This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related

Contents
157 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 157
  1. Gettier’s Classic Irrelevance.Danny Frederick - manuscript
    Edmund Gettier’s three-page article is generally regarded as a classic of epistemology. I argue that Gettier cases depend upon three false assumptions and are irrelevant to the theory of knowledge. I suggest that we follow Karl Popper in abandoning subject-centred epistemologies in favour of theories of objective knowledge.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. The Epistemic Role of our Ontological Scheme - Arguments (draft).Julian Manuel Galvez Bunge - manuscript
    Arguments for a theory about the nature of the ontological categories, the relations that determine them and their epistemic role in the construction of different kinds of limited, but true knowledge of reality in itself.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Truth-Maker Theory and the Stopped Clock: Why Heathcote Fails to Solve the Gettier Problem.Qilin Li - manuscript
    Adrian Heathcote has proposed a truth-making account of knowledge that combines traditional conditions of justified true belief with the truth-making condition, which would jointly provide us with the sufficient condition of knowledge, and this truth-maker account of knowledge in turn explains why a gettiered justified true belief fails to be regarded as a genuine instance of knowledge. In this paper, by the comparison of two different casual models that are illustrated by the thermometer and the clock respectively, however, it will (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Evidence of Falsehood.Timothy R. O'Donnell - manuscript
    It has been largely assumed from the start that truth, the first premise of the Tripartite theory of Knowledge, is necessary for a mental state of knowing. And this has intuitively made sense. Examples that demonstrate the logic of this premise are wide-spread and easily found. Yet, if one tries to establish the necessity of this condition for oneself, one may discover, a logical flaw in this premise. In theory truth is necessary, however, in practice it is not truth that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Why Knowledge Might Not Entail Belief.Pranav Ambardekar - forthcoming - Southwest Philosophical Studies.
    Despite Radford’s (1966) case of the unconfident examinee, many epistemologists think that knowledge entails belief. Epistemologists have levelled two sorts of criticisms: first, they point out that Radford’s case isn’t a clear case of knowledge; second, they object that even if knowledge is granted in Radford-like cases, agents therein will still have dispositional belief. This paper offers a case that improves upon Radford’s. In my case, the agent’s evidence is intuitively sufficient for knowledge. And we do not need to posit (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. A Defense of Explanationism against Recent Objections.Tomas Bogardus & Will Perrin - forthcoming - Episteme:1-12.
    In the recent literature on the nature of knowledge, a rivalry has emerged between modalism and explanationism. According to modalism, knowledge requires that our beliefs track the truth across some appropriate set of possible worlds. Modalists tend to focus on two modal conditions: sensitivity and safety. According to explanationism, knowledge requires only that beliefs bear the right sort of explanatory relation to the truth. In slogan form: knowledge is believing something because it’s true. In this paper, we aim to vindicate (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Who knows what? Epistemic dependence, inquiry, and function-first epistemology.Joshua DiPaolo - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Function-first epistemologists analyze epistemic concepts, norms, and practices by investigating their functions. According to the most prominent function-first account, the primary function of our concept of knowledge is identifying reliable informants. In this paper, I take for granted the function-first methodology to achieve three main goals: First, I argue against this prominent account: studying practices of knowledge attribution and denial related to epistemic dependence, coordination, and competition reveals that the primary function of our concept of knowledge is not identifying reliable (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Knowledge is extrinsically apt belief. Virtue-epistemology and the temporal objection.Anne Meylan - forthcoming - In Chris Kelp & John Greco (eds.), Virtue Epistemology. Cambridge, Royaume-Uni:
    According to Sosa’s virtue epistemological account, an instance of (animal) knowledge is a belief that instantiates the property of being apt. The purpose of this contribution is, first, to show why this claim is, without further clarification, problematic. Briefly, an instance of knowledge cannot be identified to an apt belief because beliefs are states and aptness is a property that only actions —and no states— can exemplify. Second, I present the metaphysical amendment that the tenants of virtue epistemology can adopt (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. The Explanationist and the Modalist.Dario Mortini - forthcoming - Episteme:1-16.
    Recent epistemology has witnessed a substantial opposition between two competing approaches to capturing the notion of non-accidentality in the analysis of knowledge: the explanationist and the modalist. According to the latest advocates of the former, S knows that p if and only if S believes that p because p is true. According to champions of the latter, S knows that p if and only if S's belief that p is true in a relevant set of possible worlds. Because Bogardus and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  10. Experimental evidence that knowledge entails justification.Alexandra M. Nolte, David Rose & John Turri - forthcoming - In Tania Lombrozo, Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe (eds.), Oxford studies in experimental philosophy, volume 4. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
    A standard view in philosophy is that knowledge entails justification. Yet recent research suggests otherwise. We argue that this admirable and striking research suffers from an important limitation: participants were asked about knowledge but not justification. Thus it is possible that people attributed knowledge partly because they thought the belief was justified. Perhaps though, if given the opportunity, people would deny justification while still attributing knowledge. It is also possible that earlier findings were due to perspective taking. This paper reports (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  11. Luck and Reasons.Spencer Paulson - forthcoming - Episteme:1-15.
    In this paper, I will present a problem for reductive accounts of knowledge-undermining epistemic luck. By “reductive” I mean accounts that try to analyze epistemic luck in non-epistemic terms. I will begin by briefly considering Jennifer Lackey's (2006) criticism of Duncan Pritchard's (2005) safety-based account of epistemic luck. I will further develop her objection to Pritchard by drawing on the defeasible-reasoning tradition. I will then show that her objection to safety-based accounts is an instance of a more general problem with (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  12. Social Epistemology and Knowing-How.Yuri Cath - 2024 - In Jennifer Lackey & Aidan McGlynn (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter examines some key developments in discussions of the social dimensions of knowing-how, focusing on work on the social function of the concept of knowing-how, testimony, demonstrating one's knowledge to other people, and epistemic injustice. I show how a conception of knowing-how as a form of 'downstream knowledge' can help to unify various phenomena discussed within this literature, and I also consider how these ideas might connect with issues concerning wisdom, moral knowledge, and moral testimony.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  13. Expanding the Client’s Perspective.Yuri Cath - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (3):701-721.
    Hawley introduced the idea of the client's perspective on knowledge, which she used to illuminate knowing-how and cases of epistemic injustice involving knowing-how. In this paper, I explore how Hawley's idea might be used to illuminate not only knowing-how, but other forms of knowledge that, like knowing-how, are often claimed to be distinct from mere knowing-that, focusing on the case studies of moral understanding and ‘what it is like’-knowledge.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. Virtue Epistemology and the Analysis of Knowledge.Ian M. Church - 2023 - New York: Bloomsbury Academic.
    This book centers on two trends in contemporary epistemology: (i) the dissatisfaction with the reductive analysis of knowledge and (ii) the popularity of virtue-theoretic epistemologies. The goal is to endorse non-reductive virtue epistemology. Given that prominent renditions of virtue epistemology assume the reductive model, however, such a move is not straightforward—work needs to be done to elucidate what is wrong with the reductive model, in general, and why reductive accounts of virtue epistemology, specifically, are lacking. The first part of the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. Précis on Knowing and Checking: an Epistemological Investigation.Guido Melchior - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (1):1-13.
    In this Précis, I provide an overview of my Monograph Knowing and Checking: An Epistemological Investigation (Melchior 2019), which is subject to a book symposium organized by the University of Maribor. This volume in Acta Analytica contains contributions by Peter Baumann, Kelly Becker, Marian David, Nenad Miščević, Robert Weston Siscoe, and Danilo Šuster along with my replies.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Replies to the Critics of Knowing and Checking: an Epistemological Investigation.Guido Melchior - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (1):95-131.
    This paper replies to the comments made in Acta Analytica by Peter Baumann, Kelly Becker, Marian David, Nenad Miščević, Wes Siscoe, and Danilo Šuster on my Knowing and Checking: An Epistemological Investigation (Routledge 2019), hereinafter abbreviated as KC. These papers resulted from a workshop organized by the department of philosophy of the University of Maribor. I am very thankful to the organizers of the workshop and to the authors for their comments.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. First-Class and Coach-Class Knowledge.Spencer Paulson - 2023 - Episteme 20 (3):736-756.
    I will discuss a variety of cases such that the subject's believing truly is somewhat of an accident, but less so than in a Gettier case. In each case, this is because her reasons are not ultimately undefeated full stop, but they are ultimately undefeated with certain qualifications. For example, the subject's reasons might be ultimately defeated considered in themselves but ultimately undefeated considered as a proper part of an inference to the best explanation that is undefeated without qualification. In (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  18. Good reasons are apparent to the knowing subject.Spencer Paulson - 2023 - Synthese 202 (1):1-18.
    Reasons rationalize beliefs. Reasons, when all goes well, turn true beliefs into knowledge. I am interested in the relationship between these aspects of reasons. Without a proper understanding of their relationship, the theory of knowledge will be less illuminating than it ought to be. I hope to show that previous accounts have failed to account for this relationship. This has resulted in a tendency to focus on justification rather than knowledge. It has also resulted in many becoming skeptical about the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  19. Knowledge, Evidence, and Naked Statistics.Sherrilyn Roush - 2023 - In Luis R. G. Oliveira (ed.), Externalism about Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Many who think that naked statistical evidence alone is inadequate for a trial verdict think that use of probability is the problem, and something other than probability – knowledge, full belief, causal relations – is the solution. I argue that the issue of whether naked statistical evidence is weak can be formulated within the probabilistic idiom, as the question whether likelihoods or only posterior probabilities should be taken into account in our judgment of a case. This question also identifies a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  20. Knowledge is Believing Something Because It's True.Tomas Bogardus & Will Perrin - 2022 - Episteme 19 (2):178-196.
    Modalists think that knowledge requires forming your belief in a “modally stable” way: using a method that wouldn't easily go wrong, or using a method that wouldn't have given you this belief had it been false. Recent Modalist projects from Justin Clarke-Doane and Dan Baras defend a principle they call “Modal Security,” roughly: if evidence undermines your belief, then it must give you a reason to doubt the safety or sensitivity of your belief. Another recent Modalist project from Carlotta Pavese (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  21. Addressing two recent challenges to the factive account of knowledge.Esther Goh & Frederick Choo - 2022 - Synthese 200 (435):1-14.
    It is widely thought that knowledge is factive – only truths can be known. However, this view has been recently challenged. One challenge appeals to approximate truths. Wesley Buckwalter and John Turri argue that false-but-approximately-true propositions can be known. They provide experimental findings to show that their view enjoys intuitive support. In addition, they argue that we should reject the factive account of knowledge to avoid widespread skepticism. A second challenge, advanced by Nenad Popovic, appeals to multidimensional geometry to build (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  22. Remembering is not a kind of knowing.Changsheng Lai - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):333.
    This paper purports to disprove an orthodox view in contemporary epistemology that I call ‘the epistemic conception of memory’, which sees remembering as a kind of epistemic success, in particular, a kind of knowing. This conception is embodied in a cluster of platitudes in epistemology, including ‘remembering entails knowing’, ‘remembering is a way of knowing’, and ‘remembering is sufficiently analogous to knowing’. I will argue that this epistemic conception of memory, as a whole, should be rejected insofar as we take (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  23. "Knowledge First" and Its Limits.Tammo Lossau - 2022 - Dissertation, Johns Hopkins University
    I discuss three understandings of the idea of “Knowledge First Epistemology”, i.e. Timothy Williamson’s suggestion that we should take knowledge as a starting point, rather than trying to analyze it. Some have taken this to be a suggestion about the role of the concept of knowledge, but Williamson also seems to be concerned with intuition-based metaphysics. As an alternative, I develop the idea that knowledge may be a social kind that can be understood through a functional analysis in the tradition (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. Uloga intuicija u epistemologiji.Jelena Mijić - 2022 - Dissertation, University of Belgrade
    Predmet ove disertacije se u najširem smislu može posmatrati kao odgovor na meta-epistemološko pitanje o zadatku epistemologije i načinu na koji bi epistemološki projekat trebalo voditi. U radu prikazujemo i kritički analiziramo debatu savremenih metafilozofa o ulozi, a posledično i prirodi intuicija u savremenoj analitičkoj filozofiji. Osnovni cilj našeg rada je da odbranimo stav da epistemičke intuicije igraju ulogu evidencije u okviru metoda analize pojma znanja. Ovaj stav deo je standardne slike o epistemološkoj metodologiji koja se poslednjih godina dovodi u (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. Prime Cuts and the Method of Recombination.David-Hillel Ruben - 2022 - Episteme 19 (1):21-30.
    Whether some condition is equivalent to a conjunction of some conditions has been a major issue in analytic philosophy. Examples include: knowledge, acting freely, causation, and justice. Philosophers have striven to offer analyses of these, and other concepts, by showing them equivalent to such a conjunction. Timothy Williamson offers a number of arguments for the idea that knowledge is ‘prime’, hence not equivalent to or composed by some such conjunction. I focus on one of his arguments: the requirement that such (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. Safety, Evidence, and Epistemic Luck.Michael J. Shaffer - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):121-134.
    This paper critically explores Timothy Williamson’s view of evidence, and it does so in light of the problem of epistemic luck. Williamson’s view of evidence is, of course, a crucially important aspect of his novel and influential “knowledge-first” epistemological project. Notoriously, one crucial thesis of this project is that one’s evidence is equivalent to what one knows. This has come to be known as the E = K thesis. This paper specifically addresses Williamson’s knowledge-first epistemology and the E = K (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. The Paradox of Epistemic Obligation Avoided.Michael J. Shaffer - 2022 - The Reasoner 16:49-50.
    This short paper offers a skeptical solution to Åqvist's paradox of epistemic obligation. The solution is based on the contention that in SDL/KDT logics the externalist features of knowledge, about which we cannot have obligations, are obscured.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. Further Reflections on Quasi-factivism: A Reply to Baumann.Michael J. Shaffer - 2022 - Logos and Episteme 13 (2):207-215.
    This paper is a response to Baumann's comments on "Can Knowledge Really be Non-fative?" In this paper Baumann's suggestions for how those who deny the factivty of knowledge might deal with the argument from inconsistency and explosion are addressed.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  29. The Analysis of Knowledge.Brian C. Barnett - 2021 - In Introduction to Philosophy: Epistemology. Rebus Community. pp. Chapter 1.
    According to the traditional analysis of propositional knowledge (which derives from Plato's account in the Meno and Theaetetus), knowledge is justified true belief. This chapter develops the traditional analysis, introduces the famous Gettier and lottery problems, and provides an overview of prospective solutions. In closing, I briefly comment on the value of conceptual analysis, note how it has shaped the field, and assess the state of post-Gettier epistemology.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. Knowledge is a mental state (at least sometimes).Adam Michael Bricker - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1461-1481.
    It is widely held in philosophy that knowing is not a state of mind. On this view, rather than knowledge itself constituting a mental state, when we know, we occupy a belief state that exhibits some additional non-mental characteristics. Fascinatingly, however, new empirical findings from cognitive neuroscience and experimental philosophy now offer direct, converging evidence that the brain can—and often does—treat knowledge as if it is a mental state in its own right. While some might be tempted to keep the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  31. Gaṅgeśa on Epistemic Luck.Nilanjan Das - 2021 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 49 (2):153-202.
    This essay explores a problem for Nyāya epistemologists. It concerns the notion of pramā. Roughly speaking, a pramā is a conscious mental event of knowledge-acquisition, i.e., a conscious experience or thought in undergoing which an agent learns or comes to know something. Call any event of this sort a knowledge-event. The problem is this. On the one hand, many Naiyāyikas accept what I will call the Nyāya Definition of Knowledge, the view that a conscious experience or thought is a knowledge-event (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  32. The Concept of Knowledge.Michael Hannon - 2021 - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Knowledge is central to epistemology. Indeed, the word ‘epistemology’ comes from the Greek word epistêmê, which is often translated as ‘knowledge.’ But what is knowledge? Why do we value it? How is it acquired? And how much of it do we have? This article explores the nature, significance, sources, and extent of human knowledge.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. Persistent burglars and knocks on doors: Causal indispensability of knowing vindicated.Artūrs Https://Orcidorg Logins - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (4):1335-1357.
    The aim of the present article is to accomplish two things. The first is to show that given some further plausible assumptions, existing challenges to the indispensability of knowledge in causal explanation of action fail. The second is to elaborate an overlooked and distinct argument in favor of the causal efficacy of knowledge. In short, even if knowledge were dispensable in causal explanation of action, it is still indispensable in causal explanation of other mental attitudes and, in particular, some reactive (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. Knowledge and cancelability.Tammo Lossau - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):397-405.
    Keith DeRose and Stewart Cohen object to the fallibilist strand of pragmatic invariantism regarding knowledge ascriptions that it is committed to non-cancelable pragmatic implications. I show that this objection points us to an asymmetry about which aspects of the conveyed content of knowledge ascriptions can be canceled: we can cancel those aspects that ascribe a lesser epistemic standing to the subject but not those that ascribe a better or perfect epistemic standing. This situation supports the infallibilist strand of pragmatic invariantism (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  35. Ideas that Work.Matthieu Queloz - 2021 - Aeon:1–8.
    Truth, knowledge, justice – to understand how our loftiest abstractions earn their keep, trace them to their practical origins.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. The Practical Origins of Ideas: Genealogy as Conceptual Reverse-Engineering (Open Access).Matthieu Queloz - 2021 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Why did such highly abstract ideas as truth, knowledge, or justice become so important to us? What was the point of coming to think in these terms? This book presents a philosophical method designed to answer such questions: the method of pragmatic genealogy. Pragmatic genealogies are partly fictional, partly historical narratives exploring what might have driven us to develop certain ideas in order to discover what these do for us. The book uncovers an under-appreciated tradition of pragmatic genealogy which cuts (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   43 citations  
  37. Toward a general theory of knowledge.Luis M. Augusto - 2020 - Journal of Knowledge Structures and Systems 1 (1):63-97.
    For millennia, knowledge has eluded a precise definition. The industrialization of knowledge (IoK) and the associated proliferation of the so-called knowledge communities in the last few decades caused this state of affairs to deteriorate, namely by creating a trio composed of data, knowledge, and information (DIK) that is not unlike the aporia of the trinity in philosophy. This calls for a general theory of knowledge (ToK) that can work as a foundation for a science of knowledge (SoK) and additionally distinguishes (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  38. Knowledge, adequacy, and approximate truth.Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri - 2020 - Consciousness and Cognition 83 (C):102950.
    Approximation involves representing things in ways that might be close to the truth but are nevertheless false. Given the widespread reliance on approximations in science and everyday life, here we ask whether it is conceptually possible for false approximations to qualify as knowledge. According to the factivity account, it is impossible to know false approximations, because knowledge requires truth. According to the representational adequacy account, it is possible to know false approximations, if they are close enough to the truth for (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  39. Knowing How to Know That.Benjamin Elzinga - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):1987-2001.
    Many virtue-based approaches to propositional knowledge begin with the ability and achievement intuitions. In this paper, I rely on this pair of intuitions to explore the relationship between knowing how and knowing that. On the view that emerges, propositional knowledge is a kind of success through cognitive know how. Rather than simply equating know how with ability, I reveal deeper connections between both kinds of knowledge by focusing on the role of self-regulation.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  40. The Impossibility of Mere Animal Knowledge for Reflective Subjects.Sanford Goldberg & Jonathan Matheson - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (4):829-840.
    In this paper we give reasons to think that reflective epistemic subjects cannot possess mere animal knowledge. To do so we bring together literature on defeat and higher-order evidence with literature on the distinction between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge. We then defend our argument from a series of possible objections.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  41. Not Esoteric, Just Fallible: Comment on Starmans and Friedman About Philosophical Expertise.Tsung-Hsing Ho - 2020 - Cognitive Science 44 (10):e12896.
    Gettier cases are scenarios conceived by philosophers to demonstrate that justified true beliefs may not be knowledge. Starmans and Friedman (2020) find that philosophers attribute knowledge in Gettier cases differently from laypeople and non‐philosophy academics, which seems to suggest that philosophers may be indoctrinated to adopt an esoteric concept of knowledge. I argue to the contrary: Their finding at most shows that philosophical reflection is fallible, but nevertheless able to clarify the concept of knowledge. I also suggest that their experiments (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. What is Intelligence For? A Peircean Pragmatist Response to the Knowing-How, Knowing-That Debate.Catherine Legg & Joshua Black - 2020 - Erkenntnis (5):1-20.
    Mainstream philosophy has seen a recent flowering in discussions of intellectualism which revisits Gilbert Ryle’s famous distinction between ‘knowing how’ and ‘knowing that’, and challenges his argument that the former cannot be reduced to the latter. These debates so far appear not to have engaged with pragmatist philosophy in any substantial way, which is curious as the relation between theory and practice is one of pragmatism’s main themes. Accordingly, this paper examines the contemporary debate in the light of Charles Peirce’s (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  43. Non‐Accidental Knowing.Niall J. Paterson - 2020 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 58 (2):302-326.
    Knowledge excludes luck. According to the received view, this intuition reveals that knowing is essentially modal in character. This paper demurs. Either knowledge does not exclude luck, or the entailment reveals nothing about its conceptual character. It is argued that knowledge excludes accidentality, and that this notion is not modal but causal‐explanatory. There are three central tasks. The first is to explicate the concept of accident. The second is to argue that the concepts of luck and accident are “intensionally distinct,” (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  44. Peter Browne on the Metaphysics of Knowledge.Kenneth L. Pearce - 2020 - In Kenneth L. Pearce & Takaharu Oda (eds.), Irish Philosophy in the Age of Berkeley: Volume 88. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 215-237.
    The central unifying element in the philosophy of Peter Browne (d. 1735) is his theory of analogy. Although Browne's theory was originally developed to deal with some problems about religious language, Browne regards analogy as a general purpose cognitive mechanism whereby we substitute an idea we have to stand for an object of which we, strictly speaking, have no idea. According to Browne, all of our ideas are ideas of sense, and ideas of sense are ideas of material things. Hence (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. From Paradigm-Based Explanation to Pragmatic Genealogy.Matthieu Queloz - 2020 - Mind 129 (515):683-714.
    Why would philosophers interested in the points or functions of our conceptual practices bother with genealogical explanations if they can focus directly on paradigmatic examples of the practices we now have?? To answer this question, I compare the method of pragmatic genealogy advocated by Edward Craig, Bernard Williams, and Miranda Fricker—a method whose singular combination of fictionalising and historicising has met with suspicion—with the simpler method of paradigm-based explanation. Fricker herself has recently moved towards paradigm-based explanation, arguing that it is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  46. Contextualism and the ambiguity theory of ‘knows’.Mark Satta - 2020 - Episteme 17 (2):209-229.
    The ambiguity theory of ‘knows’ is the view that ‘knows’ and its cognates have more than one sense, and that which sense of ‘knows’ is used in a knowledge ascription or denial determines, in part, the meaning (and as a result the truth conditions) of that knowledge ascription or denial. In this paper, I argue that the ambiguity theory of ‘knows’ ought to be taken seriously by those drawn to epistemic contextualism. In doing so I first argue that the ambiguity (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  47. The internalist virtue theory of knowledge.Ralph Wedgwood - 2020 - Synthese 197 (12):5357–5378.
    Here is a definition of knowledge: for you to know a proposition p is for you to have an outright belief in p that is correct precisely because it manifests the virtue of rationality. This definition resembles Ernest Sosa’s “virtue theory”, except that on this definition, the only virtue that must be manifested in all instances of knowledge is rationality, and no reductive account of rationality is attempted—rationality is assumed to be an irreducibly normative notion. This definition is compatible with (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  48. Knowledge, Scepticism, and Defeat: Themes from Klein.Rodrigo Borges, Branden Fitelson & Cherie Braden (eds.) - 2019 - Springer Verlag.
    This is a collection of new essays written in honor of the work of Peter D. Klein, who has had and continues to have a tremendous influence in the development of epistemology. The essays reflect the breadth and depth of Klein’s work by engaging directly with his views and with the views of his interlocutors.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  49. Are Modal Conditions Necessary for Knowledge?Mark Anthony Dacela - 2019 - Kritike 13 (1):101.
    Modal epistemic conditions have played an important role in post-Gettier theories of knowledge. These conditions purportedly eliminate the pernicious kind of luck present in all Gettier-type cases and offer a rather convincing way of refuting skepticism. This motivates the view that conditions of this sort are necessary for knowledge. I argue against this. I claim that modal conditions, particularly sensitivity and safety, are not necessary for knowledge. I do this by noting that the problem cases for both conditions point to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50. What's the Point of Knowledge? A Function-First Epistemology.Michael Hannon - 2019 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
    This book is about the nature and value of knowledge. At its core is a simple idea: we can answer many interesting and difficult philosophical questions by reflecting on the role (purpose, function) of epistemic evaluation in human life. I call this approach ‘function-first epistemology’. I use this method to illuminate the nature and value of knowledge, the foundations of epistemic normativity, the epistemology of testimony, and skepticism.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
1 — 50 / 157