About this topic
Summary What kinds of information is conveyed to a subject by her conscious perceptions? Suppose you are looking into a piano at the array of hammers and strings. There will be a way these things look to you when you see them: they will look to have a certain shape, color, texture, and arrangement relative to one another, among other things. Your visual experience conveys to you that the piano has these features. If your experience is illusory in some respect then the piano won't really have all those features; but even then, there will still be something conveyed to you by your experience. Issues in this category include:  what are contents and what is their relation to experiences? Which contents are contents of experience? In virtue of what do experiences have contents, when they do? What is the role of the particular objects we see in the contents of experience? What is the role of properties in the contents of experience?  What is the role of concepts in determining which experiences we have, and which contents they have?
Key works  
Introductions "The Contents of Perception". Stanford Encyclopedia."The Representational Content of Experience" Chalmers, D. 2004.
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2007 found
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1 — 50 / 2007
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  1. The Possible Worlds Theory of Visual Experience.Edward Averill & Joseph Gottlieb - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    When we watch movies, or are tricked by a trompe-l’oeil painting, we seem to be visually representing possible worlds; often non-actual possible worlds. This suggests that we really can visually represent possible worlds. The suggested claim is refined and developed here into a theory of visual experience that holds that all visual experiences, both veridical and non-veridical, represent possible worlds, many of which are non-actual.
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  2. Tropes, Universals and Visual Phenomenology.Błażej Skrzypulec - 2021 - Theoria 87 (2):435-456.
    Both philosophers of perception and analytic metaphysicians apply the tropes/universals distinction when considering the ontological status of visual properties. One way of arguing in favor of the trope interpretation of visual properties is to claim that the way in which we visually experience properties makes it plausible to characterize them as tropes. In this paper, I argue for a different position, namely that the way in which we visually experience properties provides a serious challenge for the trope interpretation, but not (...)
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  3. Contents of Unconscious Color Perception.Błażej Skrzypulec - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-17.
    In the contemporary discussions concerning unconscious perception it is not uncommon to postulate that content and phenomenal character are ‘orthogonal’, i.e., there is no type of content which is essentially conscious, but instead, every representational content can be either conscious or not. Furthermore, this is not merely treated as a thesis justified by theoretical investigations, but as supported by empirical considerations concerning the actual functioning of the human cognition. In this paper, I address unconscious color perception and argue for a (...)
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  4. How Judgments of Visual Resemblance Are Induced by Visual Experience.Alon Chasid & Alik Pelman - forthcoming - Journal of Consciousness Studies.
    Judgments of visual resemblance (‘A looks like B’), unlike other judgments of resemblance, are often induced directly by visual experience. What is the nature of this experience? We argue that the visual experience that prompts a subject looking at A to judge that A looks like B is a visual experience of B. After elucidating this thesis, we defend it, using the ‘phenomenal contrast’ method. Comparing our account to competing accounts, we show that the phenomenal contrast between a visual experience (...)
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  5. Olfactory Amodal Completion.Benjamin D. Young & Bence Nanay - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    Amodal completion is the representation of those parts of the perceived object that we get no sensory stimulation from. While amodal completion is rife and plays an essential role in all sense modalities, philosophical discussions of this phenomenon have almost entirely been limited to vision. The aim of this paper is to examine in what sense we can talk about amodal completion in olfaction. We distinguish three different senses of amodal completion – spatial, temporal and feature-based completion – and argue (...)
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  6. Barwich, A. S. (2020). Smellosophy: What the Nose Tells the Mind. [REVIEW]Ekin Erkan - 2021 - Perception 50:1-3.
    Book review of Ann-Sophia Barwich's Smellosophy: What the Nose Tells the Mind (2020), focusing on stereotypic stimulus mapping vs behavioral approaches that a proper study of olfaction, and perception tout court, necessitates.
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  7. Constancy Mechanisms and Distal Content: A Reply to Garson.Peter Schulte - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    Sensory perceptions represent things in the outside world. This mundane fact raises a major problem for naturalistic theories of content: the ‘distality problem’. In a previous paper for this journal, I presented a solution to this problem which makes central appeal to constancy mechanisms. Justin Garson, also in this journal, recently criticized my solution and suggested a Dretskean alternative to it. Here, I defend my proposal by arguing, first, that Garson's criticisms ultimately miss the mark, and secondly, that his Dretskean (...)
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  8. Perception as a Multi-Stage Process: A Reidian Account.Marina Folescu - 2021 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 19 (1):57-74.
    The starting point of this paper is Thomas Reid's anti-skepticism: our knowledge of the external world is justified. The justificatory process, in his view, starts with and relies upon one of the main faculties of the human mind: perception. Reid's theory of perception has been thoroughly studied, but there are some missing links in the explanatory chain offered by the secondary literature. In particular, I will argue that we do not have a complete picture of the mechanism of perception of (...)
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  9. Common Structure of Vision and Olfaction.Błażej Skrzypulec - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-22.
    According to a common opinion, human olfactory experiences are significantly different from human visual experiences. For instance, olfaction seems to have only rudimentary abilities to represent space; it is not clear whether olfactory experiences have any mereological structure; and while vision presents the world in terms of objects, it is a matter of debate whether there are olfactory object-representations. This paper argues that despite these differences visual and olfactory experiences share a hierarchical subject/property structure. Within this structure, olfactorily experienced odours (...)
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  10. Ways of Appearing: Experience and its Phenomenology.Miloš Vuletić - 2015 - Dissertation,
  11. Blur and Interoceptive Vision.Błażej Skrzypulec - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-19.
    The paper presents a new philosophical theory of blurred vision according to which visual experiences have two types of content: exteroceptive content, characterizing external entities, and interoceptive content, characterizing the state of the visual system. In particular, it is claimed that blurriness-related phenomenology interoceptively presents acuity of vision in relation to eye focus. The proposed theory is consistent with the representationalist thesis that phenomenal character supervenes on representational content and with the strong transparency thesis formulated in terms of mind-independentness. Furthermore, (...)
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  12. Semantics of Pictorial Space.Gabriel Greenberg - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1.
    A semantics of pictorial representation should provide an account of how pictorial signs are associated with the contents they express. Unlike the familiar semantics of spoken languages, this problem has a distinctively spatial cast for depiction. Pictures themselves are two-dimensional artifacts, and their contents take the form of pictorial spaces, perspectival arrangements of objects and properties in three dimensions. A basic challenge is to explain how pictures are associated with the particular pictorial spaces they express. Inspiration here comes from recent (...)
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  13. Philosophical Problems in Sense Perception: Testing the Limits of Aristotelianism.David Bennett & Juhana Toivanen - 2020 - Cham: Springer.
    This volume focuses on philosophical problems concerning sense perception in the history of philosophy. It consists of thirteen essays that analyse the philosophical tradition originating in Aristotle’s writings. Each essay tackles a particular problem that tests the limits of Aristotle’s theory of perception and develops it in new directions. The problems discussed range from simultaneous perception to causality in perception, from the representational nature of sense-objects to the role of conscious attention, and from the physical/mental divide to perception as quasi-rational (...)
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  14. Thinking and Perceiving: On the Malleability of the Mind.Dustin Stokes - forthcoming - London: Routledge.
    [File is the introduction to the forthcoming monograph] -/- Abstract to monograph -/- How and whether thinking affects perceiving is a deeply important question. Of course it is of scientific interest: to understand the human mind is to understand how we best distinguish its processes, how those processes interact, and what this implies for how and what we may know about the world. And so in the philosopher’s terms, this book is one on both mental architecture and the epistemology of (...)
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  15. Social-Eyes: Rich Perceptual Contents and Systemic Oppression.Dylan Ludwig - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (4):939-954.
    There is ongoing philosophical debate about the kinds of properties that are represented in visual perception. Both “rich” and “thin” accounts of perceptual content are concerned with how prior assumptions about the world influence the construction of perceptual representations. However, the idea that biased assumptions resulting from oppressive social structures contribute to the contents of perception has been largely neglected historically in this debate in the philosophy of perception. I draw on neurobiological evidence of the role of the amygdala in (...)
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  16. Coupling to Variant Information: An Ecological Account of Comparative Mental Imagery Generation.Matthew Sims - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (4):899-916.
    Action-based theories of cognition place primary emphasis upon the role that agent-environment coupling plays in the emergence of psychological states. Prima facie, mental imagery seems to present a problem for some of these theories because it is understood to be stimulus-absent and thus thought to be decoupled from the environment. However, mental imagery is much more multifaceted than this “naïve” view suggests. Focusing on a particular kind of imagery, comparative mental imagery generation, this paper demonstrates that although such imagery is (...)
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  17. Copula is an Intuitive Predicate of Consciousness on Fulfilment of Knowing and Judging Acts.Kiran Pala - 2020 - Humanit Soc Sci Commun 121 (7).
    The recent investigations into knowledge and its elements viz facts, skills and objects have become prominent in various subfields of philosophy and other areas like linguistics, cognitive science, neuroscience and artificial intelligence. These investigations have been mainly on understanding the relation between the intentionality and its referential entities to know how they enrich knowledge with their existence. This article starts with an exploration of the fundamental aspects of judgemental sense from the knowledge origins perspective. To explain the consequences of this, (...)
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  18. An Alternative to the Causal Theory of Perception.Todd Ganson - forthcoming - Tandf: Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-13.
    Proponents of the causal theory of perception have applied the theory to questions about which particular objects or events are perceived, which parts are perceived, and which properties are perceived. In each case they insist that successful perception is causally dependent on what is perceived. The causal theory rests on an important insight regarding the information-carrying role of perception. In order to succeed in this role, perception cannot be grounded in spurious correlations. But we can respect this insight without embracing (...)
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  19. Emotions Inside Out: The Content of Emotions.Christine Tappolet - forthcoming - In Concepts in Thought, Action, and Emotion: New Essays. New York:
    Most of those who hold that emotions involve appraisals also accept that the content of emotions is nonconceptual. The main motivation for nonconceptulism regarding emotions is that it accounts for the difference between emotions and evaluative judgements. This paper argues that if one assumes a broadly Fregean account of concepts, there are good reasons to accept that emotions have nonconceptual contents. All the main arguments for nonconceptualism regarding sensory perception easily transpose to the case of emotions. The paper ends by (...)
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  20. Do You See What I Know? On Reasons, Perceptual Evidence, and Epistemic Status.Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):205-220.
    Our epistemology can shape the way we think about perception and experience. Speaking as an epistemologist, I should say that I don’t necessarily think that this is a good thing. If we think that we need perceptual evidence to have perceptual knowledge or perceptual justification, we will naturally feel some pressure to think of experience as a source of reasons or evidence. In trying to explain how experience can provide us with evidence, we run the risk of either adopting a (...)
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  21. When Nothing Looks Blue.Joseph Gottlieb & Ali Rezaei - forthcoming - Synthese:1-9.
    David Pitt (2017) has argued that reductive representationalism entails an absurdity akin to the ‘paramechanical hypothesis’ Gilbert Ryle (1949) attributed to Descartes. This paper focuses on one version of reductive representationalism: the property-complex theory. We contend that at least insofar as the property-complex theory goes, Pitt is wrong. The result is not just a response to Pitt, but also a clarification of the aims and structure of the property-complex theory.
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  22. Charles Travis on Truth and Perception.Martijn Wallage - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (7):878-889.
    Charles Travis has developed a distinction between “the historical” and “the conceptual”, which underlies his influential contributions to the philosophy of language and perception. The distinction is based on the observation that there are, for any thought, indefinitely many different circumstances that would render it true. The generality of thoughts and concepts contrasts with the particularity of the sensible world. I challenge the assumption that what exhibits such generality cannot belong to the sensible world. I also defend a version of (...)
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  23. Perceiving Indeterminately.Bence Nanay - 2020 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 9 (3):160-166.
    It has been argued recently that perception is indeterminate. But there are more than one ways of spelling out what this means. The standard line is that perceptual states attribute different probabilities to different propositions. I provide an alternative to this view, where it is not the attitude, but the content of perceptual states that is indeterminate, inasmuch as it consists of the representation of determinable properties. This view does justice to the more general claim that perception is indeterminate without (...)
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  24. Don’T Go Chasing Waterfalls: Motion Aftereffects and the Dynamic Snapshot Theory of Temporal Experience.Camden Alexander McKenna - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-21.
    The philosophical investigation of perceptual illusions can generate fruitful insights in the study of subjective time consciousness. However, the way illusions are interpreted is often controversial. Recently, proponents of the so-called dynamic snapshot theory have appealed to the Waterfall Illusion, a kind of motion aftereffect, to support a particular view of temporal consciousness according to which experience is structured as a series of instantaneous snapshots with dynamic qualities. This dynamism is meant to account for familiar features of the phenomenology of (...)
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  25. Immagini (per l)e parole. La metafora visiva tra occhio innocente e immaginazione.Alessandro Cavazzana - 2017 - Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio 11 (2):109-122.
    The purpose of this paper is to give a critical reading of Noël Carroll’s account of visual metaphors. In particular, I have highlighted the possible issues arising from his proposal, focusing on two aspects: 1) homospatiality is not the pictorial equivalent for the ‘is’ of identity that, according to Carroll, can be found in verbal metaphors of the kind «A is B». The ‘is’ of verbal metaphors predicates an intension of the metaphorizing term - that the interpreter is supposed to (...)
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  26. Temporal Experience and the A Versus B Debate.Natalja Deng - 2017 - In Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Temporal Experience.
    This chapter discusses some aspects of the relation between temporal experience and the A versus B debate. To begin with, I provide an overview of the A versus B debate and, following Baron et al. (2015), distinguish between two B-theoretic responses to the A- theoretic argument from experience, veridicalism and illusionism. I then argue for veridicalism over illusionism, by examining our (putative) experiences as of presentness and as of time passing. I close with some remarks on the relation between veridicalism (...)
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  27. On the Possibility of Hallucinations.Farid Masrour - 2020 - Mind 129 (515):737-768.
    Many take the possibility of hallucinations to imply that a relationalist account, according to which perceptual experiences are constituted by direct relations to ordinary mind-independent objects, is false. The common reaction among relationalists is to adopt a disjunctivist view that denies that hallucinations have the same nature as perceptual experiences. This paper proposes a non-disjunctivist response to the argument from hallucination by arguing that the alleged empirical and a priori evidence in support of the possibility of hallucinations is inconclusive. A (...)
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  28. Mystice videre. Il gioco degli specchi tra neurobiologia e psicologia analitica.Ferruccio Vigna - 2010 - In Jung e le immagini. Torino:
    Mystice videre: un modo particolare di vedere, sperimentato, lungo la storia dell’umanità, da coloro che hanno vissuto un’esperienza straordinaria di incontro con il sacro (termine che qui utilizzo nella sua accezione più ampia, di “ciò che è separato da” tutto ciò che è ordinario). Alludo ai mistici, ovviamente. Qualcuno, clinicamente parlando, potrebbe considerarli, con qualche ragione, individui patologici, ma sotto il profilo religioso si tratta di persone che hanno avuto la grazia di un incontro con il divino attraverso visioni profonde, (...)
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  29. Perception, Emotion, and the Interconnected Mind.M. Fulkerson - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (7-8):7-30.
    I argue on the basis of extensive empirical research that perception and emotion are more deeply entangled than we might have thought. This evidence strongly suggests that we should expand our conception of perception to include emotional elements, and our conception of emotion to include perceptual ones. This expansion poses a challenge to our current taxonomic practices. In the face of this challenge, I advocate principled pluralism about psychological kinds. This view holds that, depending on our explanatory purposes, psychological processes (...)
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  30. A Role for Representations in Inflexible Behavior.Todd Ganson - 2020 - Biology and Philosophy 35 (4):1-18.
    Representationalists have routinely expressed skepticism about the idea that inflexible responses to stimuli are to be explained in representational terms. Representations are supposed to be more than just causal mediators in the chain of events stretching from stimulus to response, and it is difficult to see how the sensory states driving reflexes are doing more than playing the role of causal intermediaries. One popular strategy for distinguishing representations from mere causal mediators is to require that representations are decoupled from specific (...)
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  31. Perceptual Variation and Structuralism.John Morrison - 2020 - Noûs 54 (2):290-326.
    I use an old challenge to motivate a new view. The old challenge is due to variation in our perceptions of secondary qualities. The challenge is to say whose perceptions are accurate. The new view is about how we manage to perceive secondary qualities, and thus manage to perceive them accurately or inaccurately. I call it perceptual structuralism. I first introduce the challenge and point out drawbacks with traditional responses. I spend the rest of the paper motivating and defending a (...)
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  32. Précis of The Unity of Perception.Susanna Schellenberg - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):715-720.
  33. Seeing Entities without Seeing N-Entities.G. Ferretti & F. Marchi - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (1-2):57-70.
    When seeing a jaguar, we can see all the spots on its mantle without seeing a determinate number, N, of spots on the mantle. How is this visual phenomenon possible? Philosophers have tried to provide a reliable answer to this question, by recruiting evidence from vision science about the way attention works. Here we push this idea forward, by suggesting that an alternative and less complex solution, with respect to the one proposed in the literature, is possible. In particular, we (...)
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  34. The Art Experience.Kate McCallum, Scott Mitchell & Thom Scott-Phillips - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (1):21-35.
    Art theory has consistently emphasised the importance of situational, cultural, institutional and historical factors in viewers’ experience of fine art. However, the link between this heavily context-dependent interpretation and the workings of the mind is often left unexamined. Drawing on relevance theory—a prominent, cogent and productive body of work in cognitive pragmatics—we here argue that fine art achieves its effects by prompting the use of cognitive processes that are more commonly employed in the interpretation of words and other stimuli presented (...)
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  35. Schopenhauer on the Content of Compassion.Colin Marshall - forthcoming - Noûs.
    On the traditional reading, Schopenhauer claims that compassion is the recognition of deep metaphysical unity. In this paper, I defend and develop the traditional reading. I begin by addressing three recent criticisms of the reading from Sandra Shapshay: that it fails to accommodate Schopenhauer's restriction to sentient beings, that it cannot explain his moral ranking of egoism over malice, and that Schopenhauer requires some level of distinction to remain in compassion. Against Shapshay, I argue that Schopenhauer does not restrict compassion (...)
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  36. Minima Sensibilia: Against the Dynamic Snapshot Model of Temporal Experience.Jack Shardlow - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (3):741-757.
    In our wakeful conscious lives, the experience of time and dynamic temporal phenomena—such as continuous motion and change—appears to be ubiquitous. How is it that temporality is woven into our conscious experience? Is it through perceptual experience presenting a series of instantaneous states of the world, which combine together—in a sense which would need to be specified—to give us experience of dynamic temporal phenomena? In this paper, I argue that this is not the case. -/- Several authors have recently proposed (...)
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  37. Perceptual Capacities: Questions for Schellenberg.Matthew McGrath - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):730-739.
    According to Schellenberg’s capacitism, perception is constituted by employing perceptual capacities to discriminate and single out particulars, including objects, events and property instances. To say that perception is so constituted, for her, is to say that perceptual states have the content, phenomenal character, and evidential force they do in virtue of the fact that they are yielded by employing perceptual capacities.1 1.
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  38. Usefulness Drives Representations to Truth: A Family of Counterexamples to Hoffman's Interface Theory of Perception.Manolo Martínez - 2019 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 96 (3):319-341.
    An important objection to signaling approaches to representation is that, if signaling behavior is driven by the maximization of usefulness, then signals will typically carry much more information about agent-dependent usefulness than about objective features of the world. This sort of considerations are sometimes taken to provide support for an anti-realist stance on representation itself. The author examines the game-theoretic version of this skeptical line of argument developed by Donald Hoffman and his colleagues. It is shown that their argument only (...)
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  39. The Way Things Look: A Defence of Content.Andrea Giananti - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (3):541-562.
    How does perceptual experience disclose the world to our view? In the first introductory section, I set up a contrast between the representational and the purely relational conception of perceptual experience. In the second section, I discuss an argument given by Charles Travis against perceptual content. The third section is devoted to the phenomenon of perceptual constancy: in 3.1 I describe the phenomenon. In 3.2 I argue that the description given suggests a phenomenological distinction that can be deployed for a (...)
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  40. Misconceptions About Colour Categories.Christoph Witzel - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (3):499-540.
    The origin of colour categories and their relationship to colour perception have been the prime example for testing the influence of language on perception and thought and more generally for investigating the biological, ecological and cultural determination of human cognition. These themes are central to a broad range of disciplines, including vision research, neuroscience, cognitive psychology, developmental science, cultural anthropology, linguistics, computer science, and philosophy. Unfortunately, though, it has been tacitly taken for granted that the conceptual assumptions and methodological practices (...)
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  41. Categorising Without Concepts.Ophelia Deroy - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (3):465-478.
    A strong claim, often found in the literature, is that it is impossible to categorize perceptual properties unless one possesses the related concepts. The evidence from visual perception reviewed in this paper however questions this claim: Concepts, at least canonically defined, are ill-suited to explain perceptual categorisation, which is a fast, and crucially a largely involuntary and unconscious process, which rests on quickly updated probabilistic calculations. I suggest here that perceptual categorisation rests on non-conceptual sorting principles. This changes the claim (...)
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  42. The Evolution of Shared Concepts in Changing Populations.Jungkyu Park, Sean Tauber, Kimberly A. Jameson & Louis Narens - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (3):479-498.
    The evolution of color categorization systems is investigated by simulating categorization games played by a population of artificial agents. The constraints placed on individual agent’s perception and cognition are minimal and involve limited color discriminability and learning through reinforcement. The main dynamic mechanism for population evolution is pragmatic in nature: There is a pragmatic need for communication between agents, and if the results of such communications have positive consequences in their shared world then the agents involved are positively rewarded, whereas (...)
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  43. Sceptical Alternatives: Strong Illusionism Versus Modest Realism.R. C. Schriner - 2018 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (9-10):209-227.
    Daniel Dennett and others have suggested that qualia and introspectible phenomena do not exist. Dennett's account of consciousness, along with several related approaches, has been called illusionism by Keith Frankish. Frankish's analysis is helpful and provocative. As currently presented, however, his 'strong' version of illusionism suffers from several basic confusions, particularly regarding its relationship to eliminative materialism. This paper contrasts strong illusionism with an alternative that is easier to understand and more sharply focused -- fallibilist experiential realism, or, less technically, (...)
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  44. Spontaneity and Intermodal Perception.A. Johnstone - 2018 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (3-4):137-161.
    This paper addresses the problem of intermodal perception, that of how warranted perception arises of objects having characteristics in multiple sense modalities. It first shows the inadequacy of the currently popular explanations of such perception in terms of special, innate mechanisms. It proposes instead a phenomenological account in terms of an infant's general capacities for observation and thought. To this end it prepares the terrain with brief investigations into four topics: spontaneity, non-symbolic thinking, the role of spontaneity in perception, and (...)
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  45. Auditory Verbal Hallucinations: Social, but How?B. Alderson-Day & C. Fernyhough - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (7-8):163-194.
    Auditory verbal hallucinations are experiences of hearing voices in the absence of an external speaker. Standard explanatory models propose that AVH arise from misattributed verbal cognitions, but provide little account of how heard voices often have a distinct persona and agency. Here we review the argument that AVH have important social and agent-like properties and consider how different neurocognitive approaches to AVH can account for these elements, focusing on inner speech, memory, and predictive processing. We then evaluate the possible role (...)
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  46. A Representationalist Reading of Kantian Intuitions.Ayoob Shahmoradi - 2021 - Synthese 198 (3):2169-2191.
    There are passages in Kant’s writings according to which empirical intuitions have to be (a) singular, (b) object-dependent, and (c) immediate. It has also been argued that empirical intuitions (d) are not truth-apt, and (e) need to provide the subject with a proof of the possibility of the cognized object. Having relied on one or another of the a-e constraints, the naïve realist readers of Kant have argued that it is not possible for empirical intuitions to be representations. Instead they (...)
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  47. Perception and Memory: Beyond Representationalism and Relationalism.André Rosolem Sant'Anna - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Otago
    This thesis is a collection of five self-standing articles dealing with different issues relating to representationalism and relationalism in contemporary philosophy of perception and contemporary philosophy of memory. The main goal is to motivate a hybrid approach, where insights from representationalism and relationalism are reconciled, to current debates in both domains. The thesis is divided in two parts. Part I, which deals with perception, starts by seeking alternative relational views of perception by relying on ideas from classical pragmatism. These attempts (...)
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  48. Perception is Not All-Purpose.Bence Nanay - forthcoming - Synthese:1-12.
    I aim to show that perception depends counterfactually on the action we want to perform. Perception is not all-purpose: what we want to do does influence what we see. After clarifying how this claim is different from the one at stake in the cognitive penetrability debate and what counterfactual dependence means in my claim, I will give a two-step argument: one’s perceptual attention depends counterfactually on one’s intention to perform an action and one’s perceptual processing depends counterfactually on one’s perceptual (...)
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  49. Perceiving Exploding Tropes.Jan Almäng - 2016 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (1):42-62.
    The topic of this paper is the perception of properties. It is argued that the perception of properties allows for a distinction between the sense of the identity and the sense of the qualitative nature of a property. So, for example, we might perceive a property as being identical over time even though it is presented as more and more determinate. Thus, you might see an object first as red and then as crimson red. In this case, the property is (...)
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  50. Contents.Piotr Stalmaszczyk - 2014 - In Philosophy of Language and Linguistics: The Legacy of Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein. De Gruyter.
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