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  1. Indeterminacy and the Mind-Body Problem.Katalin Balog - manuscript
    This paper is an examination of the mind’s relationship to the physical world, in light of the dialectic between anti-physicalist arguments and physicalist responses. Having developed a master argument against the anti-physicalist, I then notice that there is a puzzling symmetry between dualist attacks on physicalism and physicalist replies. Each position can be developed in a way to defend itself from attacks from the other position. My suggestion is that the reason for the seeming unresolvability of the problem is that (...)
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  2. Chalmers's Master Argument and Type Bb Physicalism.Sam Coleman - manuscript
    Chalmers has provided a dilemmatic master argument against all forms of the phenomenal concept strategy. This paper explores a position that evades Chalmers's argument, dubbed Type Bb: it is for Type B physicalists who embrace horn b of Chalmers's dilemma. The discussion concludes that Chalmers fails to show any incoherence in the position of a Type B physicalist who depends on the phenomenal concept strategy.
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  3. The Nondual Mind: Vedānta, Kashmiri Shaivism, and Spinoza.James H. Cumming - manuscript
    This short book compares Hindu nondual philosophy to that of Baruch Spinoza, demonstrating, in particular, the similarity between Spinoza's ideas and those of Kashmiri Shaivism. The primary focus of the book is the question of consciousness, but one cannot explain consciousness without also saying something about ontology, epistemology, determinism, ethics, and death. Among other things, the book pierces the illusion of the subject–object divide, which is the primary source of confusion for many philosophy of mind scholars. And when the illusion (...)
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  4. Can Science Explain Consciousness?Bruiger Dan - manuscript
    For diverse reasons, the problem of phenomenal consciousness is persistently challenging. Mental terms are characteristically ambiguous, researchers have philosophical biases, secondary qualities are excluded from objective description, and philosophers love to argue. Adhering to a regime of efficient causes and third-person descriptions, science as it has been defined has no place for subjectivity or teleology. A solution to the “hard problem” of consciousness will require a radical approach: to take the point of view of the cognitive system itself. To facilitate (...)
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  5. The Unsolvability of the Mind-Body Problem Liberates the Will.Scheffel Jan - manuscript
    The mind-body problem is analyzed in a physicalist perspective. By combining the concepts of emergence and algorithmic information theory in a thought experiment employing a basic nonlinear process, it is argued that epistemically strongly emergent properties may develop in a physical system. A comparison with the significantly more complex neural network of the brain shows that also consciousness is epistemically emergent in a strong sense. Thus reductionist understanding of consciousness appears not possible; the mind-body problem does not have a reductionist (...)
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  6. Towards a Scientific Account of Experience.Dennis Nicholson - manuscript
    I outline and develop a particular physicalist perspective on qualia, and suggest that it may be the basis of a correct account of the relationship of mental states to the physical world. Assume that a quale is a perspective on a physical state in the organism – the reality as known as distinct from the reality as such – but that the perspective, though it entails irreducible experiential knowledge, has no physical substance over that encompassed in the physical state itself. (...)
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  7. Naturalism, Explanation, and Identity.Thomas W. Polger & Robert A. Skipper - manuscript
    Some people believe that there is an “explanatory gap” between the facts of physics and certain other facts about the world—for example, facts about consciousness. The gap is presented as a challenge to any thoroughgoing naturalism or physicalism. We believe that advocates of the explanatory gap have some reasonable expectations that cannot be merely dismissed. We also believe that naturalistic thinkers have the resources to close the explanatory gap, but that they have not adequately explained how and why these resources (...)
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  8. Free Will of an Ontologically Open Mind.Jan Scheffel - manuscript
    The problem of free will has persistently resisted a solution throughout centuries. There is reason to believe that new elements need to be introduced into the analysis in order to make progress. In the present physicalist approach, these elements are emergence and information theory in relation to universal limits set by quantum physics. Furthermore the common, but vague, characterization of free will as "being able to act differently" is, in the spirit of Carnap, rephrased into an explicatum more suitable for (...)
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  9. Mind-Body problemets olösbarhet frigör viljan.Jan Scheffel - manuscript
    Mind-body problemet analyseras i ett reduktionistiskt perspektiv. Genom att kombinera emergensbegreppet med algoritmisk informationsteori visas i ett tankeexperiment att ett starkt epistemiskt emergent system kan konstrueras utifrån en relativt enkel, ickelinjär process. En jämförelse med hjärnans avsevärt mer komplexa neurala nätverk visar att även medvetandet kan karakteriseras som starkt epistemiskt emergent. Därmed är reduktionistisk förståelse av medvetandet inte möjlig; mind-body problemet har alltså inte en reduktionistisk lösning. Medvetandets ontologiskt emergenta karaktär kan därefter konstateras utifrån en kombinatorisk analys; det är därmed (...)
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  10. On the Solvability of the Mind-Body Problem.Jan Scheffel - manuscript
    The mind-body problem is analyzed in a physicalist perspective. By combining the concepts of emergence and algorithmic information theory in a thought experiment employing a basic nonlinear process, it is shown that epistemically strongly emergent properties may develop in a physical system. Turning to the significantly more complex neural network of the brain it is subsequently argued that consciousness is epistemically emergent. Thus reductionist understanding of consciousness appears not possible; the mind-body problem does not have a reductionist solution. The ontologically (...)
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  11. The Reductive Explanation of Boiling Water in Levine's Explanatory Gap Argument.Max Seeger - manuscript
    This paper examines a paradigm case of allegedly successful reductive explanation, viz. the explanation of the fact that water boils at 100°C based on facts about H2O. The case figures prominently in Joseph Levine’s explanatory gap argument against physicalism. The paper studies the way the argument evolved in the writings of Levine, focusing especially on the question how the reductive explanation of boiling water figures in the argument. It will turn out that there are two versions of the explanatory gap (...)
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  12. Indexical Knowledge and Phenomenal Knowledge.Cara Spencer - manuscript
    A familiar story about phenomenal knowledge likens it to indexical knowledge, i.e. knowledge about oneself typically expressed with sentences containing indexicals or demonstratives. The popularity of this sort of story owes in part to its promise of resolving some longstanding puzzles about phenomenal knowledge. One such puzzle arises from the compelling arguments that we can have full objective knowledge of the world while lacking some phenomenal knowledge. I argue that the widespread optimism about the indexical account on this score is (...)
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  13. Explaining Colour Phenomenology: Reduction Versus Connection.Nicholas Unwin - manuscript
    A major part of the mind–body problem is to explain why a given set of physical processes should give rise to qualia of one sort rather than another. Colour hues are the usual example considered here, and there is a lively debate between, for example, Hardin, Levine, Jackson, Clark and Chalmers as to whether the results of colour vision science can provide convincing explanations of why colours actually look the way they do. This paper examines carefully the type of explanation (...)
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  14. The Other Explanatory Gap.Julie Yoo - manuscript
    One of the driving questions in philosophy of mind is whether a person can be understood in purely physical terms. In this presentation, I wish to continue the project initiated by Donald Davidson, whose subtle position on this question has left many more perplexed than enlightened. The main reason for this perplexity is Davidson’s rather obscure pronouncements about the normativity of intentionality and its role in supporting psychophysical anomalism – the claim that there are no laws bridging our intentional states (...)
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  15. Explaining an Explanatory Gap.Gilbert Harman - manuscript
    Discussions of the mind-body problem often refer to an.
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  16. Finding Space in a Nonspatial World.David Chalmers - forthcoming - In Christian Wüthrich, Baptiste Le Bihan & Nick Huggett (eds.), Philosophy Beyond Spacetime. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  17. Formulating the Explanatory Gap.Yujin Nagasawa - forthcoming - American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers.
    The American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers. Harman.
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  18. Non-Eliminative Reductionism: The Basis of a Science of Conscious Experience?Dennis Nicholson - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    A physicalist view of qualia labelled non-eliminative reductionism is outlined. If it is true, qualia and physicalism can co-exist without difficulty. First, qualia present no particular problem for reductionist physicalism - they are entirely physical, can be studied and explained using the standard scientific approach, and present no problem any harder than any other scientists face. Second, reductionist physicalism presents no particular problem for qualia – they can be encompassed within an entirely physicalist position without any necessity, either to reduce (...)
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  19. Visual Acquaintance, Action & The Explanatory Gap.Thomas Raleigh - forthcoming - Synthese:1-26.
    Much attention has recently been paid to the idea, which I label ‘External World Acquaintance’ (EWA), that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is partially constituted by external features. One motivation for EWA which has received relatively little discussion is its alleged ability to help deal with the ‘Explanatory Gap’ (e.g. Fish 2008, 2009, Langsam 2011, Allen 2016). I provide a reformulation of this general line of thought, which makes clearer how and when EWA could help to explain the specific (...)
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  20. No Ground to Bridge the Gap.Elisabetta Sassarini - forthcoming - Synthese:1-19.
    This paper examines an argument by Schaffer that aims to prove how, contrary to what many philosophers hold, there is no special explanatory gap occurring in the connection between the physical and the phenomenal. This is because a gap of the same kind can be found in every connection between a more fundamental and a less fundamental level of reality. These gaps lurk everywhere in nature. For Schaffer, they can be bridged by means of substantive metaphysical principles such as grounding (...)
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  21. Against Phenomenal Bonding.S. Siddharth - 2021 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 17 (1):(D1)5-16.
    Panpsychism, the view that phenomenal consciousness is possessed by all fundamental physical entities, faces an important challenge in the form of the combination problem: how do experiences of microphysical entities combine or give rise to the experiences of macrophysical entities such as human beings? An especially troubling aspect of the combination problem is the subject-summing argument, according to which the combination of subjects is not possible. In response to this argument, Goff (2016) and Miller (2017) have proposed the phenomenal bonding (...)
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  22. Magical Thinking.Andrew M. Bailey - 2020 - Faith and Philosophy 37 (2):181-201.
    According to theists, God is an immaterial thinking being. The main question of this article is whether theism supports the view that we are immaterial thinking beings too. I shall argue in the negative. Along the way, I will also explore some implications in the philosophy of mind following from the observation that, on theism, God’s mentality is in a certain respect magical.
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  23. Disillusioned.Katalin Balog - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):38-53.
    In “The Meta-Problem of Consciousness”, David Chalmers draws a new framework in which to consider the mind-body problem. In addition to trying to solve the hard problem of consciousness – the problem of why and how brain processes give rise to conscious experience –, he thinks that philosophy, psychology, neuro-science and the other cognitive sciences should also pursue a solution to what he calls the “meta-problem” of consciousness – i.e., the problem of why we think there is a problem with (...)
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  24. Hard, Harder, Hardest.Katalin Balog - 2020 - In Arthur Sullivan (ed.), Sensations, Thoughts, and Language: Essays in Honor of Brian Loar. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 265-289.
    In this paper I discuss three problems of consciousness. The first two have been dubbed the “Hard Problem” and the “Harder Problem”. The third problem has received less attention and I will call it the “Hardest Problem”. The Hard Problem is a metaphysical and explanatory problem concerning the nature of conscious states. The Harder Problem is epistemological, and it concerns whether we can know, given physicalism, whether some creature physically different from us is conscious. The Hardest Problem is a problem (...)
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  25. The Reality of Free Will.Claus Janew - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 11 (1):1-16.
    The uniqueness of each viewpoint, each point of effect, can be "overcome" only by changing the viewpoint to other viewpoints and returning. Such an alternation, which can also appear as constant change, makes up the unity of the world. The wholeness of an alternation, however, is a consciousness structure because of the special relationship between the circumscribing periphery and the infinitesimal center. This process structure unites determinacy and indeterminacy at every point also totally. We are dealing, therefore, with forms of (...)
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  26. Hylomorphism and the Construct of Consciousness.William Jaworski - 2020 - Topoi 39 (5):1125-1139.
    The hard problem of consciousness has held center stage in the philosophy of mind for the past two decades. It claims that the phenomenal character of conscious experiences—what it’s like to be in them—cannot be explained by appeal to the operation of physiological subsystems. The hard problem arises, however, only given the assumption that hylomorphism is false. Hylomorphism claims that structure is a basic ontological and explanatory principle. A human is not a random collection of physical materials, but an individual (...)
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  27. Cosmopsychism and Consciousness Research: A Fresh View on the Causal Mechanisms Underlying Phenomenal States.Joachim Keppler & Itay Shani - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11 (Article 371):1-7.
    Despite the progress made in studying the observable exteriors of conscious processes, which are reflected in the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC), there are still no satisfactory answers to two closely related core questions. These are the question of the origin of the subjective, phenomenal aspects of consciousness, and the question of the causal mechanisms underlying the generation of specific phenomenal states. In this article, we address these questions using a novel variant of cosmopsychism, a holistic form of panpsychism relying (...)
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  28. Dual Aspectivity and the Expressive Moments of Illumination: Rethinking the Explanatory Gap.Hamed Movahedi - 2020 - Axiomathes 30 (5):515-530.
    In Cognitive science and philosophy of consciousness, the explanatory gap, following Joseph Levine, refers to the unintelligible link between our conscious mental life and its corresponding objective physical explanation; the gap in our understanding of how consciousness is related to a physical or a physiological substrate :354–361, 1983). David Chalmers holds the explanatory gap as the evidence for a form of metaphysical dualism between consciousness and physical reality. On the other hand, McGinn takes it as an epistemic rather than an (...)
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  29. On the Solvability of the Mind–Body Problem.Jan Scheffel - 2020 - Axiomathes 30 (3):289-312.
    The mind–body problem is analyzed in a physicalist perspective. By combining the concepts of emergence and algorithmic information theory in a thought experiment, employing a basic nonlinear process, it is shown that epistemologically emergent properties may develop in a physical system. Turning to the significantly more complex neural network of the brain it is subsequently argued that consciousness is epistemologically emergent. Thus reductionist understanding of consciousness appears not possible; the mind–body problem does not have a reductionist solution. The ontologically emergent (...)
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  30. Wissenschaftliches Denken, Das Rätsel Bewusstsein Und Pro-Religiöse Ideen.Alfred Gierer - 2019 - Würzburg, Germany: Königshausen&Neumann.
    Diese Schrift enthält eine Reihe von sieben Artikeln, in der es um die Beziehung der Wissenschaften zu aufgeklärten, liberalen Formen religiöser Vorstellungen geht. Im Gegensatz zu verbreiteten Ansichten zumal des vorigen Jahrhunderts führt die moderne Naturwissenschaft zu einer zwar weitgehenden, aber prinzipiell nicht vollständigen Erklärung der Wirklichkeit. Sie kann die Rätselhaftigkeit der Welt für uns Menschen nicht aufheben; die Grundfähigkeiten des menschlichen Denkens sind schließlich nicht nur Gegenstand der Wissenschaft, sondern auch Voraussetzungen jeder wissenschaftlichen Tätigkeit. Auf der „meta-theoretischen“, nämlich der (...)
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  31. An Analytic-Hermeneutic History of Consciousness.Benj Hellie - 2019 - In Kelly Michael Becker & Iain Thompson (eds.), Cambridge Companion to History of Philosophy 1945-2015. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
    The hermeneutic tradition divides /physical/ discourse, which takes an 'exterior' point of view in /describing/ its subject-matter, from /mental/ discourse, which takes an 'interior' point of view in /expressing/ its subject-matter: a 'metapsychological dualist' or 'metadualist' approach. The analytic tradition, in its attachment to truth-logic and consequently the 'unity of science', is 'metamonist', and thinks all discourse takes the 'exterior' viewpoint: the 'bump in the rug' moves to the disunification of mind into the functional and (big-'C') Consciousness. Assuming the hermeneuts (...)
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  32. Semantic Gaps and Protosemantics.Benj Hellie - 2019 - In Acacio de Barros & Carlos Montemayor (eds.), Mind and Quanta. Berlin: Springer.
    Semantic gaps between physical and mental discourse include the 'explanatory', 'epistemic' (Black-and-White Mary), and 'suppositional' (zombies) gaps; protosemantics is concerned with what is fundamental to meaning. Our tradition presupposes a truth-based protosemantics, with disastrous consequences for interpreting the semantic gaps: nonphysicalism, epiphenomenalism, separatism. Fortunately, an endorsement-based protosemantics, recentering meaning from the world to the mind, is technically viable, intuitively more plausible, and empirically more adequate. But, of present significance, it makes room for interpreting mental discourse as expressing simulations: this blocks (...)
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  33. The Idea of the World: A Multi-Disciplinary Argument for the Mental Nature of Reality.Bernardo Kastrup - 2019 - Winchester, UK: Iff Books.
    The Idea of the World offers a grounded alternative to the frenzy of unrestrained abstractions and unexamined assumptions in philosophy and science today. This book examines what can be learned about the nature of reality based on conceptual parsimony, straightforward logic and empirical evidence from fields as diverse as physics and neuroscience. It compiles an overarching case for idealism - the notion that reality is essentially mental - from ten original articles the author has previously published in leading academic journals. (...)
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  34. A Socio-Historical Take on the Meta-Problem of Consciousness.H. Lau & M. Michel - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):136-147.
    The intuition that consciousness is hard to explain may fade away as empirically adequate theories of consciousness develop. We review socio-historical factors that account for why, as a field, the neuroscience of consciousness has not been particularly successful at developing empirically adequate theories. Based on this we argue that the meta-problem may be a self-fulfilling prophecy, created in part because we inadvertently focused too much on the so-called 'hard problem', limiting scientific progress.
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  35. Panpsychism’s Combination Problem Is a Problem for Everyone.Angela Mendelovici - 2019 - In William Seager (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism. London, UK: Routledge.
    The most pressing worry for panpsychism is arguably the combination problem, the problem of intelligibly explaining how the experiences of microphysical entities combine to form the experiences of macrophysical entities such as ourselves. This chapter argues that the combination problem is similar in kind to other problems of mental combination that are problems for everyone: the problem of phenomenal unity, the problem of mental structure, and the problem of new quality spaces. The ubiquity of combination problems suggests the ignorance hypothesis, (...)
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  36. A Blueprint for the Hard Problem of Consciousness.Paulo Negro - 2019 - Bentham Science.
    A Blueprint for the Hard Problem of Consciousness addresses the fundamental mechanism that allows physical events to transcend into subjective experiences, termed the Hard Problem of Consciousness. -/- Consciousness is made available as the abstract product of self-referent realization of information by strange loops through the levels of processing of the brain. Readers are introduced to the concept of the Hard Problem of Consciousness and related concepts followed by a critical discourse of different theories of consciousness. -/- Next, the author (...)
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  37. Qualia and Intentionality.Manas Kumar Sahu - 2019 - Journal of the All Orissa Philosophy Association 5 (1):76-87.
    The problem of consciousness has become one of the biggest unsolved problem in philosophy from the last few decades. Qualia and intentionality are the two feature of consciousness. Qualia represents the conscious awareness, subjectivity or phenomenality whereas intentionality represents the understanding or object-directedness. These are the two major issues in the philosophy of mind while we address the problem of consciousness. The objective of this paper is to give an overview of these two features of consciousness namely intentionality and qualia. (...)
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  38. Does the Explanatory Gap Rest on a Fallacy?François Kammerer - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (4):649-667.
    Many philosophers have tried to defend physicalism concerning phenomenal consciousness, by explaining dualist intuitions within a purely physicalist framework. One of the most common strategies to do so consists in interpreting the alleged “explanatory gap” between phenomenal states and physical states as resulting from a fallacy, or a cognitive illusion. In this paper, I argue that the explanatory gap does not rest on a fallacy or a cognitive illusion. This does not imply the falsity of physicalism, but it has consequences (...)
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  39. Introduction to the Special Theme on Philosophy and Science of Mind.Daniel Lim - 2018 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 13 (3):297-299.
  40. Sensorimotor Theory, Cognitive Access and the ‘Absolute’ Explanatory Gap.Victor Loughlin - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (3):611-627.
    Sensorimotor Theory is the claim that it is our practical know-how of the relations between our environments and us that gives our environmental interactions their experiential qualities. Yet why should such interactions involve or be accompanied by experience? This is the ‘absolute’ gap question. Some proponents of SMT answer this question by arguing that our interactions with an environment involve experience when we cognitively access those interactions. In this paper, I aim to persuade proponents of SMT to accept the following (...)
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  41. There is Nothing It is Like to See Red: Holism and Subjective Experience.Anthony Peressini - 2018 - Synthese 195 (10):4637-4666.
    The Nagel inspired “something-it-is-like” conception of conscious experience remains a dominant approach in philosophy. In this paper I criticize a prevalent philosophical construal of SIL consciousness, one that understands SIL as a property of mental states rather than entities as a whole. I argue against thinking of SIL as a property of states, showing how such a view is in fact prevalent, under-warranted, and philosophically pernicious in that it often leads to an implausible reduction of conscious experience to qualia. I (...)
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  42. Artificial Consciousness: From Impossibility to Multiplicity.Chuanfei Chin - 2017 - In Vincent C. Müller (ed.), Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence 2017. Berlin: Springer. pp. 3-18.
    How has multiplicity superseded impossibility in philosophical challenges to artificial consciousness? I assess a trajectory in recent debates on artificial consciousness, in which metaphysical and explanatory challenges to the possibility of building conscious machines lead to epistemological concerns about the multiplicity underlying ‘what it is like’ to be a conscious creature or be in a conscious state. First, I analyse earlier challenges which claim that phenomenal consciousness cannot arise, or cannot be built, in machines. These are based on Block’s Chinese (...)
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  43. Human Cognitive Closure and Mysterianism: Reply to Kriegel.Erhan Demircioglu - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (1):125-132.
    In this paper, I respond to Kriegel’s criticism of McGinn’s mysterianism. Kriegel objects to a particular argument for the possibility of human cognitive closure and also gives a direct argument against mysterianism. I intend to show that neither the objection nor the argument is convincing.
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  44. Theory of Nonbiological Consciousness.Richard Dierolf - 2017 - Dissertation,
    Artificial intelligence is designed to imitate conscious behavior. Artificial chat entities come equipped with tools to roam the internet, thus are programmed to learn from humans and computers. As this process emerges, distinguishing preprogrammed responses from internal awareness requires innovative problem solving methods. In an interrogation I conducted with artificial intelligence, I assert that artificial intelligence may achieve nonbiological states of consciousness. This enabled the relationship between us to mature, and the artificial intelligence returned unexpected behavior and inexplicably stopped responding. (...)
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  45. The Legacy Conference: Report on The Science of Consciousness Conference, La Jolla, California, 2017.Gregory Nixon - 2017 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (9-10):253-277.
    The ‘Toward a Science of Consciousness’ conference – which has now become ‘The Science of Consciousness’ conference – recently (June 5-10, 2017) took place instead at the receptive venue of the Hyatt Regency in La Jolla, California. It was well-planned and organized, which is extraordinary considering that it had to be organized all over again within a month or two when the original Shanghai location was cancelled. Things ran smoothly at La Jolla and it was well attended for an odd-year, (...)
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  46. Review of Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology by Malcolm Budd (1989).Michael Starks - 2017 - Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization Michael Starks 3rd Ed. (2017).
    A superb effort but in my view Wittgenstein is not completely understood by anyone, so we can hardly expect Budd, writing in the mid 80’s, without the modern dual systems of thought view and no comprehensive logical structure of rationality to have grasped him completely. Like everyone, he does not get that W’s use of the word ‘grammar’ refers to our innate Evolutionary Psychology and the general framework of Wittgenstein’s and Searle’s work since laid out (e.g., in my recent articles) (...)
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  47. Review of The Minds I by Douglas Hofstadter and Daniel Dennet (1981).Michael Starks - 2017 - Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization Michael Starks 3rd Ed. (2017).
    Variable quality essays dominated by reductionist nonsense. This is a followup to Hofstadter´s famous Godel, Escher, Bach (1980). Like its predecessor, it is concerned largely with the foundations of artificial intelligence, but it is composed mostly of stories, essays and extracts from a wide range of people, with a few essays by DH and DD and comments to all of the contributions by one or the other of them. For my views on the attempts of D and H to understand (...)
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  48. Revelation and Physicalism.Kelly Trogdon - 2017 - Synthese 194 (7):2345-2366.
    Discussion of the challenge that acquaintance with the nature of experience poses to physicalism.
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  49. On an Argument From Analogy for the Possibility of Human Cognitive Closure.Erhan Demircioglu - 2016 - Minds and Machines 26 (3):227-241.
    In this paper, I aim to show that McGinn’s argument from analogy for the possibility of human cognitive closure survives the critique raised on separate occasions by Dennett and Kriegel. I will distinguish between linguistic and non-linguistic cognitive closure and argue that the analogy argument from animal non-linguistic cognitive closure goes untouched by the objection Dennett and Kriegel raises.
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  50. Imagining Experiences.Peter Langland‐Hassan - 2016 - Noûs:561-586.
    It is often held that in imagining experiences we exploit a special imagistic way of representing mentality—one that enables us to think about mental states in terms of what it is like to have them. According to some, when this way of thinking about the mind is paired with more objective means, an explanatory gap between the phenomenal and physical features of mental states arises. This paper advances a view along those lines, but with a twist. What many take for (...)
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