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Summary

In the debate about the concept of disease the term is usually used in a broad sense, to include any non-healthy condition (such as injuries, poisoning, etc.) and interchangeably with ‘pathology’. The debate has focused on two main views, naturalism and normativism, and the issue of whether disease and health can be defined in a way that is value-neutral. Some recent work challenges the assumptions of this debate, such as that disease is a concept structured around necessary and sufficient conditions, and that philosophical analysis should focus on a biomedical notion of disease. Associated with this, other conceptual structures and alternative notions taking pragmatic, epidemiological, or public health perspectives have been put forward.

Key works

The naturalist position is represented by the biostatistical theory, developed by Christopher Boorse in several classic papers (1977; 1975; 1976) and defended against critiques in 1997 and 2014. Normativist views are developed by, for example, Canguilhem & Cohen 1978, Nordenfelt 1987, and Cooper 2002. Some argue that disease involves both descriptive and evaluative aspects, a position referred to as either a hybrid theory or as weak normativism, for example Wakefield 2014 and Ereshefsky 2009. Critiques of the traditional debate and alternative approaches are provided by Schwartz 2007 and Sadegh-Zadeh 2000

Introductions Cooper 2017; Murphy 2015; Boorse 2011
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723 found
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1 — 50 / 723
  1. Interventionism and Intelligibility: Why Depression is Not (Always) a Brain Disease.Quinn Hiroshi Gibson - forthcoming - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy.
    Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) is a serious condition with a large disease burden. It is often claimed that MDD is a “brain disease.” What would it mean for MDD to be a brain disease? I argue that the best interpretation of this claim is as offering a substantive empirical hypothesis about the causes of the syndrome of depression. This syndrome-causal conception of disease, combined with the idea that MDD is a disease of the brain, commits the brain disease conception of (...)
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  2. Infinity, Technology, Degeneracy: A Note on Werkhoven’s Dispositional Theory of Health.Shane N. Glackin - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axz033.
    Werkhoven’s ‘A Dispositional Theory of Health’ is an important and original contribution to debates about the disease concept, which persuasively demonstrates that dispositions must play some role in a full account of what it is to be healthy or ill. Unfortunately, as a theory, it cannot as it stands be correct.I first demonstrate what appears to be a significant, and possibly fatal, flaw; the proliferation of dispositions which Werkhoven’s theory requires makes impossible, at least in the absence of significant further (...)
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  3. How an Addiction Ontology Can Unify Competing Conceptualizations of Addiction.Robert M. Kelly, Robert West & Janna Hastings - forthcoming - In Nick Heather, Matt Field, Anthony Moss & Sally Satel (eds.), Evaluating the Brain Disease Model of Addiction. New York, NY, USA:
    Disagreement about the nature of ‘addiction’, such as whether it is a brain disease, arises in part because the label is applied to a wide range of phenomena. This creates conceptual and definitional confusions and misunderstandings, often leading to researchers talking past one another. Ontologies have been successfully implemented in other fields to help solve these problems by creating unifying frameworks that can accommodate divergence while clarifying the basis for it. We argue that ontologies can help transform the way we (...)
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  4. Correction to: Ethnomedical Specialists and their Supernatural Theories of Disease.Aaron D. Lightner, Cynthiann Heckelsmiller & Edward H. Hagen - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-1.
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  5. Mental Disorder and Suicide: What’s the Connection?Hane Htut Maung - forthcoming - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy:jhab015.
    This paper offers a philosophical analysis of the connection between mental disorder and suicide risk. In contemporary psychiatry, it is commonly suggested that this connection is a causal connection that has been established through empirical discovery. Herein, I examine the extent to which this claim can be sustained. I argue that the connection between mental disorder and increased suicide risk is not wholly causal but is partly conceptual. This in part relates to the way suicidality is built into the definitions (...)
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  6. Medicine and the Meaning of Life (Tentative Title).Thaddeus Metz - forthcoming - In Alex Broadbent (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Medicine. Oxford University Press.
    A critical survey of how the value of meaning in life has figured, and plausibly could figure, into philosophical reflection on the ends of, means of, and constraints on medical practice.
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  7. Mild Mania and the Theory of Health: A Response to "Mild Mania and Well-Being".Professor Lennart Nordenfelt - forthcoming - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 1 (3):179-184.
    In this response to "Mild Mania and Well-Being" I propose a different analytic strategy and scrutinize the presented case of mild mania within the framework of a holistic theory of health. I distinguish between the following fundamental questions: (1) is mild mania a disease or illness? (2) does the mild mania of Mr. M. reduce his health significantly? and (3) should Mr. M. be recommended treatment with lithium or not? I answer the first question in the affirmative. I propose some (...)
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  8. A Reflection on Health and Disease Amid COVID‐19 Pandemic.Si-Woon Park - forthcoming - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice.
  9. How to Define Today a Medical Disorder? Biological and Psychosocial Disadvantages as the Paramount Criteria.Diogo Telles Correia, Drozdstoy Stoyanov & Helio G. Rocha Neto - forthcoming - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice.
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  10. The Illness-Disease Dichotomy and the Biological-Clinical Splitting of Medicine.Luigi Tesio & Marco Buzzoni - forthcoming - Medical Humanities:medhum-2020-011873.
    In a recent paper, Sharpe and Greco argue that some clinical conditions, such as chronic fatigue syndrome, should be treated by altering the patient's experience and response to symptoms without necessarily searching for an underlying cause. As a result, we should allow for the existence of ‘illnesses without diseases’. Wilshire and Ward reply that this possibility requires unwarranted causal assumptions about the psychosocial origins of conditions not predicted by a disease model. In so doing, it is argued that Sharpe and (...)
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  11. Naturalism, Disease, and Levels of Functional Description.Somogy Varga & David Miguel Gray - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy and Medicine.
    The paper engages Christopher Boorse’s (1975, 1976, 1977, 1987, 1997, 2014) Bio-Statistical Theory (BST). In its current form, BST runs into a significant challenge. For BST to account for its central tenet—that lower-level part-dysfunction is sufficient for higher-level pathology—it must provide criteria for how to decide which lower-level parts are the ones to be analyzed for health or pathology. As BST is a naturalistic theory, such choices must be based solely on naturalistic considerations. An argument will be provided to show (...)
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  12. Naturalism, Disease, and Levels of Functional Description.Somogy Varga & David Miguel Gray - forthcoming - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy.
    The paper engages Christopher Boorse’s Bio-Statistical Theory. In its current form, BST runs into a significant challenge. For BST to account for its central tenet—that lower-level part-dysfunction is sufficient for higher-level pathology—it must provide criteria for how to decide which lower-level parts are the ones to be analyzed for health or pathology. As BST is a naturalistic theory, such choices must be based solely on naturalistic considerations. An argument is provided to show that, if BST is to be preserved, such (...)
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  13. Correction to: Experimental philosophy of medicine and the concepts of health and disease.Walter Veit - forthcoming - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics:1-2.
  14. Disease as a Deontic Construct.Kazem Sadegh-Zadeh - 2nd ed. 2015 - In Handbook of Analytic Philosophy of Medicine. Springer Verlag.
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  15. Reconsidering Harm in Psychiatric Manuals Within an Explicationist Framework.Mia Biturajac & Marko Jurjako - 2022 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 25:239–249.
    The notion of harm has been a recurring and a significant notion in the characterization of mental disorder. It is present in eminent diagnostic manuals such as DSM and ICD, as well as in the discussion on mental disorders in philosophy of psychiatry. Recent demotion of harm in the definition of mental disorders in DSM-5 shows a general trend towards reducing the significance of harm when thinking about the nature of mental disorders. In this paper, we defend the relevance of (...)
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  16. Holism and Reductionism in the Illness/Disease Debate.Marco Buzzoni, Luigi Tesio & Michael T. Stuart - 2022 - In Shyam Wuppuluri & Ian Stewart (eds.), From Electrons to Elephants and Elections. Springer. pp. 743-778.
    In the last decades it has become clear that medicine must find some way to combine its scientific and humanistic sides. In other words, an adequate notion of medicine requires an integrative position that mediates between the analytic-reductionist and the normative-holistic tendencies we find therein. This is especially important as these different styles of reasoning separate “illness” (something perceived and managed by the whole individual in concert with their environment) and “disease” (a “mechanical failure” of a biological element within the (...)
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  17. Del castigo divino al diagnóstico: La Concepción de la enfermedad en sófocles E hipócrates.Joaquín Fortanet Fernández - 2022 - Agora 41 (2).
    This text raises the change in the notion of disease that occurred in the 5th century BC. through the comparison between nósos, insanity and plague in the tragedies of Sophocles and the new diagnostic process that will be launched with the establishment of the Hippocratic corpus. Analyzing the causes, the cure and the being of the disease in the Philoctetes, Ajax and Oedipus Rex, we will be able to observe the distances with respect to the technical and rational conception of (...)
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  18. Nosological Diagnosis, Theories of Categorization, and Argumentations by Analogy.Francesco Gagliardi - 2022 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 47 (2):311-330.
    The nosological diagnosis is a particular type of nontheoretical diagnosis consisting of identifying the disease that afflicts the patient without explaining the underlying etiopathological mechanisms. Its origins are within the essentialist point of view on the nature of diseases, which dates back at least to 18th-century taxonomy studies. In this article, we propose a model of nosological diagnosis as a two-phase process composed of the categorization of inductive inferences and argumentations by analogy. In the inductive phase, disease entities are identified (...)
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  19. Pathological Withdrawal Syndrome: A New Kind of Depression?Katelynn V. Healy - 2022 - Inquiries Journal.
    Marion Godman makes the argument that Pathological Withdrawal Syndrome (PWS) makes the case for psychiatric disorders as a natural kind. Godman argues that we can classify kinds according to their shared ‘grounding’, but we need not know what the grounding is to know that the natural is a natural kind. However, I argue that Godman erroneously classifies PWS as its own natural kind when it is in fact a variant of depression, which is its own natural kind. Cooper highlights culture-bound (...)
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  20. The Value-Ladenness of Psychopathy.Marko Jurjako & Luca Malatesti - 2022 - In Luca Malatesti, John McMillan & Predrag Šustar (eds.), Psychopathy: Its Uses, Validity and Status. Cham: Springer. pp. 215-233.
    The recurring claim that the construct of psychopathy is value laden often is not qualified in enough detail. The chapters in this part of the volume, instead, investigate in depth the role and significance of values in different aspects of the construct of psychopathy. Following these chapters, but also by offering a background to them, we show how certain values are involved in the characterisation of psychopathy, inform societal needs satisfied by this construct, and have a central role in determining (...)
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  21. From Blocked Flows to Suppressed Emotions: The Life of a Trope.Stewart Justman - 2022 - Medical Humanities 48 (1):17-25.
    Internal blockages and build-ups cause disease: traditionally, this principle seemed intuitive both to professionals and the laity, explained conditions as diverse as melancholy and scurvy, and justified the use of evacuative treatments to get rid of noxious matter. With the collapse of humoral medicine and the establishment of the concept of specific causation, one might have expected time-honoured tropes of obstruction to die off. They did not die off, but moved with the times and adapted to new conditions. Emphasis swung (...)
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  22. Not Merely the Absence of Disease: A Genealogy of the WHO’s Positive Health Definition.Lars Thorup Larsen - 2022 - History of the Human Sciences 35 (1):111-131.
    The 1948 constitution of the World Health Organization defines health as ‘a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity’. It was a bold and revolutionary health idea to gain international consensus in a period characterized by fervent anti-communism. This article explores the genealogy of the health definition and demonstrates how it was possible to expand the scope of health, redefine it as ‘well-being’, and overcome ideological resistance to progressive and international (...)
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  23. Some Issues Concerning the Concept of Mental Illness.Cristian Marques - 2022 - Studies in Social Sciences Review 2 (3):186-194.
    Our main objective is to locate and analyze some philosophical issues about the concept of mental illness and the manner it is used, especially in contemporary psychiatry. It is even difficult to find a standard meaning in the main psychiatric textbooks; and, when there is some exposition of the concept, it is sparse, uncritical and vague. As an immediate consequence of these issues, practical guidelines and protocols for the clinic arise, which become almost “automatic”, unreflective behaviors, practices translated as health (...)
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  24. Health and Disease as Practical Concepts: Exploring Function in Context-Specific Definitions.Rik van der Linden & Maartje Schermer - 2022 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 25 (1):131-140.
    Despite the longstanding debate on definitions of health and disease concepts, and the multitude of accounts that have been developed, no consensus has been reached. This is problematic, as the way we define health and disease has far-reaching practical consequences. In recent contributions it is proposed to view health and disease as practical- and plural concepts. Instead of searching for a general definition, it is proposed to stipulate context-specific definitions. However, it is not clear how this should be realized. In (...)
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  25. Historical Epidemiology and the Single Pathogen Model of Epidemic Disease. Webb Jr - 2022 - Centaurus 64 (1):197-206.
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  26. Do Feeding and Eating Disorders Fit the General Definition of Mental Disorder?M. Cristina Amoretti - 2021 - Topoi 40 (3):555-564.
    This paper aims at considering the conceptual status of feeding and eating disorders (FEDs). Now that the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) has changed the classification and some relevant criteria of FEDs, it is particularly relevant to evaluate their psychiatric framework and their status as mental disorders. I focus my efforts on address- ing only one specific question: Do FEDs fit the DSM-5 general definition of mental disorder? In DSM-5 a mental disorder is defined as a syndrome (...)
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  27. Wherein is the Concept of Disease Normative? From Weak Normativity to Value-Conscious Naturalism.M. Cristina Amoretti & Elisabetta Lalumera - 2021 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 25 (1):1-14.
    In this paper we focus on some new normativist positions and compare them with traditional ones. In so doing, we claim that if normative judgments are involved in determining whether a condition is a disease only in the sense identified by new normativisms, then disease is normative only in a weak sense, which must be distinguished from the strong sense advocated by traditional normativisms. Specifically, we argue that weak and strong normativity are different to the point that one ‘normativist’ label (...)
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  28. The Archaeology and Philosophy of Health: Navigating the New Normal Problem.Carl Brusse - 2021 - In Anton Killin & Sean Allen Hermanson (eds.), Explorations in Archaeology and Philosophy. Cham: pp. 101-122.
    It is often taken for granted that notions of health and disease are generally applicable across the biological world, in that they are not restricted to contemporary human beings, and can be unproblematically applied to a variety of organisms both past and present (taking relevant differences between species into account). In the historical sciences it is also common to normatively contrast health states of individuals and populations from different times and places: e.g., to say that due to nutrition or pathogen (...)
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  29. Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction analysis of disorder and the problem of defining harm to nonsentient organisms.Antoine C. Dussault - 2021 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 42 (5):211-231.
    This paper criticizes Jerome Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction analysis of disorder by arguing that the conceptual linkage it establishes between the medical concepts of health and disorder and the prudential notions of well-being and harm makes the account inapplicable to nonsentient organisms, such as plants, fungi, and many invertebrate animals. Drawing on a previous formulation of this criticism by Christopher Boorse, and noting that Wakefield could avoid it if he adopted a partly biofunction-based account of interests like that often advocated in (...)
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  30. On Recovery: Re-Directing the Concept by Differentiation of its Meanings.Yael Friedman - 2021 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 24 (3):389-399.
    Recovery is a commonly used concept in both professional and everyday contexts. Yet despite its extensive use, it has not drawn much philosophical attention. In this paper, I question the common understanding of recovery, show how the concept is inadequate, and introduce new and much needed terminology. I argue that recovery glosses over important distinctions and even misrepresents the process of moving away from malady as "going back" to a former state of health. It does not invite important nuances needed (...)
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  31. Dysfunction and the Definition of Mental Disorder in the DSM.Anne-Marie Gagné-Julien - 2021 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 28 (4):353-370.
  32. Defending Social Objectivity for "Mental Disorder".Anne-Marie Gagné-Julien - 2021 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 28 (4):381-384.
    First, I want to thank PPP for the privilege of having my work read and commented on by esteemed colleagues. In this response, I briefly review some of the key issues that they have raised. These issues include 1) the usefulness of a definition of mental disorder for North American psychiatry, 2) the absence of a concrete criterion to address the demarcation problem, 3) the place and role of values in such a demarcation, and 4) the worries of over-inclusiveness, problematic (...)
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  33. Towards a socially constructed and objective concept of mental disorder.Anne-Marie Gagné-Julien - 2021 - Synthese 198 (10):9401-9426.
    In this paper, I argue for a new way to understand the integration of facts and values in the concept of mental disorder that has the potential to avoid the flaws of previous hybrid approaches. I import conceptual tools from the account of procedural objectivity defended by Helen Longino to resolve the controversy over the definition of mental disorder. My argument is threefold: I first sketch the history of the debate opposing objectivists and constructivists and focus on the criticisms that (...)
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  34. Can Populations Be Healthy? Perspectives From Georges Canguilhem and Geoffrey Rose.Élodie Giroux - 2021 - History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 43 (4):1-23.
    Canguilhem criticized the concept of “public health”: health and disease are concepts that only apply to individuals, taken as organic totalities. Their extension to a different level of organization is purely metaphorical. The importance assumed by epidemiology in the construction of our knowledge of the normal and the pathological does, however, call for reflection on the role and the status of the population level of organization in our approach to health phenomena. The entanglement of the biological and the social in (...)
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  35. The Limits of Community for A Theory of Recognition.Audra L. Goodnight - 2021 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 28 (4):319-322.
    Should madness be recognized as grounds for identity? Should society recognize and validate madness as diversity, be it psychological, behavioral, or emotional? To answer these questions, we might turn to medical consensus about which mental, behavioral, or emotional states count as mental illness. Unfortunately, the criteria for determining which mental health phenomena fall within the boundary of mental illness remain open to debate, creating what is known as "the boundary problem." Common approaches to resolving the boundary problem include naturalism, a (...)
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  36. Aging Biomarkers and the Measurement of Health and Risk.Sara Green & Line Hillersdal - 2021 - History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 43 (1):1-23.
    Prevention of age-related disorders is increasingly in focus of health policies, and it is hoped that early intervention on processes of deterioration can promote healthier and longer lives. New opportunities to slow down the aging process are emerging with new fields such as personalized nutrition. Data-intensive research has the potential to improve the precision of existing risk factors, e.g., to replace coarse-grained markers such as blood cholesterol with more detailed multivariate biomarkers. In this paper, we follow an attempt to develop (...)
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  37. How to Draw the Line Between Health and Disease? Start with Suffering.Bjørn Hofmann - 2021 - Health Care Analysis 29 (2):127-143.
    How can we draw the line between health and disease? This crucial question of demarcation has immense practical implications and has troubled scholars for ages. The question will be addressed in three steps. First, I will present an important contribution by Rogers and Walker who argue forcefully that no line can be drawn between health and disease. However, a closer analysis of their argument reveals that a line-drawing problem for disease-related features does not necessarily imply a line-drawing problem for disease (...)
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  38. A Network Perspective on the Comorbidity of Personality Disorders and Mental Disorders: An Illustration of Depression and Borderline Personality Disorder.Annemarie C. J. Köhne & Adela-Maria Isvoranu - 2021 - Frontiers in Psychology 12.
    The comorbidity of personality disorders and mental disorders is commonly understood through three types of theoretical models: either a) personality disorders precede mental disorders, b) mental disorders precede personality disorders, c) mental disorders and personality disorders share common etiological grounds. Although these hypotheses differ with respect to their idea of causal direction, they all imply a latent variable perspective, in which it is assumed that either personality and mental disorders are latent variables that have certain causal relations [models a) and (...)
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  39. Causation and Causal Selection in the Biopsychosocial Model of Health and Disease.Hane Htut Maung - 2021 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (17):M5-M27.
    In The Biopsychosocial Model of Health and Disease, Derek Bolton and Grant Gillett argue that a defensible updated version of the biopsychosocial model requires a metaphysically adequate account of disease causation that can accommodate biological, psychological, and social factors. This present paper offers a philosophical critique of their account of biopsychosocial causation. I argue that their account relies on claims about the normativity and the semantic content of biological information that are metaphysically contentious. Moreover, I suggest that these claims are (...)
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  40. On Grounds, Anchors, and Diseases: A Reply to Glackin.Alex James Miller Tate & Thomas Davies - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (2):428-437.
    Shane Glackin's 2019 Philosophical Quarterly article aims to offer a framework for understanding the philosophical debate about the nature of disease and utilise this framework to reply to several standard objections to normativist theories of disease. Specifically, Glackin claims his model avoids three central challenges to normativism, which we term the ‘Flippancy Problem’, ‘Repugnancy Problem’, and the ‘Explanatory Problem’. Although we find Glackin's framework helpful in clarifying the terrain of the debate, we argue these three challenges continue to afflict his (...)
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  41. When a Hybrid Account of Disorder is Not Enough: The Case of Gender Dysphoria.Kathleen Murphy-Hollies - 2021 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 17 (2):(SI4)5-26.
    In this paper I discuss Wakefield’s account of mental disorder as applied to the case of gender dysphoria (GD). I argue that despite being a hybrid account which brings together a naturalistic and normative element in order to avoid pathologising normal or expectable states, the theory alone is still not extensive enough to answer the question of whether GD should be classed as a disorder. I suggest that the hybrid account falls short in adequately investigating how the harm and dysfunction (...)
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  42. The Place of the Experience of Illness in the Understanding of Disease: Medical Discourse and Subjectivity.Amanda Barros Pereira Palmeira & Rodrigo Barros Gewehr - 2021 - In Joaquim Braga & Mário Santiago de Carvalho (eds.), Philosophy of Care. New Approaches to Vulnerability, Otherness and Therapy. Advancing Global Bioethics, Vol. 16. Springer. pp. 333-346.
    Recent discussions about medical discourse seek to demonstrate the apparent and progressive oblivion of the subject as well as the notion of subjectivity in the development of modern medicine - in its foundations in clinical practice and basic theoretical framework. As a result, they show that medicine has evolved in the understanding of the disease, while still keeping the experience of suffering as a blind spot. The response is to carry out countless attempts to restore subjectivity in the therapeutic process (...)
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  43. Psychological Injury is Not New and Not Normal.Claire Pouncey - 2021 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 28 (4):347-348.
    In "On the Concept of 'Psychiatric Disorder,'" Miriam Solomon strives to resolve the tension between thinking of bereavement as a normal reaction to loss, and recognizing that its most extreme forms look very much like major depressive episodes and benefit from psychiatric treatment. To do this, she introduces the idea that a condition can be both normal and a mental disorder, or in other words, that some mental disorders are normal. Although I very much like the idea that some mental (...)
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  44. The Quantitative Problem for Theories of Dysfunction and Disease.Thomas Schramme - 2021 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 17 (2):(SI7)5-30.
    Many biological functions allow for grades. For example, secretion of a specific hormone in an organism can be on a higher or lower level, compared to the same organism at another occasion or compared to other organisms. What levels of functioning constitute instances of dysfunction; where should we draw the line? This is the quantitative problem for theories of dysfunction and disease. I aim to defend a version of biological theories of dysfunction to tackle this problem. However, I will also (...)
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  45. On the Concept of "Psychiatric Disorder": Incorporating Psychological Injury.Miriam Solomon - 2021 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 28 (4):329-339.
  46. Who Owns the Concept of Psychiatric Disorder?Miriam Solomon - 2021 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 28 (4):349-351.
    About ten years ago, I participated in a consensus process on migraine nomenclature. Participants used a modified Delphi technique to explore their views about what migraine is. Candidate concepts included an illness, disease, syndrome, condition, disorder, or susceptibility. Initially, there was a wide range of views about which concept best fits our concept of migraine. Migraine—in common with many psychiatric disorders—is poorly understood by neuroscience. On scientific grounds, participants thought that "susceptibility" and "syndrome" describes our current knowledge well. However, participants (...)
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  47. Philosophy of Psychiatry.Jonathan Y. Tsou - 2021 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Jonathan Y. Tsou examines and defends positions on central issues in philosophy of psychiatry. The positions defended assume a naturalistic and realist perspective and are framed against skeptical perspectives on biological psychiatry. Issues addressed include the reality of mental disorders; mechanistic and disease explanations of abnormal behavior; definitions of mental disorder; natural and artificial kinds in psychiatry; biological essentialism and the projectability of psychiatric categories; looping effects and the stability of mental disorders; psychiatric classification; and the validity of the DSM's (...)
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  48. Function, Dysfunction, and the Concept of Mental Disorder.Jonathan Y. Tsou - 2021 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 28 (4):371-375.
    Naturalistic accounts of mental disorder aim to identify an objective basis for attributions of mental disorder. This goal is important for demarcating genuine mental disorders from artificial or socially constructed disorders. The articulation of a demarcation criterion provides a means for assuring that attributions of 'mental disorder' are not merely pathologizing different forms of social deviance. The most influential naturalistic and hybrid definitions of mental disorder identify biological dysfunction as the objective basis of mental disorders: genuine mental...
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  49. Values Constitute the Boundaries in Between the Rules of Nature and Social Recognition.Werdie van Staden - 2021 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 28 (4):315-317.
    The boundary problem on defining the conceptual scope and limits of a mental disorder may be tackled at either side of the boundary. On one side, philosophers and philosophically minded clinicians tried clarifying the concept of mental disorder and its related concepts of mental illness and dysfunction in their use and definition. On the other side, Mohammed Rashed's article gives a substantive and refreshing account of this neglected side in terms of social recognition. Thereby the boundary is clarified from the (...)
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  50. Experimental philosophy of medicine and the concepts of health and disease.Walter Veit - 2021 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 42 (3):169-186.
    If one had to identify the biggest change within the philosophical tradition in the twenty-first century, it would certainly be the rapid rise of experimental philosophy to address differences in intuitions about concepts. It is, therefore, surprising that the philosophy of medicine has so far not drawn on the tools of experimental philosophy in the context of a particular conceptual debate that has overshadowed all others in the field: the long-standing dispute between so-called naturalists and normativists about the concepts of (...)
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