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  1. added 2019-06-07
    Unconsciousness—Consciousness: Tools for Exploring the Transition: Report on a Workshop in Sigtuna, Sweden on 24-27 August 2000. [REVIEW]Peter Århem, Hans Liljenström & B. I. B. Lindahl - 2001 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (1):77-81.
  2. added 2019-02-05
    The Role of Experience in Demonstrative Thought.Michael Barkasi - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (5):648-666.
    Attention plays a role in demonstrative thought: It sets the targets. Visual experience also plays a role. I argue here that it makes visual information available for use in the voluntary control of focal attention. To do so I use both introspection and neurophysiological evidence from projections between areas of attentional control and neural correlates of consciousness. Campbell and Smithies also identify roles for experience, but they further argue that only experience can play those roles. In contrast, I argue that (...)
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  3. added 2019-02-01
    A Buddhist Analysis of Affective Bias.Sean Smith - 2019 - Journal of Indian Philosophy (1):1-31.
    In this paper, I explore a debate between some Indian Buddhist schools regarding the nature of the underlying tendencies or anusaya-s. I focus here primarily on the ninth chapter of Kathāvatthu’s representation of a dispute about whether an anusaya can be said to have intentional object. I also briefly treat of Vasubandhu’s defense of the Sautrāntika view of anuśaya in the opening section of the fifth chapter his Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam. Following Vasubandhu, I argue against the Thervādin Abhidharmikas that the underlying tendencies (...)
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  4. added 2018-12-15
    Quantum Mechanics of 'Conscious Energy'.Syed Ismyl Mahmood Rizvi - 2018 - International Journal of Mind, Brain and Cognition 9 (1-2):132-160.
    This paper is aiming to investigate the physical substrate of conscious process. It will attempt to find out: How does conscious process establish relations between their external stimuli and internal stimuli in order to create reality? How does consciousness devoid of new sensory input result to its new quantum effects? And how does conscious process gain mass in brain? This paper will also try to locate the origins of consciousness at the level of neurons along with the quantum effects of (...)
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  5. added 2018-09-23
    Neural Synchrony and the Causal Efficacy of Consciousness.David Yates - forthcoming - Topoi:1-16.
    The purpose of this paper is to address a well-known dilemma for physicalism. If mental properties are type identical to physical properties, then their causal efficacy is secure, but at the cost of ruling out mentality in creatures very different to ourselves. On the other hand, if mental properties are multiply realizable, then all kinds of creatures can instantiate them, but then they seem to be causally redundant. The causal exclusion problem depends on the widely held principle that realized properties (...)
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  6. added 2018-02-17
    Three Laws of Qualia: What Neurology Tells Us About the Biological Functions of Consciousness.Vilayanur S. Ramachandran & William Hirstein - 1997 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (5-6):429-457.
    Neurological syndromes in which consciousness seems to malfunction, such as temporal lobe epilepsy, visual scotomas, Charles Bonnet syndrome, and synesthesia offer valuable clues about the normal functions of consciousness and ‘qualia’. An investigation into these syndromes reveals, we argue, that qualia are different from other brain states in that they possess three functional characteristics, which we state in the form of ‘three laws of qualia’. First, they are irrevocable: I cannot simply decide to start seeing the sunset as green, or (...)
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  7. added 2017-09-30
    What Makes a Conscious Process Conscious?Max Velmans - 2014 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (1):43-44.
    This is an open-peer commentary on Newell, B.R. & Shanks, D.R. (2014) Unconscious influences on decision making, BBS, 37:1, pp. 1-61. Newell and Shanks’ critical review considers only a very limited sense in which mental processes can be thought of as either conscious or unconscious and consequently gives a misleading analysis of the role of consciousness in human information processing. This commentary provides an expanded analysis of conscious processing that also reveals the various ways in which mental processes are unconscious. (...)
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  8. added 2017-09-24
    Why Conscious Free Will Both is and Isn't an Illusion.Max Velmans - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):677.
    Wegner’s analysis of the illusion of conscious will is close to my own account of how conscious experiences relate to brain processes. But our analyses differ somewhat on how conscious will is not an illusion. Wegner argues that once conscious will arises it enters causally into subsequent mental processing. I argue that while his causal story is accurate, it remains a first-person story. Conscious free will is not an illusion in the sense that this first-person story is compatible with and (...)
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  9. added 2017-09-19
    Preconscious Free Will.Max Velmans - 2003 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (12):42-61.
    This paper responds to continuing commentary on Velmans (2002a) “How could conscious experiences affect brains,” a target article for a special issue of JCS. I focus on the final question dealt with by the target article: how free will relates to preconscious and conscious mental processing, and I develop the case for preconscious free will. Although “preconscious free will” might appear to be a contradiction in terms, it is consistent with the scientific evidence and provides a parsimonious way to reconcile (...)
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  10. added 2017-02-10
    Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, by Ned Block.P. Goff - 2012 - Mind 121 (483):780-784.
  11. added 2016-12-08
    Better Than Mere Knowledge? The Function of Sensory Awareness.Mark Johnston - 2006 - In John Hawthorne & Tamar Gendler (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 260--290.
  12. added 2016-12-08
    The Obsolescence of Consciousness.Helen Huss Parkhurst - 1920 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 17 (22):596-606.
  13. added 2016-03-06
    First-Hand Experience of the Self Through Imagination.Contzen Pereira & J. Shashi Kiran Reddy - 2016 - Scientific GOD Journal 7 (1):51-52.
    Imagination is the art of exploring beyond the depths of one’s body. Imagination allows one to peek into the void to realize the true existence of its self and feel the existence of eternity. The experience of imagination is a subjective experience of one’s own consciousness and it is this experience makes the experiencer worthy. Creation and creativity are the end aspects of imagination and unfold the hidden mysteries of the cosmos. This essay is a trip across the cosmic energy (...)
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  14. added 2014-09-15
    Mineness Without Minimal Selves.M. V. P. Slors & F. Jongepier - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (7-8):193-219.
    In this paper we focus on what is referred to as the ‘mineness’ of experience, that is, the intimate familiarity we have with our own thoughts, perceptions, and emotions. Most accounts characterize mineness in terms of an experiential dimension, the first-person givenness of experience, that is subsumed under the notion of minimal self-consciousness or a ‘minimal self’. We argue that this account faces problems and develop an alternative account of mineness in terms of the coherence of experiences with what we (...)
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  15. added 2014-06-24
    Die Erschaffung der Realität.Claus Janew - 1998 - Dresden, Germany: Sumari-Verlag.
    The main argument in this book is the undeniable openness of every system to the unknown. And the fundamental question goes: What does this openness produce? We are a part of the infinite universe and an incorporation of its wholeness. Both for us means an individualized reality, through which the universe expresses itself and on the other hand through which it is built up with. It also means our necessity, importance and indestructibility for the sum of its incorporations. Most connections (...)
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  16. added 2014-04-01
    How Much Work Can a Quale Do?William P. Banks - 1996 - Consciousness and Cognition 5 (3):368-80.
    It is argued that theoretical models cannot use qualia as explanatory tools, and cannot explain them either; thus, there is no way to make qualia do any useful work at all, at least in a theory. However, qualia do occur in both imagery and perception, and this article presents some ways of thinking about qualia from a functional perspective. Imagery differs from perception in its function. It is not a faded copy of perception. It is less distinct than perception because (...)
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  17. added 2014-03-31
    Is Human Information Processing Conscious?Max Velmans - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):651-69.
    Investigations of the function of consciousness in human information processing have focused mainly on two questions: (1) where does consciousness enter into the information processing sequence and (2) how does conscious processing differ from preconscious and unconscious processing. Input analysis is thought to be initially "preconscious," "pre-attentive," fast, involuntary, and automatic. This is followed by "conscious," "focal-attentive" analysis which is relatively slow, voluntary, and flexible. It is thought that simple, familiar stimuli can be identified preconsciously, but conscious processing is needed (...)
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  18. added 2014-03-30
    What Good is Consciousness?Fred Dretske - 1997 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):1-15.
    If consciousness is good for something, conscious things must differ in some causally relevant way from unconscious things. If they do not, then, as Davies and Humphreys conclude, too bad for consciousness: ‘psychological theory need not be concerned with this topic.’Davies and Humphreys are applying a respectable metaphysical idea — the idea, namely, that if an object's having a property does not make a difference to what that object does, if the object's causal powers are in no way enhanced by (...)
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  19. added 2014-03-26
    The Function of Conscious Experience: An Analogical Paradigm of Perception and Behavior.Steven Lehar - unknown
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  20. added 2014-03-24
    The Causal Potency of Qualia: Its Nature and its Source. [REVIEW]Ullin T. Place - 2000 - Brain and Mind 1 (2):183-192.
    There is an argument whichshows conclusively that if qualia are causallyimpotent we could have no possible grounds forbelieving that they exist. But if, as this argumentshows, qualia are causally potent with respect to thedescriptions we give of them, it is tolerably certainthat they are causally potent in other morebiologically significant respects. The empiricalevidence, from studies of the effect of lesions of thestriate cortex shows that what is missing inthe absence of visual qualia is the ability tocategorize sensory inputs in the (...)
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  21. added 2014-03-22
    Moral Biocentrism and the Adaptive Value of Consciousness.Kenneth Einar Himma - 2004 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (1):25-44.
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  22. added 2014-03-22
    The Functional Role of Consciousness: A Phenomenological Approach.Uriah Kriegel - 2004 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (2):171-93.
    In this paper, a theoretical account of the functional role of consciousness in the cognitive system of normal subjects is developed. The account is based upon an approach to consciousness that is drawn from the phenomenological tradition. On this approach, consciousness is essentially peripheral self-awareness, in a sense to be duly explained. It will be argued that the functional role of consciousness, so construed, is to provide the subject with just enough information about her ongoing experience to make it possible (...)
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  23. added 2014-03-16
    The Primary Function of Consciousness: Why Skeletal Muscles Are Voluntary Muscles.Ezequiel Morsella, Stephen C. Krieger & John A. Bargh - 2009 - In Ezequiel Morsella, John A. Bargh & Peter M. Gollwitzer (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Human Action. Oxford University Press.
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  24. added 2014-03-12
    Restoring Control: Comments on George Sher. [REVIEW]Neil Levy - 2008 - Philosophia 36 (2):213-221.
    In a recent article, George Sher argues that a realistic conception of human agency, which recognizes the limited extent to which we are conscious of what we do, makes the task of specifying a conception of the kind of control that underwrites ascriptions of moral responsibility much more difficult than is commonly appreciated. Sher suggests that an adequate account of control will not require that agents be conscious of their actions; we are responsible for what we do, in the absence (...)
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  25. added 2014-03-12
    Consciousness Was a 'Trouble-Maker': On the General Maladaptiveness of Unsupported Mental Representation.Jesse M. Bering - 2004 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 25 (1):33-56.
    Consciousness, as a higher-order cognitive capacity allowing for the explicit representation of abstract mental states, might be the incidental byproduct of design features from other adaptive systems, such as those governing expansion of the frontal lobes in primates. Although such abilities may have occurred entirely by chance, the standardized entrenchment of this representational capacity in human cognition may have posed engineering dilemmas for natural selection in that consciousness could not be easily removed without disrupting the adaptive features of other design (...)
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  26. added 2014-03-07
    Free Action as Two Level Voluntary Control.John Dilworth - 2008 - Philosophical Frontiers 3 (1):29-45.
    The naturalistic voluntary control (VC) theory explains free will and consciousness in terms of each other. It is central to free voluntary control of action that one can control both what one is conscious of, and also what one is not conscious of. Furthermore, the specific cognitive ability or skill involved in voluntarily controlling whether information is processed consciously or unconsciously can itself be used to explain consciousness. In functional terms, it is whatever kind of cognitive processing occurs when a (...)
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  27. added 2014-03-06
    Evolution of the Neural Basis of Consciousness: A Bird-Mammal Comparison.Ann B. Butler, Paul R. Manger, B. I. B. Lindahl & Peter Århem - 2005 - Bioessays 27 (9):923-936.
    The main objective of this essay is to validate some of the principal, currently competing, mammalian consciousness-brain theories by comparing these theories with data on both cognitive abilities and brain organization in birds. Our argument is that, given that multiple complex cognitive functions are correlated with presumed consciousness in mammals, this correlation holds for birds as well. Thus, the neuroanatomical features of the forebrain common to both birds and mammals may be those that are crucial to the generation of both (...)
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  28. added 2014-03-04
    Conscious Representations: An Intractable Problem for the Computational Theory of Mind.Bartlomiej Swiatczak - 2011 - Minds and Machines 21 (1):19-32.
    Advocates of the computational theory of mind claim that the mind is a computer whose operations can be implemented by various computational systems. According to these philosophers, the mind is multiply realisable because—as they claim—thinking involves the manipulation of syntactically structured mental representations. Since syntactically structured representations can be made of different kinds of material while performing the same calculation, mental processes can also be implemented by different kinds of material. From this perspective, consciousness plays a minor role in mental (...)
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  29. added 2012-07-20
    The Utility of Conscious Thinking on Higher-Order Theory.George Seli - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (3):303 - 316.
    Higher-order theories of consciousness posit that a mental state is conscious by virtue of being represented by another mental state, which is therefore a higher-order representation (HOR). Whether HORs are construed as thoughts or experiences, higher-order theorists have generally contested whether such metarepresentations have any significant cognitive function. In this paper, I argue that they do, focusing on the value of conscious thinking, as distinguished from conscious perceiving, conscious feeling, and other forms of conscious mentality. A thinking process is constituted (...)
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  30. added 2012-01-19
    Consciousness Modeled: Reification and Promising Pluralism.Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther - 2011 - Pensamiento 67 (254):617-630.
    Paradoxically, explorers of the territory of consciousness seem to be studying consciousness out of existence, from inside the field of "consciousness studies". How? Through their love of the phenomenon/process, they have developed powerful single models or lenses through which to understand consciousness. But in doing so, they also seek to destroy the other /equally useful/ lenses. Our opportunity lies in halting the vendettas and cross-speakings/cross-fire. The imploration is to stop the dichotomous thinking and pernicious reification of single models, and instead (...)
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  31. added 2011-05-31
    Volition and the Function of Consciousness.Hakwan Lau - 2009 - Faith and Philosophy 26 (5):537-552.
    People have intuitively assumed that many acts of volition are not influenced by unconscious information. However, the available evidence suggests that under suitable conditions, unconscious information can influence behavior and the underlying neural mechanisms. One possibility is that stimuli that are consciously perceived tend to yield strong signals in the brain, and this makes us think that consciousness has the function of sending such strong signals. However, if we could create conditions where the stimuli could produce strong signals but not (...)
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  32. added 2011-04-05
    “What We Have Learnt From Systems Theory About the Things That Nature’s Understanding Achieves”.Philippe Gagnon - 2010 - In Dirk Evers, Antje Jackelén & Taede Smedes (eds.), How do we Know? Understanding in Science and Theology. Forum Scientiarum.
    The problem of knowledge has been centred around the study of the content of our consciousness, seeing the world through internal representation, without any satisfactory account of the operations of nature that would be a pre-condition for our own performances in terms of concept efficiency in organizing action externally. If we want to better understand where and how meaning fits in nature, we have to find the proper way to decipher its organization, and account for the fact that we have (...)
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  33. added 2011-01-22
    Review of 'Consciousness and its Function' by David Rosenthal. [REVIEW]Richard Brown - 2009 - Philosopher's Digest.
    David Rosenthal is a well-known defender of a particular kind of theory of consciousness known as the higher-order thought theory (HOTT). Higher-order theories are united by what Rosenthal calls the Transitivity Principle (TP), which states that a mental state is conscious iff one is conscious of oneself, in some suitable way, as being in that mental state. Since there are various ways to implement TP and HOTT commits one to the view that any mental state could occur unconsciously it seems (...)
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  34. added 2010-07-01
    Conscious Perceptual Experience as Representational Self-Prompting.John Dilworth - 2007 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 (2):135-156.
    Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 no. 2 , pp. 135-156. The self-prompting theory of consciousness holds that conscious perceptual experience occurs when non-routine perceptual data prompt the activation of a plan in an executive control system that monitors perceptual input. On the other hand, routine, non-conscious perception merely provides data about the world, which indicatively describes the world correctly or incorrectly. Perceptual experience instead involves data that are about the perceiver, not the world. Their function is that of imperatively (...)
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  35. added 2010-06-22
    Consciousness Evolving.James H. Fetzer (ed.) - 2002 - John Benjamins.
  36. added 2010-06-22
    What Should Be Computed to Understand and Model Brain Function?T. Kitamura (ed.) - 2001 - World Scientific.
    This volume is a guide to two types of transcendence of academic borders which seem necessary for understanding and modelling brain function.
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  37. added 2010-06-22
    Where Id Was: Challenging Normalization in Psychoanalysis. Disseminations, Psychoanalysis in Contexts.Anthony Molino & Christine Ware (eds.) - 2001 - Wesleyan University Press.
  38. added 2010-06-22
    Seeing and Thinking. Reflections on Kanizsa's Studies in Visual Cognition.A. Carsetti (ed.) - 2001 - Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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  39. added 2010-06-22
    The Evolution of Cognition.Celia Heyes & Ludwig Huber (eds.) - 2000 - MIT Press.
    This book encompasses the behavior and mentality of nonhuman as well as human animals and a full range of evolutionary approaches.
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  40. added 2010-06-22
    Evolving Consciousness.Gregory R. Mulhauser (ed.) - 1998 - John Benjamins.
  41. added 2010-06-22
    Philosophical Psychopathology.George Graham & G. Lynn Stephens - 1994 - MIT Press.
  42. added 2010-06-22
    A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness.Bernard J. Baars - 1988 - Cambridge University Press.
    Conscious experience is one of the most difficult and thorny problems in psychological science. Its study has been neglected for many years, either because it was thought to be too difficult, or because the relevant evidence was thought to be poor. Bernard Baars suggests a way to specify empirical constraints on a theory of consciousness by contrasting well-established conscious phenomena - such as stimulus representations known to be attended, perceptual, and informative - with closely comparable unconscious ones - such as (...)
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  43. added 2010-03-19
    Performances of Self-Awareness Used to Explain the Evolutionary Advantages of Consciousness (TSC 2004).Christophe R. Menant - manuscript
    The question about evolution of consciousness has been addressed so far as possible selectional advantage related to consciousness ("What evolutionary advantages, if any, being conscious might confer on an organism ? "). But evidencing an adaptative explanation of consciousness has proven to be very difficult. Reason for that being the complexity of consciousness. We take here a different approach on subject by looking at possible selectional advantages related to the performance of Self Awareness that appeared during evolution millions of years (...)
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  44. added 2009-10-13
    The Function and Facilitation of Consciousness.David Rosenthal - manuscript
  45. added 2009-10-13
    Consciousness and its Function.David Rosenthal - manuscript
    MS, under submission, derived from a Powerpoint presentation at a Conference on Consciousness, Memory, and Perception, in honor of Larry Weiskrantz, City University, London, September 15, 2006.
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  46. added 2008-12-31
    Why Have Experiences?David R. Hilbert - manuscript
    In _An Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision_ George Berkeley made the claim that,.
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  47. added 2008-12-31
    What is Consciousness For?Lee Pierson & Monroe Trout - manuscript
    What is Consciousness For? Lee Pierson and Monroe Trout Copyright © 2005 Abstract: The answer to the title question is, in a word, volition. Our hypothesis is that the ultimate adaptive function of consciousness is to make volitional movement possible. All conscious processes exist to subserve that ultimate function. Thus, we believe that all conscious organisms possess at least some volitional capability. Consciousness makes volitional attention possible; volitional attention, in turn, makes volitional movement possible. There is, as far as we (...)
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  48. added 2008-12-31
    The Causal Efficacy of Consciousness.Jaegwon Kim - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 406--417.
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  49. added 2008-12-31
    The Survival Value of Informed Awareness.Robert Shaw & Jeffrey Kinsella-Shaw - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):137-154.
    Various hypotheses about the importance of psycho-neural concomitants are reviewed and their implications discussed for the 'easy' and 'hard' problems of consciousness -- especially, as viewed by cognitive and ecological psychology. In Ecological Psychology, where the subjective-objective dichotomy is repudiated, these concepts are without foundation, and are replaced by informed awareness, which is argued to play an important, perhaps, indispensable role in goal- directed actions and thus to have survival value. The significance of informed awareness is illustrated in several real- (...)
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  50. added 2008-12-31
    Feeling Causes.Michael Pauen - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):129-152.
    According to qualia-epiphenomenalism, phenomenal properties are causally inefficacious, they are metaphysically distinct from, and nomologically connected with certain physical properties. The present paper argues that the claim of causal inefficacy undermines any effort to establish the alleged nomological connection. Epiphenomenalists concede that variations of phenomenal properties in the absence of any variation of physical/functional properties are logically possible, however they deny that these variations are nomologically possible. But if such variations have neither causal nor functional consequences, there is no way (...)
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