automation mediate different aspects of human autonomy differently. Its promotion and protection can only be incompletely achieved through a narrow focus on the design and deployment of automated vehicles. Therefore, a broader focus on transporta-tion ethics is required.

Healthcare is one of the domains in which artificial intelligence (AI) is already having a major impact. Of interest is the idea of the digital twin (DT), an AI-powered technology that generates a real-time representation of the patient’s body, offering the possibility of more personalised care. Our main thesis in this paper is that the DT does not merely represent the patient’s body but produces a specific body. We argue, from a philosophical perspective and an ethical-phenomenological approach, that the virtual (...) body created by the DT has a major impact on one’s self-understanding, having consequences for gender expression and identification, and for health. This has deep implications for people who do not conform to gender normativity, for example, trans individuals. We advocate that, with thoughtful development, DT technology can and should be empowering, contributing to better addressing the diversity of bodies and facilitating trans people’s experience in healthcare contexts. (shrink)

The existence of game shows in the Philippines is ascertained and examined under the Kantian Deontology. In a more popular view, game shows provide a type of enjoyment that is not only felt by the viewers or spectators, but rather those who are able to be fortunate enough to receive prizes given by such activities. On the onset, the opus presents the conditions of the game shows in the Philippines and that of the other countries in a comparative light. This (...) is necessary so that the ethical discussions may be nuanced in light not of the circumstantial factors but rather on the acts themselves. Moving forward, the methods of Kantian Deontology gives light on the framework by providing the necessary principles of the Categorical Imperative, Respect for Persons, and On Duty and Reasonableness. These certain principles allow the phenomena to be subjected to an examination in light of inherent value and axiological dispositions. Having said such, the arguments presented are those that further verify and actualize how and what should be done on issues arising from the phenomenon of gameshows. It can be argued that there should be a respect for dignity, as such this means that the intention of the said activities must point only to benevolence. Furthermore, the representations of societal problems and issues must never be used to sensationalize such problem at the cost of exploiting the experiences of certain participants. Lastly, the argument on duty to be prudent on what certain social effects a certain action may merit, the uncontrollable evil may also be considered as a result of negligence to be prudent and as such negligence of duty as well. Keywords: Kantian Deontology, gameshows, ethics, dignity, exploitation. (shrink)

A broad set of public policy debates concern the limits of humanity’s control over nature. Attitudes towards such topics are not well explained by the standard 2-dimensional political model favored by political scientists of i) a left/right economic spectrum and ii) a liberal/authoritarian social spectrum. I pose a new, orthogonal, political spectrum to fill the void. It is a spectrum of value held for, on the one hand, nature, and on the other, technological progress. This harks back to the 18th (...) Century Enlightenment and Romanticism, but manifests again and again, including in recent debates about human enhancement biotechnology. (shrink)

This paper explores the issue of racial bias in artificial intelligence (AI) through the lens of the bioethical principle of justice, with a focus on Joy Buolamwini’s “Coded Bias” and the work of the “Algorithmic Justice League.” AI technologies, particularly facial recognition systems, have been shown to disproportionately misidentify individuals from marginalised racial groups, raising profound ethical concerns about fairness and equity. The bioethical principle of justice stresses the importance of equal treatment and the protection of vulnerable populations. Through qualitative (...) research, including content analysis of Buolamwini’s works and case studies of AI bias, this paper assesses the efforts of the Algorithmic Justice League to combat racial bias in AI. It emphasises their advocacy for the development of fair, equitable algorithms and calls for systemic reform in AI development to ensure justice for marginalised communities. (shrink)

Bio-heteronormative conceptions of the family have long reinforced a nuclear ideal of the family as a heterosexual marriage, with children who are the genetic progeny of that union. This ideal, however, has also long been resisted in light of recent social developments, exhibited through the increased incidence and acceptance of step-families, donor-conceived families, and so forth. Although to this end some might claim that the bio-heteronormative ideal is not necessary for a social unit to count as a family, a more (...) systematic conceptualization of the family—the kind of family that matters morally—is relatively underexplored in the philosophical literature. This paper makes a start at developing and defending an account of the family that is normatively attractive and in line with the growing prevalence of non-conventional families and methods of family-formation. Our account, which we call a constitutive-affirmative model of the family, takes the family to be constituted by an ongoing process of relevant affective and affirmative relations between the putative family members. (shrink)

This article presents a robust defense of the concept of ‘datafied enhancement’ as a subset of human enhancement. Firstly, the author notes that the widespread development of ICT and AI technologies has made it possible to collect and analyse human biometric data, thus integrating data into the concept of embodiment. Secondly, the author explores the cultural and intellectual history of datafied enhancement, highlighting the significant role that data has played in human evolution. Thirdly, the author examines the functional classifications of (...) datafied enhancement, arguing that conversational, wearable, ingestible and embeddable technological devices can enhance physical, cognitive, emotional and moral capacities of individuals by collecting body data. Fourthly, the author underscores the importance of distinguishing datafied enhancement from dataism to avoid misconceptions. Finally, the author addresses potential ethical issues, such as data exclusivity, the uncontrollable data self, and privacy invasion. By acknowledging these risks, datafied enhancement can be guided to become a technology that respects human dignity and promotes the common good. (shrink)

In a recent article, Kiel Brennan-Marquez and Stephen E. Henderson argue that replacing human judges with AI would violate the role-reversibility ideal of democratic governance. Unlike human judges, they argue, AI judges are not reciprocally vulnerable to the process and effects of their own decisions. I argue that role-reversibility, though a formal ideal of democratic governance, is in the service of substantive ends that may be independently achieved under AI judges. Thus, although role-reversibility is necessary for democratic governance when human (...) judges are on the job, it may not be so when AI judges replace them. One broader implication for normative evaluation of disruptive technologies follows: formal and substantive ideals that often align must be independently examined in the evaluation of disruptive technologies. This is because these formal and substantive ideals may no longer align under the factual circumstances that come to govern when such technologies are deployed. (shrink)

The demands of fair machine learning are often expressed in probabilistic terms. Yet, most of the systems of concern are deterministic in the sense that whether a given subject will receive a given score on the basis of their traits is, for all intents and purposes, either zero or one. What, then, can justify this probabilistic talk? We argue that the statistical reference classes used in fairness measures can be understood as defining the probability that hypothetical persons, who are representative (...) of social roles, will receive certain goods. We call these hypothetical persons “representative individuals.” We claim that what we owe to actual, concrete individuals—whose individual chances of receiving the good in the system might be extreme (i.e., either zero or one)—is that their representative individual has an appropriate probability of receiving the good in question. While less immediately intuitive than other approaches, we argue that the representative individual approach has important advantages over other ways of making sense of this probabilistic talk in the context of fair machine learning. (shrink)

Some philosophers believe in improvement: they think that the world is a better place than it used to be, and that future generations will fare even better. Others see decline: they claim that the condition of humanity has deteriorated and will continue to do so. Much ink has also been spilt over what explains these historical patterns. These two disagreements about the shape of history concern largely descriptive issues. But there is also a third, purely normative question that has been (...) neglected: is it better if a history features a pattern of improvement rather than deterioration, holding other things equal? This paper develops an answer to this normative question and explores some of its implications for matters related to the future of humanity. (shrink)

Shannon Vallor has raised the possibility of ethical deskilling as a potential pitfall as AI technology is increasingly being developed for and implemented in military institutions. Bringing the sociological concept of deskilling into the field of virtue ethics, she has questioned if military operators will be able to possess the ethical wherewithal to act as responsible moral agents as they find themselves increasingly removed from the battlefield, their actions ever more mediated by artificial intelligence. The risk, as Vallor sees it, (...) is that if combatants were removed, they would be deprived of the opportunity to develop moral skills crucial for acting as virtuous individuals. This article constitutes a critique of this conception of ethical deskilling and an attempt at a reappraisal of the concept. I argue first that her treatment of moral skills and virtue, as it pertains to professional military ethics, treating military virtue as a sui generis form of ethical cognition, is both normatively problematic as well as implausible from a moral psychological view. I subsequently present an alternative account of ethical deskilling, based on an analysis of military virtues, as a species of moral virtues essentially mediated by institutional and technological structures. According to this view, then, professional virtue is a form of extended cognition, and professional roles and institutional structures are parts of what makes these virtues the virtues that they are, i.e., constitutive parts of the virtues in question. Based on this analysis, I argue that the most likely source of ethical deskilling caused by technological change is not how technology, AI, or otherwise, makes individuals unable to develop appropriate moral–psychological traits but rather how it changes the institution's capacities to act. (shrink)

Researchers have identified various ethical issues related to the use of VR. For example, issues of consent, privacy and harm. It is important to address these issues as VR impacts various industries, including communications, education and entertainment. Existing ethical frameworks in particular may be the closest tool we have when it comes to understanding how to curb some of the ethical challenges that the technology presents. Recent work names ethical concerns related to VR, such as privacy and accessibility; however, we (...) note that less discuss frameworks that can be used to guide responsible VR use. Such work also glosses over what various audiences think about ethical issues. This information in turn could be used to determine which existing frameworks can provide guidance for responsible use. To address this gap, we examine current literature, government documents, and conduct an analysis of 300 Amazon reviews of three top-rated VR products—to see whether and what ethical concerns various audiences identify. That is, we ask two questions: 1) Are three specific types of audiences naming ethical VR issues, and if so, what are the issues? 2) What frameworks could potentially guide users toward responsible use? We find that users are concerned about ethical issues and that three frameworks could guide us towards more responsible VR use: 1) Institutional Review Board (IRB) frameworks, 2) a care ethics framework, and 3) co-created, living ethical codes. We further pull from these three frameworks to offer a new ethical synthesis framework or ESF framework that could guide responsible use. (shrink)

In times of rapid technological progress, transhumanism, which strives for radical technological transformations of the human being, spreads its ideas with great publicity and media impact. Although these ideas are directed towards the future, they influence how we understand humans, bodies, and technology today. T his article exam­ ines the anthropology of transhumanism and investigates the extent to which it offers approaches for the contemporary anthropology of body optimisation. T he article comes to the conclusion that the understanding of the (...) human being in transhumanism is prob­ lematic in many respects and therefore not suitable for the further development of a contemporary philosophical anthropology. Nevertheless, corrective perspectives for an anthropology of contemporary body optimisation can be derived from these problems. (shrink)

Lee argues that pronatalist policies in countries suffering from declining birth rates, such as South Korea, are ethically flawed.1 The ‘soft’ pronatalist policies Lee describes aim at persuading citizens to reproduce. For Lee, coercive pronatalist policies are so obviously unacceptable as not to merit consideration. However, we suggest that this is an issue that requires further analysis. When ethicists regard certain possibilities as not worth debating, we miss opportunities to examine the basis for our convictions. In short, it behoves us (...) now and again to challenge our convictions, especially if they seem inconsistent in relation to other views we hold. By comparing coercive pronatalism with enforced military conscription, we can notice some inconsistencies. South Korea—which Lee discusses in her paper—enforces military service, as do Austria, Switzerland, Ukraine and Finland to name a few. Many countries that do not currently conscript citizens retain the right to do so during wartime. Conscription is an example of coercive state intervention which, even if not widely endorsed, rarely generates outrage or even attention from ethicists.2 For those who accept that coercive conscription could in principle be justified, it is not easy to show why coercive pronatalism must be rejected without argument. Indeed, many of those who are alarmed about declining birth rates …. (shrink)

There is a theorem that shows that it is impossible for an algorithm to jointly satisfy the statistical fairness criteria of Calibration and Equalized Odds non-trivially. But what about the recently advocated alternative to Calibration, Base Rate Tracking? Here we show that Base Rate Tracking is strictly weaker than Calibration, and then take up the question of whether it is possible to jointly satisfy Base Rate Tracking and Equalized Odds in non-trivial scenarios. We show that it is not, thereby establishing (...) an even more general impossibility theorem. (shrink)

We can now create compelling experiences of talking with our dead. Is this ghoulish, therapeutic or something else again?

People in vulnerable positions who need support in their daily lives often face challenges in receiving timely access to care; for instance, due to disabilities or individual and situational vulnerabilities. There has been an increasing turn to technology-mediated ways to improve access to care, which has raised ethical questions about the appropriateness and inclusiveness of digitalising care requests. Specifically, for people in vulnerable positions, digitalisation is meant to facilitate requests for access to healthcare resources and to simplify the process of (...) navigating the healthcare system. In a multidisciplinary research project, we examined the use and value of a ‘sensitive’ virtual assistant that can accommodate different needs of target groups through inclusive design, adaptive technology and artificial intelligence. This paper presents empirical findings from focus groups with care recipients and caregivers about the sensitive virtual assistant and relates the findings to five larger ethical issues associated with the use of virtual assistants in healthcare settings and care practices more generally. It highlights the risk that, even with the inclusion of target groups in the design of digitalised care assistants, some people may benefit significantly less than others. (shrink)

Deepfakes are visual and audio media that use artificial intelligence to portray people saying things they never said, doing things they never did, and experiencing events that never happened. They can be trivial (“Tom Cruise knows magic tricks?”), outlandish (“Why is Nancy Pelosi drunk on national television?”), or even dangerous (“Run, the Hollywood sign is burning!”). Because deepfakes can be both persuasive and pervasive, many commentators fear that humanity will soon take another step into the post-truth abyss. -/- This Article (...) evaluates the threat deepfakes pose to truth by anticipating how they will impact the area of law most directly concerned with truth: the law of evidence. Deepfakes present an obvious challenge to the administration of justice in modern courtrooms, where audiovisual evidence plays an important role. Solutions offered in past legal scholarship—like relying on experts to identify deepfakes or criminalizing deepfake production—are superficial. They optimistically assume that deepfakes will always have a tell. To truly appreciate the threat deepfakes pose, the law must brace itself for the likely prospect of what this Article calls “deepest” fakes, which will be indistinguishable in every respect from authentic media. -/- Drawing on tools from philosophy, legal history, and technology studies, this Article demonstrates how evidence law can and likely will adapt to a world saturated with deepest fakes. Courts have long encountered the sort of philosophical skepticism that deepest fakes threaten today. In essence, the existence of deepest fakes reduces the truth value of digital media to the level of oral testimony, creative works, other easily falsifiable evidence. While deepest fakes do raise serious problems, trial procedure only needs to change if existing safeguards fail. This Article finds that deepest fakes present no different challenge for modern courts than oral testimony, paintings, and photographs presented for their early twentieth century counterparts. The safeguard then, as now, is a nuanced adversarial process that, refusing to take evidence at face value, probes each submission with contextual indicators of reliability. What emerges is an empowering picture in which human judgment, rather than blind trust in media of any sort, is the ultimate arbiter of truth. (shrink)

The search for ethical guidance in the development of artificial intelligence (AI) systems, especially in healthcare and decision support, remains a crucial effort. So far, principles usually serve as the main reference points to achieve ethically correct implementations. Based on reviewing classical criticism of principle-based ethics and taking into account the severity and potentially life-changing relevance of decisions assisted by AI-driven systems, we argue for strengthening a complementary perspective that focuses on the life-world as ensembles of practices which shape people’s (...) lives. This perspective focuses on the notion of ethical judgment sensitive to life forms, arguing that principles alone do not guarantee ethicality in a moral world that is rather a joint construction of reality than a matter of mere control. We conclude that it is essential to support and supplement the implementation of moral principles in the development of AI systems for decision-making in healthcare by recognizing the normative relevance of life forms and practices in ethical judgment. (shrink)

The analysis of citation flow from a collection of scholarly articles might provide valuable insights into their thematic focus and the genealogy of their main concepts. In this study, we employ a topic model to delineate a subcorpus of 1,360 papers representative of bioethical discussions on enhancing human life. We subsequently conduct an analysis of almost 11,000 references cited in that subcorpus to examine quantitatively, from a bird’s-eye view, the degree of openness of this part of scholarship to the specialized (...) knowledge produced in biosciences. Although almost half of the analyzed references point to journals classified as Natural Science and Engineering (NSE), we do not find strong evidence of the intellectual influence of recent discoveries in biosciences on discussions on human enhancement. We conclude that a large part of the discourse surrounding human enhancement is inflected with “science-fictional habits of mind.” Our findings point to the need for a more science-informed approach in discussions on enhancing human life. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I investigate the resources for Neo-Aristotelian moral philosophy to address social and ethical issues that arise in the use of technologies that rely on digital environments. The theoretical underpinnings of this dissertation represent efforts from contemporary philosophers to re-engineer the theories of Ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle for the present. I offer my own contribution to this tradition in the context of the ethics and philosophy of technology. I aim to answer the following question: what moral and social (...) issues arise in 21st-century digital environments that Neo-Aristotelian philosophy can address? I propose that Neo-Aristotelian philosophy, inspired by the work of Alasdair MacIntyre, is particularly well-suited to addressing the issues in digital environments that users regularly experience. This dissertation contributes to scholarship within Neo-Aristotelian ethics of technology, MacIntyrean approaches to virtue theory, and the ethics of technology more broadly. (shrink)

Estes ensaios se inspiram na abordagem CTS (ciência-tecnologia-sociedade) também conhecida como Estudos Sociais da Ciência e Tecnologia (latinoamericana) e na Teoria Crítica da Tecnologia. Perseguem uma senda de pesquisa: a compreensão de um momento zero, constituinte, marcado pelo conhecimento sobre a interação teórico-práxis do trabalho mediado pelos objetos. Os sentidos deste momento de conversão do conhecimento em técnica são também práxis. Aqui falamos da ciência e técnica no sentido de tecnologia, que assume um duplo exercício de crítica e de reificação. (...) Crítica diante de que (nem) toda técnica foi convertida em tecnologia (cientificizada), pois continua a ser obra de artifícies geniais cuja substância social (qualquer uma) vem ao mundo parida para resolver problemas práticos. (shrink)

Iglesias et al. (2025) argue that “some of the aims or ostensible goods of person-span expansion could plausibly be fulfilled in part by creating a digital doppelgänger”—that is, an AI system desig...

The emergence of artificially sentient beings raises moral, political, and legal issues that deserve scrutiny. First, it may be difficult to understand the well-being elements of artificially sentient beings and theories of well-being may have to be reconsidered. For instance, as a theory of well-being, hedonism may need to expand the meaning of happiness and suffering or it may run the risk of being irrelevant. Second, we may have to compare the claims of artificially sentient beings with the claims of (...) humans. This calls for interspecies aggregation, which is a neglected form of interpersonal aggregation. Lastly, there are practical problems to address, such as whether to include artificially sentient beings in the political decision-making processes, whether to grant them a right to self-determination in digital worlds, and how to protect them from discrimination. Given these, the emergence of artificially sentient beings compels us to reevaluate the positions we typically hold. (shrink)

This paper aims to provide a roadmap for governing AI. In contrast to the reigning paradigms, we argue that AI governance should be not merely a reactive, punitive, status-quo-defending enterprise, but rather the expression of an expansive, proactive vision for technology—to advance human flourishing. Advancing human flourishing in turn requires democratic/political stability and economic empowerment. To accomplish this, we build on a new normative framework that will give humanity its best chance to reap the full benefits, while avoiding the dangers, (...) of AI. This new framework of “Power-Sharing Liberalism” is a philosophy that restores protections of positive liberties to liberalism. As we deploy it here, it helps shape a more comprehensive (and we would contend, more accurate) understanding of both risk and opportunity introduced by AI. To lay out how Power-Sharing Liberalism can be applied to AI governance, we take four steps. First, we define central concepts in the field of AI governance, disambiguating between forms of technological harms and risks. Second, we review current normative frameworks around the globe and argue that Power-Sharing Liberalism is a better fit for governing AI. Third, we walk through the six governance tasks that should be accomplished by any governance framework and analyze them through the Power-Sharing Liberalism framework. Based on that analysis, we make 17 recommendations for the governance of AI—including transformative investments in public goods, personnel, and the sustainability of democracy itself. Finally, we discuss concrete proposals for implementing those recommendations. (shrink)

Medical artificial intelligence (AI) systems are value-laden technologies that can simultaneously encourage and discourage conflicting values that may all be relevant for the pursuit of justice. I argue that the predominant theory of healthcare justice, the Rawls-inspired approach of Norman Daniels, neither adequately acknowledges such conflicts nor explains if and how they can resolved. By juxtaposing Daniels’s theory of healthcare justice with Axel Honneth’s and Nancy Fraser’s respective theories of justice, I draw attention to one such conflict. Medical AI may (...) improve the distribution of opportunity qua health while simultaneously mis-recognizing patients and thereby reducing their self-respect. I argue that justly resolving this conflict will at times require greater inclusion of those mis-recognized in deliberation about medical AI, and consider what such inclusion may entail. (shrink)

Bruno Latour and Martin Heidegger seem like opposite thinkers, but in tandem they can in fact help us avoid some of the most profound perils of our time. Their understandings of modernity and technology offer a number of interwoven insights that may demolish dangerous dogmas and lead to new hope.

This volume looks at ethical principles for the integration of robotic and digital tools in medicine, healthcare and nursing and presents related case studies. An integrated ethical perspective has become urgent as innovations in the field of digital and robotic systems are rapidly leading to new fields of use, particularly when linked with machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI) systems. The ELSI approach (ethical, legal and social implications) has established itself as a standard for analyzing the complex challenges, opportunities and (...) risks of new technological applications. It is to be recommended in the development phase as well as in subsequent evaluations, especially when combined with a screening and assessment tool (SAT) that is integrated into research and technology development. (shrink)

The incorporation of ethical settings in Automated Driving Systems (ADSs) has been extensively discussed in recent years with the goal of enhancing potential stakeholders’ trust in the new technology. However, a comprehensive ethical framework for ADS decision-making, capable of merging multiple ethical considerations and investigating their consistency is currently missing. This paper addresses this gap by providing a taxonomy of ADS decision-making based on the Agent-Deed-Consequences (ADC) model of moral judgment. Specifically, we identify three main components of traffic moral judgment: (...) driving style, traffic rules compliance, and risk distribution. Then, we suggest distinguishable ethical settings for each traffic component. (shrink)