The Concept of Rights, Misc

This chapter explicates and critically assesses RIGHTS CORRELATIVITY. Section II addresses three core issues. The first concerns the conceptual structure of the tethered positions: does correlativity mean that the positions’ features must be symmetrical? Are correlative rights and duties the “mirror images” of one another, or not? A second issue is Existential correlativity: must the positions invariably co-obtain, or can one exist with the other(s)? Can there be a right without a correlative duty, and vice versa? A third issue concerns (...) Justificational correlativity: must all correlative relationships be explained in terms of one position grounding the other(s)? Is it always the case that A’s right is the reason for B’s duty, the basis for imposing a duty on B in the first place? Section III then demonstrates how Wesley Hohfeld’s understanding of rights correlativity motivated all of the novel features in his schema of jural relations, some of which I defend from criticisms. (shrink)

What is a right? What, if anything, makes rights different from other features of the normative world, such as duties, standards, rules, or principles? Do all rights serve some ultimate purpose? In addition to raising these questions, philosophers and jurists have long been aware that different senses of ‘a right’ abound. To help make sense of this diversity, and to address the above questions, they developed two types of accounts of rights: models and theories. This book explicates rights modelling and (...) theorising and scrutinises their methodological underpinnings. It then challenges this framework by showing why the theories ought to be abandoned. In addition to exploring structural concerns, the book also addresses the various ways that rights can be used. It clarifies important differences between rights exercise, enforcement, remedying, and vindication, and identifies forms of legal rights-claiming and rights-invoking outside of institutional contexts. (shrink)

There is a long-standing debate about how best to explain rights—one dominated by two rivals, the Interest and Will theories. This article argues that, not only is each theory irredeemably flawed, the entire debate ought to be abandoned. Section two explains the debate and its constituent theories as a dispute over the criteria for the concept of a right, or for some subset of rights. Section three argues that each theory contains fatal idiosyncratic defects—ones that mostly differ from the canonical (...) criticisms found throughout the literature. Section four then argues that the theories also suffer from graver common defects that have hitherto gone undetected. First, their criteria are unmotivated, unjustified, and of questionable accuracy. Secondly, rights theorists’ own commitments to different kinds of accounts (i.e., models) of rights and theories of law (e.g., legal positivism) show why any theory of this sort is unnecessary for understanding rights. (shrink)

America and the world are in the process of collapse from excessive population growth, most of it for the last century, and now all of it, due to 3rd world people. Consumption of resources and the addition of 3 billion more ca. 2100 will collapse industrial civilization and bring about starvation, disease, violence and war on a staggering scale. The earth loses at least 1% of its topsoil every year, so as it nears 2100, most of its food growing capacity (...) will be gone. Billions will die and nuclear war is all but certain. In America, this is being hugely accelerated by massive immigration and immigrant reproduction, combined with abuses made possible by democracy. Depraved human nature inexorably turns the dream of democracy and diversity into a nightmare of crime and poverty. China will continue to overwhelm America and the world, as long as it maintains the dictatorship which limits selfishness. The root cause of collapse is the inability of our innate psychology to adapt to the modern world, which leads people to treat unrelated persons as though they had common interests. The idea of human rights is an evil fantasy promoted by leftists to draw attention away from the merciless destruction of the earth by unrestrained 3rd world motherhood. This, plus ignorance of basic biology and psychology, leads to the social engineering delusions of the partially educated who control democratic societies. Few understand that if you help one person you harm someone else—there is no free lunch and every single item anyone consumes destroys the earth beyond repair. Consequently, social policies everywhere are unsustainable and one by one all societies without stringent controls on selfishness will collapse into anarchy or dictatorship. The most basic facts, almost never mentioned, are that there are not enough resources in America or the world to lift a significant percentage of the poor out of poverty and keep them there. The attempt to do this is bankrupting America and destroying the world. The earth’s capacity to produce food decreases daily, as does our genetic quality. And now, as always, by far the greatest enemy of the poor is other poor and not the rich. Without dramatic and immediate changes, there is no hope for preventing the collapse of America, or any country that follows a democratic system. (shrink)

Amerika und die Welt befinden sich im Prozess des Zusammenbruchs durch übermäßiges Bevölkerungswachstum, das meiste davon im letzten Jahrhundert, und jetzt alles, aufgrund der Menschen in der 3. Welt. Der Verbrauch von Ressourcen und die Hinzufügung von 4 Milliarden weiteren etwa 2100 wird die industrielle Zivilisation zusammenbrechen und Hunger, Krankheit, Gewalt und Krieg in einem erschütternden Ausmaß herbeiführen. Die Erde verliert jedes Jahr mindestens 1% ihres Oberbodens, so dass der größte Teil ihrer Nahrungsmittelanbaukapazität weg sein wird, wenn sie sich dem (...) Jahr 2100 nähert. Milliarden werden sterben, und ein Atomkrieg ist so gut wie sicher. In Amerika wird dies durch massive Einwanderung und Reproduktion von Einwanderern enorm beschleunigt, verbunden mit Missbräuchen, die durch die Demokratie ermöglicht werden. Die verdorbene menschliche Natur verwandelt den Traum von Demokratie und Vielfalt unaufhaltsam in einen Alptraum von Verbrechen und Armut. China wird Amerika und die Welt weiterhin überwältigen, solange es die Diktatur aufrechterhält, die den Egoismus einschränkt. Die Hauptursache des Zusammenbruchs ist die Unfähigkeit unserer angeborenen Psychologie, sich an die moderne Welt anzupassen, was dazu führt, dass Menschen nicht verwandte Personen behandeln, als hätten sie gemeinsame Interessen. Die Idee der Menschenrechte ist eine böse Fantasie, die von Linken gefördert wird, um die Aufmerksamkeit von der gnadenlosen Zerstörung der Erde durch die hemmungslose Mutterschaft der 3. Welt abzulenken. Dies, plus Unwissenheit über grundlegende Biologie und Psychologie, führt zu den Social-Engineering-Wahnvorstellungen der teilweise Gebildeten, die demokratische Gesellschaften kontrollieren. Nur wenige verstehen, dass, wenn Sie einer Person helfen, jemand anderem zu schaden – es gibt kein kostenloses Mittagessen und jeder einzelne Gegenstand, den jemand konsumiert, zerstört die Erde unwiederbringlich. Folglich ist die Sozialpolitik überall unhaltbar, und eine nach der anderen werden alle Gesellschaften ohne strenge Kontrolle des Egoismus in Anarchie oder Diktatur zusammenbrechen. Die grundlegendsten Fakten, die fast nie erwähnt wurden, sind, dass es in Amerika oder der Welt nicht genügend Ressourcen gibt, um einen erheblichen Prozentsatz der Armen aus der Armut zu befreien und sie dort zu halten. Der Versuch, dies zu tun, ist Amerika bankrott und zerstört die Welt. Die Fähigkeit der Erde, Nahrung zu produzieren, nimmt täglich ab, ebenso wie unsere genetische Qualität. Und jetzt, wie immer, ist der bei weitem größte Feind der Armen andere Arme und nicht die Reichen. Ohne dramatische und sofortige Veränderungen gibt es keine Hoffnung, den Zusammenbruch Amerikas oder eines Landes, das einem demokratischen System folgt, zu verhindern. (shrink)

América e o mundo estão em processo de colapso devido ao crescimento excessivo da população, a maioria no século passado, e agora tudo isso, devido ao povo do 3º mundo. O consumo de recursos e a adição de mais 4 bilhões de ca. 2100 desonram a civilização industrial e provocarão fome, doenças, violência e guerra em escala impressionante. A Terra perde pelo menos 1% de seu solo a cada ano, então, à medida que se aproxima de 2100, a maior parte (...) de sua capacidade de cultivo de alimentos desaparecerá. Bilhões morrerão e a guerra nuclear é quase certa. Na América, isso está sendo extremamente acelerado pela imigração maciça e reprodução de imigrantes, combinado com abusos possibilitados pela democracia. A natureza humana depravada inexoravelmente transforma o sonho da democracia e da diversidade em um pesadelo de crime e pobreza. A China continuará a sobrecarregar a América e o mundo, desde que mantenha a ditadura que limita o egoísmo. A causa principal do colapso é a incapacidade de nossa psicologia inata de se adaptar ao mundo moderno, o que leva as pessoas a tratar pessoas não relacionadas como se tivessem interesses comuns. A ideia dos direitos humanos é uma fantasia maligna promovida pelos esquerdistas para chamar a atenção da destruição impiedosa da Terra pela maternidade do 3º mundo. Isso, além da ignorância da biologia básica e da psicologia, leva aos delírios da engenharia social dos parcialmente educados que controlam as sociedades democráticas. Poucos entendem que se você ajuda uma pessoa que você machuca outra pessoa — não há almoço grátis e cada item que alguém consome destrói a terra além do reparo. Consequentemente, as políticas sociais em todos os lugares são insustentáveis e uma por uma todas as sociedades sem controles rigorosos sobre o egoísmo entrarão em colapso em anarquia ou ditadura. Os fatos mais básicos, quase nunca mencionados, são que não há recursos suficientes na América ou no mundo para tirar uma porcentagem significativa dos pobres da pobreza e mantê-los lá. A tentativa de fazer isso está faliu a América e destruindo o mundo. A capacidade da Terra de produzir alimentos diminui diariamente, assim como nossa qualidade genética. E agora, como sempre, de longe, o maior inimigo dos pobres é outros pobres e não os ricos. Sem mudanças dramáticas e imediatas, não há esperança para evitar o colapso da América, ou qualquer país que siga um sistema democrático. (shrink)

This article helps to clear up some misunderstandings about the Will Theory of rights. Section 2 briefly outlines the Theories of Rights. Section 3 elucidates some salient differences amongst self-described anti–Interest Theory accounts. Section 4 rebuts Carl Wellman’s and Arthur Ripstein’s respective arguments about the Will Theory differing from “Choice” or Kantian theories of a right. Section 5 then offers a candidate explanation of why people might subscribe to the Will Theory in the first place.

For all their various disagreements, one point upon which rights theorists often agree is that it is simply part of the nature of rights that they tend to override, outweigh or exclude competing considerations in moral reasoning, that they have ‘peremptory force’, making ‘powerful demands’ that can only be overridden in ‘exceptional circumstances’, Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016, p. 240). In this article I challenge this thought. My aim here is not to prove that the (...) traditional view of rights’ stringency is necessarily false, nor even that we have no good reason to believe it is true. Rather, my aim is only to show that we have good reason to think that the foundation of the traditional position is less stable than we might have otherwise supposed and that an alternative conception of rights—one which takes the stringency of any given right as particular to the kind of right it is—is both viable and attractive. In short, to begin to move us towards a more ‘particularist’ conception of rights’ standing in moral reasoning and judgement. (shrink)

This article concerns the nature and limits of individuals’ rights to privacy over information that they have made public. For some, even suggesting that an individual can have a right to privacy over such information may seem paradoxical. First, one has no right to privacy over information that was never private to begin with. Second, insofar as one makes once-private information public – whether intentionally or unintentionally – one waives one’s right to privacy to that information. In this article, however, (...) we suggest the moral situation is more complicated than this. Rather, we argue that there is a class of public information – namely, once-private information that individuals have made public unintentionally – which remains within the scope of an individuals’ right to privacy, even when it has passed into the public domain. Significantly, this class includes any information rights-holders were unaware could be inferred from information they have made public and which they would not otherwise have wanted to be in the public domain. As we show, as well as clarifying several everyday dilemmas with regards to individuals’ privacy rights, this finding has elucidates a number of problems in the ethics of Big Data. (shrink)

Estados Unidos y el mundo están en el proceso de colapso de un crecimiento excesivo de la población, la mayoría de ella para el siglo pasado, y ahora todo ello, debido a la 3ª gente del mundo. El consumo de recursos y la adición de 4 mil millones más CA. 2100 colapsarán la civilización industrial y traerán hambre, enfermedad, violencia y guerra a una escala asombrosa. La tierra pierde al menos el 1% de su suelo vegetal cada año, por lo (...) que se acerca a 2100, la mayor parte de su capacidad de cultivo de alimentos se habrá ido. Miles de millones morirán y la guerra nuclear es segura. En Estados Unidos, esto está siendo enormemente acelerado por la inmigración masiva y la reproducción de inmigrantes, combinada con los abusos hechos posible por la democracia. La naturaleza humana depravada convierte inexorablemente el sueño de la democracia y la diversidad en una pesadilla de delincuencia y pobreza. China seguirá abrumar a América y al mundo, siempre y cuando mantenga la dictadura que limita el egoísmo. La causa raíz del colapso es la incapacidad de nuestra psicología innata para adaptarse al mundo moderno, lo que lleva a las personas a tratar a las personas no relacionadas como si tuvieran intereses comunes. La idea de los derechos humanos es una fantasía malvada promovida por los izquierdistas para atraer la atención de la destrucción despiadada de la tierra por una maternidad sin restricciones del tercer mundo. Esto, además de la ignorancia de la biología básica y la psicología, conduce a los delirios de ingeniería social de los parcialmente educados que controlan las sociedades democráticas. Pocos entienden que si usted ayuda a una persona a lastimar a alguien más, no hay almuerzo gratis y cada artículo que alguien consume destruye la tierra más allá de la reparación. En consecuencia, las políticas sociales en todas partes son insostenibles y, una por una, todas las sociedades sin estrictos controles sobre el egoísmo se derrumbarán en la anarquía o la dictadura. Los hechos más básicos, casi nunca mencionados, son que no hay suficientes recursos en Estados Unidos o en el mundo para levantar un porcentaje significativo de los pobres de la pobreza y mantenerlos allí. El intento de hacer esto es la quiebra de Estados Unidos y la destrucción del mundo. La capacidad de la tierra para producir alimentos disminuye diariamente, al igual que nuestra calidad genética. Y ahora, como siempre, de lejos el mayor enemigo de los pobres es el de otros pobres y no los ricos. Sin cambios dramáticos e inmediatos, no hay esperanzas de evitar el colapso de América, o cualquier país que siga un sistema democrático. (shrink)

This is the first comprehensive explanation and survey of the Interest-Will theories of rights debate. It elucidates the traditional understanding of it as a dispute over how best to explain A RIGHT and clarifies the theories’ competing criteria for that concept. The rest of the article then shows why recent developments are either problematic or simply fail to actually advance the debate. First, it is erroneous, as some theorists have done, to frame the entire debate in terms of competing explanations (...) of the direction of ‘directed’ duties. This is because the theories’ respective answers to that issue are themselves dependent upon their respective conceptions of A RIGHT – ones that do not even necessitate the identification of different directions for such duties. Second, all of the new would-be alternative or hybrid theories are shown to merely be versions of the Interest theory. Third, recent efforts to cabin off the debate to ‘normative’ theorisation (i.e., to morally or politically evaluative accounts) are misguided. (shrink)

The most prominent theories of rights, the Will Theory and the Interest Theory, notoriously fail to accommodate all and only rights-attributions that make sense to ordinary speakers. The Kind-Desire Theory, Leif Wenar’s recent contribution to the field, appears to fare better in this respect than any of its predecessors. The theory states that we attribute a right to an individual if she has a kind-based desire that a certain enforceable duty be fulfilled. A kind-based desire is a reason to want (...) something which one has simply in virtue of being a member of a certain kind. Rowan Cruft objects that this theory creates a puzzle about the relation between rights and respect. In particular, if rights are not grounded in aspects of the particular individuals whose rights they are, how can we sustain the intuitive notion that to violate a right is to disrespect the right-holder? I present a contractualist account of respect which reconciles the Kind-Desire Theory with the intuition that rights-violations are disrespectful. On this account, respect for a person is a matter of acknowledging her legitimate authority to make demands on the will and conduct of others. And I argue that kind-based desires authorize a person to make demands even if they do not correspond to that person’s well-being or other non-relational features. (shrink)

This paper has four aims. First it distinguishes two kinds of philosophical accounts of the ‘formal’ features of rights: models and theories. Models outline the ‘conceptually basic’ types of rights (if indeed a given model deems there to be more than one), their differences, and their relationships with duties, liabilities, etc. Theories of rights posit a supposed ultimate purpose for all rights and provide criteria for determining what counts as ‘a right’ in the first place. Second, the paper argues that (...) Monistic rights models (ones positing only a single basic type of right) are under-inclusive. They wrongly exclude and cannot explain relevant data, i.e., ordinary and legal linguistic practices. The third aim is to show that certain Pluralistic models are over-inclusive in terms of what they count as ‘rights’. Fourth, the paper begins to touch upon, but does not provide, criteria for determining what counts as ‘a right’. Two candidate factors will be addressed. (shrink)

The theory of justice that Hugo Grotius developed in De Jure Belli ac Pacis (The Law of War and Peace, 1625) set itself against a certain reading of Aristotle, according to which justice is conceived of as a mean between taking too much and taking too little. I argue that we can best understand the implications of Grotius' mature conception by considering the ends to which he had deployed this Aristotelian notion in his earlier work. Grotius came to perceive that (...) his earlier understanding of justice too easily ruled out the sorts of humanitarian concerns that could have a moderating effect. (shrink)

Confronting persistent and widening inequality in educational opportunity, advocates have regarded the right to education as a linchpin for reform. In the forty years since the Supreme Court relegated that right to the domain of state constitutional law, its power has surged and faded in litigation challenging state school finance systems. Like so many of the students it is meant to protect, however, the right to education has generally underachieved, in part because those wielding it have not always appreciated its (...) distinctive forms and function. Deconstructed, the right to education held by children has been formulated doctrinally as both a claim-right, imposing affirmative duties on the state to act, and an immunity, disabling certain state action. These two strands—oft-manifested as the claim-right to educational “adequacy” and an immunity entailing “equality” of educational opportunity—once considered irreconcilable, are actually interlocked by the right’s core historical function to protect children’s liberty and equality interests. And yet the right to education is ill equipped to fulfill its protection function. Education clauses in state constitutions do not fix the standards for mutually enforcing equality and adequacy. This encumbers already-reluctant courts in addressing educational disparities and emboldens legislative resistance when they do. Appreciating that the right to education has a protection function entailing equality and liberty interests nevertheless suggests that the right can be adjudicated in a way that unifies the demands and guarantees of substantive due process and equal protection. That union holds the potential to ameliorate the enforcement standards thereby reconstituting the right to education as a mainstay of reform. (shrink)

Je décris dans ce livre un projet alternatif de société. Une société dite « digressive » serait basée sur le principe de n’en imposer aucun à autrui : principe paradoxal dont je démontre qu’il est équivalent à la maximisation globale des choix individuels ainsi qu’au combat contre toute forme d’aliénation. Loin d’être stérile, ce principe pourrait, je l’affirme, avoir des applications très concrètes dans la tenue des activités humaines. La société digressive est un manifeste pour une société post-certitude, une réponse (...) pragmatique aux dogmes et monopoles en tout genre. (shrink)

This paper is a copy of Digressive Society’s conclusions. In the book Digressive Society, I describe a society that would be based on the principle that no one is allowed to impose a principle on others. This paradoxical principle is, as I demonstrate, equivalent to the global maximisation of individual choices as well as the combating of all forms of alienation. A digression should be understood in the positive sense, it is distancing ourselves from an initial intention, deviate from a (...) pre-established or expected discourse. This book is, I hope, a productive attempt to develop a system at the crossroads of critical theory, existentialism, libertarianism, and anarchism: a system founded not on any preconceived notion of justice or human rights, but rooted in the ambiguous nature of human existence. (shrink)

Artykuł, choć traktuje głównie o statusie jednostki w realiach i myśli politycznej monarchii absolutnej doby Bodinusa i Pufendorfa, odnosi się – toutes proportions gardées – do następującej kwestii: Czy członków państw niedemokratycznych, pozbawionych pełni praw i wolności politycznych, można określać mianem obywateli? Krzysztof Trzciński, Odwrócenie perspektywy: poddany jako obywatel w monarchii absolutnej, czyli o wieloznaczności pojęć lub ich różnym rozumieniu, „Przegląd Politologiczny” 3/2004, s. 93-106.

The paper engages the conceptual question of the nature of rights. First, moral methodology for developing criteria to judge the adequacy of theories for the concept of rights is discussed. Standard methodologies for conceptual theory, such as analysis of language practices, appealing to intuitions to test and correct hypotheses, and mixtures of these with appeals to substantive moral values, are shown to fail in important ways to give us reasons to adopt one or another view of the concept. An alternative (...) methodology is proposed which appeals to the distinct role of concepts in our value scheme (the added value of being able to employ such concepts in our moral judgments). This is then used to develop criteria for a successful theory of rights. Two existing theories are shown, as a matter of illustration, to fail to satisfy the criteria, and finally an alternative theory of rights which does satisfy these criteria is proposed and defended. (shrink)