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  1. added 2020-02-10
    Counterfactuals, Counteractuals, and Free Choice.Fabio Lampert & Pedro Merlussi - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-25.
    In a recent paper, Pruss (2013) proves the validity of the rule beta-2 relative to Lewis’s semantics for counterfactuals, which is a significant step forward in the debate about the consequence argument. Yet, we believe there remain intuitive counter-examples to beta-2 formulated with the actuality operator and rigidified descriptions. We offer a novel and two-dimensional formulation of the Lewisian semantics for coun- terfactuals and prove the validity of a new transfer rule according to which a new version of the consequence (...)
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  2. added 2019-12-28
    Frankfurt Cases and 'Could Have Done Otherwise'.Leslie Allan - manuscript
    In his seminal essay, Harry Frankfurt argued that our exercise of free will and allocation of moral responsibility do not depend on us being able to do other than we did. Leslie Allan defends this moral maxim from Frankfurt's attack. Applying his character-based counterfactual conditional analysis of free acts to Frankfurt's counterexamples, Allan unpacks the confusions that lie at the heart of Frankfurt's argument. The author also explores how his 4C compatibilist theory measures up against Frankfurt’s conclusions.
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  3. added 2019-12-20
    The Consequence of the Consequence Argument.Marco Hausmann - 2019 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy (AO):AO.
    The aim of my paper is to compare three alternative formal reconstructions of van Inwagen’s famous argument for incompatibilism. In the first part of my paper, I examine van Inwagen’s own reconstruction within a propositional modal logic. I point out that, due to the expressive limitations of his propositional modal logic, van Inwagen is unable to argue directly (that is, within his formal framework) for incompatibilism. In the second part of my paper, I suggest to reconstruct van Inwagen’s argument within (...)
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  4. added 2019-07-19
    The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge.Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski - 1991 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    A compelling contribution to the field, The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge will appeal to students and scholars of theistic philosophy and the philosophy ...
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  5. added 2019-07-19
    God, Freedom, and Foreknowledge.John Martin Fischer (ed.) - 1989 - Stanford, Ca: Stanford University Press.
  6. added 2019-07-12
    Modal Inference and the Free-Will Problem.Peter Van Inwagen - 1991 - Daimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 3:57-63.
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  7. added 2019-06-06
    Dennett and Taylor’s Alleged Refutation of the Consequence Argument.Johan E. Gustafsson - forthcoming - Analysis:anz048.
    Daniel C. Dennett and Christopher Taylor claim that the Consequence Argument relies on an inference rule that is invalid given a fairly plausible account of having the power to cause something. I show that Dennett and Taylor’s refutation does not work against a better, more standard version of the Consequence Argument.
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  8. added 2019-06-06
    Reply to Brueckner.Joseph Keim Campbell - 2008 - Analysis 68 (3):264-269.
  9. added 2019-06-06
    The Consequence Argument and the Mind Argument.Dana Nelkin - 2001 - Analysis 61 (2):107-115.
  10. added 2019-06-06
    Freedom and Experience: Self-Determination Without Illusions.Magill Kevin - 1997 - London: author open access, originally MacMillan.
    Most of us take it for granted that we are free agents: that we can sometimes act so as to shape our own lives and those of others, that we have choices about how to do so and that we are responsible for what we do. But are we really justified in believing this? For centuries philosophers have argued about whether free will and moral responsibility are compatible with determinism or natural causation, and they seem no closer to agreeing about (...)
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  11. added 2019-06-06
    Reply to Christopher Hill.Peter van Inwagen - 1992 - Analysis 52 (2):56.
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  12. added 2019-05-02
    Time, Leeway, and the Laws of Nature: Why Humean Compatibilists Cannot Be Eternalists.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2019 - Metaphysica 20 (1):51-71.
    Humean compatibilism combines a Humean conception of laws of nature with a strong dual-ability condition for free will that requires that agents possess the ability to decide differently when they make a free decision. On the Humean view of laws of nature, laws of nature are taken to be contingent non-governing descriptions of significant regularities that obtain in the entire history of the universe. On Humean compatibilism, agents are taken to possess dual ability when making free decisions because what the (...)
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  13. added 2019-04-20
    Freier Wille und Naturgesetze: Überlegungen zum Konsequenzargument.Andreas Hüttemann & Christian Loew - 2019 - In Martin Breul, Aaron Langenfeld, Saskia Wendel & Klaus von Stoch (eds.), Streit um die Freiheit – Philosophische und Theologische Perspektiven. Paderborn: Schöningh. pp. 77-93.
    In this paper, we argue that the Consequence Argument relies on empirical premises. In particular, we show how the argument depends upon assumptions about the character of the laws of nature.
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  14. added 2019-04-20
    Willensfreiheit. Antworten auf Walde, Willaschek und Jäger.Geert Keil - 2009 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 57 (5):781-195.
    The article is a reply to three reviews of my book Willensfreiheit (Berlin/New York 2007) which were published in a previous issue of this journal. In the book, I develop a libertarian account of free will that invokes neither uncaused events nor mind-body dualism nor agent causality. Against Bettina Walde’s criticism, I argue that a well-balanced libertarianism can evade the luck objection and that it should not be portrayed as positing tiny causal gaps in an otherwise deterministic world. Against Marcus (...)
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  15. added 2019-04-08
    The Counterfactual Structure of the Consequence Argument.Stefan Rummens - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-20.
    This paper revisits a well-known rebuttal of Peter van Inwagen’s consequence argument. This CS-rebuttal, as I shall call it, focuses on the counterfactual structure of alternative possibilities. It shows that the ability to do otherwise is such that if the agent had exercised it, the distant past and/or the laws of nature would have been different. On the counterfactual scenario, there is, therefore, no need for the agent to exercise an ability to change the past or the laws of nature. (...)
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  16. added 2019-04-08
    Elusive Freedom? A Reply to Helen Beebee.Michael Huemer - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (3):411-416.
    I defend my earlier argument for incompatibilism, against Helen Beebee’s reply. Beebee’s reply would allow one to have free will despite that nothing one does counts as an exercise of that freedom, and would grant one the ability to do A even when one’s doing A requires something to happen that one cannot bring about and that in fact will not happen.
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  17. added 2019-04-08
    The Core of the Consequence Argument.Alex Blum - 2003 - Dialectica 57 (4):423-429.
    We suggest that the classical version of the consequence argument contending that freedom and determinism are incompatible subtly misstates the core intuition, which is that if a true conditional and a true antecedent are jointly beyond our control, then so is the consequent. We show however that the improved version no less than the classical implies fatalism.Interestingly, the reasoning, that yields fatalism, undermines a direct argument for the soundness of the improved version. But if fatalism is sound, then trivially, so (...)
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  18. added 2019-04-08
    The Irrelevance of Indeterministic Counterexamples to Principle Beta.Thomas M. Crisp & Ted A. Warfield - 2000 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):173-184.
    Incompatibilism about freedom and causal determinism is commonly supported by appeal to versions of the well known Consequence argument. Critics of the Consequence argument have presented counterexamples to the Consequence argument's central inference principle. The thesis of this article is that proponents of the Consequence argument can easily bypass even the best of these counterexamples.
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  19. added 2019-04-08
    On an Argument for Incompatibilism.David Widerker - 1986 - Analysis 46 (4):37-41.
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  20. added 2019-03-29
    The Logic of Freedom.Joseph Michael Campbell - 1992 - Dissertation, The University of Arizona
    I take it for granted that free will is a central philosophical notion. Still, throughout Western history certain philosophers have put forth arguments which claim that no person has, or could have, free will. These arguments may be grouped into three different types. First, there are metalogical arguments which argue that since all propositions are either true or false, and since propositions do not change their truth-values, no person ever has free will. Second, there are divination arguments which claim that (...)
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  21. added 2019-02-22
    Bailey on Incompatibilism and the “No Past Objection”.Anthony Brueckner & Christopher T. Buford - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (4):613-617.
    In ”Incompatibilism and the Past,” Andrew Bailey engages in a thorough investigation of what he calls the "No Past Objection" to arguments for incompatibilism.This is an objection that stems from the work of Joseph Keim Campbell and that has generated an Interesting literature. Bailey ends by offering his own answer to the No Past Objection by giving his own argument for incompatibilism, an argument that he claims to be immune to the objection. We have some observations to make regarding what (...)
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  22. added 2019-02-22
    Free Will and the Necessity of the Past.J. K. Campbell - 2007 - Analysis 67 (2):105-111.
  23. added 2019-02-11
    What the Consequence Argument Is an Argument For.Justin A. Capes - 2019 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 8 (1):50-56.
    The consequence argument is among the most influential arguments for the conclusion that free will and determinism are incompatible. Recently, however, it has become increasingly clear that the argument fails to establish that particular incompatibilist conclusion. Even so, a version of the argument can be formulated that supports a different incompatibilist conclusion, according to which free will is incompatible with our behavior being predetermined by factors beyond our control. This conclusion, though not equivalent to the traditional incompatibilist thesis that determinism (...)
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  24. added 2019-02-11
    The Consequence Argument Ungrounded.Marco Hausmann - 2018 - Synthese 195 (11):4931-4950.
    Peter van Inwagen’s original formulation of the Consequence Argument employed an inference rule that was shown to be invalid given van Inwagen’s interpretation of the modal operators in the Consequence Argument. In response, van Inwagen recently suggested a revised interpretation of his modal operators. Following up on a debate between Blum and Schnieder, I analyze van Inwagen’s revised interpretation in terms of explanatory notions and I argue that van Inwagen faces a dilemma: he either has to admit that beta entails (...)
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  25. added 2019-02-11
    What is the Consequence Argument an Argument For?Brian Cutter - 2017 - Analysis 77 (2):278-287.
    The consequence argument is widely regarded as the most important argument for incompatibilism. In this paper, I argue that, although the consequence argument may be sound in its standard formulations, it does not support any thesis that could reasonably be called ‘incompatibilism’.
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  26. added 2019-02-11
    A Strengthening of the Consequence Argument for Incompatibilism.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2017 - Analysis 77 (4):705-715.
    The aim of the Consequence Argument is to show that, if determinism is true, no one has, or ever had, any choice about anything. In the stock version of the argument, its two premisses state that no one is, or ever was, able to act so that the past would have been different and no one is, or ever was, able to act so that the laws of nature would have been different. This stock version fails, however, because it requires (...)
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  27. added 2019-02-11
    Relative Modality and the Ability to Do Otherwise.Ralph Weir - 2016 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 12 (1):47-61.
    It is widely held that for an action to be free it must be the case that the agent can do otherwise. Compatibilists and incompatibilists disagree over what this ability amounts to. Two recent articles offer novel perspectives on the debate by employing Angelika Kratzer’s semantics of ‘can’. Alex Grzankowski proposes that Kratzer’s semantics favour incompatibilism because they make valid a version of the Consequence Argument. Christian List argues that Kratzer’s semantics favour a novel form of compatibilism. I argue that (...)
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  28. added 2019-02-11
    Retooling the Consequence Argument.Anthony Brueckner - 2008 - Analysis 68 (1):10-13.
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  29. added 2019-02-11
    Van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument.Michael Huemer - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (4):525.
    Peter van Inwagen has presented a compelling argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism, which he calls “the Consequence Argument.” This argument depends on a controversial inference rule, “rule beta,” which says.
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  30. added 2019-02-11
    Van Inwagen on the Consequence Argument.Christopher S. Hill - 1992 - Analysis 52 (2):49.
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  31. added 2019-02-07
    Causes, Laws, and Free Will.Storrs McCall - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):870-871.
  32. added 2019-02-07
    Free Will.Derk Pereboom (ed.) - 2009 - Hackett Publishing Company.
    A unique anthology featuring contributions to the dispute over free will from Aristotle to the twenty-first century, Derk Pereboom's volume presents the most thoughtful positions taken in this crucial debate and discusses their consequences for free will's traditional corollary, moral responsibility. The Second Edition retains the organizational structure that made its predecessor the leading anthology of its kind, while adding major new selections by such philosophers as Spinoza, Reid, John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Galen Strawson, and Timothy O'Connor. _Hackett Readings (...)
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  33. added 2018-08-20
    Laws of Nature and Free Will.Pedro Merlussi - 2017 - Dissertation, Durham University
    This thesis investigates the conceptual relationship between laws of nature and free will. In order to clarify the discussion, I begin by distinguishing several questions with respect to the nature of a law: i) do the laws of nature cover everything that happens? ii) are they deterministic? iii) can there be exceptions to universal and deterministic laws? iv) do the laws of nature govern everything in the world? In order to answer these questions I look at three widely endorsed accounts (...)
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  34. added 2018-07-20
    Manipulation Arguments and the Freedom to Do Otherwise.Patrick Todd - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):395-407.
    I provide a manipulation-style argument against classical compatibilism—the claim that freedom to do otherwise is consistent with determinism. My question is simple: if Diana really gave Ernie free will, why isn't she worried that he won't use it precisely as she would like? Diana's non-nervousness, I argue, indicates Ernie's non-freedom. Arguably, the intuition that Ernie lacks freedom to do otherwise is stronger than the direct intuition that he is simply not responsible; this result highlights the importance of the denial of (...)
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  35. added 2018-02-17
    Freedom, Causation, and the Consequence Argument.Laura Waddell Ekstrom - 1998 - Synthese 115 (3):333-354.
    The problem of analyzing causation and the problem of incompatibilism versus compatibilism are largely distinct. Yet, this paper will show that there are some theories of causation that a compatibilist should not endorse: namely, counterfactual theories, specifically the one developed by David Lewis and a newer, amended version of his account. Endorsing either of those accounts of causation undercuts the main compatibilist reply to a powerful argument for incompatibilism. Conversely, the argument of this paper has the following message for incompatibilists: (...)
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  36. added 2017-11-09
    The Explanatory Power of Local Miracle Compatibilism.Garrett Pendergraft - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):249-266.
    Local miracle compatibilists claim that we are sometimes able to do otherwise than we actually do, even if causal determinism obtains. When we can do otherwise, it will often be true that if we were to do otherwise, then an actual law of nature would not have been a law of nature. Nevertheless, it is a compatibilist principle that we cannot do anything that would be or cause an event that violates the laws of nature. Carl Ginet challenges this nomological (...)
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  37. added 2017-09-18
    Freedom of the Will.Randolph Clarke - 2002 - In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 369--404.
    This chapter in the Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind surveys issues concerning free will. Topics include the compatibility question, compatibilist accounts, and libertarian accounts of free will.
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  38. added 2017-07-25
    Student.Krishna Mantirraju - manuscript
    Freedom is an impossibility; the dream of having the ability to choose anything one wants is hampered by reality. However, what aspect of reality ultimately hampers the birth of true freedom? What I propose is that reality itself makes freedom impossible. Furthermore, I also make the logical assumption, from the evidence I have found, that the only entity that can have freedom is a being that is formless, timeless, featureless, and is an infinite environment of nothing. While my studies today (...)
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  39. added 2017-07-24
    Determinism, Laws of Nature and the Consequence Argument.Pedro Merlussi - 2016 - Manuscrito 39 (1):73-95.
    Scott Sehon argues that the conception of determinism employed in the Consequence Argument is implausible because it rules out the logical possibility of the laws of nature being violated. Sehon says, for instance, that determinism is incompatible with the logical possibility of an interventionist God. His objection to the Consequence Argument boils down to a way of reading the box in what is implied by van Inwagen's conception of determinism. Sehon reads the box as logical necessity, and this clearly precludes (...)
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  40. added 2017-06-12
    Able to Do the Impossible.Jack Spencer - 2017 - Mind 126 (502):466-497.
    According to a widely held principle—the poss-ability principle—an agent, S, is able to only if it is metaphysically possible for S to. I argue against the poss-ability principle by developing a novel class of counterexamples. I then argue that the consequences of rejecting the poss-ability principle are interesting and far-reaching.
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  41. added 2017-01-19
    Self-Representation & Good Determination.Michael Popejoy - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (1):113-122.
    I argue that a distinction made in recent literature in the philosophy of mind between self-organizing and self-governing systems can serve as the basis of a principled distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ determination on the part of the compatibilist with respect to freedom or control. I first consider two arguments for the claim that causal determinism undermines control: the Consequence Argument as presented by Peter van Inwagen, and the Four Case Argument of Derk Pereboom. I then elucidate the difference between (...)
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  42. added 2017-01-16
    The Consequence Argument and the Definition of Determinism.Christopher Hughes - 2015 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 71 (4):705-724.
    Resumo Peter van Inwagen no seu An Essay of Free Will e, no muito mais tarde, “The Consequence Argument” formula várias versões daquilo que designou por “o argumento de consequência”. van Inwagen descreveu o “argumento da consequência” como um argumento para a incompatibilidade do determinismo com o livre arbítrio. Contudo, o autor deste artigo argumenta que a mais recente formulação do argumento da consequência não é, tal como está, um argumento para a incompatibilidade do determinismo com o livre arbítrio. Embora (...)
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  43. added 2017-01-15
    A New Way with the Consequence Argument, and the Fixity of the Laws.J. Westphal - 2003 - Analysis 63 (3):208-212.
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  44. added 2017-01-12
    Free Will and Rationality.António Zilhão - 2015 - Axiomathes 25 (1):93-106.
    In this paper I analyse different justifications for the claim that the minor premise of the libertarian argument is true, namely, intuition, van Inwagen’s argument from moral responsibility and an argument from rationality. I claim none of these is satisfactory. I conclude by suggesting a possible way of interpreting the meaning of the free will intuition libertarians claim we have.
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  45. added 2016-12-12
    What Must a Proof of Incompatibilism Prove?Seth Shabo - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (3):361-371.
    Peter van Inwagen has developed two highly influential strategies for establishing incompatibilism about causal determinism and moral responsibility. These have come to be known as ‘the Direct Argument’ and ‘the Indirect Argument,’ respectively. In recent years, the two arguments have attracted closely related criticisms. In each case, it is claimed, the argument does not provide a fully general defense of the incompatibilist’s conclusion. While the critics are right to notice these arguments’ limitations, they have not made it clear what the (...)
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  46. added 2016-12-08
    Can the Incompatibilist Get Past the No Past Objection?Jiji Zhang - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (3):345-352.
    I refute Bailey's claim that his argument for incompatibilism is immune to Campbell's No Past Objection. In my refutation I stress a simple point, that nomological necessitation by future world states does not undermine one's freedom with respect to the present world state. My analysis reveals that the No Past Objection challenges van Inwagen's second consequence argument about as much as it does the others, and suggests that the (uncompromising) incompatibilist must pursue some of the options that Bailey regarded as (...)
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  47. added 2016-12-08
    Free Will.Joseph Keim Campbell - 2011 - Polity.
    What is free will? Why is it important? Can the same act be both free and determined? Is free will necessary for moral responsibility? Does anyone have free will, and if not, how is creativity possible and how can anyone be praised or blamed for anything? These are just some of the questions considered by Joseph Keim Campbell in this lively and accessible introduction to the concept of free will. Using a range of engaging examples the book introduces the problems, (...)
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  48. added 2016-12-08
    A Flawed Conception of Determinism in the Consequence Argument.S. Sehon - 2011 - Analysis 71 (1):30-38.
    According to the Consequence Argument, the truth of determinism plus other plausible principles would yield the conclusion that we have no free will. In this paper I will argue that the conception of determinism typically employed in the various versions of the Consequence Argument is not plausible. In particular, I will argue that, taken most straightforwardly, determinism as defined in the Consequence Argument would imply that the existence of God is logically impossible. This is quite an implausible result. The truth (...)
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  49. added 2016-12-08
    A Contextualist Reply to the Direct Argument.Matthew H. Slater - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 125 (1):115-137.
    The Direct Argument for the incompatibility of moral responsibility and determinism is designed to side-step complaints given by compatibilist critiques of the so-called Transfer Argument. I argue that while it represents an improvement over the Transfer Argument, it loses some of its plausibility when we reflect on some metalogical issues about normal modal modeling and the semantics of natural language. More specifically, the crucial principle on which the Direct Argument depends appears doubtful where context plays a role in evaluation of (...)
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  50. added 2016-12-08
    N.A. Blum - 2000 - Analysis 60 (3):284-286.
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