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  1. Schaffer's Demon.Nathan Ballantyne & Ian Evans - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):552-559.
    Jonathan Schaffer (2010) has summoned a new sort of demon – which he calls the debasing demon – that apparently threatens all of our purported knowledge. We show that any debasing skeptical argument must attack the justification condition and can do so only if a plausible thesis about justification is false.
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  2. The Problems and Postulates of Epistemology.N. V. Banerjee - 1930 - The Monist 40 (4):552-558.
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  3. Is Memory Merely Testimony From One's Former Self?David James Barnett - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (3):353-392.
    A natural view of testimony holds that a source's statements provide one with evidence about what the source believes, which in turn provides one with evidence about what is true. But some theorists have gone further and developed a broadly analogous view of memory. According to this view, which this essay calls the “diary model,” one's memory ordinarily serves as a means for one's present self to gain evidence about one's past judgments, and in turn about the truth. This essay (...)
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  4. The Basing Relation and the Impossibility of the Debasing Demon.Patrick Bondy & J. Adam Carter - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly.
    Descartes’ demon is a deceiver: the demon makes things appear to you other than as they really are. However, as Descartes famously pointed out in the Second Meditation, not all knowledge is imperilled by this kind of deception. You still know you are a thinking thing. Perhaps, though, there is a more virulent demon in epistemic hell, one from which none of our knowledge is safe. Jonathan Schaffer (2010) thinks so. The “Debasing Demon” he imagines threatens knowledge not via the (...)
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  5. Two Reasons Why Epistemic Reasons Are Not Object‐Given Reasons.Anthony Robert Booth - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):1-14.
    In this paper I discuss two claims; the first is the claim that state-given reasons for belief are of a radically different kind to object-given reasons for belief. The second is that, where this last claim is true, epistemic reasons are object-given reasons for belief (EOG). I argue that EOG has two implausible consequences: (i) that suspension of judgement can never be epistemically justified, and (ii) that the reason that epistemically justifies a belief that p can never be the reason (...)
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  6. Can There Be Epistemic Reasons for Action?Anthony Robert Booth - 2006 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 73 (1):133-144.
    In this paper I consider whether there can be such things as epistemic reasons for action. I consider three arguments to the contrary and argue that none are successful, being either somewhat question-begging or too strong by ruling out what most epistemologists think is a necessary feature of epistemic justification, namely the epistemic basing relation. I end by suggesting a "non-cognitivist" model of epistemic reasons that makes room for there being epistemic reasons for action and suggest that this model may (...)
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  7. Skepticism and Possibilities.James Cargile - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):157-171.
    One skeptical strategy against A’s claim to know that P is to hold that it is logically possible for someone to have the same “base” for P as A does in spite of its not being true that P. Philosophical replies have focussed on showing that these are not genuine possibilities. Whether they are can be an interesting question of metaphysics, but it is argued in this paper that this metaphysical discussion is not the proper focus for an assessment of (...)
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  8. An Actionist Approach to the Justificational Role of Perceptual Experience.Eros Moreira de Carvalho - 2016 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 72 (2-3):545-572.
    In this paper, I defend an account of how perceptual experience can bear rational relation to our empirical thought. In the first part, I elaborate two claims that are central for the justificational role of perceptual experience, namely, the claim that perception and belief share the same kind of content, and the claim that perception is independent from belief. At first sight, these claims seems not to be compatible, since the first one seems to require the truth of content conceptualism, (...)
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  9. Crenças justificadas não-inferencialmente e o mito do dado.Eros Moreira De Carvalho - 2009 - Princípios 16 (25):231-263.
    The aim of this paper is to present an explanation of how the perceptualexperience fulfills its role of justification. The idea is that the perceptual experience justifiesnon-inferentially empirical beliefs in an internalist sense of justification. Against Sellars, I want to say that S relied on his experience to believe that the world is so and so. To discussthis question, I choose the arguments of Brewer and McDowell. Both argue that theexperience can justify beliefs, provided it has a conceptual content. But (...)
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  10. Inference and Consciousness.Timothy Chan & Anders Nes (eds.) - forthcoming - Routledge.
  11. A Well-Founded Solution to the Generality Problem.Juan Comesaña - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 129 (1):27-47.
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  12. Debasing Skepticism Refuted.Earl Conee - 2015 - Episteme 12 (1):1-11.
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  13. Subjectivity, Judgment, and the Basing Relationship.John K. Davis - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (1):21-40.
    Moral and legal judgments sometimes depend on personal traits in this sense: the subject offers good reasons for her judgment, but if she had a different social or ideological background, her judgment would be different. If you would judge the constitutionality of restrictions on abortion differently if you were not a secular liberal, is your judgment really based on the arguments you find convincing, or do you find them so only because you are a secular liberal? I argue that a (...)
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  14. Knowledge by Imagination - How Imaginative Experience Can Ground Knowledge.Fabian Dorsch - forthcoming - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy.
    In this article, I defend the view that we can acquire factual knowledge – that is, contingent propositional knowledge about certain (perceivable) aspects of reality – on the basis of imaginative experience. More specifically, I argue that, under suitable circumstances, imaginative experiences can rationally determine the propositional content of knowledge-constituting beliefs – though not their attitude of belief – in roughly the same way as perceptual experiences do in the case of perceptual knowledge. I also highlight some philosophical consequences of (...)
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  15. The Phenomenal Presence of Perceptual Reasons.Fabian Dorsch - forthcoming - In Fabian Dorsch & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Phenomenal Presence. Oxford University Press.
    Doxasticism about our awareness of normative (i.e. justifying) reasons – the view that we can recognise reasons for forming attitudes or performing actions only by means of normative judgements or beliefs – is incompatible with the following triad of claims: -/- (1) Being motivated (i.e. forming attitudes or performing actions for a motive) requires responding to and, hence, recognising a relevant reason. -/- (2) Infants are capable of being motivated. -/- (3) Infants are incapable of normative judgement or belief. -/- (...)
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  16. On Peter Klein's Concept of Arbitrariness.Coos Engelsma - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (2):192-200.
    According to Peter Klein, foundationalism fails because it allows a vicious form of arbitrariness. The present article critically discusses his concept of arbitrariness. It argues that the condition Klein takes to be necessary and sufficient for an epistemic item to be arbitrary is neither necessary nor sufficient. It also argues that Klein's concept of arbitrariness is not a concept of something that is obviously vicious. Even if Klein succeeds in establishing that foundationalism allows what he regards as arbitrariness, this does (...)
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  17. The Problem of the Basing Relation.Ian Evans - 2013 - Synthese 190 (14):2943-2957.
    In days past, epistemologists expended a good deal of effort trying to analyze the basing relation—the relation between a belief and its basis. No satisfying account was offered, and the project was largely abandoned. Younger epistemologists, however, have begun to yearn for an adequate theory of basing. I aim to deliver one. After establishing some data and arguing that traditional accounts of basing are unsatisfying, I introduce a novel theory of the basing relation: the dispositional theory. It begins with the (...)
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  18. Agency of Belief and Intention.A. K. Flowerree - forthcoming - Synthese:1-22.
    In this paper, I argue for a conditional parity thesis: if we are agents with respect to our intentions, we are agents with respect to our beliefs. In the final section, I motivate a categorical version of the parity thesis: we are agents with respect to belief and intention. My aim in this paper is to show that there is no unique challenge facing epistemic agency that is not also facing agency with respect to intention. My thesis is ambitious on (...)
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  19. Causal Theories in Epistemology.Carl Ginet - 1992 - In Jonathan Dancy & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Blackwell's A Companion to Epistemology. Blackwell.
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  20. Epistemology and the Psychology of Belief.Alvin I. Goldman - 1978 - The Monist 61 (4):525-535.
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  21. Epistemic Reasons and the Basing Relation.Scott Christopher Hendricks - 2001 - Dissertation, The University of Arizona
    When we believe for reasons, we appreciate those reasons. That is, we believe on the basis of those reasons. This relation between beliefs and their reasons is the basing relation. The basing relation is a psychological relation. How should we understand the nature of this relation? I examine two accounts: a causal theory of the basing relation and a noncausal, dispositional theory. ;Sententialism is the most widely embraced version of the causal theory of the basing relation. According to general sententialism, (...)
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  22. Foundational Beliefs and the Structure of Justification.Kenneth Hobson - 2008 - Synthese 164 (1):117 - 139.
    I argue that our justification for beliefs about the external physical world need not be constituted by any justified beliefs about perceptual experiences. In this way our justification for beliefs about the physical world may be nondoxastic and this differentiates my proposal from traditional foundationalist theories such as those defended by Laurence BonJour, Richard Fumerton, and Timothy McGrew. On the other hand, it differs from certain non-traditional foundationalist theories such as that defended by James Pryor according to which perceptual experience (...)
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  23. A Problem for Naturalizing Epistemologies.Anne Jaap Jacobson - 1992 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (4):31-49.
    Every epistemological theory needs to be able to articulate some version of the following principle: If S's belief "q" is to make S's belief "p" justified (or is to make "p" something S knows), then "q" must possess some positive epistemic merit. This paper argues that naturalizing epistemologies do not have access to this principle. The central problem is that of providing a naturalistic account of the notion of a reason-for-which one believes while avoiding internalist commitments. The discussion, which focuses (...)
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  24. Warrant, Defeaters, and the Epistemic Basis of Religious Belief.Christoph Jäger - 2005 - In Michael G. Parker and Thomas M. Schmidt (ed.), Scientific explanation and religious belief. Mohr Siebeck. pp. 81-98.
    I critically examine two features of Plantinga’s Reformed Epistemology. (i) If basic theistic beliefs are threatened by defeaters (of various kinds) and thus must be defended by higher-order defeaters in order to remain rational and warranted, are they still “properly basic”? (ii) Does Plantinga’s overall account offer an argument that basic theistic beliefs actually are warranted? I answer both questions in the negative.
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  25. The Morality of Basing-Point Pricing.Raymond C. Jancauskas - 1952 - The Thomist 15:349.
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  26. Knowledge, Evidence, and Inference.Masashi Kasaki - 2016 - Philosophical Forum 47 (3-4):439-458.
    In this paper, first, I distinguish four questions concerning evidence: (a) the ontological question: what kind of entity qualifies as evidence? (b) the possession question: what is it for S to possess evidence? (c) the evidential relation question: what is it for one or a set of things to be evidence for another? And (d) the evidential basis question: how does S’s evidence contribute to forming, maintaining, or revising S’s doxastic attitudes? Williamson’s E = K thesis is only concerned with (...)
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  27. ``Useful False Beliefs&Quot.Peter Klein - 2008 - In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 25-63.
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  28. The Causal-Doxastic Theory of the Basing Relation.Keith Allen Korcz - 2000 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (4):525-550.
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  29. The Epistemic Basing Relation.Keith Allen Korcz - 1996 - Dissertation, The Ohio State University
    The epistemic basing relation is the relation occurring between a belief and a reason when the reason is the reason for which the belief is held. It marks the distinction between a belief's being justifiable for a person, and the person's being justified in holding the belief. As such, it is an essential component of any complete theory of epistemic justification. ;I survey and evaluate all theories of the basing relation that I am aware of published between 1965 and 1995. (...)
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  30. Recent Work on the Basing Relation.Keith Allen Korez - 1997 - American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (2):171 - 191.
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  31. ``Coherentism: Misconstrual and Misapprehension&Quot.Jonathan Kvanvig - 1995 - Southwest Philosophy Review 11 (1):159-169.
    Some critics of coherentism have depicted it so that it founders on the distinction between warrant for the content of a belief and warrant for the believing itself. This distinction has to do with the basing relation: one might have warrant for the content of what one believes without basing one's belief properly, without holding the belief because of what warrants it. When the first kind of warrant obtains, I will say that a belief is propositionally warranted.
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  32. On Lemke's Defence of a Causal Basing Requirement.Jonathan Kvanvig - 1987 - Analysis 47 (3):162 - 167.
    LEMKE has recently taken issue (see ANALYSIS 46.3, June 1986, pp. 138-44) with my claim that no counterfactual causal account of the basing relation is plausible (see ANALYSIS 45.3, June 1985, pp. 153-8). Intuitively, a counterfactual causal account claims that belief is based on evidence if and only if the evidence either causes the belief or would have caused it had the actual cause been absent. This intuitive formulation accounts only for counterfactual causes of level one: events which would have (...)
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  33. Justification and Proper Basing.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2003 - In Erik Olsson (ed.), The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer. Dordrecht: Kluwer Publishing Co.. pp. 43-62.
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  34. On Lemke's Defense of a Causal Basing Relation.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 1987 - Analysis 47:162--167.
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  35. Swain on the Basing Relation.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 1985 - Analysis 45 (3):153-158.
    Suppose we want to know whether a person justifiably believes a certain claim. Further, suppose that our interest in this question is because we take such justification to be necessary for knowledge. To justifiably believe a claim requires more than there being a justification for that claim. Presumably, there is a justification for accepting all sorts of scientific theories of which I have no awareness; because of my lack of awareness, I do not justifiably believe those theories. Further, even if (...)
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  36. Is There a Viable Account of Well-Founded Belief?Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2010 - Erkenntnis 72 (2):205-231.
    My starting point is some widely accepted and intuitive ideas about justified, well-founded belief. By drawing on John Pollock’s work, I sketch a formal framework for making these ideas precise. Central to this framework is the notion of an inference graph. An inference graph represents everything that is relevant about a subject for determining which of her beliefs are justified, such as what the subject believes based on what. The strengths of the nodes of the graph represent the degrees of (...)
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  37. Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen‐Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.
    Recent authors have drawn attention to a new kind of defeating evidence commonly referred to as higher-order evidence. Such evidence works by inducing doubts that one’s doxastic state is the result of a flawed process – for instance, a process brought about by a reason-distorting drug. I argue that accommodating defeat by higher-order evidence requires a two-tiered theory of justification, and that the phenomenon gives rise to a puzzle. The puzzle is that at least in some situations involving higher-order defeaters (...)
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  38. How Reasons Give Us Knowledge, or the Case of the Gypsy Lawyer.Keith Lehrer - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (10):311-313.
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  39. What the Basing Relation Can Teach Us About the Theory of Justification.Adam Leite - manuscript
    According to a common view, the activity of justifying is epistemologically irrelevant: being justified in believing as one does never requires the ability to justify one’s belief. This view runs into trouble regarding the epistemic basing relation, the relation between a person’s belief and the reasons for which the person holds it. The view must appeal to basing relations as part of its account of what it is for a person to be justified in believing as she does, but the (...)
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  40. On Justifying and Being Justified.Adam Leite - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):219–253.
    We commonly speak of people as being ‘‘justified’’ or ‘‘unjustified’’ in believing as they do. These terms describe a person’s epistemic condition. To be justified in believing as one does is to have a positive epistemic status in virtue of holding one’s belief in a way which fully satisfies the relevant epistemic requirements or norms. This requires something more (or other) than simply believing a proposition whose truth is well-supported by evidence, even by evidence which one possesses oneself, since one (...)
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  41. Kvanvig and Swain on the Basing Relation.Lory Lemke - 1986 - Analysis 46 (3):138-144.
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  42. Evidence and its Limits.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Conor McHugh Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford University Press.
    On a standard view about reasons, evidence, and justification, there is justification for you to believe all and only what your evidence supports and the reasons that determine whether there is justification to believe are all just pieces of evidence. This view is mistaken about two things. It is mistaken about the rational role of evidence. It is also mistaken about the rational role of reasons. To show this, I present two basis problems for the standard view and argue that (...)
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  43. Learning From Learning From Our Mistakes.Clayton Littlejohn - 2016 - In Pedro Schmechtig & Martin Grajner (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals. De Gruyter. pp. 51-70.
    What can we learn from cases of knowledge from falsehood? Critics of knowledge-first epistemology have argued that these cases provide us with good reason for rejecting the knowledge accounts of evidence, justification, and the norm of belief. I shall offer a limited defense of the knowledge-first approach to these matters. Knowledge from falsehood cases should undermine our confidence in like-from-like reasoning in epistemology. Just as we should be open to the idea that knowledge can come from non-knowledge, we should be (...)
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  44. Causation and the Epistemic Basing Relation.Brent J. C. Madison - unknown
    The epistemic-basing relation is the relation that holds between a reason, or one’s grounds, and one’s belief when the belief is held for that reason. As I will explain, understanding this relation is crucial for epistemology since basing a belief on a reason seems necessary for epistemic justification to obtain. But what is the nature of this relation? Is it, at least in part, causal as one might assume? Or, due to problems with causal accounts, are rival accounts of the (...)
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  45. Evidentialism and Epistemic Justification.Kevin McCain - 2014 - Routledge.
    Evidentialism is a popular theory of epistemic justification, yet, as early proponents of the theory Earl Conee and Richard Feldman admit, there are many elements that must be developed before Evidentialism can provide a full account of epistemic justification, or well-founded belief. It is the aim of this book to provide the details that are lacking; here McCain moves past Evidentialism as a mere schema by putting forward and defending a full-fledged theory of epistemic justification. In this book McCain offers (...)
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  46. The Interventionist Account of Causation and the Basing Relation.Kevin McCain - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (3):357-382.
    It is commonplace to distinguish between propositional justification (having good reasons for believing p) and doxastic justification (believing p on the basis of those good reasons).One necessary requirement for bridging the gap between S’s merely having propositional justification that p and S’s having doxastic justification that p is that S base her belief that p on her reasons (propositional justification).A plausible suggestion for what it takes for S’s belief to be based on her reasons is that her reasons must contribute (...)
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  47. On the Causal-Doxastic Theory of the Basing Relation.Daniel M. Mittag - 2002 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (4):543 - 559.
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  48. In Defense of the Gypsy Lawyer: An Analysis of Doxastic Justification.Daniel Marlin Mittag - unknown
    It is widely recognized that in order for one's belief to be justified (in the sense of justification thought to be necessary for knowledge, i.e., doxastic justification) one's belief must be based on that which justifies it. Epistemologists, however, differ about the exact relation that the evidence must bear to one's belief in order for that belief to be doxastically justified. The various analyses of the basing relation that have been proposed can be divided into two main categories: causal accounts (...)
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  49. A Problem About Epistemic Dependence.Tim Oakley - 2006 - In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Aspects of Knowing. Elsevier Science. pp. 17.
    A person’s being justified in a belief will sometimes depend on her being justified in some other belief. I argue that this concept of epistemic dependence is required for setting up the debate between epistemological foundationalism and its alternatives. I also argue that the concept is deeply problematic, in that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to give a coherent account of it. Several possible analyses of epistemic dependence are presented and found wanting, and attention is given to different (...)
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  50. Non-Agential Permissibility In Epistemology.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):389-394.
    Paul Silva has recently argued that doxastic justification does not have a basing requirement. An important part of his argument depends on the assumption that doxastic and moral permissibility have a parallel structure. I here reply to Silva's argument by challenging this assumption. I claim that moral permissibility is an agential notion, while doxastic permissibility is not. I then briefly explore the nature of these notions and briefly consider their implications for praise and blame.
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