About this topic
Summary Do perceptual experiences purport to tell us about our immediate environment?  If so, what form does the 'telling' take? Do experiences have accuracy conditions? If so, what is the relationship between those accuracy conditions and the conscious character of experience? What is the relationship between contents of experience and concepts? If perceptual experiences have contents, which contents can they have? What kinds of properties are we presented with in experience? Are contents object-involving, or can two experiences have the same contents, even if they are experiences of seeing different objects?
Key works Siegel 2005 provides an overview of issues concerning the contents of perception.  PEACOCKE 1992 discuses basic issues concerning the role of concepts in experience contents.
Introductions Siegel 2005
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409 found
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  1. added 2020-06-18
    Perceptual Experience and Degrees of Belief.Thomas Raleigh & Filippo Vindrola - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    According to the recent Perceptual Confidence view, perceptual experiences possess not only a representational content, but also a degree of confidence in that content. The motivations for this view are partly phenomenological and partly epistemic. We discuss both the phenomenological and epistemic motivations for the view, and the resulting account of the interface between perceptual experiences and degrees of belief. We conclude that, in their present state of development, orthodox accounts of perceptual experience are still to be favoured over the (...)
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  2. added 2020-06-16
    The Two-Dimensional Content of Consciousness.Simon Prosser - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (3):319 - 349.
    In this paper I put forward a representationalist theory of conscious experience based on Robert Stalnaker's version of two-dimensional modal semantics. According to this theory the phenomenal character of an experience correlates with a content equivalent to what Stalnaker calls the diagonal proposition. I show that the theory is closely related both to functionalist theories of consciousness and to higher-order representational theories. It is also more compatible with an anti-Cartesian view of the mind than standard representationalist theories.
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  3. added 2020-06-03
    The Inaugural Address: Analogue Content.Christopher Peacocke - 1986 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes( 60:1-17.
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  4. added 2020-05-22
    Double Vision, Phosphenes and Afterimages: Non-Endorsed Representations Rather Than Non-Representational Qualia.Işık Sarıhan - 2020 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 16 (1):5-32.
    Pure representationalism or intentionalism for phenomenal experience is the theory that all introspectible qualitative aspects of a conscious experience can be analyzed as qualities that the experience non-conceptually represents the world to have. Some philosophers have argued that experiences such as afterimages, phosphenes and double vision are counterexamples to the representationalist theory, claiming that they are non- representational states or have non-representational aspects, and they are better explained in a qualia-theoretical framework. I argue that these states are fully representational states (...)
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  5. added 2020-03-21
    Waltonian Perceptualism.Madeleine Ransom - 2020 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 78 (1):66-70.
    Kendall Walton’s project in ‘Categories of Art’ (1970) is to answer two questions. First, does the history of an artwork’s production determine its aesthetic properties? Second, how – if at all – should knowledge of the history of a work’s production influence our aesthetic judgments of its properties? While his answer to the first has been clearly understood, his answer to the second less so. Contrary to how many have interpreted Walton, such knowledge is not necessary for making aesthetic judgments; (...)
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  6. added 2020-03-17
    McDowell and the Contents of Intuition.Jacob Browning - 2019 - Dialectica 73 (1-2):83-104.
    In Mind and World, John McDowell provided an influential account of how perceptual experience makes knowledge of the world possible. He recommended a view he called “conceptualism”, according to which concepts are intimately involved in perception and there is no non‐conceptual content. In response to criticisms of this view (especially those from Charles Travis), McDowell has more recently proposed a revised account that distinguishes between two kinds of representation: the passive non‐propositional contents of perceptual experience – what he now calls (...)
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  7. added 2020-01-27
    Phenomenology and Experimental Psychology: On the Prospects and Limitations of Experimental Research for a Phenomenological Epistemology.Philipp Berghofer - forthcoming - Journal of Transcendental Philosophy.
    Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is first and foremost a science of the structures of consciousness. Since it is intended to yield eidetic, i.e., a priori insights, it is often assumed that transcendental phenomenology and the natural sciences are totally detached from each other such that phenomenological investigations cannot possibly benefit from empirical evidence. The aim of this paper is to show that a beneficial relationship is possible. To be more precise, I will show how Husserl’s a priori investigations on consciousness can (...)
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  8. added 2020-01-17
    Probabilistic Representations in Perception: Are There Any, and What Would They Be?Steven Gross - 2020 - Mind and Language 35 (3):377-389.
    Nick Shea’s Representation in Cognitive Science commits him to representations in perceptual processing that are about probabilities. This commentary concerns how to adjudicate between this view and an alternative that locates the probabilities rather in the representational states’ associated “attitudes”. As background and motivation, evidence for probabilistic representations in perceptual processing is adduced, and it is shown how, on either conception, one can address a specific challenge Ned Block has raised to this evidence.
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  9. added 2019-11-22
    Perception and Iconic Memory: What Sperling Doesn't Show.Ian B. Phillips - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (4):381-411.
    Philosophers have lately seized upon Sperling's partial report technique and subsequent work on iconic memory in support of controversial claims about perceptual experience, in particular that phenomenology overflows cognitive access. Drawing on mounting evidence concerning postdictive perception, I offer an interpretation of Sperling's data in terms of cue-sensitive experience which fails to support any such claims. Arguments for overflow based on change-detection paradigms (e.g. Landman et al., 2003; Sligte et al., 2008) cannot be blocked in this way. However, such paradigms (...)
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  10. added 2019-10-09
    ‘Let Us Imagine That God has Made a Miniature Earth and Sky’: Malebranche on the Body-Relativity of Visual Size.Colin Chamberlain - 2020 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6 (2):206-224.
    Malebranche holds that visual experience represents the size of objects relative to the perceiver's body and does not represent objects as having intrinsic or nonrelational spatial magnitudes. I argue that Malebranche's case for this body-relative thesis is more sophisticated than other commentators—most notably, Atherton and Simmons —have presented it. Malebranche's central argument relies on the possibility of perceptual variation with respect to size. He uses two thought experiments to show that perceivers of different sizes—namely, miniature people, giants, and typical human (...)
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  11. added 2019-10-09
    The Grammatical Category of Time as a Means of the Expression of Temporal Deixis in Belarusian and English in the Comparative Aspect.Volha Artsiomava - 2017 - Language: Classic – Modern – Postmodern 3:259-266.
    The article analyzes the grammatical category of time as a means of actualizing temporal deixis in Belarusian and English in the typological aspect. Traditionally, the reference point of temporal deixis is the moment of speech. Nevertheless, it is important to take into account both the speaker and the observer. The purpose of the research is to carry out the comparative analysis of the grammatical category of time in Belarusian and English in terms of the speaker and the observer, as well (...)
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  12. added 2019-09-27
    Perceiving Potentiality: A Metaphysics for Affordances.Barbara Vetter - forthcoming - Topoi:1-15.
    According to ecological psychology, animals perceive not just the qualities of things in their environment, but their affordances: in James Gibson’s words, ’what things furnish, for good or ill’. I propose a metaphysics for affordances that fits into a contemporary anti-Humean metaphysics of powers or potentialities. The goal is to connect two debates, one in the philosophy of perception and one in metaphysics, that stand to gain much from each other.
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  13. added 2019-09-09
    Phenomenology and Perceptual Content.Kristjan Laasik - 2019 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 57 (3):402-427.
    Terence Horgan and John Tienson argue that there is phenomenal intentionality, i.e., “a kind of intentionality, pervasive in human mental life, that is constitutively determined by phenomenology alone” (p. 520). However, their arguments are open to two lines of objection. First, Horgan and Tienson are not sufficiently clear as to what kind of content it is that they take to be determined by, or to supervene on, phenomenal character. Second, critics have objected that, for their conclusion to follow, Horgan and (...)
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  14. added 2019-08-29
    Pain, Perception, and the Appearance-Reality Distinction.Thomas Park - 2017 - Philosophical Analysis 2017 (38):205-237.
    I argue that pain sensations are perceptual states, namely states that represent (actual or potential) damage. I defend this position against the objection that pains, unlike standard perceptual states, do not allow for an appearance-reality distinction by arguing that in the case of pain as well as in standard perceptual experiences, cognitive penetration or malfunctions of the underlying sensory systems can lead to a dissociation between the sensation on the one hand, and what is represented on the other hand. Moreover, (...)
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  15. added 2019-08-21
    Review of Berit Brogaard Seeing and Saying. [REVIEW]Mohan Matthen - 2019 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 201906.
    Brogaard's book is extremely informative about the grammar of perceptual verbs, and questions that it indicates representationalism (as opposed to naive realism). As useful as this is, I question how much grammar tells us much about perception.
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  16. added 2019-08-19
    "Cognitive Penetrability" - Ch 3 of Seemings and Epistemic Justification.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification.
    In this chapter I introduce the thesis that perceptual appearances are cognitively penetrable and analyse cases made against phenomenal conservatism hinging on this thesis. In particular, I focus on objections coming from the externalist reliabilist camp and the internalist inferentialist camp. I conclude that cognitive penetrability doesn’t yield lethal or substantive difficulties for phenomenal conservatism.
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  17. added 2019-08-18
    The Perception of Virtue.Jennifer J. Matey - forthcoming - In Berit Brogaard & D. Gratzia (eds.), The Epistemology of Non-visual Perception. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press.
    In this paper, I put forward an argument for the view that emotional responses of esteem to perceived demonstrations of good character represent the perceived character traits as valuable, and hence, as virtues. These esteeming experiences are analogous to perceptual representations in other modalities in their epistemic role as causing, providing content for and justifying beliefs regarding the value of the traits they represent. I also discuss the role that the perceiver’s own character plays in their ability to recognize and (...)
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  18. added 2019-06-16
    One Thing After Another: Why the Passage of Time Is Not an Illusion.Natalja Deng - 2019 - In Adrian Bardon, Valtteri Arstila, Sean Power & Argiro Vatakis (eds.), The Illusions of Time: Philosophical and Psychological Essays on Timing and Time Perception. Palgrave Macmillan.
    Does time seem to pass, even though it doesn’t, really? Many philosophers think the answer is ‘Yes’—at least when ‘time’s passing’ is understood in a particular way. They take time’s passing to be a process by which each time in turn acquires a special status, such as the status of being the only time that exists, or being the only time that is present. This chapter suggests that, on the contrary, all we perceive is temporal succession, one thing after another, (...)
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  19. added 2019-06-15
    Appearances and Illusions.Gianfranco Soldati - 2018 - Phänomenologische Forschungen 2.
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  20. added 2019-06-05
    The Epistemic Significance of Perceptual Learning.Elijah Chudnoff - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (5-6):520-542.
    First impressions suggest the following contrast between perception and memory: perception generates new beliefs and reasons, justification, or evidence for those beliefs; memory preserves old beliefs and reasons, justification, or evidence for those beliefs. In this paper, I argue that reflection on perceptual learning gives us reason to adopt an alternative picture on which perception plays both generative and preservative epistemic roles.
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  21. added 2019-03-23
    The Uneasy Heirs of Acquaintance.Susanna Siegel - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):348-365.
    My contribution to the first round of a tetralog with Bill Brewer, Anil Gupta, and John McDowell. Each of us has written a response to the writings of the other three philosophers on the topic "Empirical Reason". My initial contribution focuses on what we know a priori about perception. In the second round, we will each respond to the each writer's first-round contributions.
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  22. added 2019-03-08
    Appearance Properties?1.Andy Egan - 2006 - Noûs 40 (3):495-521.
    Intentionalism—the view that the phenomenal character of an experience is wholly determined by its representational content—is very attractive. Unfortunately, it’s in conflict with some quite robust intuitions about the possibility of phenomenal spectrum inversion without misrepresentation. Faced with such a problem, there are the usual three options—reject intentionalism, discount the intuitions and deny that spectrum inversion without misrepresentation is possible, or find a way to reconcile the two by dissolving the apparent conflict. Sydney Shoemaker’s (1994) introduction of appearance properties is (...)
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  23. added 2019-03-04
    The Perception of Causality. [REVIEW]J. B. R. - 1964 - Review of Metaphysics 18 (1):180-181.
    Since the time of Hume and Maine de Biran there have been two dominant views concerning our experience or perception of causality: Humians maintain that there is no direct experience of a causal link between successive events, while followers of Maine de Biran have argued that there is an internal experience of causality. By devising a series of ingenious experiments, Michotte attempts to show that both traditions are mistaken, and that there are causal impressions in the realm of external experience. (...)
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  24. added 2019-02-11
    On Perceptual Confidence and “Completely Trusting Your Experience”.Jacob Beck - 2020 - Analytic Philosophy 61 (2):174-188.
    John Morrison has argued that confidences are assigned in perceptual experience. For example, when you perceive a figure in the distance, your experience might assign a 55-percent confidence to the figure’s being Isaac. Morrison’s argument leans on the phenomenon of ‘completely trusting your experience’. I argue that Morrison presupposes a problematic ‘importation model’ of this familiar phenomenon, and propose a very different way of thinking about it. While the article’s official topic is whether confidences are assigned in perceptual experience, it (...)
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  25. added 2019-01-11
    The Contents of Visual Experience, by Susanna Siegel. Oxford: Oxford. [REVIEW]Heather Logue - 2012 - Mind 121 (483):842-849.
  26. added 2019-01-10
    Colour Hallucination: A New Problem for Externalist Representationalism.Laura Gow - 2017 - Analysis 77 (4):695-704.
    Externalist representationalists claim that the phenomenal character of a visual perceptual experience is determined by the representational content of that experience. Their deployment of the idea that perceptual experience is transparent shows that they account for representational content with reference to the properties which are represented – the properties out there in the world. I explain why this commits the externalist representationalist to objectivism and realism about colour properties. Colour physicalism has proved to be the position of choice for externalist (...)
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  27. added 2018-10-12
    Perceptual Confidence and Categorization.John Morrison - 2017 - Analytic Philosophy 58 (1):71-85.
    In “Perceptual Confidence,” I argue that our perceptual experiences assign degrees of confidence. In “Precision, not Confidence, Describes the Uncertainty of Perceptual Experience,” Rachel Denison disagrees. In this reply I first clarify what i mean by ‘perceptual experiences’, ‘assign’ and ‘confidence’. I then argue, contra Denison, that perception involves automatic categorization, and that there is an intrinsic difference between a blurry perception of a sharp image and a sharp perception of a blurry image. -/- .
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  28. added 2018-10-12
    Perceptual Confidence.John Morrison - 2016 - Analytic Philosophy 57 (1):15-48.
    Perceptual Confidence is the view that perceptual experiences assign degrees of confidence. After introducing, clarifying, and motivating Perceptual Confidence, I catalogue some of its more interesting consequences, such as the way it blurs the distinction between veridical and illusory experiences, a distinction that is sometimes said to carry a lot of metaphysical weight. I also explain how Perceptual Confidence fills a hole in our best scientific theories of perception and why it implies that experiences don't have objective accuracy conditions.
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  29. added 2018-09-22
    Perceptual Experience: Assembling a Medieval Puzzle.Juhana Toivanen - 2018 - In Margaret Cameron (ed.), Philosophy of Mind in the Early and High Middle Ages: The History of the Philosophy of Mind, Volume 2. London, UK: pp. 134-156.
  30. added 2018-09-14
    Understanding Evans.Rick Grush - manuscript
    This paper is largely exegetical/interpretive. My goal is to demonstrate that some criticisms that have been leveled against the program Gareth Evans constructs in The Varieties of Reference (Evans 1980, henceforth VR) misfire because they are based on misunderstandings of Evans’ position. First I will be discussing three criticisms raised by Tyler Burge (Burge, 2010). The first has to do with Evans’ arguments to the effect that a causal connection between a belief and an object is insufficient for that belief (...)
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  31. added 2018-09-05
    Acquaintance, Conceptual Capacities, and Attention.Anders Nes - 2019 - In Jonathan Knowles & Thomas Raleigh (eds.), Acquaintance: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 191-212.
    Russell’s theory of acquaintance construes perceptual awareness as at once constitutively independent of conceptual thought and yet a source of propositional knowledge. Wilfrid Sellars, John McDowell, and other conceptualists object that this is a ‘myth’: perception can be a source of knowledge only if conceptual capacities are already in play therein. Proponents of a relational view of experience, including John Campbell, meanwhile voice sympathy for Russell’s position on this point. This paper seeks to spell out, and defend, a claim that (...)
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  32. added 2018-08-21
    The Rationality of Perception, by Susanna Siegel. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, Xxv + 221 Pp. ISBN 978‐0‐19‐879708‐1 Hb £35.00. [REVIEW]Louise Richardson - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):1191-1194.
  33. added 2018-07-23
    Michael Madary's Visual Phenomenology.Neil Mehta - forthcoming - Philosophical Review.
  34. added 2018-07-23
    Recent Issues in High-Level Perception.Grace Helton - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (12):851-862.
    Recently, several theorists have proposed that we can perceive a range of high-level features, including natural kind features (e.g., being a lemur), artifactual features (e.g., being a mandolin), and the emotional features of others (e.g., being surprised). I clarify the claim that we perceive high-level features and suggest one overlooked reason this claim matters: it would dramatically expand the range of actions perception-based theories of action might explain. I then describe the influential phenomenal contrast method of arguing for high-level perception (...)
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  35. added 2018-06-19
    Philosophy of Mind in the Phenomenological Tradition.Philip J. Walsh & Jeffrey Yoshimi - 2019 - In Amy Kind (ed.), Philosophy of Mind in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries: The History of the Philosophy of Mind, Vol. 6. New York: Routledge. pp. 21-51.
  36. added 2018-05-18
    Do We Need Visual Subjects?Błażej Skrzypulec - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (4):574-594.
    It is widely accepted within contemporary philosophy of perception that the content of visual states cannot be characterized simply as a list of represented features. This is because such characterization leads to the so-called, “Many Properties problem”, i.e. it does not allow us to explain how the visual system is able to distinguish between scenes containing different arrangements of the same features. The usual solution to the Many Properties problem is to characterize some elements of content as subjects, to which (...)
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  37. added 2018-05-18
    Thisness and Visual Objects.Błażej Skrzypulec - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (1):17-32.
    According to the traditional view, visual objects can be characterized as bundles of features and locations. This initially plausible idea is contested within the contemporary psychology and philosophy of perception, where it is claimed that the visual system can represent objects as merely ‘this’ or ‘that’, in abstraction from their qualities. In this paper, I consider whether philosophical and psychological arguments connected with the rejection of the ‘bundle’ view of visual objects show that it is needed to postulate an additional, (...)
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  38. added 2018-05-18
    Particularity of Content and Illusions of Identity.Błażej Skrzypulec - 2018 - Axiomathes 28 (5):491-506.
    This paper argues that the accuracy of perceptual experiences cannot be properly characterized by using the particular notion of content without breaking one of the three plausible assumptions. On the other hand, the general notion of content is not threatened by this problem. The first assumption is that all elements of content determine the accuracy conditions of an experience. The second states that objects needed for the accuracy of experiences are physical entities that stand in a perceptual relation to a (...)
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  39. added 2018-05-18
    Ontology of Early Visual Content.Błażej Skrzypulec - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (2):261-276.
    The main goal of the paper is to sketch an ontological model of visual content at the low- and medium-level of visual processing, relying on psychological conceptions of vision. It is argued that influential cognitive models contain assumptions concerning “objects of content,” that is, objects whose presence is a necessary condition of the adequacy of visual representations. Subsequently, the structure of considered objects of content is presented, and its development through the perceptual process is described. In addition, during the course (...)
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  40. added 2018-05-18
    Relational Construction of Visual Objects.Błażej Skrzypulec - 2015 - Filozofia Nauki 23 (2):45-68.
    One of the main functions of visual system is to construct representations of objects. These ‘visual objects’ are formed by developing the structure of more primitive visual representations. In the course of the article, I define the notions of ‘minimal visual object’, ‘maximal-non object representation’, and ‘constructing characteristic’ that differentiates minimal objects from maximal non-objects. Relying on these distinctions, I consider the type of ontological change that transforms visual regions, treated as maximal non-object representations, into basic, low-level visual objects. In (...)
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  41. added 2018-04-13
    Perfect Pitch and the Content of Experience.Fiona Macpherson - 1999 - Anthropology and Philosophy 3 (2):89-101.
    This paper examines the representationalist view of experiences in the light of the phenomena of perfect and relative pitch. Two main kinds of representationalism are identified - environment-based and cognitive role-based. It is argued that to explain the relationship between the two theories a distinction should be drawn between various types of implicit and explicit content. When investigated, this distinction sheds some light on the difference between the phenomenology of perfect and relative pitch experiences and may be usefully applied to (...)
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  42. added 2018-03-21
    Naive Realist Perspectives on Seeing Blurrily.Craig French - 2014 - Ratio 27 (4):393-413.
    Naive realists hold that experience is to be understood in terms of an intimate perceptual relation between a subject and aspects of the world, relative to a certain standpoint. Those aspects of the world themselves shape the contours of consciousness. But blurriness is an aspect of some of our experiences that does not seem to come from the world. I argue that this constitutes a significant challenge to some forms of naive realism. But I also argue that there is a (...)
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  43. added 2018-03-09
    Perceptual Demonstrative Thought: A Property-Dependent Theory.Sean Crawford - 2020 - Topoi 39 (2):439-457.
    The paper presents a new theory of perceptual demonstrative thought, the property-dependent theory. It argues that the theory is superior to both the object-dependent theory (Evans, McDowell) and the object-independent theory (Burge).
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  44. added 2018-03-09
    Perception Pragmatized: A Pragmatic Reconciliation of Representationalism and Relationalism.André Sant’Anna - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (2):411-432.
    This paper develops a theory of perception that reconciles representationalism and relationalism by relying on pragmatist ideas. I call it the pragmatic view of perception. I argue that fully reconciling representationalism and relationalism requires, first, providing a theory in which how we perceive the world involves representations; second, preserving the idea that perception is constitutively shaped by its objects; and third, offering a direct realist account of perception. This constitutes what I call the Hybrid Triad. I discuss how Charles Peirce’s (...)
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  45. added 2018-02-28
    Visual Phenomenology.Michael Madary - 2017 - MIT Press.
    In this book, Michael Madary examines visual experience, drawing on both phenomenological and empirical methods of investigation. He finds that these two approaches—careful, philosophical description of experience and the science of vision—independently converge on the same result: Visual perception is an ongoing process of anticipation and fulfillment. -/- Madary first makes the case for the descriptive premise, arguing that the phenomenology of vision is best described as on ongoing process of anticipation and fulfillment. He discusses visual experience as being perspectival, (...)
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  46. added 2018-02-24
    A Epistemologia da Percepção (Verbete).Eros Carvalho - manuscript
    Tomamos como certo que os nossos sentidos nos colocam em contato com o ambiente ao nosso redor. Enquanto caminhamos em uma rua, vemos obstáculos que temos de contornar ou remover. Mesmo de costas, podemos ouvir a bicicleta que se aproxima e dar passagem. Em suma, por meio de experiências perceptivas (visuais, auditivas, olfativas etc.), ficamos conscientes de objetos ou eventos que estejam ocorrendo ao nosso redor. Além disso, com base no que percebemos, podemos formar e manter crenças acerca do ambiente (...)
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  47. added 2018-02-24
    On Experiencing Meaning: Irreducible Cognitive Phenomenology and Sinewave Speech.John Joseph Dorsch - 2017 - Phenomenology and Mind 12:218-227.
    Upon first hearing sinewaves, all that can be discerned are beeps and whistles. But after hearing the original speech, the beeps and whistles sound like speech. The difference between these two episodes undoubtedly involves an alteration in phenomenal character. O’Callaghan (2011) argues that this alteration is non-sensory, but he leaves open the possibility of attributing it to some other source, e.g. cognition. I discuss whether the alteration in phenomenal character involved in sinewave speech provides evidence for cognitive phenomenology. I defend (...)
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  48. added 2018-02-17
    Structural Description and Qualitative Content in Perception Theory.Johannes Andres & Rainer Mausfeld - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (1):307-311.
    The paper is a critical comment on D. Hoffman. The Scrambling Theorem: A simple proof of the logical possibility of spectrum inversion. Consciousness and Cognition, 2006, 15, 31–45.
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  49. added 2018-02-17
    The Ontology of Perception: Bipolarity and Content.Jérôme Dokic - 1998 - Erkenntnis 48 (2-3):153-169.
    The notion of perceptual content is commonly introduced in the analysis of perception. It stems from an analogy between perception and propositional attitudes. Both kinds of mental states, it is thought, have conditions of satisfaction. I try to show that on the most plausible account of perceptual content, it does not determine the conditions under which perceptual experience is veridical. Moreover, perceptual content must be bipolar, whereas perception as a mental state is not. This has profound consequences for the epistemological (...)
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  50. added 2018-01-14
    Are the Senses Silent? Travis’s Argument From Looks.Keith A. Wilson - 2018 - In John Collins & Tamara Dobler (eds.), The Philosophy of Charles Travis: Language, Thought, and Perception. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 199-221.
    Many philosophers and scientists take perceptual experience, whatever else it involves, to be representational. In ‘The Silence of the Senses’, Charles Travis argues that this view involves a kind of category mistake, and consequently, that perceptual experience is not a representational or intentional phenomenon. The details of Travis’s argument, however, have been widely misinterpreted by his representationalist opponents, many of whom dismiss it out of hand. This chapter offers an interpretation of Travis’s argument from looks that it is argued presents (...)
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