About this topic
Summary Traditionally conceived, the exclusion problem is faced by non-reductive materialist views which hold that mental causes are distinct from physical causes. Many think that if materialism is true, then every physical effect must have a sufficient physical cause; but in that case the purportedly distinct mental causes can appear to be "excluded" as genuine causes because the physical causes "already" do all the "causal work". Exclusion can work both ways - some have argued that mental causes exclude physical causes - but most have thought that it is mental causes that are under threat. Some have taken the exclusion argument to demonstrate the falsity of non-reductive materialism, but most have tried to defend non-reductive materialism by contending that the exclusion argument is unsound.
Key works The exclusion argument was first proposed by Norman Malcolm (1968). After a brief flurry of interest in Malcolm's argument (e.g. Goldman 1969; Martin 1971), discussion of the issue largely died off until Jaegwon Kim resurrected the exclusion argument and used it as the central component of his sustained critique of non-reductive materialism (1989; 1998; 2005). Subsequent debates have had two main focal points. First, the nature of the mental-physical causal relation (e.g. Horgan 1997; Crisp & Warfield 2001; Kim 2007; Loewer 2007; Menzies 2013; Zhong 2014). Second, explaining the holding of the mental-physical supervenience relation (e.g. Yablo 1992; Shoemaker 2007; Paul 2007; Walter 2007; Bennett 2008Wilson 2009; Pereboom 2011).
Introductions Sophie Gibb's introduction to the volume she co-edited with Lowe and Ingthorsson (2013) is a good place to start, and that volume also contains much of the state of the art thinking on the exclusion problem. Kim 2005, or Kim 2007 alongside Loewer 2007, are also a good way in. Enyclopedia entries include Yoo 2007, Robb & Heil 2008 - although these survey the broader issue of mental causation, of which the exclusion problem is just one part.
  Show all references
Related categories
Siblings:
424 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Order:
1 — 50 / 424
  1. Gustavo Fernández Acevedo (2005). La Ineficacia Causal de Lo Mental y El Éxito Explicativo de la Psicología (The Causal Inefficacy of the Mental and the Explanatory Success of Psychology). Critica 37 (110):53 - 77.
    Las llamadas "estrategias deflacionistas" han constituido una alternativa relativamente popular para enfrentar el problema de la presunta ineficacia causal de los estados mentales en el marco del materialismo no reduccionista. Las propuestas de Lynn Baker y Tyler Burge, desarrolladas en el marco de esta estrategia, coinciden en señalar la necesidad de limitar la importancia de la reflexión metafísica y privilegiar el análisis de la explicación mentalista como fuente para la solución (o "disolución") de los problemas de la causación mental. En (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. Simona Aimar (2011). Counterfactuals, Overdetermination and Mental Causation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3):469-477.
    The Exclusion Problem for mental causation suggests that there is a tension between the claim that the mental causes physical effects, and the claim that the mental does not overdetermine its physical effects. In response, Karen Bennett puts forward an extra necessary condition for overdetermination : if one candidate cause were to occur but the other were not to occur, the effect would still occur. She thus denies one of the assumptions of EP, the assumption that if an effect has (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  3. R. F. Alfred Hoernle (1917). The Mental and the Physical as a Problem for Philosophy. Philosophical Review 26 (3):297-314.
  4. Peter Alward, Comments on Noa Latham’s €œIs There a Conception of Causation That Gives Rise to a Problem of Mental Causation?€.
    Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Latham defends the following argument against problems that putatively arise for mental causation: 1. A problem for mental causation arises for a conception of causation only if it attributes a causal role to physical but not mental entities.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Peter Alward (2008). Mopes, Dopes, and Tropes. Dialogue 47 (1):53-64.
    ABSTRACT: A popular strategylor resolving Kim 's exclusion problem is to suggest that mental and physical property tropes are identical despite the non-identity of the mental and physical properties themselves. I argue that mental and physical tropes can be identified without losing the dispositional character of mentality only if a dual-character hypothesis regarding the intrinsic characters of tropes is endorsed. But even with this assumption, the causaI efficacy of the wrong dispositions is secured.RÉSUMÉ: On résout habituellement le problème de l'exclusion (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. Peter Alward (2008). Mopes, Dopes, and Tropes: A Critique of the Trope Solution to the Problem of Mental Causation. Dialogue 47 (01):53-.
    ABSTRACT: A popular strategylor resolving Kim 's exclusion problem is to suggest that mental and physical property tropes are identical despite the non-identity of the mental and physical properties themselves. I argue that mental and physical tropes can be identified without losing the dispositional character of mentality only if a dual-character hypothesis regarding the intrinsic characters of tropes is endorsed. But even with this assumption, the causaI efficacy of the wrong dispositions is secured.RÉSUMÉ: On résout habituellement le problème de l'exclusion (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. Peter Alward (2006). Are Functional Properties Causally Potent? Sorites 17:49-55.
    Kim has defended a solution to the exclusion problem which deploys the «causal inheritance principle» and the identification of instantiations of mental properties with instantiations of their realizing physical properties. I wish to argue that Kim's putative solution to the exclusion problem rests on an equivocation between instantiations of properties as bearers of properties and instantiations as property instances. On the former understanding, the causal inheritance principle is too weak to confer causal efficacy upon mental properties. And on the latter (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. Holly Andersen (2015). Mental Causation. In N. Levy J. Clausen (ed.), Springer Handbook of Neuroethics. Springer.
    The problem of mental causation in contemporary philosophy of mind concerns the possibility of holding two different views that are in apparent tension. The first is physicalism, the view that there is nothing more to the world than the physical. The second is that the mental has genuine causal efficacy in a way that does not reduce to pure physical particle-bumping. This article provides a historical background to this question, with focus on Davidson’s anomalous monism and Kim’s causal exclusion problem. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Holly K. Andersen (2010). Mental Causation: The Mind-Body Problem. By Anthony Dardis. Metaphilosophy 41 (3):450-455.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Louise M. Antony (2003). Who's Afraid of Disjunctive Properties? Philosophical Issues 13 (1):1-21.
  11. Louise M. Antony (1996). Mental Causation. Philosophical Review 105 (4):564.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. István Aranyosi (2008). Excluding Exclusion: The Natural(Istic) Dualist Approach. Philosophical Explorations 11 (1):67-78.
    The exclusion problem for mental causation is one of the most discussed puzzles in the mind-body literature. There has been a general agreement among philosophers, especially because most of them are committed to some form of physicalism, that the dualist cannot escape the exclusion problem. I argue that a proper understanding of dualism --its form, commitments, and intuitions?makes the exclusion problem irrelevant from a dualist perspective. The paper proposes a dualist approach, based on a theory of event causation, according to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. Steinvör Thöll Árnadóttir (2015). Overdetermination and Elimination. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (4):479-503.
    I focus on two arguments, due to Jaegwon Kim and Trenton Merricks, that move from claims about the sufficiency of one class of causes to the reduction or elimination of another class of entity, via claims about overdetermination. I argue that in order to validate their move from sufficiency to reduction or elimination, both Kim and Merricks must assume that there can be no ‘weak overdetermination’; i.e., that no single effect can have numerically distinct but dependently sufficient causes occurring at (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  14. Steinvör Thöll Árnadóttir & Tim Crane (2013). There is No Exclusion Problem. In Sophie C. Gibb & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Mental Causation and Ontology. Oxford University Press. pp. 248.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  15. Paul Audi (2013). Causation, Coincidence, and Commensuration. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):447-464.
    What does it take to solve the exclusion problem? An ingenious strategy is Stephen Yablo’s idea that causes must be commensurate with their effects. Commensuration is a relation between events. Roughly, events are commensurate with one another when one contains all that is required for the occurrence of the other, and as little as possible that is not required. According to Yablo, one event is a cause of another only if they are commensurate. I raise three reasons to doubt that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. James W. Austin (1980). Wittgenstein's Solutions to the Color Exclusion Problem. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 41 (September-December):142-149.
  17. Lynne Rudder Baker (2009). Nonreductive Materialism I. Introduction. In Brian McLaughlin and Ansgar Beckermann (ed.), Oxford Handbook for the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
    The expression ‘nonreductive materialism’ refers to a variety of positions whose roots lie in attempts to solve the mind-body problem. Proponents of nonreductive materialism hold that the mental is ontologically part of the material world; yet, mental properties are causally efficacious without being reducible to physical properties.s After setting out a minimal schema for nonreductive materialism (NRM) as an ontological position, I’ll canvass some classical arguments in favor of (NRM).1 Then, I’ll discuss the major challenge facing any construal of (NRM): (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. Lynne Rudder Baker (1993). Metaphysics and Mental Causation. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press. pp. 75-96.
    My aim is twofold: first, to root out the metaphysical assumptions that generate the problem of mental causation and to show that they preclude its solution; second, to dissolve the problem of mental causation by motivating rejection of one of the metaphysical assumptions that give rise to it. There are three features of this metaphysical background picture that are important for our purposes. The first concerns the nature of reality: all reality depends on physical reality, where physical reality consists of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   39 citations  
  19. Derek Ball (2014). Critical Notice: Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism, by Derk Pereboom. Analytic Philosophy 55 (1):118-129.
    Critical notice of Derk Pereboom's "Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism". Discusses Pereboom's idea that conscious states might be misrepresented in introspection, and his idea that instantiations of mental properties are composed of instantiations of physical properties.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. Joseph A. Baltimore (2013). Type Physicalism and Causal Exclusion. Journal of Philosophical Research 38:405-418.
    While concerns of the mental being causally excluded by the physical have persistently plagued non-reductive physicalism, such concerns are standardly taken to pose no problem for reductive type physicalism. Type physicalists have the obvious advantage of being able to countenance the reduction of mental properties to their physical base properties by way of type identity, thereby avoiding any causal competition between instances of mental properties and their physical bases. Here, I challenge this widely accepted advantage of type physicalism over non-reductive (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  21. Joseph A. Baltimore (2010). Defending the Piggyback Principle Against Shapiro and Sober's Empirical Approach. Synthese 175 (2):151-168.
    Jaegwon Kim’s supervenience/exclusion argument attempts to show that non-reductive physicalism is incompatible with mental causation. This influential argument can be seen as relying on the following principle, which I call “the piggyback principle”: If, with respect to an effect, E, an instance of a supervenient property, A, has no causal powers over and above, or in addition to, those had by its supervenience base, B, then the instance of A does not cause E (unless A is identical with B). In (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. Yasmin Bassi (2013). Interventionism and the Exclusion Problem. Dissertation, University of Warwick
    Jaegwon Kim (1998a, 2005) claims that his exclusion problem follows a priori for the non-reductive physicalist given her commitment to five apparently inconsistent theses: mental causation, non-identity, supervenience, causal closure and non-overdetermination. For Kim, the combination of these theses entails that mental properties are a priori excluded as causes, forcing the non-reductive physicalist to accept either epiphenomenalism, or some form of reduction. In this thesis, I argue that Kim’s exclusion problem depends on a particular conception of causation, namely sufficient production, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23. Michael Baumgartner (2013). Rendering Interventionism and Non‐Reductive Physicalism Compatible. Dialectica 67 (1):1-27.
    In recent years, the debate on the problem of causal exclusion has seen an ‘interventionist turn’. Numerous non-reductive physicalists (e.g. Shapiro and Sober 2007) have argued that Woodward's (2003) interventionist theory of causation provides a means to empirically establish the existence of non-reducible mental-to-physical causation. By contrast, Baumgartner (2010) has presented an interventionist exclusion argument showing that interventionism is in fact incompatible with non-reductive physicalism. In response, a number of revised versions of interventionism have been suggested that are compatible with (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  24. Michael Baumgartner (2012). The Logical Form of Interventionism. Philosophia 40 (4):751-761.
    This paper argues that, notwithstanding the remarkable popularity of Woodward's (2003) interventionist analysis of causation, the exact definitional details of that theory are surprisingly little understood. There exists a discrepancy in the literature between the clarity about the logical details of interventionism, on the one hand, and the enormous work interventionism is expected to do, on the other. The first part of the paper distinguishes three significantly different readings of the logical form of Woodward's (2003) interventionist theory and identifies the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  25. Michael Baumgartner (2010). Interventionism and Epiphenomenalsim. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):359-383.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  26. Michael Baumgartner (2009). Interventionist Causal Exclusion and Non-Reductive Physicalism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (2):161-178.
    The first part of this paper presents an argument showing that the currently most highly acclaimed interventionist theory of causation, i.e. the one advanced by Woodward, excludes supervening macro properties from having a causal influence on effects of their micro supervenience bases. Moreover, this interventionist exclusion argument is demonstrated to rest on weaker premises than classical exclusion arguments. The second part then discusses a weakening of interventionism that Woodward suggests. This weakened version of interventionism turns out either to be inapplicable (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   16 citations  
  27. Umut Baysan (2014). Review of Mental Causation and Ontology, Edited by S. C. Gibb, E. J. Lowe, and R. D. Ingthorsson. Mind 123 (491):906-909.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. White Ben (forthcoming). Conservation Laws and Interactionist Dualism. Philosophical Quarterly.
    The Exclusion Argument for physicalism maintains that since (1) every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause, and (2) cases of causal overdetermination are rare, it follows that if (3) mental events cause physical events as frequently as they seem to, then (4) mental events must be physical in nature. In defence of (1), it is sometimes said that (1) is supported if not entailed by conservation laws. Against this, I argue that conservation laws do not lend sufficient support to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. Aaron Ben-Zeev (1986). Making Mental Properties More Natural. The Monist 69 (3):434-446.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  30. Karen Bennett (2008). Exclusion Again. In Jakob Hohwy & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation. Oxford University Press.
    I think that there is an awful lot wrong with the exclusion problem. So, it seems, does just about everybody else. But of course everyone disagrees about exactly _what_ is wrong with it, and I think there is more to be said about that. So I propose to say a few more words about why the exclusion problem is not really a problem after all—at least, not for the nonreductive physicalist. The genuine _dualist_ is still in trouble. Indeed, one of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   12 citations  
  31. Karen Bennett (2003). Why the Exclusion Problem Seems Intractable and How, Just Maybe, to Tract It. Noûs 37 (3):471-97.
    The basic form of the exclusion problem is by now very, very familiar. 2 Start with the claim that the physical realm is causally complete: every physical thing that happens has a sufficient physical cause. Add in the claim that the mental and the physical are distinct. Toss in some claims about overdetermination, give it a stir, and voilá—suddenly it looks as though the mental never causes anything, at least nothing physical. As it is often put, the physical does all (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   61 citations  
  32. Sara Bernstein (2016). Erratum To: Overdetermination Underdetermined. Erkenntnis 81 (1):183-183.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. Sara Bernstein (2016). Overdetermination Underdetermined. Erkenntnis 81 (1):17-40.
    Widespread causal overdetermination is often levied as an objection to nonreductive theories of minds and objects. In response, nonreductive metaphysicians have argued that the type of overdetermination generated by their theories is different from the sorts of coincidental cases involving multiple rock-throwers, and thus not problematic. This paper pushes back. I argue that attention to differences between types of overdetermination discharges very few explanatory burdens, and that overdetermination is a bigger problem for the nonreductive metaphysician than previously thought.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  34. Sara Bernstein & Jessica Wilson (2016). Free Will and Mental Quausation. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2:310-331.
    Free will, if such there be, involves free choosing: the ability to mentally choose an outcome, where the outcome is 'free' in being, in some substantive sense, up to the agent of the choice. As such, it is clear that the questions of how to understand free will and mental causation are connected, for events of seemingly free choosing are mental events that appear to be efficacious vis-a-vis other mental events as well as physical events. Nonetheless, the free will and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. A. G. Bills (1935). Some Causal Factors in Mental Blocking. Journal of Experimental Psychology 18 (2):172.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. Alexander Bird (2008). Causal Exclusion and Evolved Emergent Properties. In Ruth Groff (ed.), Revitalizing Causality: Realism About Causality in Philosophy and Social Science. Routledge. pp. 163--78.
    Emergent properties are intended to be genuine, natural higher level causally efficacious properties irreducible to physical ones. At the same time they are somehow dependent on or 'emergent from' complexes of physical properties, so that the doctrine of emergent properties is not supposed to be returned to dualism. The doctrine faces two challenges: (i) to explain precisely how it is that such properties emerge - what is emergence; (ii) to explain how they sidestep the exclusion problem - how it is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  37. M. E. Bitterman & E. Soloway (1946). The Relation Between Frequency of Blinking and Effort Expended in Mental Work. Journal of Experimental Psychology 36 (2):134.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38. Ned Block (2003). Do Causal Powers Drain Away. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):133-150.
    In this note, I will discuss one issue concerning the main argument of Mind in a Physical World (Kim, 1998), the Causal Exclusion Argument. The issue is whether it is a consequence of the Causal Exclusion Argument that all macro level causation (that is, causation above the level of fundamental physics) is an illusion, with all of the apparent causal powers of mental and other macro properties draining into the bottom level of physics. I will argue that such a consequence (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   36 citations  
  39. Ned Block (1989). Can the Mind Change the World? In George S. Boolos (ed.), Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam. Cambridge University Press. pp. 137--170.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  40. Thomas D. Bontly (2005). Exclusion, Overdetermination, and the Nature of Causation. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:261-282.
    A typical thesis of contemporary materialism holds that mental properties and events supervene on, without being reducible to, physical properties and events. Many philosophers have grown skeptical about the causal efficacy of irreducibly supervenient properties, however, and one of the main reasons is an assumption about causation which Jaegwon Kim calls the causal exclusion principle. I argue here that this principle runs afoul of cases of genuine causal overdetermination.Many would argue that causal overdetermination is impossible anyway, but a careful analysis (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  41. Thomas D. Bontly (2005). Proportionality, Causation, and Exclusion. Philosophia 32 (1-4):331-348.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  42. Thomas D. Bontly (2002). The Supervenience Argument Generalizes. Philosophical Studies 109 (1):75-96.
    In his recent book, Jaegwon Kim argues thatpsychophysical supervenience withoutpsychophysical reduction renders mentalcausation `unintelligible'. He also claimsthat, contrary to popular opinion, his argumentagainst supervenient mental causation cannot begeneralized so as to threaten the causalefficacy of other `higher-level' properties:e.g., the properties of special sciences likebiology. In this paper, I argue that none ofthe considerations Kim advances are sufficientto keep the supervenience argument fromgeneralizing to all higher-level properties,and that Kim's position in fact entails thatonly the properties of fundamental physicalparticles are causally efficacious.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  43. Jan Bransen (1998). Making X Happen: Prolepsis and the Problem of Mental Determination. In J. A. M. Bransen & S. E. Cuypers (eds.), Human Action, Deliberation and Causation. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 131--153.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. Janez Bregant (2004). Van Gulick's Solution of the Exclusion Problem Revisited. Acta Analytica 19 (33):83-94.
    The anti-reductionist who wants to preserve the causal efficacy of mental phenomena faces several problems in regard to mental causation, i.e. mental events which cause other events, arising from her desire to accept the ontological primacy of the physical and at the same time save the special character of the mental. Psychology tries to persuade us of the former, appealing thereby to the results of experiments carried out in neurology; the latter is, however, deeply rooted in our everyday actions and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. Janez Bregant (2003). The Problem of Causal Exclusion and Horgan's Causal Compatibilism. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (9):305-320.
    It is quite obvious why the antireductionist picture of mental causation that rests on supervenience is an attractive theory. On the one hand, it secures uniqueness of the mental; on the other hand, it tries to place the mental in our world in a way that is compatible with the physicalist view. However, Kim reminds us that anti-reductionists face the following dilemma: either mental properties have causal powers or they do not. If they have them, we risk a violation of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46. Andrei A. Buckareff (2012). An Action Theoretic Problem for Intralevel Mental Causation. Philosophical Issues 22 (1):89-105.
    I take it that the following is a desideratum of our theories in the philosophy of mind. A theory in the philosophy of mind should help us better understand ourselves as agents and aid in our theorizing about the nature of action and agency. In this paper I discuss a strategy adopted by some defenders of nonreductive physicalism in response to the problem of causal exclusion. The strategy, which I refer to as “intralevelism,” relies on treating mental causation as intra (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. Andrei A. Buckareff (2011). Intralevel Mental Causation. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):402-425.
    This paper identifies and critiques a theory of mental causation defended by some proponents of nonredutive physicalism that I call “intralevelism.” Intralevelist theories differ in their details. On all versions, the causal outcome of the manifestation of physical properties is physical and the causal outcome of the manifestation of mental properties is mental. Thus, mental causation on this view is intralevel mental to mental causation. This characterization of mental causation as intralevel is taken to insulate nonreductive physicalism from some objections (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  48. Evan Butts (2008). Attributing Mental Properties to Wide Subjects. Dissertation, University of Edinburgh
    Rob Wilson (2001) claims that mental properties are not attributable to wide subjects, despite the claims of authors like Clark and Chalmers (1998). I examine Wilson's objection and endeavor to demonstrate that Clark and Chalmers' account does support the attribution of mental properties to wide subjects.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49. John Campbell, An Interventionist Approach to Causation in Psychology by John Campbell.
    My project in this paper is to extend the interventionist analysis of causation to give an account of causation in psychology. Many aspects of empirical investigation into psychological causation fit straightforwardly into the interventionist framework. I address three problems. First, the problem of explaining what it is for a causal relation to be properly psychological rather than merely biological. Second, the problem of rational causation: how it is that reasons can be causes. Finally, I look at the implications of an (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50. John Campbell (2010). Control Variables and Mental Causation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (1):15-30.
    I introduce the notion of a ‘control variable’ which gives us a way of seeing how mental causation could be an unproblematic case of causation in general, rather than being some sui generis form of causation. Psychological variables may be the control variables for a system for which there are no physical control variables, even in a deterministic physical world. That explains how there can be psychological causation without physical causation, even in a deterministic physical world.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
1 — 50 / 424