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  1. added 2018-08-20
    Laws of Nature and Free Will.Pedro Merlussi - 2017 - Dissertation, Durham University
    This thesis investigates the conceptual relationship between laws of nature and free will. In order to clarify the discussion, I begin by distinguishing several questions with respect to the nature of a law: i) do the laws of nature cover everything that happens? ii) are they deterministic? iii) can there be exceptions to universal and deterministic laws? iv) do the laws of nature govern everything in the world? In order to answer these questions I look at three widely endorsed accounts (...)
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  2. added 2018-07-20
    Manipulation Arguments and the Freedom to Do Otherwise.Patrick Todd - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):395-407.
    I provide a manipulation-style argument against classical compatibilism—the claim that freedom to do otherwise is consistent with determinism. My question is simple: if Diana really gave Ernie free will, why isn't she worried that he won't use it precisely as she would like? Diana's non-nervousness, I argue, indicates Ernie's non-freedom. Arguably, the intuition that Ernie lacks freedom to do otherwise is stronger than the direct intuition that he is simply not responsible; this result highlights the importance of the denial of (...)
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  3. added 2018-02-17
    Freedom, Causation, and the Consequence Argument.Laura W. Ekstrom - 1998 - Synthese 115 (3):333-354.
    The problem of analyzing causation and the problem of incompatibilism versus compatibilism are largely distinct. Yet, this paper will show that there are some theories of causation that a compatibilist should not endorse: namely, counterfactual theories, specifically the one developed by David Lewis and a newer, amended version of his account. Endorsing either of those accounts of causation undercuts the main compatibilist reply to a powerful argument for incompatibilism. Conversely, the argument of this paper has the following message for incompatibilists: (...)
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  4. added 2018-02-16
    ‘Determinism’ Is Just Fine: A Reply to Scott Sehon.Gabriel De Marco - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (2):469-477.
    Scott Sehon recently argued that the standard notion of determinism employed in the Consequence Argument makes it so that, if our world turns out to be deterministic, then an interventionist God is logically impossible. He further argues that because of this, we should revise our notion of determinism. In this paper I show that Sehon’s argument for the claim that the truth of determinism, in this sense, would make an interventionist God logically impossible ultimately fails. I then offer and respond (...)
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  5. added 2017-11-09
    The Explanatory Power of Local Miracle Compatibilism.Garrett Pendergraft - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):249-266.
    Local miracle compatibilists claim that we are sometimes able to do otherwise than we actually do, even if causal determinism obtains. When we can do otherwise, it will often be true that if we were to do otherwise, then an actual law of nature would not have been a law of nature. Nevertheless, it is a compatibilist principle that we cannot do anything that would be or cause an event that violates the laws of nature. Carl Ginet challenges this nomological (...)
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  6. added 2017-09-18
    Freedom of the Will.Randolph Clarke - 2002 - In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 369--404.
    This chapter in the Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind surveys issues concerning free will. Topics include the compatibility question, compatibilist accounts, and libertarian accounts of free will.
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  7. added 2017-07-25
    Student.Krishna Mantirraju - manuscript
    Freedom is an impossibility; the dream of having the ability to choose anything one wants is hampered by reality. However, what aspect of reality ultimately hampers the birth of true freedom? What I propose is that reality itself makes freedom impossible. Furthermore, I also make the logical assumption, from the evidence I have found, that the only entity that can have freedom is a being that is formless, timeless, featureless, and is an infinite environment of nothing. While my studies today (...)
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  8. added 2017-07-24
    Determinism, Laws of Nature and the Consequence Argument.Pedro Merlussi - 2016 - Manuscrito 39 (1):73-95.
    Scott Sehon argues that the conception of determinism employed in the Consequence Argument is implausible because it rules out the logical possibility of the laws of nature being violated. Sehon says, for instance, that determinism is incompatible with the logical possibility of an interventionist God. His objection to the Consequence Argument boils down to a way of reading the box in what is implied by van Inwagen's conception of determinism. Sehon reads the box as logical necessity, and this clearly precludes (...)
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  9. added 2017-06-12
    Able to Do the Impossible.Jack Spencer - 2017 - Mind 126 (502):466-497.
    According to a widely held principle—the poss-ability principle—an agent, S, is able to only if it is metaphysically possible for S to. I argue against the poss-ability principle by developing a novel class of counterexamples. I then argue that the consequences of rejecting the poss-ability principle are interesting and far-reaching.
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  10. added 2017-01-19
    Self-Representation & Good Determination.Michael Popejoy - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (1):113-122.
    I argue that a distinction made in recent literature in the philosophy of mind between self-organizing and self-governing systems can serve as the basis of a principled distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ determination on the part of the compatibilist with respect to freedom or control. I first consider two arguments for the claim that causal determinism undermines control: the Consequence Argument as presented by Peter van Inwagen, and the Four Case Argument of Derk Pereboom. I then elucidate the difference between (...)
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  11. added 2017-01-16
    The Consequence Argument and the Definition of Determinism.Christopher Hughes - 2015 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 71 (4):705-724.
    Resumo Peter van Inwagen no seu An Essay of Free Will e, no muito mais tarde, “The Consequence Argument” formula várias versões daquilo que designou por “o argumento de consequência”. van Inwagen descreveu o “argumento da consequência” como um argumento para a incompatibilidade do determinismo com o livre arbítrio. Contudo, o autor deste artigo argumenta que a mais recente formulação do argumento da consequência não é, tal como está, um argumento para a incompatibilidade do determinismo com o livre arbítrio. Embora (...)
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  12. added 2017-01-15
    A New Way with the Consequence Argument, and the Fixity of the Laws.J. Westphal - 2003 - Analysis 63 (3):208-212.
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  13. added 2017-01-12
    Free Will and Rationality.António Zilhão - 2015 - Axiomathes 25 (1):93-106.
    In this paper I analyse different justifications for the claim that the minor premise of the libertarian argument is true, namely, intuition, van Inwagen’s argument from moral responsibility and an argument from rationality. I claim none of these is satisfactory. I conclude by suggesting a possible way of interpreting the meaning of the free will intuition libertarians claim we have.
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  14. added 2016-12-12
    What Must a Proof of Incompatibilism Prove?Seth Shabo - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (3):361-371.
    Peter van Inwagen has developed two highly influential strategies for establishing incompatibilism about causal determinism and moral responsibility. These have come to be known as ‘the Direct Argument’ and ‘the Indirect Argument,’ respectively. In recent years, the two arguments have attracted closely related criticisms. In each case, it is claimed, the argument does not provide a fully general defense of the incompatibilist’s conclusion. While the critics are right to notice these arguments’ limitations, they have not made it clear what the (...)
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  15. added 2016-12-08
    Can the Incompatibilist Get Past the No Past Objection?Jiji Zhang - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (3):345-352.
    I refute Bailey's claim that his argument for incompatibilism is immune to Campbell's No Past Objection. In my refutation I stress a simple point, that nomological necessitation by future world states does not undermine one's freedom with respect to the present world state. My analysis reveals that the No Past Objection challenges van Inwagen's second consequence argument about as much as it does the others, and suggests that the (uncompromising) incompatibilist must pursue some of the options that Bailey regarded as (...)
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  16. added 2016-12-08
    Free Will.Joseph Keim Campbell - 2011 - Polity.
    What is free will? Why is it important? Can the same act be both free and determined? Is free will necessary for moral responsibility? Does anyone have free will, and if not, how is creativity possible and how can anyone be praised or blamed for anything? These are just some of the questions considered by Joseph Keim Campbell in this lively and accessible introduction to the concept of free will. Using a range of engaging examples the book introduces the problems, (...)
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  17. added 2016-12-08
    A Flawed Conception of Determinism in the Consequence Argument.S. Sehon - 2011 - Analysis 71 (1):30-38.
    According to the Consequence Argument, the truth of determinism plus other plausible principles would yield the conclusion that we have no free will. In this paper I will argue that the conception of determinism typically employed in the various versions of the Consequence Argument is not plausible. In particular, I will argue that, taken most straightforwardly, determinism as defined in the Consequence Argument would imply that the existence of God is logically impossible. This is quite an implausible result. The truth (...)
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  18. added 2016-12-08
    A Contextualist Reply to the Direct Argument.Matthew H. Slater - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 125 (1):115-137.
    The Direct Argument for the incompatibility of moral responsibility and determinism is designed to side-step complaints given by compatibilist critiques of the so-called Transfer Argument. I argue that while it represents an improvement over the Transfer Argument, it loses some of its plausibility when we reflect on some metalogical issues about normal modal modeling and the semantics of natural language. More specifically, the crucial principle on which the Direct Argument depends appears doubtful where context plays a role in evaluation of (...)
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  19. added 2016-12-08
    N.A. Blum - 2000 - Analysis 60 (3):284-286.
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  20. added 2016-12-08
    Incompatibilism and Ambiguity in the Practical Modalities.T. Kapitan - 1996 - Analysis 56 (2):102-110.
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  21. added 2016-09-20
    ‘Determinism’ Is Just Fine: A Reply to Scott Sehon.Gabriel Marco - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-9.
    Scott Sehon recently argued that the standard notion of determinism employed in the Consequence Argument makes it so that, if our world turns out to be deterministic, then an interventionist God is logically impossible. He further argues that because of this, we should revise our notion of determinism. In this paper I show that Sehon’s argument for the claim that the truth of determinism, in this sense, would make an interventionist God logically impossible ultimately fails. I then offer and respond (...)
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  22. added 2016-09-20
    Free Will Hunting.Ken Michael Levy - 1999 - Dissertation, Rutgers the State University of New Jersey - New Brunswick
    Philosophers misleadingly speak of "the problem of free will". This is misleading because there is not just one but several different problems of free will. "The problem" to which philosophers usually refer is the question: is free will even possible? I address this question in Chapters 2 and 3. In Chapter 2, I argue that if free will entails ultimate self-causation, then free will is indeed impossible. But I then argue in Chapter 3 that free will does not entail ultimate (...)
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  23. added 2016-09-19
    Free Will and Miracles.Neal A. Tognazzini - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):236-238.
    The Consequence Argument is sound only if no one has a choice about the laws of nature, and one prominent compatibilist reply to the argument—championed by David Lewis —begins by claiming that there is a sense in which we do have such a choice, and a sense in which we don't. Lewis then insists that the sense in which we do have such a choice is the only sense required by compatibilism. Peter van Inwagen has responded that even if Lewis's (...)
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  24. added 2016-09-06
    The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism.Peter Van Inwagen - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 27 (3):185 - 199.
    In this paper I shall define a thesis I shall call ' determinism ', and argue that it is incompatible with the thesis that we are able to act otherwise than we do. Other theses, some of them very different from what I shall call ' determinism ', have at least an equal right to this name, and, therefore, I do not claim to show that every thesis that could be called ' determinism ' without historical impropriety is incompatible with (...)
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  25. added 2016-08-22
    Traditional Compatibilism Reformulated and Defended.Markus E. Schlosser - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Research 42:277-300.
    Traditional compatibilism about free will is widely considered to be untenable. In particular, the conditional analysis of the ability to do otherwise appears to be subject to clear counterexamples. I will propose a new version of traditional compatibilism that provides a conditional account of both the ability to do otherwise and the ability to choose to do otherwise, and I will argue that this view withstands the standard objections to traditional compatibilism. For this, I will assume with incompatibilists that the (...)
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  26. added 2016-04-15
    ‘Can’ and the Consequence Argument.Alex Grzankowski - 2014 - Ratio 27 (2):173-189.
    The consequence argument is a powerful incompatibilist argument for the conclusion that, if determinism is true, what one does is what one must do. A major point of controversy between classical compatibilists and incompatibilists has been over the use of ‘can’ in the consequence argument. Classical compatibilists, holding that abilities to act are dispositions, have argued that ‘can’ should be analyzed as a conditional. But such an analysis of ‘can’ puts compatibilists in a position to grant the premises of the (...)
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  27. added 2016-04-10
    Der metaphysische Begriff der Willensfreiheit und das Transferprinzip des Keine-Wahl-Habens.Godehard Brüntrup - 2000 - In Dirk Greiman & Constanze Peres (eds.), Wahrheit - Sein - Struktur. Auseinandersetzungen mit Metaphysik. Georg Olms. pp. 102-120.
    Article on the problem of free will and determinism. A defense of the so-called "consequence argument" arguing that free will and determinism are incompatible.
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  28. added 2015-11-19
    The Manipulation Argument.Kristin Mickelson - 2016 - In Chapter 14, the Routledge Companion to Free Will (editors: Meghan Griffith , Kevin Timpe & Neil Levy). New York: Routledge.
    "The Manipulation Argument has recently taken center stage in the free-will debate, yet little else can be said of this newcomer that is uncontroversial. At present, even the most fundamental elements of the Manipulation Argument--its structure, conclusion, and target audience--are a matter of dispute. As such, we cannot begin, as we ideally would, with a simple and relatively uncontroversial overview of the argument. Instead, clarifying the debate over the basic structure and general conclusion of the Manipulation Argument will be our (...)
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  29. added 2015-09-17
    What’s Wrong with the Consequence Argument: In Defence of Compatibilist Libertarianism.Christian List - manuscript
    The most prominent argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism is Peter van Inwagen’s consequence argument. In this paper, I offer a new diagnosis of what is wrong with this argument. Both proponents and critics of the argument typically accept the way it is framed and only disagree on whether the argument’s premises and the rules of inference on which it relies are true. I suggest that the argument involves a category mistake: it conflates two different levels of (...)
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  30. added 2015-08-25
    The Metasphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control.John Martin Fischer - 1994 - Wiley-Blackwell.
    The Metaphysics of Free Will provides a through statement of the major grounds for skepticism about the reality of free will and moral responsibility. The author identifies and explains the sort of control that is associated with personhood and accountability, and shows how it is consistent with causal determinism. In so doing, out view of ourselves as morally responsible agents is protected against the disturbing changes posed by science and religion.
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  31. added 2015-07-25
    Willensfreiheit. Antworten auf Walde, Willaschek und Jäger.Geert Keil - 2009 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 57 (5):781-795.
    The article is a reply to three reviews of my book Willensfreiheit which were published in a previous issue of this journal. In the book, I develop a libertarian account of free will that invokes neither uncaused events nor mind-body dualism nor agent causality. Against Bettina Walde′s criticism, I argue that a well-balanced libertarianism can evade the luck objection and that it should not be portrayed as positing tiny causal gaps in an otherwise deterministic world. Against Marcus Willaschek′s Moorean compatibilism, (...)
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  32. added 2015-06-12
    Determinismus und Verantwortung: Was kann das Konsequenzargument?Christoph Jäger - 2009 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 57 (1):119-131.
    In his recent book Willensfreiheit Geert Keil defends a version of libertarianism. Yet he criticizes a flagship argument for incompatibilism. Van Inwagen's consequence argument, Keil thinks, relies on an irrelevant premise when it claims that agents have no choice about the remote past. I argue that Keil's charge rests on a misunderstanding. I then sketch why discussions of the consequence argument should focus on the question whether or not a certain version of rule Beta is valid.
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  33. added 2015-05-21
    Incompatibilism and the Fixity of the Past.Neal A. Tognazzini & John Martin Fischer - 2017 - In John Keller (ed.), Being, Freedom, and Method: Themes From the Philosophy of Peter van Inwagen. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 140-148.
    A style of argument that calls into question our freedom (in the sense that involves freedom to do otherwise) has been around for millennia; it can be traced back to Origen. The argument-form makes use of the crucial idea that the past is over-and-done-with and thus fixed; we cannot now do anything about the distant past (or, for that matter, the recent past)—it is now too late. Peter van Inwagen has presented this argument (what he calls the Consequence Argument) in (...)
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  34. added 2015-03-24
    Molinists Cannot Endorse the Consequence Argument.Yishai Cohen - 2015 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77 (3):231-246.
    Perszyk has argued that Molinists cannot consistently endorse the consequence argument because of a structurally similar argument for the incompatibility of true Molinist counterfactuals of freedom and the ability to do otherwise. Wierenga has argued that on the proper understanding of CCFs, there is a relevant difference between the consequence argument and the anti-Molinist argument. I argue that, even on Wierenga’s understanding of CCFs, there is in fact no relevant difference between the two arguments. Moreover, I strengthen Perszyk’s challenge by (...)
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  35. added 2014-12-02
    Das Konsequenzargument.Christoph Jäger - 2013 - In Rolf W. Puster (ed.), Klassische Argumentationen der Philosophie. pp. 275-296.
    The paper reconstructs causal and theological versions of the consequence argument against the compatibility of free will and determinism and discusses the most influential objections to them.
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  36. added 2014-08-18
    Truthmakers and the Consequence Argument.Charles Hermes - manuscript
    Recent work in the truthmakers literature demonstrates that the logic of truthmaking is distinct from classical logic. Since free will is an ontological issue, and not merely a semantic issue, arguments about free will ought to be sensitive to these developments. In Truthmakers and the Direct Argument, Hermes argues that one of the main arguments for incompatibiilsm fails precisely where the truthmakers literature would predict. Here, I argue that similar problems make the Consequence Argument untenable.
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  37. added 2014-07-10
    What Free Will Is.Danny Frederick - manuscript
    A very brief explanation of free will and the confusion of the contemporary debate.
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  38. added 2014-05-28
    Against Counterfactual Miracles.Cian Dorr - 2016 - Philosophical Review 125 (2):241-286.
    This paper considers how counterfactuals should be evaluated on the assumption that determinism is true. I argue against Lewis's influential view that the actual laws of nature would have been false if something had happened that never actually happened, and in favour of the competing view that history would have been different all the way back. I argue that we can do adequate justice to our ordinary practice of relying on a wide range of historical truths in evaluating counterfactuals by (...)
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  39. added 2014-04-02
    Free Will, Determinism, and the Possibility of Doing Otherwise.Christian List - 2014 - Noûs 48 (1):156-178.
    I argue that free will and determinism are compatible, even when we take free will to require the ability to do otherwise and even when we interpret that ability modally, as the possibility of doing otherwise, and not just conditionally or dispositionally. My argument draws on a distinction between physical and agential possibility. Although in a deterministic world only one future sequence of events is physically possible for each state of the world, the more coarsely defined state of an agent (...)
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  40. added 2014-04-02
    Incompatibilism and the Past.Andrew M. Bailey - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):351-376.
    There is a new objection to the Consequence Argument for incompatibilism. I argue that the objection is more wide-ranging than originally thought. In particular: if it tells against the Consequence Argument, it tells against other arguments for incompatibilism too. I survey a few ways of dealing with this objection and show the costs of each. I then present an argument for incompatibilism that is immune to the objection and that enjoys other advantages.
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  41. added 2014-04-02
    An Essay on Free Will. By Peter van Inwagen.Victoria S. Wike - 1986 - Modern Schoolman 63 (3):225-226.
  42. added 2014-03-30
    The Mind Argument and Libertarianism.Alicia Finch & Ted A. Warfield - 1998 - Mind 107 (427):515-28.
    Many critics of libertarian freedom have charged that freedom is incompatible with indeterminism. We show that the strongest argument that has been provided for this claim is invalid. The invalidity of the argument in question, however, implies the invalidity of the standard Consequence argument for the incompatibility of freedom and determinism. We show how to repair the Consequence argument and argue that no similar improvement will revive the worry about the compatibility of indeterminism and freedom.
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  43. added 2014-03-29
    A Reconsideration of an Argument Against Compatibilism.Thomas McKay & David Johnson - 1996 - Philosophical Topics 24 (2):113-122.
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  44. added 2014-03-27
    Van Inwagen's Consequence Argument Against Compatibilism.Grant Sterling - 2011 - In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 123--124.
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  45. added 2014-03-27
    Van Inwagen's Consequence Argument.Michael Huemer - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (4):525-544.
    Peter van Inwagen ’s argument for incompatibilism uses a sentential operator, “N”, which can be read as “No one has any choice about the fact that....” I show that, given van Inwagen ’s understanding of the notion of having a choice, the argument is invalid. However, a different interpretation of “N” can be given, such that the argument is clearly valid, the premises remain highly plausible, and the conclusion implies that free will is incompatible with determinism.
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  46. added 2014-03-27
    Compatibilism and the Consequence Argument.Terence Horgan - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 47 (May):339-56.
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  47. added 2014-03-24
    Reply to Huemer on the Consequence Argument.Helen Beebee - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):235-241.
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  48. added 2014-03-23
    Molinism and the Consequence Argument.Kenneth J. Perszyk - 2003 - Faith and Philosophy 20 (2):131-151.
  49. added 2014-03-21
    Incompatibilism and the Logic of Transfer.Danilo šuster - 2004 - Acta Analytica 19 (33):45-54.
    Modal arguments for incompatibility of freedom and determinism are typically based on the “transfer principle” for inability to act otherwise (Beta). The principle of agglomerativity (closure under conjunction introduction) is derivable from Beta. The most convincing counterexample to Beta is based on the denial of Agglomeration. The defender of the modal argument has two ways to block counterexamples to Beta: (i) use a notion of inability to act otherwise which is immune to the counterexample to agglomerativity; (ii) replace Beta with (...)
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  50. added 2014-03-12
    Saying Good-Bye to the Direct Argument the Right Way.Michael McKenna - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (3):349-383.
    Peter van Inwagen contends that nonresponsibility transfers across deterministic relations. Suppose it does. If the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail every truth about what one does, and no one is even in part morally responsible for the past and the laws, then no one is even in part morally responsible for what one does. This argument, the Direct Argument, has drawn various critics, who have attempted to produce counterexamples to its core inference principle. This article (...)
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