Related categories

143 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 143
  1. added 2020-06-03
    Quine, I.Elliott Sober - 2000 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1):237–280.
    In 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', Quine attacks the analytic/synthetic distinction and defends a doctrine that I call epistemological holism. Now, almost fifty years after the article's appearance, what are we to make of these ideas? I suggest that the philosophical naturalism that Quine did so much to promote should lead us to reject Quine's brief against the analytic/synthetic distinction; I also argue that Quine misunderstood Carnap's views on analyticity. As for epistemological holism, I claim that this thesis does not follow (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  2. added 2020-04-29
    Fictionalism of Anticipation.Raimundas Vidunas - manuscript
    A promising recent approach for understanding complex phenomena is recognition of anticipatory behavior of living organisms, social organizations. The anticipatory, predictive action permits learning, novelty seeking, rich experiential existence. I argue that the established frameworks of anticipation, adaptation, or learning imply overly passive roles of anticipatory agents, and that a fictionalist, or even a mythological vocabulary would reflect the core of anticipatory behavior better than representational or future references. Cognizing beings enact not just their model of the world, but own (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. added 2019-12-18
    How Do We Know That We Are Free?Timothy O’Connor - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):79-98.
    We are naturally disposed to believe of ourselves and others that we are free: that what we do is often and to a considerable extent ‘up to us’ via the exercise of a power of choice to do or to refrain from doing one or more alternatives of which we are aware. In this article, I probe thesource and epistemic justification of our ‘freedom belief’. I propose an account that (unlike most) does not lean heavily on our first-personal experience of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. added 2019-09-24
    Externalism and A Priori Knowledge of the World: Why Privileged Access is Not the Issue.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (4):433-445.
    I look at incompatibilist arguments aimed at showing that the conjunction of the thesis that a subject has privileged, a priori access to the contents of her own thoughts, on the one hand, and of semantic externalism, on the other, lead to a putatively absurd conclusion, namely, a priori knowledge of the external world. I focus on arguments involving a variety of externalism resulting from the singularity or object‐dependence of certain terms such as the demonstrative ‘that’. McKinsey argues that incompatibilist (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  5. added 2019-09-02
    Armchair Philosophy.Timothy Williamson - 2019 - Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 56 (2):19 - 25.
    The article presents an anti-exceptionalist view of philosophical methodology, on which it is much closer to the methodology of other disciplines than many philosophers like to think. Like mathematics, it is a science, but not a natural science. Its methods are not primarily experimental, though it can draw on the results of natural science. Like foundational mathematics, its methods are abductive as well as deductive. As in the natural sciences, much progress in philosophy consists in the construction of better models (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. added 2019-06-06
    Ontology, Understanding, and the A Priori.Ernest Sosa - 2003 - Ratio 16 (2):178-188.
    How might one explain the reliability of one's a priori beliefs? What if anything is implied about the ontology of a certain realm of knowledge by the possibility of explaining one's reliability about that realm? Very little, or so it is argued here.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  7. added 2019-06-06
    Mises, the A Priori, and the Foundations of Economics: A Qualified Defence: Stephen D. Parsons.Stephen D. Parsons - 1997 - Economics and Philosophy 13 (2):175-196.
    In a recent paper, Pierluigi Barrotta argues that Mises ‘ended up by defending an epistemological tenet very far from Kant's’, concluding that ‘Mises's apriorism cannot be vindicated through Kant's epistemology’. In contrast, I shall argue that certain of Mises's arguments can be reconstructed in Kantian terms, and thus the distance between Mises and Kant is not as extreme as Barrotta's argument may appear to suggest. Specifically, I shall argue that Mises, like Kant, seeks to establish the a priori nature of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8. added 2019-03-26
    The World is Not Enough.Nathan Robert Howard & N. G. Laskowski - forthcoming - Noûs.
    Throughout his career, Derek Parfit made the bold suggestion, at various times under the heading of the "Normativity Objection," that anyone in possession of normative concepts is in a position to know, on the basis of their competence with such concepts alone, that reductive realism in ethics is not even possible. Despite the prominent role that the Normativity Objection plays in Parfit's non-reductive account of the nature of normativity, when the objection hasn't been ignored, it's been criticized and even derided. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. added 2019-02-07
    Are There Indefeasible Epistemic Rules?Darren Bradley - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.
    What if your peers tell you that you should disregard your perceptions? Worse, what if your peers tell you to disregard the testimony of your peers? How should we respond if we get evidence that seems to undermine our epistemic rules? Several philosophers have argued that some epistemic rules are indefeasible. I will argue that all epistemic rules are defeasible. The result is a kind of epistemic particularism, according to which there are no simple rules connecting descriptive and normative facts. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  10. added 2019-02-06
    Chudnoff on the Awareness of Abstract Objects.D. Gene Witmer - 2016 - Florida Philosophical Review 16 (1):105-116.
    In his book Intuition, Elijah Chudnoff develops an account of how we might, by having intuitions, be made aware of abstract objects. While the conditions under which we enjoy such awareness are, on his account, happily free of objectionable metaphysics or dubious mechanisms, it is not clear that the conditions bear the epistemic weight they need to carry. To flesh out this worry, I develop an example that is parallel in all relevant respects to cases of intuitive awareness as described (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  11. added 2018-08-11
    Is There a Reliability Challenge for Logic?Joshua Schechter - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):325-347.
    There are many domains about which we think we are reliable. When there is prima facie reason to believe that there is no satisfying explanation of our reliability about a domain given our background views about the world, this generates a challenge to our reliability about the domain or to our background views. This is what is often called the reliability challenge for the domain. In previous work, I discussed the reliability challenges for logic and for deductive inference. I argued (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  12. added 2018-06-05
    The Experiential Defeasibility and Overdetermination of A Priori Justification.Mikael Janvid - 2008 - Journal of Philosophical Research 33:271-278.
    In a recent and interesting paper “Experientially Defeasible A Priori Justification,” Joshua Thurow argues that many a priori justified beliefs are defeasible by experience. The argument takes the form of an objection against Albert Casullo’s recent book, A Priori Justification, where Casullo, according to Thurow, denies that if a justified belief is non-experientially defeasible, then that belief is also experientially defeasible. This paper critically examines Thurow’s two arguments in the first two sections I–II. In the last section, III, an alternative (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  13. added 2018-02-17
    Relativizing the Relativized a Priori: Reichenbach’s Axioms of Coordination Divided.Flavia Padovani - 2011 - Synthese 181 (1):41-62.
    In recent years, Reichenbach's 1920 conception of the principles of coordination has attracted increased attention after Michael Friedman's attempt to revive Reichenbach's idea of a "relativized a priori". This paper follows the origin and development of this idea in the framework of Reichenbach's distinction between the axioms of coordination and the axioms of connection. It suggests a further differentiation among the coordinating axioms and accordingly proposes a different account of Reichenbach's "relativized a priori".
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  14. added 2018-02-17
    Bonjour’s Arguments Against Skepticism About the A Priori.James R. Beebe - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (2):243-267.
    I reconstruct and critique two arguments Laurence BonJour has recently offered against skepticism about the a priori. While the arguments may provide anti-skeptical, internalist foundationalists with reason to accept the a priori, I show that neither argument provides sufficient reason for believing the more general conclusion that there is no rational alternative to accepting the a priori.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. added 2018-02-17
    Testimony and A Priori Knowledge.Albert Casullo - 2007 - Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 4 (3):322-334.
    Tyler Burge offers a theory of testimony that allows for the possibility of both testimonial a priori warrant and testimonial a priori knowledge. I uncover a tension in his account of the relationship between the two, and locate its source in the analogy that Burge draws between testimonial warrant and preservative memory. I contend that this analogy should be rejected, and offer a revision of Burge's theory that eliminates the tension. I conclude by assessing the impact of the revised theory (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  16. added 2018-02-16
    A Place for Pragmatism in the Dynamics of Reason?Thomas Mormann - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1):27-37.
    Abstract. In Dynamics of Reason Michael Friedman proposes a kind of synthesis between the neokantianism of Ernst Cassirer, the logical empiricism of Rudolf Carnap, and the historicism of Thomas Kuhn. Cassirer and Carnap are to take care of the Kantian legacy of modern philosophy of science, encapsulated in the concept of a relativized a priori and the globally rational or continuous evolution of scientific knowledge,while Kuhn´s role is to ensure that the historicist character of scientific knowledge is taken seriously. More (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  17. added 2018-01-19
    Semantic Pragmatism and a Priori Knowledge: (Or 'Yes We Could All Be Brains in a Vat').Henry Jackman - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (4):455-480.
    Hillary Putnam has famously argued that we can know that we are not brains in a vat because the hypothesis that we are is self-refuting. While Putnam's argument has generated interest primarily as a novel response to skepticism, his original use of the brain in a vat scenario was meant to illustrate a point about the "mind/world relationship." In particular, he intended it to be part of an argument against the coherence of metaphysical realism, and thus to be part of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  18. added 2017-10-27
    Trusting Others in the Sciences: A Priori or Empirical Warrant?Elizabeth Fricker - 2002 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (2):373-383.
    Testimony is indispensable in the sciences. To deny the propriety of relying on it engenders an untenable scepticism. But this leaves open the issue of what exactly confers a scientist’s epistemic right to rely upon the word of her colleagues. Some authors have suggested a recipient of testimony enjoys an epistemic entitlement to trust the word of another as such, not requiring evidence of her trustworthiness, so long as there is not evidence of her untrustworthiness. I argue that, whether or (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   38 citations  
  19. added 2017-10-12
    P. Garavaso and N. Vassallo, Frege on Thinking and its Epistemic Significance. [REVIEW]Clinton Tolley - 2017 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2017.
  20. added 2017-09-12
    One Dogma of Millianism.Derek Ball & Bryan Pickel - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):70-92.
    Millians about proper names typically claim that it is knowable apriori that Hesperus is Phosphorus. We argue that they should claim instead that it is knowable only aposteriori that Hesperus is Hesperus, since the Kripke-Putnam epistemic arguments against descriptivism are special cases of Quinean arguments that nothing is knowable apriori, and Millians have no resources to resist the more general Quinean arguments.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  21. added 2017-09-04
    On a Priori Knowledge of Necessity.Juhani Yli-Vakkuri & Margot Strohminger - manuscript
    The idea that the epistemology of modality is in some sense a priori is a popular one, but it has turned out to be difficult to precisify in a way that does not expose it to decisive counterexamples. The most common precisifications follow Kripke’s suggestion that cases of necessary a posteriori truth that can be known a priori to be necessary if true ‘may give a clue to a general characterization of a posteriori knowledge of necessary truths’. The idea is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  22. added 2017-07-27
    There Is No Pure Empirical Reasoning.Michael Huemer - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):592-613.
    The justificatory force of empirical reasoning always depends upon the existence of some synthetic, a priori justification. The reasoner must begin with justified, substantive constraints on both the prior probability of the conclusion and certain conditional probabilities; otherwise, all possible degrees of belief in the conclusion are left open given the premises. Such constraints cannot in general be empirically justified, on pain of infinite regress. Nor does subjective Bayesianism offer a way out for the empiricist. Despite often-cited convergence theorems, subjective (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  23. added 2017-03-29
    Actuality, Tableaux, and Two-Dimensional Modal Logics.Fabio Lampert - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (3):403-443.
    In this paper we present tableau methods for two-dimensional modal logics. Although models for such logics are well known, proof systems remain rather unexplored as most of their developments have been purely axiomatic. The logics herein considered contain first-order quantifiers with identity, and all the formulas in the language are doubly-indexed in the proof systems, with the upper indices intuitively representing the actual or reference worlds, and the lower indices representing worlds of evaluation—first and second dimensions, respectively. The tableaux modulate (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  24. added 2017-03-29
    Moral Fixed Points and Conceptual Deficiency: Reply to Ingram (2015).Kyriacou Christos - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 2017 (3):1-9.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  25. added 2017-02-12
    On Wright's Characterization of the Apriori.Ivette Fred - 1999 - Diálogos. Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Puerto Rico 34 (73):127-138.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. added 2016-12-12
    Two Kinds of a Priori Infallibility.Glen Hoffmann - 2011 - Synthese 181 (2):241-253.
    On rationalist infallibilism, a wide range of both (i) analytic and (ii) synthetic a priori propositions can be infallibly justified (or absolutely warranted), i.e., justified to a degree that entails their truth and precludes their falsity. Though rationalist infallibilism is indisputably running its course, adherence to at least one of the two species of infallible a priori justification refuses to disappear from mainstream epistemology. Among others, Putnam (1978) still professes the a priori infallibility of some category (i) propositions, while Burge (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  27. added 2016-12-08
    A Priori Skepticism.James R. Beebe - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (3):583-602.
    In this article I investigate a neglected form of radical skepticism that questions whether any of our logical, mathematical and other seemingly self-evident beliefs count as knowledge. ‘A priori skepticism,’ as I will call it, challenges our ability to know any of the following sorts of propositions: (1.1) The sum of two and three is five. (1.2) Whatever is square is rectangular. (1.3) Whatever is red is colored. (1.4) No surface can be uniformly red and uniformly blue at the same (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  28. added 2016-12-08
    The a Priori Defended: A Defense of the Generality Argument.Joshua C. Thurow - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 146 (2):273-289.
    One of Laurence BonJour’s main arguments for the existence of the a priori is an argument that a priori justification is indispensable for making inferences from experience to conclusions that go beyond experience. This argument has recently come under heavy fire from Albert Casullo, who has dubbed BonJour’s argument, “The Generality Argument.” In this paper I (i) defend the Generality Argument against Casullo’s criticisms, and (ii) develop a new, more plausible, version of the Generality Argument in response to some other (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  29. added 2016-10-27
    A Priori.Edwin Mares - 2011 - Routledge.
    In recent years many influential philosophers have advocated that philosophy is an a priori science. Yet very few epistemology textbooks discuss a priori knowledge at any length, focusing instead on empirical knowledge and empirical justification. As a priori knowledge has moved centre stage, the literature remains either too technical or too out of date to make up a reasonable component of an undergraduate course. Edwin Mares book aims to rectify this. This book seeks to make accessible to students the standard (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. added 2016-09-23
    Frontloading, Supposition, and Contraction.Bryan Pickel - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (264):559-578.
    In Constructing the World, Chalmers observes that our knowledge exceeds the core evidence provided by our senses and introspection. Thus, on the basis of core evidence, one also can know (S) that water covers the majority of the Earth. This knowledge, Chalmers suggests, requires a great deal of apriori knowledge. Chalmers argues that even if one suspends belief in one’s core evidence, one can nevertheless reason from a description of this evidence to an ordinary claim such as S. Chalmers concludes (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. added 2016-09-19
    Deficiency Arguments Against Empiricism and the Question of Empirical Indefeasibility.Lisa Warenski - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1675-1686.
    I give a brief overview of Albert Casullo’s Essays on A Priori Knowledge and Justification, followed by a summary of his diagnostic framework for evaluating accounts of a priori knowledge and a priori justification. I then discuss Casullo’s strategy for countering deficiency arguments against empiricism. A deficiency argument against empiricism can be countered by mounting a parallel argument against moderate rationalism that shows moderate rationalism to be defective in a similar way. I argue that a particular deficiency argument put forth (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. added 2016-09-03
    Entitlement and Rationality.C. S. Jenkins - 2007 - Synthese 157 (1):25-45.
    This paper takes the form of a critical discussion of Crispin Wright’s notion of entitlement of cognitive project. I examine various strategies for defending the claim that entitlement can make acceptance of a proposition epistemically rational, including one which appeals to epistemic consequentialism. Ultimately, I argue, none of these strategies is successful, but the attempt to isolate points of disagreement with Wright issues in some positive proposals as to how an epistemic consequentialist should characterize epistemic rationality.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   57 citations  
  33. added 2016-05-29
    Rule-Following and A Priori Biconditionals - A Sea of Tears?Amrei Bahr & Markus Seidel - 2016 - In Simon Derpmann & David Schweikard (eds.), Philip Pettit: Five Themes from his Work. Springer. pp. 19-31.
  34. added 2016-03-22
    Review : 'New Essays on the A Priori' Ed. By P. Boghossian & C Peacocke. [REVIEW]Graham Oppy - 2002 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (3):384-6.
    Review of *New Essays on the A Priori*, an excellent collection edited by Paul Boghossian and Christopher Peacocke. Contributors include: Tyler Burge; Quassim Cassam; Philip Kitcher; Penelope Maddy; Hartry Field; Paul Horwich; Peter Railton; Stephen Yablo; Bob Hale; Crispin Wright; Frank Jackson; Stewart Shapiro; Michael Friedman; Martin Davies; Bill Brewer; and Thomas Nagel.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. added 2015-09-12
    Cartesianism, Neo-Reidianism, and the A Priori: Reply to Pust.Gregory Stoutenburg - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (2):231–235.
    Joel Pust has recently challenged the Thomas Reid-inspired argument against the reliability of the a priori defended by Alvin Plantinga, Nicholas Wolterstorff, William Alston, and Michael Bergmann. The Reidian argument alleges that the Cartesian insistence on the primacy of a priori rationality and subjective sensory experience as the foundations of epistemic justification is unwarranted because the same kind of global skeptical scenario that Cartesians recognize as challenging the legitimacy of perceptual beliefs about the external world also undermine the reliability of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. added 2015-02-15
    Ideal Rationality and Logical Omniscience.Declan Smithies - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):2769-2793.
    Does rationality require logical omniscience? Our best formal theories of rationality imply that it does, but our ordinary evaluations of rationality seem to suggest otherwise. This paper aims to resolve the tension by arguing that our ordinary evaluations of rationality are not only consistent with the thesis that rationality requires logical omniscience, but also provide a compelling rationale for accepting this thesis in the first place. This paper also defends an account of apriori justification for logical beliefs that is designed (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  37. added 2014-12-21
    Aristotle on Norms of Inquiry.James G. Lennox - 2011 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 1 (1):23-46.
    Where does Aristotle stand in the debate between rationalism and empiricism? The locus classicus on this question, Posterior Analytics II. 19, seems clearly empiricist. Yet many commentators have resisted this conclusion. Here, I review their arguments and conclude that they rest in part on expectations for this text that go unfulfilled. I argue that this is because his views about norms of empirical inquiry are in the rich methodological passages in his scientific treatises. In support of this claim, I explore (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  38. added 2014-11-05
    Conceptual and Linguistic Analysis: A Two-Step Program.Andrew Melnyk - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):267–291.
    This paper argues against both conceptual and linguistic analysis as sources of a priori knowledge. The key claim is that none of the main views about what concepts are can underwrite the possibility of such knowledge.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  39. added 2014-06-24
    Einstein, Kant, and the A Priori.Michael Friedman - 2010 - In Mauricio Suarez, Mauro Dorato & Miklos Redei (eds.), EPSA Philosophical Issues in the Sciences · Launch of the European Philosophy of Science Association. Springer. pp. 65--73.
    Kant's original version of transcendental philosophy took both Euclidean geometry and the Newtonian laws of motion to be synthetic a priori constitutive principles—which, from Kant's point of view, function as necessary presuppositions for applying our fundamental concepts of space, time, matter, and motion to our sensible experience of the natural world. Although Kant had very good reasons to view the principles in question as having such a constitutively a priori role, we now know, in the wake of Einstein's work, that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  40. added 2014-04-25
    Armchair Luck: Apriority, Intellection and Epistemic Luck. [REVIEW]Nenad Miščević - 2007 - Acta Analytica 22 (1):48-73.
    The paper argues that there is such a thing as luck in acquisition of candidate a priori beliefs and knowledge, and that the possibility of luck in this “armchair” domain shows that definitions of believing by luck that p offered in literature are inadequate, since they mostly rely on the possibility of it being the case that not- p. When p is necessary, such a definition should be supplemented by one pointing to variation in belief, not in the fact believed. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  41. added 2014-04-03
    A Priori Truth.Jody Azzouni - 1992 - Erkenntnis 37 (3):327 - 346.
    There are several epistemic distinctions among truths that I have argued for in this paper. First, there are those truths which holdof every rationally accessible conceptual scheme (class A truths). Second, there are those truths which holdin every rationally accessible conceptual scheme (class B truths). And finally, there are those truths whose truthvalue status isindependent of the empirical sciences (class C truths). The last category broadly includes statementsabout systems and the statements they contain, as well as statements true by virtue (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  42. added 2014-04-02
    Testimony as an a Priori Basis of Acceptance: Problems and Prospects.Robert Audi - 2006 - Philosophica 78.
    This paper explores the possibility that testimony is an a priori source, even if not a basic source, of rational support for certain kinds of cognitions, particularly for a kind of acceptance that it is natural to call presumption. The inquiry is conducted in the light of two important distinctions and the relation between them. One distinction is between belief and acceptance, the other between justification and rationality. Cognitive acceptance is also distinguished from behavioral acceptance, and their normative status is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. added 2014-04-02
    Perceiving Particulars and Recollecting the Forms in the 'Phaedo'.Catherine Osborne - 1994 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95:211 - 233.
    I ask whether the Recollection argument commits Socrates to the view that our only source of knowledge of the Forms is sense perception. I argue that Socrates does not confine our presently available sources of knowledge to empirically based recollection, but that he does think that we can't begin to move towards a philosophical understanding of the Forms except as a result of puzzles prompted by the shortfall of particulars in relation to the Forms, and hence that our awareness of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  44. added 2014-04-02
    The A Priori From Kant to Schelling.Jean Grondin - 1989 - Idealistic Studies 19 (3):202-221.
    “Der Begriff, den Kant in den synthetischen Urteilen a priori aufgestellt hat,—der Begriff von Unterschiedenem, das ebenso untrennbar ist, einem Identischen, das an ihm selbst ungetrennt Unterschied ist, gehört zu dem Grossen und Unsterblichen seiner Philosophie.”.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  45. added 2014-04-01
    The 'Truth' in Solipsism, and Wittgenstein's Rejection of the A Priori.Peter M. Sullivan - 1996 - European Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):195-220.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  46. added 2014-03-31
    Neorationalist Epistemology.Douglas Odegard - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):567-584.
    Whether any beliefs are justified nonempirically is important in a debate with sceptics who deny empirical justification, if the parties involved in the debate claim that their position is justified. Sceptics must assume that their premises are justified nonempirically, to avoid begging the question. The main problem with advocating nonempirical justification is that accounts tend to be either too niggardly or too generous, implying either that nonempirical justification is impossible or that peer adversaries must be equally justified. The way to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. added 2014-03-30
    A Priori Truths.Greg Restall - 2009 - In John Shand (ed.), Central Issues of Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.
    Philosophers love a priori knowledge: we delight in truths that can be known from the comfort of our armchairs, without the need to venture out in the world for confirmation. This is due not to laziness, but to two different considerations. First, it seems that many philosophical issues aren’t settled by our experience of the world — the nature of morality; the way concepts pick out objects; the structure of our experience of the world in which we find ourselves — (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  48. added 2014-03-28
    On Thought Experiments as a Priori Science.Richard Arthur - 1999 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13 (3):215 – 229.
    Against Norton's claim that all thought experiments can be reduced to explicit arguments, I defend Brown's position that certain thought experiments yield a priori knowledge. They do this, I argue, not by allowing us to perceive “Platonic universals” (Brown), even though they may contain non-propositional components that are epistemically indispensable, but by helping to identify certain tacit presuppositions or “natural interpretations” (Feyerabend's term) that lead to a contradiction when the phenomenon is described in terms of them, and by suggesting a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  49. added 2014-03-28
    Kant's Criteria of the a Priori.John Divers - 1999 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (1):17–45.
  50. added 2014-03-26
    Empiricism, Rationalism and the Limits of Justification. [REVIEW]Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3):641–648.
    BonJour’s intricately argued and provocative book raises a fundamental challenge for the empiricist: if we lack the capacity for direct apprehension of necessary truths, how do we know so much? How do we know about logic and mathematics and other apparently a priori subjects? How do we know about generalities, about the past and the future, about objects that are not present? How do we know about the relations that hold between premises and conclusions? If the first half of BonJour’s (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
1 — 50 / 143