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  1. A Naturalized Approach to the a Priori.Louise Antony - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):1–17.
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  2. On Thought Experiments as a Priori Science.Richard Arthur - 1999 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13 (3):215 – 229.
    Against Norton's claim that all thought experiments can be reduced to explicit arguments, I defend Brown's position that certain thought experiments yield a priori knowledge. They do this, I argue, not by allowing us to perceive “Platonic universals” (Brown), even though they may contain non-propositional components that are epistemically indispensable, but by helping to identify certain tacit presuppositions or “natural interpretations” (Feyerabend's term) that lead to a contradiction when the phenomenon is described in terms of them, and by suggesting a (...)
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  3. Testimony as an a Priori Basis of Acceptance: Problems and Prospects.Robert Audi - 2006 - Philosophica 78.
    This paper explores the possibility that testimony is an a priori source, even if not a basic source, of rational support for certain kinds of cognitions, particularly for a kind of acceptance that it is natural to call presumption. The inquiry is conducted in the light of two important distinctions and the relation between them. One distinction is between belief and acceptance, the other between justification and rationality. Cognitive acceptance is also distinguished from behavioral acceptance, and their normative status is (...)
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  4. The a Priori Authority of Testimony.Robert Audi - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):18–34.
  5. A Priori Truth.Jody Azzouni - 1992 - Erkenntnis 37 (3):327 - 346.
    There are several epistemic distinctions among truths that I have argued for in this paper. First, there are those truths which holdof every rationally accessible conceptual scheme (class A truths). Second, there are those truths which holdin every rationally accessible conceptual scheme (class B truths). And finally, there are those truths whose truthvalue status isindependent of the empirical sciences (class C truths). The last category broadly includes statementsabout systems and the statements they contain, as well as statements true by virtue (...)
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  6. Reichenbach on the Relative a Priori and the Context of Discovery/Justification Distinction.Samet Bagce - 2011 - Synthese 181 (1):79 - 93.
    Hans Reichenbach introduced two seemingly separate sets of distinctions in his epistemology at different times. One is between the axioms of coordination and the axioms of connections. The other distinction is between the context of discovery and the context of justification. The status and nature of each of these distinctions have been subject-matter of an ongoing debate among philosophers of science. Thus, there is a significant amount of works considering both distinctions separately. However, the relevance of Reichenbach's two distinctions to (...)
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  7. Rule-Following and A Priori Biconditionals - A Sea of Tears?Amrei Bahr & Markus Seidel - 2016 - In Simon Derpmann & David Schweikard (eds.), Philip Pettit: Five Themes from his Work. Springer. pp. 19-31.
  8. One Dogma of Millianism.Derek Ball & Bryan Pickel - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):70-92.
    Millians about proper names typically claim that it is knowable apriori that Hesperus is Phosphorus. We argue that they should claim instead that it is knowable only aposteriori that Hesperus is Hesperus, since the Kripke-Putnam epistemic arguments against descriptivism are special cases of Quinean arguments that nothing is knowable apriori, and Millians have no resources to resist the more general Quinean arguments.
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  9. One Dogma of Millianism.Derek Ball & Bryan Pickel - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):70-92.
    Millians about proper names typically claim that it is knowable apriori that Hesperus is Phosphorus. We argue that they should claim instead that it is knowable only aposteriori that Hesperus is Hesperus, since the Kripke-Putnam epistemic arguments against descriptivism are special cases of Quinean arguments that nothing is knowable apriori, and Millians have no resources to resist the more general Quinean arguments.
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  10. Bonjour's Arguments Against Skepticism About the A Priori.James Beebe - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 137 (2):243 - 267.
    I reconstruct and critique two arguments Laurence BonJour has recently offered against skepticism about the a priori. While the arguments may provide anti-skeptical, internalist foundationalists with reason to accept the a priori, I show that neither argument provides sufficient reason for believing the more general conclusion that there is no rational alternative to accepting the a priori.
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  11. A Priori Skepticism.James R. Beebe - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (3):583-602.
    In this article I investigate a neglected form of radical skepticism that questions whether any of our logical, mathematical and other seemingly self-evident beliefs count as knowledge. ‘A priori skepticism,’ as I will call it, challenges our ability to know any of the following sorts of propositions: (1.1) The sum of two and three is five. (1.2) Whatever is square is rectangular. (1.3) Whatever is red is colored. (1.4) No surface can be uniformly red and uniformly blue at the same (...)
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  12. Sense-Perception and the a Priori.José A. Benardete - 1969 - Mind 78 (310):161-177.
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  13. The a Priori and the Self-Evident: A Reply to Mr. Casullo.David Benfield - 1977 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 38 (2):225-227.
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  14. Williamson on the A Priori and the Analytic. [REVIEW]Paul Boghossian - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):488-497.
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  15. Inference and Insight. [REVIEW]Paul Boghossian - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3):633–640.
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  16. New Essays on the A Priori.Paul Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.) - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
    A stellar line-up of leading philosophers from around the world offer new treatments of a topic which has long been central to philosophical debate, and in ...
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  17. Review: Boghossian, Paul, New Essays on the A Priori[REVIEW]Laurence Bonjour - 2002 - Mind 111 (443):647-652.
  18. In Defense of Pure Reason.Laurence BonJour - 1998 - Cambridge University Press.
    A comprehensive defence of the rationalist view that insight independent of experience is a genuine basis for knowledge.
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  19. Logic and Analyticity.Tyler Burge - 2003 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 66 (1):199-249.
    The view that logic is true independently of a subject matter is criticized—enlarging on Quine's criticisms and adding further ones. It is then argued apriori that full reflective understanding of logic and deductive reasoning requires substantial commitment to mathematical entities. It is emphasized that the objectively apriori connections between deductive reasoning and commitment to mathematics need not be accepted by or even comprehensible to a given deductive reasoner. The relevant connections emerged only slowly in the history of logic. But they (...)
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  20. A Priori Existence.Alex Burri - 2007 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):163-175.
    This paper deals with the question whether existence claims may be supported in an a priori manner. I examine a particular case in point, namely the argument for the existence of so-called logical atoms to be found in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Although I find it wanting, I argue that more general reflections on the notion of existence allow us to straightforwardly answer our initial question in the affirmative.
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  21. Defeasible a Priori Justification: A Reply to Thurow.Albert Casullo - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):336–343.
    Joshua Thurow offers a defence of the claim that if a belief is defeasible by non-experiential evidence then it is defeasible by experiential evidence. He responds to an objection which I make against this claim, and offers two arguments in support of his own position. I show that Thurow's response misconstrues my objection, and that his supporting arguments fall short of their goal.
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  22. Testimony and A Priori Knowledge.Albert Casullo - 2007 - Episteme 4 (3):322-334.
    Tyler Burge offers a theory of testimony that allows for the possibility of both testimonial a priori warrant and testimonial a priori knowledge. I uncover a tension in his account of the relationship between the two, and locate its source in the analogy that Burge draws between testimonial warrant and preservative memory. I contend that this analogy should be rejected, and offer a revision of Burge's theory that eliminates the tension. I conclude by assessing the impact of the revised theory (...)
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  23. Is Empiricism Coherent?Albert Casullo - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:61-74.
    In recent years empiricism has come under attack. Some argue that the view is incoherent and conclude, on that basis, that some knowledge is a priori. Whatever the merits of such arguments against empiricism, they cannot be parlayed into an argument in support of the a priori unless the latter is not open to those arguments. My primary contention is that the a priori is open to the arguments offered against empiricism. Hence, they do not advance the case for the (...)
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  24. Presupposition and the a Priori.Nate Charlow - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):509-526.
    This paper argues for and explores the implications of the following epistemological principle for knowability a priori (with 'Ka' abbreviating 'it is knowable a priori that'). -/- (AK) For all ϕ, ψ such that ϕ semantically presupposes ψ: if Ka(ϕ), Ka(ψ). -/- Well-known arguments for the contingent a priori and a priori knowledge of logical truth founder when the semantic presuppositions of the putative items of knowledge are made explicit. Likewise, certain kinds of analytic truth turn out to carry semantic (...)
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  25. Testimony, Memory and the Limits of the a Priori.David Christensen & Hilary Kornblith - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 86 (1):1-20.
    A number of philosophers, from Thomas Reid1 through C. A. J. Coady2, have argued that one is justified in relying on the testimony of others, and furthermore, that this should be taken as a basic epistemic presumption. If such a general presumption were not ultimately dependent on evidence for the reliability of other people, the ground for this presumption would be a priori. Such a presumption would then have a status like that which Roderick Chisholm claims for the epistemic principle (...)
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  26. Moral Fixed Points and Conceptual Deficiency: Reply to Ingram (2015).Kyriacou Christos - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 2017:1-9.
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  27. Awareness of Abstract Objects.Elijah Chudnoff - 2013 - Noûs 47 (4):706-726.
    Awareness is a two-place determinable relation some determinates of which are seeing, hearing, etc. Abstract objects are items such as universals and functions, which contrast with concrete objects such as solids and liquids. It is uncontroversial that we are sometimes aware of concrete objects. In this paper I explore the more controversial topic of awareness of abstract objects. I distinguish two questions. First, the Existence Question: are there any experiences that make their subjects aware of abstract objects? Second, the Grounding (...)
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  28. Is Intuition Based On Understanding?Elijah Chudnoff - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):42-67.
    According to the most popular non-skeptical views about intuition, intuitions justify beliefs because they are based on understanding. More precisely: if intuiting that p justifies you in believing that p it does so because your intuition is based on your understanding of the proposition that p. The aim of this paper is to raise some challenges for accounts of intuitive justification along these lines. I pursue this project from a non-skeptical perspective. I argue that there are cases in which intuiting (...)
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  29. Intuitive Knowledge.Elijah Chudnoff - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):359-378.
    In this paper I assume that we have some intuitive knowledge—i.e. beliefs that amount to knowledge because they are based on intuitions. The question I take up is this: given that some intuition makes a belief based on it amount to knowledge, in virtue of what does it do so? We can ask a similar question about perception. That is: given that some perception makes a belief based on it amount to knowledge, in virtue of what does it do so? (...)
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  30. Review of What Place for the A Priori? [REVIEW]Elijah Chudnoff - 2011 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
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  31. Mr. Lewis and the a Priori.James Collins - 1948 - Journal of Philosophy 45 (21):561-572.
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  32. No Place for the a Priori.Michael Devitt - unknown
    Why believe in the a priori? The answer is clear: there are many examples, drawn from mathematics, logic and philosophy, of knowledge that does not seem to be empirical. It does not seem possible that this knowledge could be justified or revised “by experience.” It must be justified in some other way, justified a priori.
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  33. Apriority in Kant and Merleau-Ponty.M. C. Dillon - 1987 - Kant-Studien 78 (1-4):403-423.
    If the a priori is the proper subject matter of transcendental philosophy, then the problems of the a priori are also problems for transcendental philosophy. the idea that defines transcendental philosophy is the idea that there are stable general structures which are discernible in experience, provide the foundations of our knowledge of it, and collectively constitute an a priori which transcends experience and informs it. the a priori is traditionally conceived as a nexus of relations which is held to be (...)
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  34. Kant's Criteria of the a Priori.John Divers - 1999 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (1):17–45.
  35. Apriority.Sinan Dogramaci - 2012 - In Gillian Russell Delia Graff Fara (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language. Routledge.
    After briefly expositing some fundamental issues in current debates about apriority, I go on to critically examine meaning-based explanations of how we acquire apriori justification.
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  36. De Re A Priori Knowledge.Cian Dorr - 2011 - Mind 120 (480):939-991.
    Suppose a sentence of the following form is true in a certain context: ‘Necessarily, whenever one believes that the F is uniquely F if anything is, and x is the F, one believes that x is uniquely F if anything is’. I argue that almost always, in such a case, the sentences that result when both occurrences of ‘believes’ are replaced with ‘has justification to believe’, ‘knows’, or ‘knows a priori’ will also be true in the same context. I also (...)
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  37. Secondary Qualities and the a Priori.Jim Edwards - 1992 - Mind 101 (402):263-272.
  38. How Are Basic Belief-Forming Methods Justified?Enoch David & Schechter Joshua - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):547–579.
    In this paper, we develop an account of the justification thinkers have for employing certain basic belief-forming methods. The guiding idea is inspired by Reichenbach's work on induction. There are certain projects in which thinkers are rationally required to engage. Thinkers are epistemically justified in employing any belief-forming method such that "if it doesn't work, nothing will" for successfully engaging in such a project. We present a detailed account based on this intuitive thought and address objections to it. We conclude (...)
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  39. Actuality, Tableaux, and Two-Dimensional Modal Logic.Fabio Lampert - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-41.
    In this paper we present tableau methods for two-dimensional modal logics. Althoughmodels for such logics are well known, proof systems remain rather unexplored as mostof their developments have been purely axiomatic. The logics herein considered containfirst-order quantifiers with identity, and all the formulas in the language are doubly-indexed in the proof systems, with the upper indices intuitively representing the actualor reference worlds, and the lower indices representing worlds of evaluation — first and second dimensions, respectively. The tableaux modulate over different (...)
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  40. On Wright's Characterization of the Apriori.Ivette Fred - 1999 - Dialogos 34 (73):127-138.
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  41. Trusting Others in the Sciences: A Priori or Empirical Warrant?Elizabeth Fricker - 2002 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (2):373-383.
    Testimony is indispensable in the sciences. To deny the propriety of relying on it engenders an untenable scepticism. But this leaves open the issue of what exactly confers a scientist’s epistemic right to rely upon the word of her colleagues. Some authors have suggested a recipient of testimony enjoys an epistemic entitlement to trust the word of another as such, not requiring evidence of her trustworthiness, so long as there is not evidence of her untrustworthiness. I argue that, whether or (...)
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  42. Einstein, Kant, and the A Priori.Michael Friedman - 2010 - In Mauricio Suarez, Mauro Dorato & Miklos Redei (eds.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Springer. pp. 65--73.
    Kant's original version of transcendental philosophy took both Euclidean geometry and the Newtonian laws of motion to be synthetic a priori constitutive principles—which, from Kant's point of view, function as necessary presuppositions for applying our fundamental concepts of space, time, matter, and motion to our sensible experience of the natural world. Although Kant had very good reasons to view the principles in question as having such a constitutively a priori role, we now know, in the wake of Einstein's work, that (...)
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  43. Empiricism, Rationalism and the Limits of Justification. [REVIEW]Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3):641–648.
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  44. We Can't Know a Priori That H2O Exists. But Can We Know a Priori That Water Does?Brie Gertler - 2004 - Analysis 64 (1):44-47.
    Goldberg (2003) defends externalism from Boghossian's (1998) version of the "armchair knowledge" objection. I argue here that, while Goldberg's challenge blocks a different version of this objection, it does not directly block Boghossian's version. And Goldberg's approach is not promising as a response to Boghossian's version of the armchair knowledge objection.
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  45. A Priori Warrant and Naturalistic Epistemology: The Seventh Philosophical Perspectives Lecture.Alvin I. Goldman - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):1-28.
  46. Kant, Ontology & the a Priori.Moltke S. Gram - 1968 - Northwestern University Press.
  47. Iterated Modalities, Meaning and A Priori Knowledge.Dominic Gregory - 2011 - Philosophers' Imprint 11 (3).
    Recent work on the philosophy of modality has tended to pass over questions about iterated modalities in favour of constructing ambitious metaphysical theories of possibility and necessity, despite the central importance of iterated modalities to modal logic. Yet there are numerous unresolved but fundamental issues involving iterated modalities: Chandler and Salmon have provided forceful arguments against the widespread assumption that all necessary truths are necessarily necessary, for example. The current paper examines a range of ways in which one might seek (...)
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  48. The Epistemology of a Priori Knowledge - by Tamara Horowitz.Dominic Gregory - 2008 - Philosophical Books 49 (2):167-168.
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  49. The A Priori From Kant to Schelling.Jean Grondin - 1989 - Idealistic Studies 19 (3):202-221.
  50. The A Priori Thesis.Sören Häggqvist - 2007 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):47-61.
    Recent debates about thought experiments have focused on a perceived epistemological problem: how do thought experiments manage to provide knowledge when they yield no new empirical data? A bold answer to this question is provided by James Robert Brown’s platonisrn, according to which a certain class of thought experiments allow a sort of intellectual perception of laws of nature, understood as relations between universals. I suggest that there are three main problems with platonism. First, it is restricted to a very (...)
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