About this topic
Summary The Doctrine of Double Effect is a normative principle according to which in pursuing the good it is sometimes morally permissible to bring about some evil as a side-effect or merely foreseen consequence: the same evil would not be morally justified as an intended means or end. The Doctrine is normally thought to originate from Aquinas’s discussion of self-defence and it has today more or less legitimate application to a variety of important ethical issues: amongst the most common are collateral damages in war, palliative care, abortion, self-sacrifice, self-defence, and the so-called Trolley Problem. Following Gury and Mangan 1949, the Doctrine of Double Effect is normally formalised as comprising four conditions: 1) the action in itself from its very object must be good or at least indifferent; 2) the good effect and not the evil effect must be intended; 3) the good effect must not be produced by means of the evil effect; 4) there must be a proportionately grave reason for permitting the evil effect.
Key works Apart from Mangan 1949, a key modern source on double effect is Foot 1967. See also Boyle Jr 1980 on double effect's four conditions. For an influential critique see Bennett 1980.
Introductions McIntyre 2008 has written an introduction to the topic.
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307 found
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  1. The Principle of Double Effect.Leslie Allan - manuscript
    Absolutist systems of ethics have come in for harsh criticism on a number of fronts. The Principle of Double Effect was formulated by Catholic ethicists to overcome such objections. In this essay, Leslie Allan addresses four of the most prominent problems faced by an absolutist ethic and evaluates the extent to which the Principle of Double Effect is successful in avoiding or mitigating these criticisms.
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  2. Anscombe, Thomson, and Double Effect in Advance.T. A. Cavanaugh - forthcoming - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly.
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  3. Eight Arguments Against Double Effect.Ezio Di Nucci - forthcoming - In Proceedings of the XXIII. Kongress der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Philosophie.
    I offer eight arguments against the Doctrine of Double Effect, a normative principle according to which in pursuing the good it is sometimes morally permissible to bring about some evil as a side-effect or merely foreseen consequence: the same evil would not be morally justified as an intended means or end.
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  4. Trolleys and Double Effect in Experimental Ethics.Ezio Di Nucci - forthcoming - In Christoph Luetge, Hannes Rusch & Matthias Uhl (eds.), Experimental Ethics. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    I analyse the relationship between the Doctrine of Double Effect and the Trolley Problem: the former offers a solution for the latter only on the premise that killing the one in Bystander at the Switch is permissible. Here I offer both empirical and theoretical arguments against the permissibility of killing the one: firstly, I present data from my own empirical studies according to which the intuition that killing the one is permissible is neither widespread nor stable; secondly, I defend a (...)
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  5. Principle of Double Effect.H. T. Engelhardt Jr & J. P. Kenny - forthcoming - Bioethics: Readings and Cases, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, Nj.
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  6. The Role of the Primary Effect in the Assessment of Intentionality and Morality.Michael Waldmann - forthcoming - Proceedings of the 34th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society.
    In moral dilemmas performing an action often leads to both a good primary and a bad secondary effect. In such cases, how do people judge whether the bad secondary effect was brought about intentionally, and how do they assess the moral value of the act leading to the secondary effect? Various theories have been proposed that either focus on the causal role or on the moral valence of the secondary effect as the primary determinants of intentionality and morality assessments. We (...)
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  7. Double Effect Donation.Charles Camosy & Joseph Vukov - 2021 - The Linacre Quarterly 88 (2):149-162.
    Double Effect Donation claims it is permissible for a person meeting brain death criteria to donate vital organs, even though such a person may be alive. The reason this act is permissible is that it does not aim at one’s own death but rather at saving the lives of others, and because saving the lives of others constitutes a proportionately serious reason for engaging in a behavior in which one foresees one’s death as the outcome. Double Effect Donation, we argue, (...)
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  8. Mark C. Murphy, God’s Own Ethics: Norms of Divine Agency and the Argument From Evil. [REVIEW]Nevin Climenhaga - 2020 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 17 (5):587-590.
  9. The Right-Based Criticism of the Doctrine of Double Effect.Stephen Kershnar & Robert Kelly - 2020 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 34 (2):215-233.
    If people have stringent moral rights, then the doctrine of double effect is false or unimportant, at least when it comes to making acts permissible or wrong. There are strong and weak versions of the doctrine of double effect. The strong version asserts that an act is morally right if and only if the agent does not intentionally infringe a moral norm and the act brings about a desirable result (perhaps the best state of affairs available to the agent or (...)
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  10. Trolleyology: ¿De quién es el dilema del tranvía?Fabio Morandín-Ahuerma - 2020 - Vox Juris 38 (1):203-210.
    El autor recobra las fuentes originales del llamado Dilema del Tranvía pues considera que existe confusión sobre quién es el autor original. Sostiene que no es Phillipa Foot como suele citarse comúnmente, ni siquiera Judith Thomson, sino que sus raíces son más lejanas y se encuentran en dos juristas alemanes: Hans Welzel y, aún antes, Karl Engisch. Propone que la solución al dilema está dada desde el Derecho positivo y no en especulaciones consecuencialistas. ABSTRACT The author recovers the original sources (...)
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  11. Lethal Organ Donation: Would the Doctor Intend the Donor’s Death?Ben Bronner - 2019 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 44 (4):442-458.
    Lethal organ donation is a hypothetical procedure in which vital organs are removed from living donors, resulting in their death. An important objection to lethal organ donation is that it would infringe the prohibition on doctors intentionally causing the death of patients. I present a series of arguments intended to undermine this objection. In a case of lethal organ donation, the donor’s death is merely foreseen, and not intended.
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  12. “‘But I Voted for Him for Other Reasons!’: Moral Permissibility and a Doctrine of Double Endorsement.Alida Liberman - 2019 - In Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 9. pp. 138 - 160.
    Many people presume that you can permissibly support the good features of a symbol, person, activity, or work of art while simultaneously denouncing its bad features. This chapter refines and assesses this commonsense (but undertheorized) moral justification for supporting problematic people, projects, and political symbols, and proposes an analogue of the Doctrine of Double Effect called the Doctrine of Double Endorsement (DDN). DDN proposes that when certain conditions are met, it is morally permissible to directly endorse some object in virtue (...)
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  13. The Intention Principle and the Doctrine of Double Effect.Amir Saemi - 2019 - Analysis 79 (1):91-99.
    It is commonly believed that the Doctrine of Double Effect is identical with, or presupposes, the Intention Principle according to which an act can be impermissible if done with a wrongful intention. A main line of objections to the DDE, then, stems from the worry that the Intention Principle implausibly interiorizes the wrongness of an action. I will argue, first, that the DDE does not presuppose the Intention Principle, and, second, that intuitions brought against the Intention Principle do not warrant (...)
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  14. Wild Goose Chase: Still No Rationales for the Doctrine of Double Effect and Related Principles.Uwe Steinhoff - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (1):1-25.
    I focus on the question as to what rationale could possibly underlie the doctrine of double effect or related principles. I first briefly review the correct critiques of the claim that people who intend some evil as a means to a good must be “guided by evil,” and that this is allegedly always wrong. I then argue that Quinn’s claim that violations of the DDE express certain negative attitudes of the agent and that agents violating the DDE must make an (...)
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  15. Targeting the Fetal Body and/or Mother-Child Connection: Vital Conflicts and Abortion.Helen Watt & Anthony McCarthy - 2019 - The Linacre Quarterly:1-14.
    Is the “act itself” of separating a pregnant woman and her previable child neither good nor bad morally, considered in the abstract? Recently, Maureen Condic and Donna Harrison have argued that such separation is justified to protect the mother’s life and that it does not constitute an abortion as the aim is not to kill the child. In our article on maternal–fetal conflicts, we agree there need be no such aim to kill (supplementing aims such as to remove). However, we (...)
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  16. A Stronger Doctrine of Double Effect.Ben Bronner & Simon Goldstein - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (4):793-805.
    Many believe that intended harms are more difficult to justify than are harms that result as a foreseen side effect of one's conduct. We describe cases of harming in which the harm is not intended, yet the harmful act nevertheless runs afoul of the intuitive moral constraint that governs intended harms. We note that these cases provide new and improved counterexamples to the so-called Simple View, according to which intentionally phi-ing requires intending to phi. We then give a new theory (...)
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  17. Intention, Character, and Double Effect.Lawrence Masek - 2018 - Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.
    The principle of double effect has a long history, from scholastic disputations about self-defense and scandal to current debates about terrorism, torture, euthanasia, and abortion. Despite being widely debated, the principle remains poorly understood. In Intention, Character, and Double Effect, Lawrence Masek combines theoretical and applied questions into a systematic defense of the principle that does not depend on appeals to authority or intuitions about cases. Masek argues that actions can be wrong because they corrupt the agent's character and that (...)
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  18. Intended and Foreseen Unavoidable Consequences.Devlin Russell - 2018 - Manuscrito 41 (4):481-499.
    What is the difference between an intended consequence and a foreseen unavoidable consequence? The answer, I argue, turns on the exercise of knowhow knowledge in the process that led to the consequence. I argue for this using a theory according to which acting intentionally is acting as a reason. I show how this gives us a more promising explanation of the difference than the dominant explanations, according to which acting intentionally is acting for a reason.
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  19. Targeting Human Shields.Amir Saemi & Philip Atkins - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (271):328-348.
    In this paper, we are concerned with the morality of killing human shields. Many moral philosophers seem to believe that knowingly killing human shields necessarily involves intentionally targeting human shields. If we assume that the distinction between intention and foresight is morally significant, then this view would entail that it is generally harder to justify a military operation in which human shields are knowingly killed than a military operation in which the same number of casualties result as a merely foreseen (...)
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  20. The Secret to the Success of the Doctrine of Double Effect : Biased Framing, Inadequate Methodology, and Clever Distractions.Uwe Steinhoff - 2018 - The Journal of Ethics 22 (3-4):235-263.
    There are different formulations of the doctrine of double effect, and sometimes philosophers propose “revisions” or alternatives, like the means principle, for instance. To demonstrate that such principles are needed in the first place, one would have to compare cases in which all else is equal and show that the difference in intuitions, if any, can only be explained by the one remaining difference and thus by the principle in question. This is not the methodology defenders of the DDE and (...)
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  21. Bennett, Intention and the DDE – The Sophisticated Bomber as Pseudo-Problem.Uwe Steinhoff - 2018 - Analysis 78 (1):73-80.
    Arguing against the doctrine of double effect, Bennett claims that the terror bomber only intends to make his victims appear dead. An obvious reply is that he intends to make them appear dead by killing them. I argue that the alleged refutations of this reply rest on a mistaken test question to determine what an agent intends, as Bennett's own test question confirms, and that Bennett is misled by confusing metaphorical death and literal death. Moreover, Bennett's argument is half-hearted anyway, (...)
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  22. The Means/Side-Effect Distinction in Moral Cognition: A Meta-Analysis.Adam Feltz & Joshua May - 2017 - Cognition 166:314-327.
    Experimental research suggests that people draw a moral distinction between bad outcomes brought about as a means versus a side effect (or byproduct). Such findings have informed multiple psychological and philosophical debates about moral cognition, including its computational structure, its sensitivity to the famous Doctrine of Double Effect, its reliability, and its status as a universal and innate mental module akin to universal grammar. But some studies have failed to replicate the means/byproduct effect especially in the absence of other factors, (...)
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  23. Civic Trust.Ryan Preston-Roedder - 2017 - Philosophers' Imprint 17.
    It is a commonplace that there are limits to the ways we can permissibly treat people, even in the service of good ends. For example, we may not steal someone’s wallet, even if we plan to donate the contents to famine relief, or break a promise to help a colleague move, even if we encounter someone else on the way whose need is somewhat more urgent. In other words, we should observe certain constraints against mistreating people, where a constraint is (...)
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  24. The Closeness Problem for Double Effect: A Reply to Nelkin and Rickless.Joshua Stuchlik - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (1):69-83.
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  25. Climate Change, Individual Emissions, and Foreseeing Harm.Chad Vance - 2017 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (5):562-584.
    There are a number of cases where, collectively, groups cause harm, and yet no single individual’s contribution to the collective makes any difference to the amount of harm that is caused. For instance, though human activity is collectively causing climate change, my individual greenhouse gas emissions are neither necessary nor sufficient for any harm that results from climate change. Some (e.g., Sinnott-Armstrong) take this to indicate that there is no individual moral obligation to reduce emissions. There is a collective action (...)
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  26. Vital Conflicts, Bodily Respect, and Conjoined Twins: Are We Asking the Right Questions?Helen Watt - 2017 - In Jason Eberl (ed.), Contemporary Controversies in Catholic Bioethics. Springer. pp. 135-145.
    What does it mean to respect life and health in an innocent fellow-human being? Separating conjoined twins where one twin will die as a result need not involve the intention to kill or harm. Arguably, however, not all side-effects are “mere” side-effects which could, in principle, be outweighed by sufficiently good intended effects. Rather, foreseen serious harm for an innocent person we non-therapeutically affect can be morally conclusive when linked to the intention to affect the person’s body or invade the (...)
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  27. Double Effect Reasoning: Why We Need It.Helen Watt - 2017 - Ethics and Medicine 33 (1):13-19.
    The “principle of double effect” is a vital tool for moral decision making and is applicable to all areas of medical practice, including (for example) end-of-life care, transplant medicine, and cases of conscientious objection. Both our ultimate and our more immediate intentions are relevant in making and evaluating choices— though side effects must be kept proportionate and can be morally conclusive when linked with some intentions. Intentions help to form the character of doctors, and of human beings generally. While hypocrisy (...)
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  28. The Total Artificial Heart and the Dilemma of Deactivation.Ben Bronner - 2016 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 26 (4):347-367.
    It is widely believed to be permissible for a physician to discontinue any treatment upon the request of a competent patient. Many also believe it is never permissible for a physician to intentionally kill a patient. I argue that the prospect of deactivating a patient’s artificial heart presents us with a dilemma: either the first belief just mentioned is false or the second one is. Whichever horn of the dilemma we choose has significant implications for contemporary medical ethics.
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  29. Can Deontological Principles Be Unified? Reflections on the Mere Means Principle.Stijn Bruers - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (2):407-422.
    The mere means principle says it is impermissible to treat someone as merely a means to someone else’s ends. I specify this principle with two conditions: a victim is used as merely a means if the victim does not want the treatment by the agent and the agent wants the presence of the victim’s body. This principle is a specification of the doctrine of double effect which is compatible with moral intuitions and with a restricted kind of libertarianism. An extension (...)
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  30. The Psychological Origins of the Doctrine of Double Effect.Fiery Cushman - 2016 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 10 (4):763-776.
    The doctrine of double effect is a moral principle that distinguishes between harm we cause as a means to an end and harm that we cause as a side-effect. As a purely descriptive matter, the DDE is well established that it describes a consistent feature of human moral judgment. There are, however, several rival theories of its psychological cause. I review these theories and consider their advantages and disadvantages. Critically, most extant psychological theories of the DDE regard it as an (...)
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  31. Retracted Article: Strategic Bombing, Causal Beliefs, and Double Effect.Ezio Di Nucci - 2016 - Journal of Value Inquiry 50 (2):385-394.
    I argue against the Doctrine of Double Effect’s explanation of the moral difference between terror bombing and strategic bombing. I show that the standard thought-experiment of terror bombing and strategic bombing which dominates this debate is underdetermined with regards to the agents’ psychologies: (a) if Terror Bomber and Strategic Bomber have the same causal beliefs, then why does Terror Bomber set out to kill the children? It may then be this unwarranted and immoral choice and not the Doctrine of Double (...)
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  32. Appropriately Using People Merely as a Means.Alexander A. Guerrero - 2016 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 10 (4):777-794.
    There has been a great deal of philosophical discussion about using people, using people intentionally, using people as a means to some end, and using people merely as a means to some end. In this paper, I defend the following claim about using people: NOT ALWAYS WRONG: using people—even merely as a means—is not always morally objectionable. Having defended that claim, I suggest that the following claim is also correct: NO ONE FEATURE: when it is morally objectionable to use people, (...)
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  33. The Doctrine of Double Effect and the Trolley Problem.Whitley Kaufman - 2016 - Journal of Value Inquiry 50 (1):21-31.
    It is widely held by moral philosophers that J.J. Thomson’s “Loop Variant,” a version of the Trolley Problem first presented by her in 1985, decisively refutes the Doctrine of Double Effect as the right explanation of our moral intuitions in the various trolley-type cases.See Bruers and Brackman, “A Review and Systematization of the Trolley Problem,” Philosophia 42:2 : 251–269; T. Scanlon, Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame ; Peter Singer, “Ethics and Intuitions,” Journal of Ethics 9:314 : 331–352, p. 340; Matthew (...)
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  34. The Relevance of Intention to Criminal Wrongdoing.Dana Kay Nelkin & Samuel C. Rickless - 2016 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 10 (4):745-762.
    In this paper, we defend the general thesis that intentions are relevant not only to moral permissibility and impermissibility, but also to criminal wrongdoing, as well as a specific version of the Doctrine of Double Effect that we believe can help solve some challenging puzzles in the criminal law. We begin by answering some recent arguments that marginalize or eliminate the role of intentions as components of criminal wrongdoing [e.g., Alexander and Ferzan, Chiao, Walen ]. We then turn to some (...)
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  35. Book Reviews: Action Reconceptualized: Human Agency and Its Sources by David Chan, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. [REVIEW]Amir Saemi - 2016 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews:1-2.
    David K. Chan provides an account of various mental entities that interact with each other to produce human action. Once we have a theory of human action, Chan states, we will be in a better position to examine how to evaluate human actions from a moral perspective. I will address only two sets of claims that I don't find convincing. The first concerns Chan's idea that we need to introduce a new category of non-intentional action (besides intentional and unintentional) to (...)
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  36. Should We Prevent Deontological Wrongdoing?Re’em Segev - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2049-2068.
    Is there a reason to prevent deontological wrongdoing—an action that is wrong due to the violation of a decisive deontological constraint? This question is perplexing. On the one hand, the intuitive response seems to be positive, both when the question is considered in the abstract and when it is considered with regard to paradigmatic cases of deontological wrongdoing such as Bridge and Transplant. On the other hand, common theoretical accounts of deontological wrongdoing do not entail this answer, since not preventing (...)
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  37. Predicting Moral Judgments From Causal Judgments.Emmanuel Chemla, Paul Egré & Philippe Schlenker - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (1):21-48.
    Several factors have been put forward to explain the variability of moral judgments for superficially analogous moral dilemmas, in particular in the paradigm of trolley cases. In this paper we elaborate on Mikhail's view that (i) causal analysis is at the core of moral judgments and that (ii) causal judgments can be quantified by linguistic methods. According to this model, our moral judgments depend both on utilitarian considerations (whether positive effects outweigh negative effects) and on a representation of the causal (...)
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  38. The Doctrine of Double Effect.Neil Delaney - 2015 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):397-406.
    Abstract: This essay consists of some clarifying remarks on the doctrine of double effect (DDE). After providing a contemporary formulation of the doctrine we put special emphasis on the distinction between those aspects of an action plan that are intended and those that are merely foreseen (the I/F distinction). Making use of this distinction is often made difficult in practice because salient aspects of the action plan exhibit a felt “closeness” to one another that is difficult if not impossible to (...)
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  39. Early Induction and Double Effect.John A. DiCamillo & Edward J. Furton - 2015 - The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 15 (2):251-261.
    A recent consensus statement claimed that double effect can justify induction of labor before viability when life-threatening pathological complications arise from the interaction of a normally functioning placenta with the diseased heart of the mother. The authors of this essay agree. They analyze two pieces published in response, using the framework of the first and fourth criteria of double effect; identify and attempt to clarify inaccuracies and other sources of ambiguity in the discussion; and acknowledge practical implications for other scenarios (...)
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  40. Intentions, Permissibility and the Reasons for Which We Act.Ulrike Heuer - 2015 - In George Pavlakos & Veronica Rodriguez Blanco (eds.), Practical Normativity. Essays on Reasons and Intentions in Law and Practical Reason. Cambridge University Press. pp. 11-30.
  41. Are Enabling and Allowing Harm Morally Equivalent?Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen - 2015 - Utilitas 27 (3):365-383.
    It is sometimes asserted that enabling harm is morally equivalent to allowing harm. In this article, I criticize this view. Positively, I show that cases involving self-defence and cases involving people acting on the basis of a reasonable belief to the effect that certain obstacles to harm will remain in place, or will be put in place, show that enabling harm is harder to justify than allowing it. Negatively, I argue that certain cases offered in defence of the moral equivalence (...)
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  42. In Defense of a Minimalist, Agent-Based Principle of Double Effect.Lawrence Masek - 2015 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):521-538.
    Many philosophers assume that the principle of double effect (PDE) is meant to cover trolley cases. In fact, trolley cases come from PDE’s critics, not its defenders. When philosophers stretch PDE to explain intuitions about trolley cases, they define intended effects too broadly. More importantly, trolley cases make poor illustrations of PDE because they focus attention away from the agent and onto the victim. When philosophers lose sight of the agent, some intuitions that fit PDE survive, but the rational basis (...)
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  43. So Close, Yet So Far: Why Solutions to the Closeness Problem for the Doctrine of Double Effect Fall Short.Dana Kay Nelkin & Samuel C. Rickless - 2015 - Noûs 49 (2):376-409.
    According to the classical Doctrine of Double Effect, there is a morally significant difference between intending harm and merely foreseeing harm. Versions of DDE have been defended in a variety of creative ways, but there is one difficulty, the so-called “closeness problem”, that continues to bedevil all of them. The problem is that an agent's intention can always be identified in such a fine-grained way as to eliminate an intention to harm from almost any situation, including those that have been (...)
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  44. The Principle of Double Effect in End-of-Life Care.Jordan Potter - 2015 - The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 15 (3):515-529.
    In Catholic moral theology, the principle of double effect has been an effective normative tool for centuries, and it can be used to determine the ethicality of actions that contain both good and evil consequences. The principle of double effect is especially useful in end-of-life care, because many end-of-life treatment options inherently have both good and evil conse­quences. The principle of double effect can be used to make both practical and moral distinctions between the acts of euthanasia, physician-assisted suicide, palliative (...)
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  45. Aquinas, Double-Effect Reasoning, and the Pauline Principle.Bernard G. Prusak - 2015 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):505-520.
    This paper reconsiders whether Aquinas is rightly read as a double-effect thinker and whether it is right to understand him as concurring with Paul’s dictum that evil is not to be done that good may come. I focus on what to make of Aquinas’s position that, though the private citizen may not intend to kill a man in self-defense, those holding public authority, like soldiers, may rightly do so. On my interpretation, we cannot attribute to Aquinas the position that aiming (...)
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  46. Wrongful Intentions Without Closeness.Victor Tadros - 2015 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 43 (1):52-74.
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  47. Double Effect and Two Hard Cases in Medical Ethics.Christopher Tollefsen - 2015 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):407-420.
    Two hard cases have generated controversy regarding the application of the principle of double effect in recent years. As regards the first, the case of the conjoined twins of Malta, there has been considerable convergence: most natural law ethicists seem to agree that separation of the twins was morally permissible. By contrast, the so-called “Phoenix case,” involving an abortion at a Catholic hospital for a woman with pulmonary arterial hypertension, has become a touchstone of disagreement between defenders of the so-called (...)
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  48. The Theological Implications of Double Effect.John Zeis - 2015 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 89 (1):133-138.
    Double effect reasoning is central to Catholic moral theology. It is the principle which enables it to maintain absolute moral standards while effectively handling morally difficult choices which entail bringing about some evil as well as the good. DER has been focused on the way in which it applies to human agents and their relation to bringing about evil as well as the good. According to DER, only the good can be brought about intentionally; evil can only be brought about (...)
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  49. A Review and Systematization of the Trolley Problem.Stijn Bruers & Johan Braeckman - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (2):251-269.
    The trolley problem, first described by Foot (1967) and Thomson (The Monist, 59, 204–217, 1976), is one of the most famous and influential thought experiments in deontological ethics. The general story is that a runaway trolley is threatening the lives of five people. Doing nothing will result in the death of those persons, but acting in order to save those persons would unavoidably result in the death of another, sixth person. It appears that, depending on the situation, we have different (...)
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  50. Aristotle’s Voluntary / Deliberate Distinction, Double-Effect Reasoning, and Ethical Relevance.T. A. Cavanaugh - 2014 - International Philosophical Quarterly 54 (4):367-378.
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