This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories

26 found
Order:
  1. It Must Be True – But How Can It Be? Some Remarks on Panpsychism and Mental Composition.Pierfrancesco Basile - 2010 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 85 (67):93-112.
    Although panpsychism has had a very long history, one that goes back to the very origin of western philosophy, its force has only recently been appreciated by analytic philosophers of mind. And even if many still reject the theory as utterly absurd, others have argued that it is the only genuine form of physicalism. This paper examines the case for panpsychism and argues that there are at least good prima facie reasons for taking it seriously. In a second step, the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  2. Panpsychism Without Subjectivity? A Brief Commentary on Sam Coleman's 'Mental Chemistry' and 'The Real Combination Problem'.Michael Blamauer - 2013 - Panpsychism Without Subjectivity? A Brief Commentary on Sam Coleman’s ‘Mental Chemistry’ and ‘the Real Combination Problem’ (Online First).
    Blamauer, Michael_Panpsychism without Subjectivity (Online First).
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Panpsychism and Neutral Monism: How to Make Up One's Mind.Sam Coleman - forthcoming - In Jaskolla Brüntrup (ed.), Panpsychism. Oxford University Press.
  4. The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism, Micro-Subjects, and Emergence.Sam Coleman - 2013 - Erkenntnis (1):1-26.
    Taking their motivation from the perceived failure of the reductive physicalist project concerning consciousness, panpsychists ascribe subjectivity to fundamental material entities in order to account for macro-consciousness. But there exists an unresolved tension within the mainstream panpsychist position, the seriousness of which has yet to be appreciated. I capture this tension as a dilemma, and offer advice to panpsychists on how to resolve it. The dilemma is as follows: Panpsychists take the micro-material realm to feature phenomenal properties, plus micro-subjects to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  5. Mental Chemistry: Combination for Panpsychists.Sam Coleman - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (1):137-166.
    Panpsychism, an increasingly popular competitor to physicalism as a theory of mind, faces a famous difficulty, the ‘combination problem’. This is the difficulty of understanding the composition of a conscious mind by parts (the ultimates) which are themselves taken to be phenomenally qualitied. I examine the combination problem, and I attempt to solve it. There are a few distinct difficulties under the banner of ‘the combination problem’, and not all of them need worry panpsychists. After homing in on the genuine (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  6. Review of Consciousness and its Place in Nature. [REVIEW]Barry Dainton - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):238-261.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  7. Amplifying Phenomenal Information: Toward a Fundamental Theory of Consciousness.Liane Gabora - 2002 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (8):3-29.
    from non-conscious components by positing that consciousness is a universal primitive. For example, the double aspect theory of information holds that infor- mation has a phenomenal aspect. How then do you get from phenomenal infor- mation to human consciousness? This paper proposes that an entity is conscious to the extent it amplifies information, first by trapping and integrating it through closure, and second by maintaining dynamics at the edge of chaos through simul- taneous processes of divergence and convergence. The origin (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. Raymond Ruyer, la Biologie Et la Théologie Naturelle [Raymond Ruyer, Biology, and Natural Theology].Philippe Gagnon - 2012 - In Ronny Desmet & Michel Weber (eds.), Chromatikon VIII: Annales de la philosophie en procès — Yearbook of Philosophy in Process. Éditions Chromatika.
    This is the outline: Introduction : le praticien d’une science-philosophie; Épiphénoménisme retourné et subjectivité délocalisée; Dieu est-il jamais inféré par la science ?; La question du panthéisme; Le pilotage axiologique et la parabole mécaniste; L'unité domaniale comme ce qui reste en dehors de la science.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Against Constitutive Russellian Monism.Philip Goff - forthcoming - In Yujin Nagasawa (ed.), Consciousness and the Physical World. Oxford University Press.
  10. The Phenomenal Bonding Solution to the Combination Problem.Philip Goff - forthcoming - In L. Jaskolla (ed.), Panpsychism. Oxford University Press.
  11. Why Panpsychism Doesn't Help Us Explain Consciousness.Philip Goff - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (3):289-311.
    This paper starts from the assumption that panpsychism is counterintuitive and metaphysically demanding. A number of philosophers, whilst not denying these negative aspects of the view, think that panpsychism has in its favour that it offers a good explanation of consciousness. In opposition to this, the paper argues that panpsychism cannot help us to explain consciousness, at least not the kind of consciousness we have pre-theoretical reason to believe in.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  12. Experiences Don't Sum.Philip Goff - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):53-61.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  13. Panpsychism and Causation: A New Argument and a Solution to the Combination Problem.Hedda Hassel Morch - 2014 - Dissertation, Oslo
    Panpsychism is the view that every concrete and unified thing has some form of phenomenal consciousness or experience. It is an age-old doctrine, which, to the surprise of many, has recently taken on new life. In philosophy of mind, it has been put forth as a simple and radical solution to the mind–body problem (Chalmers 1996, 2003;Strawson 2006; Nagel 1979, 2012). In metaphysics and philosophy of science, it has been put forth as a solution to the problem of accounting for (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  14. Neuroelectrical Approaches to Binding Problems.Mostyn W. Jones - manuscript
    How do separate brain processes bind to form unified, conscious percepts? This is the perceptual binding problem, which straddles neuroscience and psychology. In fact, two problems exist here: (1) the easy problem of how neural processes are unified, and (2) the hard problem of how this yields unified perceptual consciousness. Binding theories face familiar troubles with (1) and they do not come to grips with (2). This paper argues that neuroelectrical (electromagnetic-field) approaches may help with both problems. Concerning the easy (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. Avoiding Perennial Mind-Body Problems.Mostyn W. Jones - forthcoming - Journal of Consciousness Studies.
    Russell argued that we can’t know what brains are really like behind our perceptions of them, so minds can conceivably reside in brains. Physicalist-leaning Russellians from Feigl to Strawson try to avoid physicalist and dualist issues with this Russellian idea. Strawson also tries to avoid emergentist issues through panpsychism. Yet critics feel that these Russellians don’t really avoid these issues, but just recast them in new forms. For example, dualist issues arguably remain because it’s hard to see how private pains (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. The Combination Problem: Subjects and Unity.Kevin Morris - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (1):103-120.
    Panpsychism has often been motivated on the grounds that any attempt to account for experience and consciousness in organisms in purely physical, nonexperiential terms faces severe difficulties. The “combination problem” charges that attributing phenomenal properties to the basic constituents of organisms, as panpsychism proposes, likewise fails to provide a satisfactory basis for experience in humans and other organisms. This paper evaluates a recent attempt to understand, and solve, the combination problem. This approach, due to Sam Coleman, is premised on a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. Skrbina's *Mind That Abides: Panpsychism in the New Millennium*. [REVIEW]Gregory Nixon - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (9):116-121.
    Is the great god Pan reborn? For a while there, it seemed every intellectual movement began with the prefix ‘post’, implying non-totality, but now there are indications that ‘pan’ (all) is returning to provide another answer to one of the most basic of ontological questions: What is the relationship of mind to matter? In this important book with 17 different authors, panpsychism is given its due.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. Combining Minds: A Defence of the Possibility of Experiential Combination.Luke Roelofs - 2015 - Dissertation, University of Toronto
    This thesis explores the possibility of composite consciousness: phenomenally conscious states belonging to a composite being in virtue of the consciousness of, and relations among, its parts. We have no trouble accepting that a composite being has physical properties entirely in virtue of the physical properties of, and relations among, its parts. But a long­standing intuition holds that consciousness is different: my consciousness cannot be understood as a complex of interacting component consciousnesses belonging to parts of me. I ask why: (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. Phenomenal Blending and the Palette Problem.Luke Roelofs - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):59-70.
    I discuss the apparent discrepancy between the qualitative diversity of consciousness and the relative qualitative homogeneity of the brain's basic constituents, a discrepancy that has been raised as a problem for identity theorists by Maxwell and Lockwood (as one element of the ‘grain problem’), and more recently as a problem for panpsychists (under the heading of ‘the palette problem’). The challenge posed to panpsychists by this discrepancy is to make sense of how a relatively small ‘palette’ of basic qualities could (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. Do the Primary and Secondary Intensions of Phenomenal Concepts Coincide in All Worlds?Robert Schroer - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (4):561-577.
    A slew of conceivability arguments have been given against physicalism. Many physicalists try to undermine these arguments by offering accounts of phenomenal concepts that explain how there can be an epistemic gap, but not an ontological gap, between the phenomenal and the physical. Some complain, however, that such accounts fail to do justice to the nature of our introspective grasp of phenomenal properties. A particularly influential version of this complaint comes from David Chalmers (1996; 2003), who claims, in opposition to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. Panpsychism, Aggregation and Combinatorial Infusion.William Seager - 2010 - Mind and Matter 8 (2):167-184.
    Deferential Monadic Panpsychism is a view that accepts that physical science is capable of discovering the basic structure of reality. However, it denies that reality is fully and exhaustively de- scribed purely in terms of physical science. Consciousness is missing from the physical description and cannot be reduced to it. DMP explores the idea that the physically fundamental features of the world possess some intrinsic mental aspect. It thereby faces a se- vere problem of understanding how more complex mental states (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  22. What Panpsychists Should Reject: On the Incompatibility of Panpsychism and Organizational Invariantism.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1833-1846.
    Some philosophers, like David Chalmers, have either shown their sympathy for, or explicitly endorsed, the following two principles: Panpsychism—roughly the thesis that the mind is ubiquitous throughout the universe—and Organizational Invariantism—the principle that holds that two systems with the same fine-grained functional organization will have qualitatively identical experiences. The purpose of this paper is to show the tension between the arguments that back up both principles. This tension should lead, or so I will argue, defenders of one of the principles (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23. Cosmopsychism: A Holistic Approach to the Metaphysics of Experience.Itay Shani - 2015 - Philosophical Papers 44 (3):389-437.
    This paper introduces cosmopsychism as a holistic alternative to atomistic panpsychism, and as a general perspective on the metaphysics of consciousness. I begin with some necessary background details concerning contemporary panpsychism and the problems it faces, and then proceed to the theory itself. The starting point of the theory is the assumption that an all pervading cosmic consciousness is the single ontological ultimate. From this assumption, a panpsychist ontology of mind with distinct holistic overtones is developed. In particular, I argue (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. Mind Stuffed with Red Herrings: Why William James’ Critique of the Mind-Stuff Theory Does Not Substantiate a Combination Problem for Panpsychism. [REVIEW]Itay Shani - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (4):413-434.
    There is a famous passage in chapter six of James’ Principles of Psychology whose import, many believe, deals a devastating blow to the explanatory aspirations of panpsychism. In the present paper I take a close look at James’ argument, as well as at the claim that it underlies a powerful critique of panpsychism. Apart from the fact that the argument was never aimed at panpsychism as such, I show that it rests on highly problematic assumptions which, if followed to their (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  25. Mind and Being: The Primacy of Panpsychism.Galen Strawson - 2016 - In Godehard Brüntrup & Ludwig Jaskolla (eds.), Panpsychism: Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 000-00.
    I endorse a 12-word metaphysics. [1] Stoff ist Kraft ≈ being is energy. [2] Wesen ist Werden ≈ being is becoming. [3] Sein ist Sosein ≈ being is qualit[ativit]y. [4] Ansichsein ist Fürsichsein ≈ being is mind. [1]–[3] are plausible metaphysical principles and unprejudiced consideration of what we know about concrete reality obliges us to favor [4], i.e. panpsychism or panexperientialism, above all other positive substantive proposals. For [i] panpsychism is the most ontologically parsimonious view, given that the existence of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. In Defence of Strong Emergentist Panpsychism.J. Symes - manuscript
    Panpsychism is the view that physical objects possess phenomenal properties. According to this view, as well as their more familiar properties such as shape, size and charge, the ‘essence’ of physical matter partly consists of mental properties at a fundamental level. The view shows great promise for providing a solution to Chalmers’ hard problem of consciousness. It will be made clear that the reasons that motivate one to adopt panpsychism are compelling. By accepting panpsychism we can recognise the world possesses (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography