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  1. added 2019-01-09
    Relacja pomiędzy absolutnym a względnym wymiarem rzeczywistości w klasycznych Upaniszadach.Marta Kudelska - 2018 - Diametros 56:1-16.
    The above problem is discussed with the use of the example of selected canonical Upanishads. The analysis starts with a fragment from the Mundaka Upanishad : “When he [ brahman ] that is both high [ para ] and low [ apara ] is seen”. In my opinion, this very conjoining of the absolute and relative reality, which is considerably rare in the canonical texts, requires in-depth analysis. In the discussed texts, the para / apara dimensions of reality are strictly (...)
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  2. added 2018-12-23
    Erro, Ergo Sum: An Evolutionary Map for Conciousness.Andrew Notier - 2018 - Philosophy Pathways 226.
    This paper presents an argument in support of physicalism and the biological foundations of consciousness, approached from the direction of human error. The ideas put forth are a framework in which consciousness, cognition and free will emerged from a single evolutionary adaptation to safeguard against perceptual errors.
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  3. added 2018-11-06
    Природа и сознание (Nature and consciousness).Francois-Igor Pris - 2018 - Диалог 3:8-17.
  4. added 2018-10-30
    Peace, Culture, and Violence.Fuat Gürsözlü (ed.) - 2018
  5. added 2018-10-05
    The Sense of Ego-Maker in Classical Sāṃkhya and Yoga: Reconsideration of ‘Ahaṃkāra’ with Reference to the Mind-Body Problem.Jakubczak Marzenna - 2013 - In Girishwar Misra (ed.), Psychology & Psychoanalysis. History of Science, Philosophy. New Delhi: Munshiram Monoharlal. pp. 291-308.
    While elucidating the sense of ego-maker in classical Samkhya and Yoga philosophy I bear in mind several meanings of the word ‘sense’, or different levels of its understanding, namely: the semantic, ontological and epistemic as well as axiological sense. Thus, my aim is, firstly, to specify the semantic sense of the term ‘ahamkara’, that is to explain its contents or denotation. Secondly, when focusing on the ontological context I will try to define the nature and reason, or purpose (arthavattava), of (...)
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  6. added 2018-06-21
    Consciousness (Critical Concepts in Psychology), Major Works Series (4 Volumes).Max Velmans - 2018 - London: Routledge.
    This is a 4-volume collection of Major Works on Consciousness commissioned by Routledge, London. As the collection forms part of a Critical Concepts in Psychology series, this selection of major works focuses mainly on works that have a direct psychological relevance. From the mid 19th Century onwards, psychology began to separate itself from philosophy, and the development of psychological thought about consciousness links intimately to the development of psychology itself. In order to trace this development, the four volumes of this (...)
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  7. added 2018-05-01
    Consciousness.Anezka Kuzmicova - forthcoming - In Leah Price & Matthew Rubery (eds.), Further Reading. New York: Oxford University Press.
    This chapter revisits three common ideas about how consciousness works when we read fiction. Firstly, I contest the notion that the reading consciousness is a container of sorts, containing a circumscribed amount of textual stimulus. Secondly, I argue against the view that readers abstract their personal concerns away in reading, and that they do so with benefit. Thirdly, I show how the reading consciousness encompasses rather than excludes the physical situation and environment of reading. For each idea revisited, I discuss (...)
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  8. added 2018-04-26
    The Quantum Physics of Synaptic Communication Via the SNARE Protein Complex.Danko D. Georgiev & James F. Glazebrook - 2018 - Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology 135:16-29.
    Twenty five years ago, Sir John Carew Eccles together with Friedrich Beck proposed a quantum mechanical model of neurotransmitter release at synapses in the human cerebral cortex. The model endorsed causal influence of human consciousness upon the functioning of synapses in the brain through quantum tunneling of unidentified quasiparticles that trigger the exocytosis of synaptic vesicles, thereby initiating the transmission of information from the presynaptic towards the postsynaptic neuron. Here, we provide a molecular upgrade of the Beck and Eccles model (...)
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  9. added 2018-04-04
    Verbal Disputes in the Theory of Consciousness.Joseph Gottlieb - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5.
    The primary aim of a theory of consciousness is to articulate existence conditions for conscious states, i.e. the conditions under which a mental state is conscious rather than unconscious. There are two main broad approaches: The Higher-Order approach and the First-Order approach. Higher-Order theories claim that a mental state is conscious only if it is the object of a suitable state of higher-order awareness. First-Order theories reject this necessary condition. However, both sides make the following claim: for any mental state (...)
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  10. added 2018-03-19
    Thinking About Consciousness. [REVIEW]Katalin Balog - 2004 - Mind 113 (452):774-778.
    Papineau in his book provides a detailed defense of physicalism via what has recently been dubbed the “phenomenal concept strategy”. I share his enthusiasm for this approach. But I disagree with his account of how a physicalist should respond to the conceivability arguments. Also I argue that his appeal to teleosemantics in explaining mental quotation is more like a promissory note than an actual theory.
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  11. added 2018-02-17
    Shakespeare's Hamlet: The Way I Visioned..Rituparna Ray Chaudhuri - forthcoming
    On A Complete Self Analysis; Let angels judge it..
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  12. added 2018-02-17
    La fenomenología frente al problema del déficit en la explicación de la conciencia.Denis Fisette - 2007 - In César Moreno, Rafael Lorenzo & Alicia Ma de Mingo (eds.), Filosofía y Realidad Virtual. Zaragoza: Prensas Universitarias de Zaragoza. pp. 91--117.
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  13. added 2018-02-16
    Immediate Transfer of Synesthesia to a Novel Inducer.Aleksandra Mroczko, Thomas Metzinger, Wolf Singer & Danko Nikolić - 2009 - Journal of Vision 9 (12):1-8.
  14. added 2018-01-10
    Why Biology is Beyond Physical Sciences?Bhakti Niskama Shanta & Bhakti Vijnana Muni - 2016 - Advances in Life Sciences 6 (1):13-30.
    In the framework of materialism, the major attention is to find general organizational laws stimulated by physical sciences, ignoring the uniqueness of Life. The main goal of materialism is to reduce consciousness to natural processes, which in turn can be translated into the language of math, physics and chemistry. Following this approach, scientists have made several attempts to deny the living organism of its veracity as an immortal soul, in favor of genes, molecules, atoms and so on. However, advancement in (...)
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  15. added 2017-10-05
    Consciousness and the Physical World.Max Velmans - 2008 - In Michel Weber & Will Desmond (eds.), Handbook of Whiteheadian Process Thought Volume 1. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. pp. 371-382.
    Physicalists commonly argue that conscious experiences are nothing more than states of the brain, and that conscious qualia are observer-independent, physical properties of the external world. Although this assumes the ‘mantle of science,’ it routinely ignores the findings of science, for example in sensory physiology, perception, psychophysics, neuropsychology and comparative psychology. Consequently, although physicalism aims to ‘naturalise’ consciousness, it gives an unnatural account of it. It is possible, however, to develop a natural, nonreductive, reflexive model of how consciousness relates to (...)
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  16. added 2017-10-05
    Dualism, Reductionism, and Reflexive Monism.Max Velmans - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. New York: Blackwell. pp. 346-358.
    (added for 2013 upload): This chapter compares classical dualist and reductionist views of phenomenal consciousness with an alternative, reflexive way of viewing the relations amongst consciousness, brain and the external physical world. It argues that dualism splits the universe in two fundamental ways: in viewing phenomenal consciousness as having neither location nor extension it splits consciousness from the material world, and subject from object. Materialist reductionism views consciousness as a brain state or function (located and extended in the brain) which (...)
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  17. added 2017-10-02
    Is My Unconscious Somebody Else's Consciousness?: A Review of D.Chalmers (1996) the Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory, Oxford University Press. [REVIEW]Max Velmans - 1997 - Network 64:57-60.
  18. added 2017-09-11
    There is Nothing It is Like to See Red: Holism and Subjective Experience.Anthony F. Peressini - 2017 - Synthese:1-30.
    The Nagel inspired “something-it-is-like” conception of conscious experience remains a dominant approach in philosophy. In this paper I criticize a prevalent philosophical construal of SIL consciousness, one that understands SIL as a property of mental states rather than entities as a whole. I argue against thinking of SIL as a property of states, showing how such a view is in fact prevalent, under-warranted, and philosophically pernicious in that it often leads to an implausible reduction of conscious experience to qualia. I (...)
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  19. added 2017-09-07
    Cognitive Phenomenology.Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.) - 2011 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Does thought have distinctive experiential features? Is there, in addition to sensory phenomenology, a kind of cognitive phenomenology--phenomenology of a cognitive or conceptual character? Leading philosophers of mind debate whether conscious thought has cognitive phenomenology and whether it is part of conscious perception and conscious emotion.
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  20. added 2017-09-06
    The Legacy Conference: Report on The Science of Consciousness Conference, La Jolla, California, 2017.Gregory Nixon - 2017 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (9-10):253-277.
    The ‘Toward a Science of Consciousness’ conference – which has now become ‘The Science of Consciousness’ conference – recently (June 5-10, 2017) took place instead at the receptive venue of the Hyatt Regency in La Jolla, California. It was well-planned and organized, which is extraordinary considering that it had to be organized all over again within a month or two when the original Shanghai location was cancelled. Things ran smoothly at La Jolla and it was well attended for an odd-year, (...)
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  21. added 2017-08-31
    On the Matter of Robot Minds.Brian P. McLaughlin & David Rose - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy.
    The view that phenomenally conscious robots are on the horizon often rests on a certain philosophical view about consciousness, one we call “nomological behaviorism.” The view entails that, as a matter of nomological necessity, if a robot had exactly the same patterns of dispositions to peripheral behavior as a phenomenally conscious being, then the robot would be phenomenally conscious; indeed it would have all and only the states of phenomenal consciousness that the phenomenally conscious being in question has. We experimentally (...)
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  22. added 2017-08-21
    Heightened Consciousness.Gregory Nixon - 2016 - In Harold L. Miller Jr (ed.), The SAGE Encyclopedia of Theory in Psychology. Thousand Oaks, CA, USA: Sage Publications. pp. 409-411.
    Heightened consciousness has become a common expression in daily conversations, but it expresses a number of different concepts depending on the meaning of the speaker and is related to other phrases or terms that have slightly different connotations. This entry explores the different meanings of the term heightened consciousness and similar phrases in regard to personal development.
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  23. added 2017-07-30
    The Concept of Consciousness and the Bogeyman of Conflation.Dylan Black - 2017 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (No. 7):28-50.
    Many philosophers of mind believe that the term 'consciousness' is ambiguous and charge that theoretical work on consciousness is often guilty of conflating distinct concepts of consciousness. I criticize the best arguments for this view -- what I call the multiple concepts view -- and I offer some preliminary support for a new brand of univocalism according to which the concept of consciousness is a cluster concept. In particular I address three lines of evidence for the multiple concepts view: (1) (...)
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  24. added 2017-07-14
    The Problem of the Rock and the Grammar of Consciousness.Lajos L. Brons - 2017 - Disputatio 9 (44):5-12.
    The “Problem of the Rock” (PoR) is a famous objection to Higher-Order (HO) theories of consciousness. According to PoR, the HO theorists’ claim that a mental state is conscious iff there is a higher-order mental state about it implies that a rock is also conscious iff there is a higher-order mental state about it. In this paper I show that this argument confuses two grammatically distinct attributions of consciousness, and that if the consequent equivocation fallacy is avoided, PoR is either (...)
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  25. added 2017-05-25
    Review of Imants Barusš & Julia Mossbridge, *Transcendent Mind: Rethinking the Science of Consciousness*. [REVIEW]Gregory Nixon - 2017 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (7-8):246-250.
    This book arrives with a reputation. Apparently, it is the first book on psi and other anomalous human experiences to be published by the rather traditionalist APA (American Psychological Association). If this is true, this is likely due to the fact that much of the book relies on carefully monitored and repeated experiments to demonstrate the statistical veracity of such things as precognition, remote viewing, clairvoyance, mental telepathy, and even psychokinesis. This is the key to the authors’ claim of empirical (...)
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  26. added 2017-03-13
    Vagueness and Zombies: Why ‘Phenomenally Conscious’ has No Borderline Cases.Jonathan A. Simon - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (8):2105-2123.
    I argue that there can be no such thing as a borderline case of the predicate ‘phenomenally conscious’: for any given creature at any given time, it cannot be vague whether that creature is phenomenally conscious at that time. I first defend the Positive Characterization Thesis, which says that for any borderline case of any predicate there is a positive characterization of that case that can show any sufficiently competent speaker what makes it a borderline case. I then appeal to (...)
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  27. added 2017-01-13
    Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization -- Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 by Michael Starks 2nd Ed. 674p (2017).Michael Starks (ed.) - 2017 - Henderson: michael starks.
    This collection of articles was written over the last 10 years and the most important and longest within the last year. Also I have edited them to bring them up to date (2017). The copyright page has the date of this first edition and new editions will be noted there as I edit old articles or add new ones. All the articles are about human behavior (as are all articles by anyone about anything), and so about the limitations of having (...)
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  28. added 2016-12-12
    Vagueness and the Metaphysics of Consciousness.Michael V. Antony - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (3):515-538.
    An argument is offered for this conditional: If our current concept conscious state is sharp rather than vague, and also correct , then common versions of familiar metaphysical theories of consciousness are false--?namely versions of the identity theory, functionalism, and dualism that appeal to complex physical or functional properties in identification, realization, or correlation. Reasons are also given for taking seriously the claim that our current concept conscious state is sharp. The paper ends by surveying the theoretical options left open (...)
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  29. added 2016-12-12
    Minds and Persons.Anthony O'Hear (ed.) - 2003 - Cambridge University Press.
    The nature of the mind and of consciousness, the reality of freedom, the concept of agency and the relation of language to the mental: all are central and perennial questions in philosophy. In this collection, these and other topics are pursued in original essays by some of the leading figures in contemporary philosophy of mind and action. The essays are based on the lectures given in The Royal Institute of Philosophy's annual lecture series for 2001–2002.
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  30. added 2016-12-12
    Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind.Anthony O'Hear (ed.) - 1998 - Cambridge University Press.
    What is the mind? How does it relate to the body and the world? What is consciousness? What is experience? How free are we? Do we have special insights into ourselves? These perennial questions are at the forefront of the philosophical concerns today. Much of the most exciting and innovative work in philosophy at the present time is being done in the philosophy of mind. The best of this work is represented in this collection, based on the Royal Institute of (...)
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  31. added 2016-12-12
    What is It Like to Be a Person?Norton Nelkin - 1987 - Mind and Language 2 (3):220-41.
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  32. added 2016-12-08
    Are Our Concepts Conscious State and Conscious Creature Vague?Michael V. Antony - 2008 - Erkenntnis 68 (2):239 - 263.
    are sharp rather than vague, that they can have no borderline cases. On the other hand, many who take conscious states to be identical to, or realized by, complex physical states are committed to the vagueness of those concepts. In the paper I argue that conscious state and conscious creature are sharp by presenting four necessary conditions for conceiving borderline cases in general, and showing that some of those conditions cannot be met with conscious state. I conclude that conscious state (...)
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  33. added 2016-12-08
    The Ontology of Creature Consciousness: A Challenge for Philosophy.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):103-104.
    I appeal to Merker's theory to motivate a hypothesis about the ontology of consciousness: Creature consciousness is (at least partially) constitutive of phenomenal consciousness. Rather than elaborating theories of phenomenal consciousness couched solely in terms of state consciousness, as philosophers are fond of doing, a correct approach to phenomenal consciousness should begin with an account of creature consciousness.
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  34. added 2016-12-08
    On the Conscious Mind.E. A. Singer Jr - 1929 - Journal of Philosophy 26 (21):561-575.
  35. added 2016-06-01
    What If Every Subconscious Brain Module is Really an Independent Consciousness?Robert Vermeulen - manuscript
    What if subconscious brain processes are actually independent consciousnesses, each resembling an independent advisor whispering advice to the main consciousness, or “I”? This multi-consciousness model would support free will, as our choices are informed by other consciousnesses, not the subconscious. Each independent consciousness allows a movable perspective through its rich representation of the world and constantly seeks harmony and resonance between its internal concepts, other consciousnesses, external reality, and the genetic worm hole to the evolutionary past.
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  36. added 2016-05-20
    Passive Frame Theory: A New Synthesis.Ezequiel Morsella, Godwin Christine, Jantz Tiffany, Krieger Stephen & Gazzaley Adam - forthcoming - Behavioral and Brain Sciences.
    Passive frame theory attempts to illuminate what consciousness is, in mechanistic and functional terms; it does not address the “implementation” level of analysis (how neurons instantiate conscious states), an enigma for various disciplines. However, in response to the commentaries, we discuss how our framework provides clues regarding this enigma. In the framework, consciousness is passive albeit essential. Without consciousness, there would not be adaptive skeletomotor action.
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  37. added 2016-03-25
    The Foundations of Cognitive Science.Joao Branquinho (ed.) - 2001 - Oxford University Press UK.
    The Foundations of Cognitive Science is a set of thirteen new essays on key topics in this lively interdisciplinary field, by a stellar international line-up of authors. Philosophers, psychologists, and neurologists here come together to investigate such fascinating subjects as consciousness; vision; rationality; artificial life; the neural basis of language, cognition, and emotion; and the relations between mind and world, for instance our representation of numbers and space. The contributors are Ned Block, Margaret Boden, Susan Carey, Patricia Churchland, Paul Churchland, (...)
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  38. added 2016-01-21
    Consciousness: Individuated Information in Action.J. Jonkisz - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
    Within theoretical and empirical enquiries, many different meanings associated with consciousness have appeared, leaving the term itself quite vague. This makes formulating an abstract and unifying version of the concept of consciousness – the main aim of this article –into an urgent theoretical imperative. It is argued that consciousness, characterized as dually accessible (cognized from the inside and the outside), hierarchically referential (semantically ordered), bodily determined (embedded in the working structures of an organism or conscious system), and useful in action (...)
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  39. added 2015-12-01
    Why Does Rorty’s Attack on the Philosophy of Mind Focus on the Notion of a ‘Mark of the Mental’?Martin Jackson - 2015 - Dissertation, Keele University
    Rorty, mind, consciousness, introspection, categorical.
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  40. added 2015-11-16
    International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences.N. J. Smelser & P. B. Baltes (eds.) - 2002 - Elsevier.
  41. added 2015-10-30
    Phenomenal Concepts.Kati Balog - 2009 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
    This article is about the special, subjective concepts we apply to experience, called “phenomenal concepts”. They are of special interest in a number of ways. First, they refer to phenomenal experiences, and the qualitative character of those experiences whose metaphysical status is hotly debated. Conscious experience strike many philosophers as philosophically problematic and difficult to accommodate within a physicalistic metaphysics. Second, PCs are widely thought to be special and unique among concepts. The sense that there is something special about PCs (...)
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  42. added 2015-06-04
    Writing on the Page of Consciousness.Christoph Hoerl - 2015 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (3pt3):187-209.
    I identify one particular strand of thought in Thomas Nagel's ‘What Is It Like to Be a Bat?’, which I think has helped shape a certain conception of perceptual consciousness that is still prevalent in the literature. On this conception, perceptual consciousness is to be explained in terms of a special class of properties perceptual experiences themselves exhibit. I also argue that this conception is in fact in conflict with one of the key ideas that supposedly animates Nagel's argument in (...)
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  43. added 2015-05-02
    Consciousness, Attention, and Conscious Attention.Carlos Montemayor & Harry H. Haladjian - 2015 - MIT Press.
    In this book, Carlos Montemayor and Harry Haladjian consider the relationship between consciousness and attention. The cognitive mechanism of attention has often been compared to consciousness, because attention and consciousness appear to share similar qualities. But, Montemayor and Haladjian point out, attention is defined functionally, whereas consciousness is generally defined in terms of its phenomenal character without a clear functional purpose. They offer new insights and proposals about how best to understand and study the relationship between consciousness and attention by (...)
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  44. added 2015-04-23
    Consciousness, Attention and Commonsense.F. de Brigard - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (9-10):189-201.
    In a recent paper, Christopher Mole (2008) argued in favour of the view that, according to our commonsense psychology, while consciousness is necessary for attention, attention isn’t necessary for consciousness. In this paper I offer an argument against this view. More precisely, I offer an argument against the claim that, according to our commonsense psychology, consciousness is necessary for attention. However, I don’t claim it follows from this argument that commonsense has it the other way around, viz. that consciousness isn’t (...)
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  45. added 2015-03-30
    Theory of Pricing as Relativistic Kinematics.Sergiy Melnyk - manuscript
    The algebra of transactions as fundamental measurements is constructed on the basis of the analysis of their properties and represents an expansion of the Boolean algebra. The notion of the generalized economic measurements of the economic “quantity” and “quality” of objects of transactions is introduced. It has been shown that the vector space of economic states constructed on the basis of these measurements is relativistic. The laws of kinematics of economic objects in this space have been analyzed and the stages (...)
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  46. added 2014-04-02
    Blurring Two Conceptions of Subjective Experience: Folk Versus Philosophical Phenomenality.Anthony F. Peressini - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (6):862-889.
    Philosophers and psychologists have experimentally explored various aspects of people’s understandings of subjective experience based on their responses to questions about whether robots “see red” or “feel frustrated,” but the intelligibility of such questions may well presuppose that people understand robots as experiencers in the first place. Departing from the standard approach, I develop an experimental framework that distinguishes 20 between “phenomenal consciousness” as it is applied to a subject (an experiencer) and to an (experiential) mental state and experimentally test (...)
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  47. added 2014-04-02
    Does Mentality Entail Consciousness?Rocco J. Gennaro - 1995 - Philosophia 24 (3-4):331-58.
  48. added 2014-04-01
    Shades of Consciousness.Roderic A. Girle - 1996 - Minds and Machines 6 (2):143-57.
    It has been argued that consciousness might be what differentiates human from machine mentality. What then is consciousness? We discuss consciousness, particularly perception accounts of consciousness. It is argued that perception and consciousness are distinct. Armstrong's account of consciousness is rejected. It is proposed that perception is a necessary but not sufficient condition for consciousness, and that there is a distinction to be drawn between consciousness and self-consciousness. Consciousness is tightly linked to attention and to certain sorts of knowledge. Implications (...)
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  49. added 2014-03-30
    What is Consciousness?Norton Nelkin - 1993 - Philosophy of Science 60 (3):419-34.
    When philosophers and psychologists think about consciousness, they generally focus on one or more of three features: phenomenality , intentionality , and introspectibility . Using examples from empirical psychology and neuroscience, I argue that consciousness is not a unitary state, that, instead, these three features characterize different and dissociable states, which often happen to occur together. Understanding these three features as dissociable from each other will resolve philosophical disputes and facilitate scientific investigation.
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  50. added 2014-03-29
    Perceiving the World.Bence Nanay (ed.) - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
    'Perceiving the World' offers 11 essays written especially for this book by some of the leading contemporary philosophers of perception: Susanna Siegel, Jesse ...
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