Epistemology > Knowledge > Defining Knowledge > The Gettier Problem

The Gettier Problem

Edited by Ian M. Church (Hillsdale College)
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Summary

Traditionally, knowledge has been taken to yield a reductive analysis in terms of (conceptually primitive) necessary and jointly sufficient conditions—most commonly, justified (or warranted) true belief. In 1963, however, Edmund Gettier’s “Is Knowledge Justified True Belief?” challenged the reductive model of knowledge by producing a series of counterexamples where, intuitively, a justified true belief fails to be knowledge. Since Gettier’s original challenge, the philosophical literature has been replete with attempts to defend the reductive analysis against Gettier counterexamples (now generalized well beyond the cases posed in 1963) and those claiming that such defenses fail. 
Key works Gettier 1963 is the piece that started it all, and should be the first point of contact with the literature. And Shope 1983 provides an excellent summary of the first 20 years following Gettier's landmark paper. While there is certainly a legion of accounts aiming to provide a viable reductive account of knowledge that is not vulnerable to Gettier counterexample, four seminal accounts can be found here: Hetherington 2001, Howard-Snyder 2003, Zagzebski 1999, and Nozick 1981. Other philosophers have tried to defuse Gettier counterexamples by challenging the intuitions that inform and undergird them. See Weatherson 2003 and Weinberg et al 2001. Finally, it is worth noting that some philosophers have argued that Gettier counterexamples are unavoidable within the reductive model of knowledge. See Zagzebski 1994, Floridi 2004, and Church 2013
Introductions Encyclopedia articles include Steup 2008 and Hetherington 2005. 
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  1. added 2019-01-02
    The Gettier Problem.Ian M. Church - 2019 - In The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck. New York, USA: pp. 261-271.
    In this chapter, we will explore the luck at issue in Gettier-styled counterexamples and the subsequent problem it poses to any viable reductive analysis of knowledge. In the 1st section, we will consider the specific species of luck that is at issue in Gettier counterexamples, then, in the next section, I will briefly sketch a diagnosis of the Gettier Problem and try to explain why the relevant species of luck has proven to be extremely difficult to avoid. And finally, I (...)
  2. added 2018-12-21
    Modal Virtue Epistemology.Bob Beddor & Carlotta Pavese - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    This essay defends a novel form of virtue epistemology: Modal Virtue Epistemology. It borrows from traditional virtue epistemology the idea that knowledge is a type of skillful performance. But it goes on to understand skillfulness in purely modal terms — that is, in terms of success across a range of counterfactual scenarios. We argue that this approach offers a promising way of synthesizing virtue epistemology with a modal account of knowledge, according to which knowledge is safe belief. In particular, we (...)
  3. added 2018-12-14
    Die identifikationistische Lösung des Gettier Problems.Sven Bernecker - 2015 - In Dirk Koppelberg & Stefan Tolksdorf (eds.), Erkenntnistheorie -- Wie und Wozu? Munster, Germany: Mentis. pp. 189-214.
  4. added 2018-10-10
    The Theory of Justification.James Richard Ciccotelli - 1981 - Dissertation, Princeton University
    Analytic epistemologists, over the last two decades, have been troubled by two vexing and seemingly unrelated problems. First they have been trying to describe the "structure" of justification of our knowledge claims; this enterprise has been called the "foundationalism debate." Secondly though, they have also been trying to formulate precisely the necessary and sufficient conditions for "knowing;" this difficulty has come to be known as the "Gettier Problem." The first project deals with epistemic justification and the second, with the analysis (...)
  5. added 2018-10-09
    Does Knowledge Entail Justification?L. S. Carrier - 1994 - International Philosophical Quarterly 34 (4):413-418.
  6. added 2018-10-05
    The Internalist Virtue Theory of Knowledge.Ralph Wedgwood - 2018 - Synthese:1-22.
    Here is a definition of knowledge: for you to know a proposition p is for you to have an outright belief in p that is correct precisely because it manifests the virtue of rationality. This definition resembles Ernest Sosa’s “virtue theory”, except that on this definition, the only virtue that must be manifested in all instances of knowledge is rationality, and no reductive account of rationality is attempted—rationality is assumed to be an irreducibly normative notion. This definition is compatible with (...)
  7. added 2018-10-01
    In Defense of Justified True Belief.I. Thalberg - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (22):794-803.
  8. added 2018-09-29
    Keith Lehrer: Profiles. [REVIEW]Peter D. Klein - 1983 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 43 (3):409-419.
  9. added 2018-09-29
    Keith Lehrer: Profiles.Radu J. Bogdan (ed.) - 1981 - Dordrecht: Reidel.
  10. added 2018-09-22
    The Gettier Intuition From South America to Asia.Edouard Machery, Stephen Stich, David Rose, Mario Alai, Adriano Angelucci, Renatas Berniūnas, Emma E. Buchtel, Amita Chatterjee, Hyundeuk Cheon, In-Rae Cho, Daniel Cohnitz, Florian Cova, Vilius Dranseika, Ángeles Eraña Lagos, Laleh Ghadakpour, Maurice Grinberg, Ivar Hannikainen, Takaaki Hashimoto, Amir Horowitz, Evgeniya Hristova, Yasmina Jraissati, Veselina Kadreva, Kaori Karasawa, Hackjin Kim, Yeonjeong Kim, Minwoo Lee, Carlos Mauro, Masaharu Mizumoto, Sebastiano Moruzzi, Christopher Y. Olivola, Jorge Ornelas, Barbara Osimani, Carlos Romero, Alejandro Rosas Lopez, Massimo Sangoi, Andrea Sereni, Sarah Songhorian, Paulo Sousa, Noel Struchiner, Vera Tripodi, Naoki Usui, Alejandro Vázquez del Mercado, Giorgio Volpe, Hrag Abraham Vosgerichian, Xueyi Zhang & Jing Zhu - 2017 - Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 34 (3):517-541.
    This article examines whether people share the Gettier intuition (viz. that someone who has a true justified belief that p may nonetheless fail to know that p) in 24 sites, located in 23 countries (counting Hong Kong as a distinct country) and across 17 languages. We also consider the possible influence of gender and personality on this intuition with a very large sample size. Finally, we examine whether the Gettier intuition varies across people as a function of their disposition to (...)
  11. added 2018-09-01
    An Externalist Decision Theory for a Pragmatic Epistemology.Brian Kim - 2019 - In Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Routledge.
    In recent years, some epistemologists have argued that practical factors can make the difference between knowledge and mere true belief. While proponents of this pragmatic thesis have proposed necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge, it is striking that they have failed to address Gettier cases. As a result, the proposed analyses of knowledge are either lacking explanatory power or susceptible to counterexamples. Gettier cases are also worth reflecting on because they raise foundational questions for the pragmatist. Underlying these challenges is (...)
  12. added 2018-08-27
    Truth in Epistemology.Scott Sturgeon - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (1):99 - 108.
  13. added 2018-06-18
    Robust Virtue Epistemology As Anti‐Luck Epistemology: A New Solution.J. Adam Carter - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (1):140-155.
    Robust Virtue Epistemology maintains that knowledge is achieved just when an agent gets to the truth through, or because of, the manifestation of intellectual virtue or ability. A notorious objection to the view is that the satisfaction of the virtue condition will be insufficient to ensure the safety of the target belief; that is, RVE is no anti-luck epistemology. Some of the most promising recent attempts to get around this problem are considered and shown to ultimately fail. Finally, a new (...)
  14. added 2018-05-27
    Higher Order Ignorance Inside the Margins.Sam Carter - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    According to the KK-principle, knowledge iterates freely. It has been argued, notably in Greco, that accounts of knowledge which involve essential appeal to normality are particularly conducive to defence of the KK-principle. The present article evaluates the prospects for employing normality in this role. First, it is argued that the defence of the KK-principle depends upon an implausible assumption about the logical principles governing iterated normality claims. Once this assumption is dropped, counter-instances to the principle can be expected to arise. (...)
  15. added 2018-03-27
    Gettier Cases, Mental States, and Best Explanations: Another Reply to Atkins.Moti Mizrahi - 2018 - Logos and Episteme 9 (1):75-90.
    I have argued that Gettier cases are misleading because, even though they appear to be cases of knowledge failure, they are in fact cases of semantic failure. Atkins has responded to my original paper and I have replied to his response. He has then responded again to insist that he has the so-called “Gettier intuition.” But he now admits that intuitions are only defeasible, not conclusive, evidence for and/or against philosophical theories. I address the implications of Atkins’ admission in this (...)
  16. added 2018-02-20
    Hintikka’s Socratic Epistemology Meets Gettier’s Counterexamples.John Ian K. Boongaling - 2017 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):25-56.
    The overall goal of this paper is to apply Hintikka’s Socratic Epistemology to Gettier’s counterexamples to the tripartite definition of knowledge as justified true belief. In the process, I will make full use of Socratic Epistemology’s methodology and commitments. This includes, among other things, looking at Gettier’s counterexamples as games between an Inquirer and Nature (the source of information), as well as treating the items in them as pieces of information. The strategy that I employ in this paper also makes (...)
  17. added 2018-02-17
    Epistemic Dispositions.Rachel Briggs & Daniel Nolan - 2012 - Logos and Episteme 3 (4):629-636.
    We reply to recent papers by John Turri and Ben Bronner, who criticise the dispositionalised Nozickian tracking account we discuss in “Mad, Bad and Dangerous to Know.” We argue that the account we suggested can handle the problems raised by Turri and Bronner. In the course of responding to Turri and Bronner’s objections, we draw three general lessons for theories of epistemic dispositions: that epistemic dispositions are to some extent extrinsic, that epistemic dispositions can have manifestation conditions concerning circumstances where (...)
  18. added 2018-02-16
    Epistemic Luck.Jonathan Kvanvig - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):272-281.
    Duncan Pritchard’s book (Epistemic Luck, Oxford University Press, 2005) concerns the interplay between two disturbing kinds of epistemic luck, termed “reflective” and “veritic,” and two types of arguments for skepticism, one based on a closure principle for knowledge and the other on an underdetermination thesis about the quality of our evidence for the everyday propositions we believe. Pritchard defends the view that a safety-based account of knowledge can answer the closure argument and provide an account of how veritic epistemic luck (...)
  19. added 2018-01-30
    Saving Safety From Counterexamples.Thomas Grundmann - forthcoming - Synthese.
    In this paper I will offer a comprehensive defense of the safety account of knowledge against counterexamples that have been recently put forward. In section 1, I will discuss different versions of safety, arguing that a specific variant of method-relativized safety is the most plausible. I will then use this specific version of safety to respond to counterexamples in the recent literature. In section 2, I will address alleged examples of safe beliefs that still constitute Gettier cases. In section 3, (...)
  20. added 2018-01-06
    Does Warrant Entail Truth?Sharon Ryan - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):183-192.
  21. added 2018-01-06
    A Problem for Defeasibility Theories.Deborah Scaduto-Horn - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (1):40-45.
  22. added 2018-01-06
    The Analysis of 'Knowledge That P'.Ernest Sosa - 1964 - Analysis 25 (1):1 - 8.
  23. added 2017-12-23
    Virtue Epistemology and Explanatory Salience.Georgi Gardiner - forthcoming - In Heather Battaly (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology. Routledge.
    Robust virtue epistemology holds that knowledge is true belief obtained through cognitive ability. In this essay I explain that robust virtue epistemology faces a dilemma, and the viability of the theory depends on an adequate understanding of the ‘through’ relation. Greco interprets this ‘through’ relation as one of causal explanation; the success is through the agent’s abilities iff the abilities play a sufficiently salient role in a causal explanation of why she possesses a true belief. In this paper I argue (...)
  24. added 2017-12-15
    The Problem of Truth in the Classical Analysis of Knowledge.Filip Vittorio Rossi - 2014 - Romanian Journal of Analytic Philosophy 8 (2):41-49.
    In this article I propose a new problem for the classical analysis of knowledge (as justified true belief) and all analyses belonging to its legacy. The gist of my argument is that truth as a condition for a belief to be knowledge is problematic insofar there is no definition of truth. From this, and other remarks relating to the possibility of defining truth (or lack thereof) and about what truth theories fit our thoughts about knowledge, I conclude that as long (...)
  25. added 2017-11-28
    Justified True Belief as Knowledge.Robert J. Richman - 1975 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):435 - 439.
  26. added 2017-09-11
    Defending Virtue Epistemology: Epistemic Dependence in Testimony and Extended Cognition.Walker Page - forthcoming - Synthese:1-24.
    This paper provides an account of how virtue epistemology can accommodate knowledge acquired through testimony and extended cognition. Section 1 articulates the characteristic claim of virtue epistemology, and introduces the issues discussed in the paper. Section 2 details a related pair of objections to VE: that it is unable to accommodate cases of knowledge through testimony and extended cognition. Section 3 reviews two different virtue epistemologies and their responses to these objections presented in Greco :1–26, 2012). Considerations are presented for (...)
  27. added 2017-08-30
    Internalism and the Collapse of the Gettier Problem.Timothy Mcgrew & Lydia Mcgrew - 1998 - Journal of Philosophical Research 23:239-256.
    On the “Russellian” solution to the Gettier problem, every Gettier case involves the implicit or explicit use of a false premise on the part of the subject. We distinguish between two senses of “justification” ---“legitimation” and “justification proper.” The former does not require true premises, but the latter does. We then argue that in Gettier cases the subject possesses “legitimation” but not “justification proper,” and we respond to many attempted counterexamples, including several variants of the Nogot scenario, a case involving (...)
  28. added 2017-08-28
    Gettier’s Classic Irrelevance.Danny Frederick - manuscript
    Edmund Gettier’s three-page article is generally regarded as a classic of epistemology. I argue that Gettier cases depend upon three false assumptions and are irrelevant to the theory of knowledge. I suggest that we follow Karl Popper in abandoning subject-centred epistemologies in favour of theories of objective knowledge.
  29. added 2017-08-25
    KNOWLEDGE, TRUTH, INSIGHT, WISDOM.Ulrich De Balbian - 2017 - Oxford: Academic Publications.
    An exploration of the umbrella notion‭ '‬knowledge‭' ‬and related notions,‭ ‬truth,‭ ‬wisdom,‭ ‬knowing,‭ ‬insights,‭ ‬understanding,‭ ‬perception,‭ ‬etc.‭ ‬The‭ ‬philosophical approach,‭ ‬such as that of Gettier,‭ ‬to this notion.
  30. added 2017-08-10
    The Gettier Intuition From South America to Asia.Edouard Machery, Stephen Stich, David Rose, Mario Alai, Adriano Angelucci, Renatas Berniūnas, Emma E. Buchtel, Amita Chatterjee, Hyundeuk Cheon, In-Rae Cho, Daniel Cohnitz, Florian Cova, Vilius Dranseika, Ángeles Eraña Lagos, Laleh Ghadakpour & Maurice Grinberg - 2017 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 34 (3):517-541.
    This article examines whether people share the Gettier intuition (viz. that someone who has a true justified belief that p may nonetheless fail to know that p) in 24 sites, located in 23 countries (counting Hong-Kong as a distinct country) and across 17 languages. We also consider the possible influence of gender and personality on this intuition with a very large sample size. Finally, we examine whether the Gettier intuition varies across people as a function of their disposition to engage (...)
  31. added 2017-07-28
    Knowledge as justified true belief and the Gettier problem.Francois-Igor Pris - 2018 - NB Философская Мысль (6):41-52.
  32. added 2017-07-25
    Intuition in Gettier.Elijah Chudnoff - forthcoming - In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Classic Philosophical Arguments: The Gettier Problem. Cambridge: Cambridge University Presss.
    Gettier’s paper, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?,” is widely taken to be a paradigm example of the sort of philosophical methodology that has been so hotly debated in the recent literature. Reflection on it motivates the following four theses about that methodology: (A) Intuitive judgments form an epistemically distinctive kind. (B) Intuitive judgments play an epistemically privileged role in philosophical methodology. (C) If intuitive judgments play an epistemically privileged role in philosophical methodology, then their role is to be taken as (...)
  33. added 2017-07-12
    Review: Précis of Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification. [REVIEW]Robert J. Fogelin - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (2):395 - 400.
  34. added 2017-07-12
    Empirical Knowledge.Alan H. Goldman - 1991 - University of California Press.
    This remarkably clear and comprehensive account of empirical knowledge will be valuable to all students of epistemology and philosophy. The author begins from an explanationist analysis of knowing—a belief counts as knowledge if, and only if, its truth enters into the best explanation for its being held. Defending common sense and scientific realism within the explanationist framework, Alan Goldman provides a new foundational approach to justification. The view that emerges is broadly empiricist, counteracting the recently dominant trend that rejects that (...)
  35. added 2017-07-10
    Knowledge as a Thick Concept: New Light on the Gettier and Value Problems.Brent G. Kyle - 2011 - Dissertation, Cornell University
    I argue that knowledge is a particular kind of concept known as a thick concept. Examples of thick concepts include courage, generosity, loyalty, brutality, and so forth. These concepts are commonly said to combine both evaluation and description, and one of the main goals of this dissertation is to provide a new account of how a thick concept combines these elements. It is argued that thick concepts are semantically evaluative, and that they combine evaluation and description in a way similar (...)
  36. added 2017-03-21
    Why Gettier Cases Are Still Misleading: A Reply to Atkins.Mizrahi Moti - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (1):129-139.
    In this paper, I respond to Philip Atkins’ reply to my attempt to explain why Gettier cases (and Gettier-style cases) are misleading. I have argued that Gettier cases (and Gettier-style cases) are misdealing because the candidates for knowledge in such cases contain ambiguous designators. Atkins denies that Gettier’s original cases contain ambiguous designators and offers his intuition that the subjects in Gettier’s original cases do not know. I argue that his reply amounts to mere intuition mongering and I explain why (...)
  37. added 2017-02-11
    Anti-Intellectualism.Blake Roeber - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):437-466.
    Intellectualists disagree with anti-intellectualists about the relationship between knowledge and truth. According to intellectualists, this relationship is intimate. Knowledge entails true belief, and in fact everything required for knowledge is somehow relevant to the probability that the belief in question is true. According to anti-intellectualists, this relationship isn’t intimate. Or, at least, it’s not as intimate as intellectualists think. Factors that aren’t in any way relevant to the probability that a belief is true can make a difference to whether it (...)
  38. added 2017-01-29
    Personal and Doxastic Variants of Epistemic Justification and Their Roles in the Theory of Knowledge.Mylan Engel Jr - 1988 - Dissertation, The University of Arizona
    Most epistemologists agree that epistemic justification is required for knowledge. This requirement is usually formulated in one of two ways: S knows that p only if S is justified in believing that p. S knows that p only if S's belief that p is justified. Surprisingly and are generally regarded as synonymous formulations of the justification condition. In Chapter 1, I argue that such a synonymy thesis is mistaken and that, in fact, and specify substantively different requirements. requires that the (...)
  39. added 2017-01-09
    In Defense of the Kantian Account of Knowledge: Reply to Whiting.Mark Schroeder - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (3): 371-382.
    In this paper I defend the view that knowledge is belief for reasons that are both objectively and subjectively sufficient from an important objection due to Daniel Whiting, in this journal. Whiting argues that this view fails to deal adequately with a familiar sort of counterexample to analyses of knowledge, fake barn cases. I accept Whiting’s conclusion that my earlier paper offered an inadequate treatment of fake barn cases, but defend a new account of basic perceptual reasons that is consistent (...)
  40. added 2017-01-08
    Are Gettier Cases Misleading?Philip Atkins - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (3):379-384.
    The orthodox view in contemporary epistemology is that Edmund Gettier refuted the JTB analysis of knowledge, according to which knowledge is justified true belief. In a recent paper Moti Mizrahi questions the orthodox view. According to Mizrahi, the cases that Gettier advanced against the JTB analysis are misleading. In this paper I defend the orthodox view.
  41. added 2017-01-06
    Non-Pickwickian Belief and 'the Gettier Problem'.John Biro - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (1):47-69.
    That in Gettier's alleged counterexamples to the traditional analysis of knowledge as justified true belief the belief condition is satisfied has rarely been questioned. Yet there is reason to doubt that a rational person would come to believe what Gettier's protagonists are said to believe in the way they are said to have come to believe it. If they would not, the examples are not counter-examples to the traditional analysis. I go on to discuss a number of examples inspired by (...)
  42. added 2017-01-06
    An Argument Against the Possibility of Gettiered Beliefs.Benoit Gaultier - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (3): 265-272.
    In this paper, I propose a new argument against Gettier’s counterexamples to the thesis that knowledge is justified true belief. I claim that if there is no doxastic voluntarism, and if it is admitted that one has formed the belief that p at t1 if, at t0, one would be surprised to learn or discover that not–p, it can be plausibly argued that Gettiered beliefs simply cannot be formed.
  43. added 2016-12-12
    Ernest Sosa's epistemology and other theories of knowledge.Pris Francois-Igor - 2017 - Journal of the Belarusian State University. Philosophy and Psychology 1:36-44.
  44. added 2016-12-08
    Sensitivity Actually.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3):606-625.
    A number of prominent epistemologists claim that the principle of sensitivity “play[s] a starring role in the solution to some important epistemological problems”. I argue that traditional sensitivity accounts fail to explain even the most basic data that are usually considered to constitute their primary motivation. To establish this result I develop Gettier and lottery cases involving necessary truths. Since beliefs in necessary truths are sensitive by default, the resulting cases give rise to a serious explanatory problem for the defenders (...)
  45. added 2016-12-08
    A Critique to the Significance of Gettier Counter-Examples.Cao Jianbo - 2006 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 1 (4):675-687.
    Usually, people think that Gettier counter-examples challenged the traditional tripartite definition of knowledge and fundamentally changed the characteristic of the contemporary epistemology. This paper argues that regard for Gettier counter-examples is exaggerated, because (i) the JTB definition is neither an important nor a comprehensive one that covers all knowledge. Moreover, the significance of Gettier counter-examples is limited. (ii) The source of Gettier counter-examples lies in one arbitrary judgment, two mix-ups, three false assumptions, and a misunderstanding about the JTB definition.
  46. added 2016-12-08
    Gettier Cases Without False Lemmas?Michael Levin - 2006 - Erkenntnis 64 (3):381-392.
    Examples cited by Feldman, Lehrer and others of true beliefs that are justified, but not by false lemmas, turn out under scrutiny to involve false lemmas after all. In each case there is an EG inference whose conclusion is unwarranted unless its base instance is false. A shift to non-deductive justification does not avert the difficulty. The relation of this result to non-inferential Gettier cases is suggested.
  47. added 2016-11-06
    A Critical Survey of Some Recent Philosophical Research in China.Xingming Hu - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-28.
    In this paper, I survey some recent literature produced by the established Chinese philosophers who regularly publish in Chinese philosophy journals and work in Mainland China. Specifically, I review the recent research of these philosophers in two areas: Chinese Philosophy and epistemology. In each area, I focus on two topics that have caught the attention of a lot of Chinese philosophers. I argue that the Chinese philosophers’ research on these topics has two prevalent problems: (i) a lot of arguments they (...)
  48. added 2016-10-31
    Good to Know.Earl Conee - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):311-331.
    Our curiosity has us interested in finding out the truth. Knowing the fact of the matter fulfills the interest. This fulfillment is something satisfying about knowledge. Additionally, knowledge is a good way for a person to relate to a proposition. Knowing is good because of what knowledge is. In other words, knowledge is intrinsically good. The credibility of these assessments calls for some explanation. A traditional view is that knowledge is justified true belief with no Gettier accidents. This conception is (...)
  49. added 2016-10-31
    The Problems of Epistemology in the Wittgensteinian Context ISBN: 978-3-659-97848-7.Francois-Igor Pris - 2016 - Lap Lambert.
  50. added 2016-10-03
    How to Be an Infallibilist.Julien Dutant - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):148-171.
    When spelled out properly infallibilism is a viable and even attractive view. Because it has long been summary dismissed, however, we need a guide on how to properly spell it out. The guide has to fulfil four tasks. The first two concern the nature of knowledge: to argue that infallible belief is necessary, and that it is sufficient, for knowledge. The other two concern the norm of belief: to argue that knowledge is necessary, and that it is sufficient, for justified (...)
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