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  1. Performances of Self-Awareness Used to Explain the Evolutionary Advantages of Consciousness (TSC 2004).Christophe R. Menant - manuscript
    The question about evolution of consciousness has been addressed so far as possible selectional advantage related to consciousness ("What evolutionary advantages, if any, being conscious might confer on an organism ? "). But evidencing an adaptative explanation of consciousness has proven to be very difficult. Reason for that being the complexity of consciousness. We take here a different approach on subject by looking at possible selectional advantages related to the performance of Self Awareness that appeared during evolution millions of years (...)
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  2. The Function and Facilitation of Consciousness.David Rosenthal - manuscript
  3. Neural Synchrony and the Causal Efficacy of Consciousness.David Yates - 2020 - Topoi 39 (5):1057-1072.
    The purpose of this paper is to address a well-known dilemma for physicalism. If mental properties are type identical to physical properties, then their causal efficacy is secure, but at the cost of ruling out mentality in creatures very different to ourselves. On the other hand, if mental properties are multiply realizable, then all kinds of creatures can instantiate them, but then they seem to be causally redundant. The causal exclusion problem depends on the widely held principle that realized properties (...)
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  4. The Role of Experience in Demonstrative Thought.Michael Barkasi - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (5):648-666.
    Attention plays a role in demonstrative thought: It sets the targets. Visual experience also plays a role. I argue here that it makes visual information available for use in the voluntary control of focal attention. To do so I use both introspection and neurophysiological evidence from projections between areas of attentional control and neural correlates of consciousness. Campbell and Smithies also identify roles for experience, but they further argue that only experience can play those roles. In contrast, I argue that (...)
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  5. A Buddhist Analysis of Affective Bias.Sean Smith - 2019 - Journal of Indian Philosophy (1):1-31.
    In this paper, I explore a debate between some Indian Buddhist schools regarding the nature of the underlying tendencies or anusaya-s. I focus here primarily on the ninth chapter of Kathāvatthu’s representation of a dispute about whether an anusaya can be said to have intentional object. I also briefly treat of Vasubandhu’s defense of the Sautrāntika view of anuśaya in the opening section of the fifth chapter his Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam. Following Vasubandhu, I argue against the Thervādin Abhidharmikas that the underlying tendencies (...)
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  6. Quantum Mechanics of 'Conscious Energy'.Syed Ismyl Mahmood Rizvi - 2018 - International Journal of Mind, Brain and Cognition 9 (1-2):132-160.
    This paper is aiming to investigate the physical substrate of conscious process. It will attempt to find out: How does conscious process establish relations between their external stimuli and internal stimuli in order to create reality? How does consciousness devoid of new sensory input result to its new quantum effects? And how does conscious process gain mass in brain? This paper will also try to locate the origins of consciousness at the level of neurons along with the quantum effects of (...)
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  7. First-Hand Experience of the Self Through Imagination.Contzen Pereira & J. Shashi Kiran Reddy - 2016 - Scientific GOD Journal 7 (1):51-52.
    Imagination is the art of exploring beyond the depths of one’s body. Imagination allows one to peek into the void to realize the true existence of its self and feel the existence of eternity. The experience of imagination is a subjective experience of one’s own consciousness and it is this experience makes the experiencer worthy. Creation and creativity are the end aspects of imagination and unfold the hidden mysteries of the cosmos. This essay is a trip across the cosmic energy (...)
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  8. Mineness Without Minimal Selves.M. V. P. Slors & F. Jongepier - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (7-8):193-219.
    In this paper we focus on what is referred to as the ‘mineness’ of experience, that is, the intimate familiarity we have with our own thoughts, perceptions, and emotions. Most accounts characterize mineness in terms of an experiential dimension, the first-person givenness of experience, that is subsumed under the notion of minimal self-consciousness or a ‘minimal self’. We argue that this account faces problems and develop an alternative account of mineness in terms of the coherence of experiences with what we (...)
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  9. What Makes a Conscious Process Conscious?Max Velmans - 2014 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (1):43-44.
    This is an open-peer commentary on Newell, B.R. & Shanks, D.R. (2014) Unconscious influences on decision making, BBS, 37:1, pp. 1-61. Newell and Shanks’ critical review considers only a very limited sense in which mental processes can be thought of as either conscious or unconscious and consequently gives a misleading analysis of the role of consciousness in human information processing. This commentary provides an expanded analysis of conscious processing that also reveals the various ways in which mental processes are unconscious. (...)
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  10. Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, by Ned Block.P. Goff - 2012 - Mind 121 (483):780-784.
  11. The Utility of Conscious Thinking on Higher-Order Theory.George Seli - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (3):303 - 316.
    Higher-order theories of consciousness posit that a mental state is conscious by virtue of being represented by another mental state, which is therefore a higher-order representation (HOR). Whether HORs are construed as thoughts or experiences, higher-order theorists have generally contested whether such metarepresentations have any significant cognitive function. In this paper, I argue that they do, focusing on the value of conscious thinking, as distinguished from conscious perceiving, conscious feeling, and other forms of conscious mentality. A thinking process is constituted (...)
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  12. Conscious Representations: An Intractable Problem for the Computational Theory of Mind.Bartlomiej Swiatczak - 2011 - Minds and Machines 21 (1):19-32.
    Advocates of the computational theory of mind claim that the mind is a computer whose operations can be implemented by various computational systems. According to these philosophers, the mind is multiply realisable because—as they claim—thinking involves the manipulation of syntactically structured mental representations. Since syntactically structured representations can be made of different kinds of material while performing the same calculation, mental processes can also be implemented by different kinds of material. From this perspective, consciousness plays a minor role in mental (...)
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  13. Consciousness Modeled: Reification and Promising Pluralism.Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther - 2011 - Pensamiento 67 (254):617-630.
    Paradoxically, explorers of the territory of consciousness seem to be studying consciousness out of existence, from inside the field of "consciousness studies". How? Through their love of the phenomenon/process, they have developed powerful single models or lenses through which to understand consciousness. But in doing so, they also seek to destroy the other /equally useful/ lenses. Our opportunity lies in halting the vendettas and cross-speakings/cross-fire. The imploration is to stop the dichotomous thinking and pernicious reification of single models, and instead (...)
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  14. “What We Have Learnt From Systems Theory About the Things That Nature’s Understanding Achieves”.Philippe Gagnon - 2010 - In Dirk Evers, Antje Jackelén & Taede Smedes (eds.), How do we Know? Understanding in Science and Theology. Forum Scientiarum.
    The problem of knowledge has been centred around the study of the content of our consciousness, seeing the world through internal representation, without any satisfactory account of the operations of nature that would be a pre-condition for our own performances in terms of concept efficiency in organizing action externally. If we want to better understand where and how meaning fits in nature, we have to find the proper way to decipher its organization, and account for the fact that we have (...)
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  15. Review of 'Consciousness and its Function' by David Rosenthal. [REVIEW]Richard Brown - 2009 - Philosopher's Digest.
    David Rosenthal is a well-known defender of a particular kind of theory of consciousness known as the higher-order thought theory (HOTT). Higher-order theories are united by what Rosenthal calls the Transitivity Principle (TP), which states that a mental state is conscious iff one is conscious of oneself, in some suitable way, as being in that mental state. Since there are various ways to implement TP and HOTT commits one to the view that any mental state could occur unconsciously it seems (...)
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  16. Volition and the Function of Consciousness.Hakwan Lau - 2009 - Faith and Philosophy 26 (5):537-552.
    People have intuitively assumed that many acts of volition are not influenced by unconscious information. However, the available evidence suggests that under suitable conditions, unconscious information can influence behavior and the underlying neural mechanisms. One possibility is that stimuli that are consciously perceived tend to yield strong signals in the brain, and this makes us think that consciousness has the function of sending such strong signals. However, if we could create conditions where the stimuli could produce strong signals but not (...)
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  17. The Primary Function of Consciousness: Why Skeletal Muscles Are Voluntary Muscles.Ezequiel Morsella, Stephen C. Krieger & John A. Bargh - 2009 - In Ezequiel Morsella, John A. Bargh & Peter M. Gollwitzer (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Human Action. Oxford University Press.
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  18. Free Action as Two Level Voluntary Control.John Dilworth - 2008 - Philosophical Frontiers 3 (1):29-45.
    The naturalistic voluntary control (VC) theory explains free will and consciousness in terms of each other. It is central to free voluntary control of action that one can control both what one is conscious of, and also what one is not conscious of. Furthermore, the specific cognitive ability or skill involved in voluntarily controlling whether information is processed consciously or unconsciously can itself be used to explain consciousness. In functional terms, it is whatever kind of cognitive processing occurs when a (...)
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  19. Restoring Control: Comments on George Sher. [REVIEW]Neil Levy - 2008 - Philosophia 36 (2):213-221.
    In a recent article, George Sher argues that a realistic conception of human agency, which recognizes the limited extent to which we are conscious of what we do, makes the task of specifying a conception of the kind of control that underwrites ascriptions of moral responsibility much more difficult than is commonly appreciated. Sher suggests that an adequate account of control will not require that agents be conscious of their actions; we are responsible for what we do, in the absence (...)
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  20. Consciousness and its Function.David Rosenthal - 2008
    MS, under submission, derived from a Powerpoint presentation at a Conference on Consciousness, Memory, and Perception, in honor of Larry Weiskrantz, City University, London, September 15, 2006.
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  21. Conscious Perceptual Experience as Representational Self-Prompting.John Dilworth - 2007 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 (2):135-156.
    Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 no. 2 , pp. 135-156. The self-prompting theory of consciousness holds that conscious perceptual experience occurs when non-routine perceptual data prompt the activation of a plan in an executive control system that monitors perceptual input. On the other hand, routine, non-conscious perception merely provides data about the world, which indicatively describes the world correctly or incorrectly. Perceptual experience instead involves data that are about the perceiver, not the world. Their function is that of imperatively (...)
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  22. The Causal Efficacy of Consciousness.Jaegwon Kim - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 406--417.
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  23. The Survival Value of Informed Awareness.Robert Shaw & Jeffrey Kinsella-Shaw - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):137-154.
    Various hypotheses about the importance of psycho-neural concomitants are reviewed and their implications discussed for the 'easy' and 'hard' problems of consciousness -- especially, as viewed by cognitive and ecological psychology. In Ecological Psychology, where the subjective-objective dichotomy is repudiated, these concepts are without foundation, and are replaced by informed awareness, which is argued to play an important, perhaps, indispensable role in goal- directed actions and thus to have survival value. The significance of informed awareness is illustrated in several real- (...)
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  24. Better Than Mere Knowledge? The Function of Sensory Awareness.Mark Johnston - 2006 - In John Hawthorne & Tamar Gendler (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 260--290.
  25. Feeling Causes.Michael Pauen - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):129-152.
    According to qualia-epiphenomenalism, phenomenal properties are causally inefficacious, they are metaphysically distinct from, and nomologically connected with certain physical properties. The present paper argues that the claim of causal inefficacy undermines any effort to establish the alleged nomological connection. Epiphenomenalists concede that variations of phenomenal properties in the absence of any variation of physical/functional properties are logically possible, however they deny that these variations are nomologically possible. But if such variations have neither causal nor functional consequences, there is no way (...)
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  26. Evolution of the Neural Basis of Consciousness: A Bird-Mammal Comparison.Ann B. Butler, Paul R. Manger, B. I. B. Lindahl & Peter Århem - 2005 - Bioessays 27 (9):923-936.
    The main objective of this essay is to validate some of the principal, currently competing, mammalian consciousness-brain theories by comparing these theories with data on both cognitive abilities and brain organization in birds. Our argument is that, given that multiple complex cognitive functions are correlated with presumed consciousness in mammals, this correlation holds for birds as well. Thus, the neuroanatomical features of the forebrain common to both birds and mammals may be those that are crucial to the generation of both (...)
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  27. Is Consciousness Epiphenomenal? Comment on Susan Pockett.Gilberto Gomes - 2005 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (12):77-79.
    In a provocative article published in the Journal of Consciousness Studies, Susan Pockett argues for the plausibility of considering consciousness as an epiphenomenon of neural activity. This means that consciousness, though caused by the brain, would not in its turn have any role in the causation of neural activity and, consequently, of behaviour. Critical for her argument is the distinction she makes between 'consciousness per se' and 'the neural processing that accompanies it' . In her discussion, though, the author begs (...)
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  28. Consciousness Was a 'Trouble-Maker': On the General Maladaptiveness of Unsupported Mental Representation.Jesse M. Bering - 2004 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 25 (1):33-56.
    Consciousness, as a higher-order cognitive capacity allowing for the explicit representation of abstract mental states, might be the incidental byproduct of design features from other adaptive systems, such as those governing expansion of the frontal lobes in primates. Although such abilities may have occurred entirely by chance, the standardized entrenchment of this representational capacity in human cognition may have posed engineering dilemmas for natural selection in that consciousness could not be easily removed without disrupting the adaptive features of other design (...)
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  29. Moral Biocentrism and the Adaptive Value of Consciousness.Kenneth Einar Himma - 2004 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (1):25-44.
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  30. The Functional Role of Consciousness: A Phenomenological Approach.Uriah Kriegel - 2004 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (2):171-93.
    In this paper, a theoretical account of the functional role of consciousness in the cognitive system of normal subjects is developed. The account is based upon an approach to consciousness that is drawn from the phenomenological tradition. On this approach, consciousness is essentially peripheral self-awareness, in a sense to be duly explained. It will be argued that the functional role of consciousness, so construed, is to provide the subject with just enough information about her ongoing experience to make it possible (...)
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  31. Why Conscious Free Will Both is and Isn't an Illusion.Max Velmans - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):677.
    Wegner’s analysis of the illusion of conscious will is close to my own account of how conscious experiences relate to brain processes. But our analyses differ somewhat on how conscious will is not an illusion. Wegner argues that once conscious will arises it enters causally into subsequent mental processing. I argue that while his causal story is accurate, it remains a first-person story. Conscious free will is not an illusion in the sense that this first-person story is compatible with and (...)
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  32. Thoughts on Thinking Matter.James Barham - 2003 - Progress in Complexity, Information, and Design 2 (3).
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  33. Can Conscious Experience Affect Brain Activity?Benjamin W. Libet - 2003 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (12):24-28.
    The chief goal of Velmans' article is to find a way to solve the problem of how conscious experience could have bodily effects. I shall discuss his treatment of this below. First, I would like to deal with Velmans' treatment of my own studies of volition and free will in relation to brain processes. Unconscious Initiation and Conscious Veto of Freely Voluntary Acts Velmans appropriately refers to our experimental study that found that onset of an electrically observable cerebral process preceded (...)
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  34. Preconscious Free Will.Max Velmans - 2003 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (12):42-61.
    This paper responds to continuing commentary on Velmans (2002a) “How could conscious experiences affect brains,” a target article for a special issue of JCS. I focus on the final question dealt with by the target article: how free will relates to preconscious and conscious mental processing, and I develop the case for preconscious free will. Although “preconscious free will” might appear to be a contradiction in terms, it is consistent with the scientific evidence and provides a parsimonious way to reconcile (...)
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  35. The Function of Consciousness.David J. Cole - 2002 - In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins. pp. 287-305.
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  36. Consciousness Evolving.James H. Fetzer (ed.) - 2002 - John Benjamins.
  37. Three Tricks of Consciousness: Qualia, Chunking and Selection.David Hodgson - 2002 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (12):65-88.
    DAVID HODGSON: This article supports the proposition that, if a judgment about the aesthetic merits of an artistic object can take into account and thereby be influenced by the particular quality of the object, through gestalt experiences evoked by the object, then we have free will. It argues that it is probable that such a judgment can indeed take into account and be influenced by the particular quality of the object through gestalt experiences evoked by it, so as to make (...)
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  38. Unconsciousness—Consciousness: Tools for Exploring the Transition: Report on a Workshop in Sigtuna, Sweden on 24-27 August 2000. [REVIEW]Peter Århem, Hans Liljenström & B. I. B. Lindahl - 2001 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (1):77-81.
  39. The Emergence of Contentful Experience.Mark H. Bickhard - 2001 - In T. Kitamura (ed.), What Should Be Computed to Understand and Model Brain Function? World Scientific.
    There are many facets to mental life and mental experience. In this chapter, I attempt to account for some central characteristics among those facets. I argue that normative function and representation are emergent in particular forms of the self-maintenance of far from thermodynamic equilibrium systems in their essential far-from-equilibrium conditions. The nature of representation that is thereby modeled.
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  40. Psychoanalysis and the Function of Consciousness.David M. Black - 2001 - In Anthony Molino & Christine Ware (eds.), Where Id Was: Challenging Normalization in Psychoanalysis. Disseminations, Psychoanalysis in Contexts. Wesleyan University Press. pp. 47-57.
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  41. An Experimental Disconnection Approach to a Function of Consciousness.Joseph E. Bogen - 2001 - International Journal of Neuroscience 111 (3):135-136.
  42. Seeing and Thinking. Reflections on Kanizsa's Studies in Visual Cognition.A. Carsetti (ed.) - 2001 - Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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  43. What Should Be Computed to Understand and Model Brain Function?T. Kitamura (ed.) - 2001 - World Scientific.
    This volume is a guide to two types of transcendence of academic borders which seem necessary for understanding and modelling brain function.
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  44. Where Id Was: Challenging Normalization in Psychoanalysis. Disseminations, Psychoanalysis in Contexts.Anthony Molino & Christine Ware (eds.) - 2001 - Wesleyan University Press.
    A unique authoritative analysis of the individual an social concerns informing the politics of contemporary psychoanalysis.
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  45. Toward an Analytic Phenomenology: The Concepts of "Bodiliness" and "Grabbiness".Kevin J. O'Regan, Erik Myin & No - 2001 - In A. Carsetti (ed.), Seeing and Thinking. Reflections on Kanizsa's Studies in Visual Cognition. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    In this paper, we present an account of phenomenal con- sciousness. Phenomenal consciousness is experience, and the _problem _of phenomenal consciousness is to explain how physical processes.
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  46. The Nature and Function of Consciousness: Lessons From Blindsight.Guven Guzeldere, Owen J. Flanagan & Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 2000 - In Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.), The New Cognitive Neurosciences: 2nd Edition. MIT Press.
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  47. The Evolution of Cognition.Celia Heyes & Ludwig Huber (eds.) - 2000 - MIT Press.
    This book encompasses the behavior and mentality of nonhuman as well as human animals and a full range of evolutionary approaches.
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  48. The Privatization of Sensation.Nicholas Humphrey - 2000 - In Celia Heyes & Ludwig Huber (eds.), The Evolution of Cognition. MIT Press. pp. 241--252.
    It is the ambition of evolutionary psychology to explain how the basic features of human mental life came to be selected because of their contribution to biological survival. Counted among the most basic must be the subjective qualities of conscious sensory experience: the felt redness we experience on looking at a ripe tomato, the felt saltiness on tasting an anchovy, the felt pain on being pricked by a thorn. But, as many theorists acknowledge, with these qualia, the ambition of evolutionary (...)
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  49. The Causal Potency of Qualia: Its Nature and its Source. [REVIEW]Ullin T. Place - 2000 - Brain and Mind 1 (2):183-192.
    There is an argument whichshows conclusively that if qualia are causallyimpotent we could have no possible grounds forbelieving that they exist. But if, as this argumentshows, qualia are causally potent with respect to thedescriptions we give of them, it is tolerably certainthat they are causally potent in other morebiologically significant respects. The empiricalevidence, from studies of the effect of lesions of thestriate cortex shows that what is missing inthe absence of visual qualia is the ability tocategorize sensory inputs in the (...)
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  50. Why Did Evolution Engineer Consciousness?Selmer Bringsjord & Ron Noel - 1998 - In Gregory R. Mulhauser (ed.), Evolving Consciousness. John Benjamins.
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