Temporary Intrinsics

Edited by A. P. Taylor (North Dakota State University)
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  1. added 2020-06-03
    Is There a Problem About Persistence?Mark Johnston & Graeme Forbes - 1987 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 61 (1):107-156.
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  2. added 2020-04-14
    The Situationalist Account of Change.Martin Pickup - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics.
    In this paper I propose a new solution to the problem of change: situationalism. According to this view, parts of reality fundamentally disagree about what is the case and reality as a whole is unsettled (i.e. metaphysically indeterminate). When something changes, parts of the world irreconcilably disagree about what properties it has. From this irreconcilable disagreement, indeterminacy arises. I develop this picture using situations, which are parts of possible worlds; this gives it the name situationalism. It allows a B-theory endurance (...)
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  3. added 2019-01-02
    The Disappearance of Change: Towards a Process Account of Persistence.Anne Sophie Meincke - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (1):12-30.
    This paper aims to motivate a new beginning in metaphysical thinking about persistence by drawing attention to the disappearance of change in current accounts of persistence. I defend the claim that the debate is stuck in a dilemma which results from neglecting the constructive role of change for persistence. Neither of the two main competing views, perdurantism and endurantism, captures the idea of persistence as an identity through time. I identify the fundamental ontological reasons for this, namely the shared commitment (...)
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  4. added 2018-07-12
    Thisness Presentism: An Essay on Time, Truth, and Ontology.David Ingram - 2019 - Oxford, UK: Routledge.
    Thisness Presentism outlines and defends a novel version of presentism, the view that only present entities exist and what is present really changes. Presentism is a view of time that captures a real and objective difference between what is past, present, and future, and which offers a model of reality that is dynamic and mutable, rather than static and immutable. The book advances a new defence of presentism by developing a novel ontology of thisness, combining insights about the nature of (...)
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  5. added 2018-04-09
    Mctaggart’s Paradox.Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson - 2016 - Routledge.
    McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time, first published in 1908, set the agenda for 20th-century philosophy of time. Yet there is very little agreement on what it actually says—nobody agrees with the conclusion, but still everybody finds something important in it. This book presents the first critical overview of the last century of debate on what is popularly called "McTaggart’s Paradox". Scholars have long assumed that McTaggart’s argument stands alone and does not rely on any contentious ontological principles. The (...)
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  6. added 2017-06-12
    Relativity and Degrees of Relationality.Jack Spencer - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):432-459.
    Some well-known metaphysical arguments against relativism rest on the claim that relativity somehow must be accompanied by relationality. I argue otherwise, and trace the consequences for some prominent disputes between relativists and absolutists.
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  7. added 2017-03-14
    Bent, Not Broken: Why Exemplification Simpliciter Remains a Problem for Eternalist Endurantism.Daniel Giberman - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (5):947-966.
    One premise in David Lewis’s well-known argument from temporary intrinsic properties in favor of temporal parts is the intuition that material objects exemplify such properties simpliciter, that is, without qualification. The argument has spawned a large critical literature, with commentators questioning the simpliciter premise’s motivation, content, dialectical force, and status as an intuition. The present essay has two chief goals: to provide a novel framework for clarifying Lewis’s simpliciter premise and to explain how the resulting clarification upends a wide range (...)
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  8. added 2017-03-04
    Ought a Four-Dimensionalist To Believe in Temporal Parts?Kristie Miller - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):619-646.
    This paper presents the strongest version of a non-perdurantist four-dimensionalism: a theory according to which persisting objects are four-dimensionally extended in space-time, but not in virtue of having maximal temporal parts. The aims of considering such a view are twofold. First, to evaluate whether such an account could provide a plausible middle ground between the two main competitor accounts of persistence: three-dimensionalism and perdurantist four-dimensionalism. Second, to see what light such a theory sheds on the debate between these two competitor (...)
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  9. added 2017-01-15
    Craig on McTaggart's Paradox and the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics.L. N. Oaklander - 1999 - Analysis 59 (4):314-318.
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  10. added 2017-01-15
    McTaggart's Paradox and the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics.W. L. Craig - 1998 - Analysis 58 (2):122-127.
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  11. added 2017-01-15
    Lewis, Temporary Intrinsics and Momentary Tropes.D. Ehring - 1997 - Analysis 57 (4):254-258.
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  12. added 2016-12-08
    Aristotelian Endurantism: A New Solution to the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics.J. E. Brower - 2010 - Mind 119 (476):883-905.
    It is standardly assumed that there are three — and only three — ways to solve problem of temporary intrinsics: (a) embrace presentism, (b) relativize property possession to times, or (c) accept the doctrine of temporal parts. The first two solutions are favoured by endurantists, whereas the third is the perdurantist solution of choice. In this paper, I argue that there is a further type of solution available to endurantists, one that not only avoids the usual costs, but is structurally (...)
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  13. added 2016-08-11
    No Paradox of Multi-Location.Kris McDaniel - 2003 - Analysis 63 (4):309-311.
    This is a defense of endurantism against an alleged paradox.
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  14. added 2016-03-01
    Persisting Particulars and Their Properties.Kristie Miller - 2016 - In Francesco Federico Calemi (ed.), Metaphysics and Scientific Realism: Essays in Honour of David Malet Armstrong. De Gruyter. pp. 139-160.
    My present inclination is to say that both identity and relational analyses are intelligible hypotheses. I reject the identity analysis, looking rather to relations between different phases to secure the unity of a particular over time. But I do not think that the identity view can be rejected as illogical. If it is to be rejected, then I think it must be rejected for Occamist reasons. The different phases exist, and so do their relations. These phases so related, it seems, (...)
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  15. added 2016-03-01
    There is No Simpliciter Simpliciter.Kristie Miller & David Braddon-Mitchell - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (2):249-278.
    This paper identifies problems with indexicalism and abverbialism about temporary intrinsic properties, and solves them by disentangling two senses in which a particular may possess a property simpliciter. The first sense is the one identified by adverbialists in which a particular possesses at all times the property as a matter of foundational metaphysical fact regardless of whether it is manifest. The second involves building on adverbialism to produce a semantics for property-manifestation according to which different members of a family of (...)
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  16. added 2016-02-26
    Can Things Endure in Tenseless Time.Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson - 2009 - SATS 10 (1):79-99.
    It has been argued that the tenseless view of time is incompatible with endurantism. This has been disputed, perhaps most famously by Hugh Mellor and Peter Simons. They argue that things can endure in tenseless time, and indeed must endure if tenseless time is to contain change. In this paper I will point out some difficulties with Mellor’s and Simons’ claims that in tenseless time a particular can be ‘wholly present’ at various times, and therefore endure, as well as have (...)
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  17. added 2015-04-21
    Temporal Parts And Temporary Intrinsics.Andrew Botterell - 2004 - Metaphysica 5 (2):5-23.
    In this paper I consider an objection that friends of the Metaphysic of Temporal Parts (MTP) press against other solutions to the problem of temporary intrinsics and turn it against the MTP itself. I do not argue that the MTP must be false, nor do I argue that there are no arguments in favor of the MTP. Rather, the conclusion I draw is conditional: if the MTP provides an adequate response to the problem of temporary intrinsics, then the MTP provides (...)
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  18. added 2015-04-06
    The Problems of Intrinsic Change: Rejoinder to Lewis.E. J. Lowe - 1988 - Analysis 48 (2):72-77.
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  19. added 2015-04-05
    A Temporary Blackout And She And I.Robert Champ - 1998 - Humanitas 11 (1):42-44.
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  20. added 2015-03-19
    The Problem of Temporary Intrinsics.Montserrat Bordes - 2011 - In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  21. added 2015-02-12
    David Lewis on Persistence.Katherine Hawley - forthcoming - In Barry Loewer & Jonathan Schaffer (eds.), A Companion to David Lewis. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 237-49.
    This paper provides an overview on David Lewis's writings about persistence. I focus on two issues. First, what is the relationship between the doctrine of Humean Supervenience and the rejection of endurantism? Second, why did Lewis not adopt a stage theory of persistence, given that he advocated a counterpart theory of modality?
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  22. added 2014-06-26
    Temporary Intrinsics and Christological Predication.Timothy Pawl - 2016 - In Jon Kvanvig (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, VII. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 157-189.
    In this paper I show that the problem of temporary intrinsics and a fundamental philosophical problem concerning the doctrine of the incarnation are isomorphic. To do so, I present the problem of temporary intrinsics, along with five responses to the problem. I then present the fundamental problem for Christology, which I call the problem of natural intrinsics. I present six responses to that problem, all but the last analogous to a response to the problem of temporary intrinsics. My goal is (...)
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  23. added 2014-03-30
    Why Temporary Properties Are Not Relations Between Physical Objects and Times.Katherine Hawley - 1998 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (2):211–216.
    Take this banana. It is now yellow, and when I bought it yesterday it was green. How can a single object be both green all over and yellow all over without contradiction? It is, of course, the passage of time which dissolves the contradiction, but how is this possible? How can a banana ripen? These questions raise the problem of change. The problem is sometimes called the problem of temporary intrinsics, but, as I shall explain below, this emphasis on intrinsic (...)
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  24. added 2014-03-18
    Four New Ways to Change Your Shape.F. MacBride - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (1):81 – 89.
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  25. added 2014-03-14
    The Lowe Road to the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics.Lawrence B. Lombard - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 112 (2):163 - 185.
    It has been argued that there is a problem oftemporary intrinsics, the problem of explaininghow it is possible for things to possesssuccessively contrary properties, if a certaintheory about time, ``eternalism'', is true. Inthis paper, I consider whether there really issuch a problem and survey some standardsolutions to it. I argue for one of them, onewhich has been offered by Mark Johnston andPeter van Inwagen, and which I call the``exemplification-solution''''. I consider avariant on that solution offered by E.J. Lowe(and Sally Haslanger), (...)
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  26. added 2014-03-12
    The Argument From Temporary Intrinsics.R. Wasserman - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):413 – 419.
    The problem of temporary intrinsics is the problem of how persisting objects can have different intrinsic properties at different times. The relativizer responds to this problem by replacing ordinary intrinsic properties with relations to times. In this note, I identify and respond to three different objections to the relativizer's proposal, each of which can be traced to the work of David Lewis.
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  27. added 2014-03-07
    Three Arguments From Temporary Intrinsics.M. Eddon - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):605-619.
    The Argument from Temporary Intrinsics is one of the canonical arguments against endurantism. I show that the two standard ways of presenting the argument have limited force. I then present a new version of the argument, which provides a more promising articulation of the underlying objection to endurantism. However, the premises of this argument conflict with the gauge theories of particle physics, and so this version of the argument is no more successful than its predecessors. I conclude that no version (...)
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  28. added 2014-03-06
    Temporary Intrinsics and Relativization.M. Oreste Fiocco - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (1):64-77.
    Some have concluded that the only appropriate response to the problem of temporary intrinsics is the view that familiar, concrete objects persist through time by perduring, that is, by having temporal parts. Many, including myself, believe this view of persistence is false, and so reject this conclusion. However, the most common attempts to resolve the problem and yet defend the view that familiar, concrete objects endure are self-defeating. This has heretofore gone unnoticed. I consider the most familiar such attempts, based (...)
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  29. added 2011-10-27
    Identity Through Time and the Discernibility of Identicals.Donald L. M. Baxter - 1989 - Analysis 49 (3):125 - 131.
    Ordinary usage gives a way to think of identity through time: the Pittsburgh of 1946 was the same city as the Pittsburgh of today is--namely Pittsburgh. Problem: The Pittsburgh of 1946 does not exist; Pittsburgh still does. How can they have been identical? I reject the temporal parts view on which they were not but we may speak as though they were. Rather I argue that claiming their identity is not contradictory. I interpret ‘the Pittsburgh of 1946’ as ‘Pittsburgh as (...)
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  30. added 2011-07-01
    Intrinsicness, Duplication and Relations to Times.Neil McKinnon - unknown
    The principal aim of this paper is to defend a certain view about temporary properties from an important objection to that view. More specifically, I will be defending the view that ostensible temporary intrinsic properties are really relations between the things that have those properties and times. The objection is, roughly speaking, that by construing ostensible temporary intrinsics as relations to times, persisting things are impoverished, being clothed only by their essential (and perhaps also their permanent) intrinsic properties. The worry (...)
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  31. added 2011-07-01
    McTaggart and Indexing the Copula.Bradley Rettler - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (3):431-434.
    In this paper, I show how a solution to Lewis’ problem of temporary intrinsics is also a response to McTaggart’s argument that the A-series is incoherent. There are three strategies Lewis considers for solving the problem of temporary intrinsics: perdurantism, presentism, and property-indexing. William Lane Craig (Analysis 58(2):122–127, 1998) has examined how the three strategies fare with respect to McTaggart’s argument. The only viable solution Lewis considers to the problem of temporary intrinsics that also succeeds against McTaggart, Craig claims, is (...)
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  32. added 2011-07-01
    The Stage View and Temporary Intrinsics.Theodore Sider - 2000 - Analysis 60 (1):84 - 88.
    According to four dimensionalism, the material world is divided into momentary stages. In a four-dimensional world, which objects are the ordinary things, the things we normally name and quantify over? Aggregates of stages, according to most four-dimensionalists, but according to stage theorists (or exdurantists), ordinary objects are instead to be identified with the stages themselves. (A temporal counterpart theoretic account of de re temporal predication is then given.) This paper argues that a stage theorist is best positioned to accept David (...)
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  33. added 2011-07-01
    Craig on Mctaggart's Paradox and the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics.L. Nathan Oaklander - 1999 - Analysis 59 (4):314–318.
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  34. added 2011-07-01
    Mctaggart's Paradox and the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics.William Lane Craig - 1998 - Analysis 58 (2):122–127.
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  35. added 2011-07-01
    Lewis, Temporary Intrinsics and Momentary Tropes.Douglas Ehring - 1997 - Analysis 57 (4):254–258.
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  36. added 2011-07-01
    Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics.Sally Haslanger - 1989 - Analysis 49 (3):119-125.
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