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  1. Our Understanding of Other Minds: Theory of Mind and the Intentional Stance.Kristin Andrews - 2000 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (7):12-24.
    Psychologists distinguish between intentional systems which have beliefs and those which are also able to attribute beliefs to others. The ability to do the latter is called having a 'theory of mind', and many cognitive ethologists are hoping to find evidence for this ability in animal behaviour. I argue that Dennett's theory entails that any intentional system that interacts with another intentional system (such as vervet monkeys and chess-playing computers) has a theory of mind, which would make the distinction all (...)
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  2. Instrumental Intentionality.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (June):303-16.
    Many physicalists are committed to an austere dichotomy: either beliefs, desires and intentions are scientifically respectable or attributions of such attitudes are all false. One physicalist, Daniel Dennett, offers a third alternative, which seems to permit a kind of instrumentalism concerning attitudes. I argue that Dennett's attempt to reconcile an instrumentalistic account of attributions of attitudes with a thoroughgoing physicalism founders on unresolvable conflicts between his official theory and his actual treatment of key concepts. As a result, instrumentalism concerning attitudes (...)
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  3. Instrumentalism: Back From the Brink?Lynne Rudder Baker - 1987 - In Saving Belief. Princeton University Press. pp. 149-166.
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  4. Realism, Instrumentalism, and the Intentional Stance.William P. Bechtel - 1985 - Cognitive Science 9 (4):265-92.
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  5. Dennett and the Quest for Real Meaning: In Defense of a Myth.David Beisecker - 2002 - Philosophy in the Contemporary World 9 (1):11-18.
    In several recent pieces, Daniel Dennett has advanced a line of reasoning purporting to show that we should reject the idea that there is a tenable distinction to be drawn between the manner in which we represent the way things are and the manner in which "blessedly simple" intentional systems like thermostats and frogs represent the way things are. Through a series of thought experiments, Dennett aims to show that philosophers of mind should abandon their preoccupation with "real meaning as (...)
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  6. Comments on Dennett From a Cautious Ally.Jonathan Bennett - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):381-385.
    In these notes, unadorned page numbers under 350 refer to Dennett (1987) - The Intentional Stance, hereafter referred to as Stance - and ones over 495 refer to Dennett (1988) - mostly to material by him but occasionally to remarks of his critics. Since the notes will focus on disagreements, I should say now that I am in Dennett’s camp and am deeply in debt to his work in the philosophy of mind, which I think is wider, deeper, more various (...)
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  7. Towards a Theory of Reflexive Intentional Systems.Lukas Böök - 1999 - Synthese 118 (1):105 - 117.
    (1) Intentional system: a system whose behaviour we may reliably predict via the intentional strategy, i.e., by interpreting its behaviour as a (more or less) rational consequence of its beliefs and desires. (2) Reflexive intentional system: a system that is able to interpret itself via the intentional strategy, and whose behaviour is, thus, influenced by an understanding of itself. All intentional systems behave in a meaningful way, but only reflexive intentional systems are aware of the meaning, Hence, only the latter (...)
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  8. Inconsistency and Interpretation.Lisa Bortolotti - 2003 - Philosophical Explorations 6 (2):109-123.
    Abstract In this paper I discuss one apparent counterexample to the rationality constraint on belief ascription. The fact that there are inconsistent believers does not seem compatible with the idea that only rational creatures can be ascribed beliefs. I consider Davidson's explanation of the possibility of inconsistent believers and claim that it involves a reformulation of the rationality constraint in terms of the believers' subscription to norms of rationality. I shall argue that Davidson's strategy is partially successful, but that the (...)
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  9. Patterns and Descriptions.Denny E. Bradshaw - 1998 - Philosophical Papers 27 (3):181-202.
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  10. The Intentional Stance.Susan J. Brison - 1989 - Philosophical Books 30 (3):169-172.
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  11. Dennett on Intelligent Storage.Philip Cam - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (December):247-62.
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  12. Belief, Opinion and Consciousness.Andy Clark - 1990 - Philosophical Psychology 3 (1):139-154.
    Abstract The paper considers two recent accounts of the difference between human and animal thought. One deflationary account, due to Daniel Dennett, insists that the only real difference lies in our ability to use words and sentences to give artificial precision and determinacy to our mental contents. The other, due to Paul Smolensky, conjectures that we at times deploy a special purpose device (the Conscious Rule Interpreter) whose task is to deal with public, symbolically coded data and commands. Both these (...)
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  13. Patterns Lost: Indeterminism and Dennett's Realism About Beliefs.B. Cohen - 1995 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 76 (1):17-31.
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  14. I—The Presidential Address The Unity of Unconsciousness.Tim Crane - 2017 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 117 (1):1-21.
  15. What Can Be Learned From Brainstorms?Robert C. Cummins - 1981 - Philosophical Topics 12 (1):83-92.
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  16. Dennett, D. C., The Intentional Stance. [REVIEW]St Cuypers - 1990 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 52:350.
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  17. Can Science Explain Consciousness?Bruiger Dan - manuscript
    For diverse reasons, the problem of phenomenal consciousness is persistently challenging. Mental terms are characteristically ambiguous, researchers have philosophical biases, secondary qualities are excluded from objective description, and philosophers love to argue. Adhering to a regime of efficient causes and third-person descriptions, science as it has been defined has no place for subjectivity or teleology. A solution to the “hard problem” of consciousness will require a radical approach: to take the point of view of the cognitive system itself. To facilitate (...)
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  18. Dennett's Stance on Intentional Realism.David Davies - 1995 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):299-312.
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  19. Intentional Systems Theory.Daniel Dennett - 2011 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
  20. The Free Floating Rationales of Evolution.Daniel C. Dennett - 2012 - Rivista di Filosofia 103 (2):185-200.
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  21. Real Patterns.Daniel C. Dennett - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):27-51.
    Are there really beliefs? Or are we learning (from neuroscience and psychology, presumably) that, strictly speaking, beliefs are figments of our imagination, items in a superceded ontology? Philosophers generally regard such ontological questions as admitting just two possible answers: either beliefs exist or they don't. There is no such state as quasi-existence; there are no stable doctrines of semi-realism. Beliefs must either be vindicated along with the viruses or banished along with the banshees. A bracing conviction prevails, then, to the (...)
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  22. The Interpretation of Texts, People and Other Artifacts.Daniel C. Dennett - 1990 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50:177-194.
    I want to explore four different exercises of interpretation: (1) the interpretation of texts (or hermeneutics), (2) the interpretation of people (otherwise known as "attribution" psychology, or cognitive or intentional psychology), (3) the interpretation of other artifacts (which I shall call artifact hermeneutics), (4) the interpretation of organism design in evolutionary biology--the controversial interpretive activity known as adaptationism.
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  23. Precis of the Intentional Stance.Daniel C. Dennett - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):495-505.
    The intentional stance is the strategy of prediction and explanation that attributes beliefs, desires, and other states to systems and predicts future behavior from what it would be rational for an agent to do, given those beliefs and desires. Any system whose performance can be thus predicted and explained is an intentional system, whatever its innards. The strategy of treating parts of the world as intentional systems is the foundation of but is also exploited in artificial intelligence and cognitive science (...)
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  24. The Intentional Stance.Daniel C. Dennett - 1987 - MIT Press.
    Through the use of such "folk" concepts as belief, desire, intention, and expectation, Daniel Dennett asserts in this first full scale presentation of...
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  25. Making Sense of Ourselves.Daniel C. Dennett - 1981 - Philosophical Topics 12 (1):63-81.
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  26. Brainstorms.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - MIT Press.
    This collection of 17 essays by the author offers a comprehensive theory of mind, encompassing traditional issues of consciousness and free will.
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  27. Intentional Systems.Daniel C. Dennett - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (February):87-106.
  28. Persons and the Intentional Stance.William Dibrell - 1988 - Journal of Critical Analysis 9 (1):13-25.
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  29. Daniel C. Dennett, The Intentional Stance Reviewed By.Warren Dow - 1988 - Philosophy in Review 8 (8):300-304.
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  30. Daniel C. Dennett, The Intentional Stance. [REVIEW]Warren Dow - 1988 - Philosophy in Review 8:300-304.
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  31. The Uses and Abuses of the Personal/Subpersonal Distinction.Zoe Drayson - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):1-18.
    In this paper, I claim that the personal/subpersonal distinction is first and foremost a distinction between two kinds of psychological theory or explanation: it is only in this form that we can understand why the distinction was first introduced, and how it continues to earn its keep. I go on to examine the different ontological commitments that might lead us from the primary distinction between personal and subpersonal explanations to a derivative distinction between personal and subpersonal states. I argue that (...)
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  32. The Rationality Assumption.Richard Dub - 2015 - In Carlos Muñoz-Suárez & Felipe De Brigard (eds.), Content and Consciousness Revisited. With Replies by Daniel Dennett. Springer. pp. 93-110.
    Dennett has long maintained that one of the keystones of Intentional Systems Theory is an assumption of rationality. To deploy the Intentional Stance is to presume from the outset that the target of interpretation is rational. This paper examines the history of rationality constraints on mental state ascription. I argue that the reasons that Dennett and his philosophical brethren present for positing rationality constraints are not convincing. If humans are found to be rational, this will not be because a presumption (...)
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  33. Propositional Attitudes, Intentionality, and Lawful Behaviors.Luiz Henrique de A. Dutra - 2010 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 7 (1):93-114.
    This paper aims to discuss Quine’s last analysis of propositional attitudes as involving intentionality and as regards human action and the very sub-ject matter of social sciences. As to this problem, Quine acquiesces in both Davidson’s anomalous monism and Dennett’s intentional stance. An al-ternative analysis is here presented, which is based on Howard Rachlin’s teleological behaviorism. Some problems regarding this approach are also considered. Intentionality and rationality are still to be saved, but they are construed according to a lawful perspective (...)
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  34. Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science.Jerry A. Fodor - 1981 - MIT Press.
  35. Three Cheers for Propositional Attitudes.Jerry A. Fodor - 1981 - In Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science. MIT Press.
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  36. Is Intentional Ascription Intrinsically Normative?Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore - 1993 - In B. Dahlbom (ed.), Dennett and His Critics. Blackwell.
    In a short article called “Mid-Term Examination: Compare and Contrast” that epitomizes and concludes his book The Intentional Stance, D. C. Dennett (1987) provides a sketch of what he views as an emerging Interpretivist consensus in the philosophy of mind. The gist is that Brentano’s thesis is true (the intentional is irreducible to the physical) and that it follows from the truth of Brentano’s thesis that: strictly speaking, ontologically speaking, there are no such things as beliefs, desires, or other intentional (...)
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  37. On the Evolution of Intentionality as Seen From the Intentional Stance.Jeffrey E. Foss - 1994 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 37 (3):287-310.
    Like everyone with a scientific bent of mind, Dennett thinks our capacity for meaningful language and states of mind is the product of evolution (Dennett [1987, ch. VIII]). But unlike many of this bent, he sees virtue in viewing evolution itself from the intentional stance. From this stance, ?Mother Nature?, or the process of evolution by natural selection, bestows intentionality upon us, hence we are not Unmeant Meaners. Thus, our intentionality is extrinsic, and Dennett dismisses the theories of meaning of (...)
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  38. Beyond the Marketing Philosophy.Gordon R. Foxall - 2004 - Philosophy of Management 4 (1):67-85.
    The intentional stance and the contextual stance are inextricably interdependent in the production of a comprehensive explanation and means of predicting complex human behaviour. This is illustrated in the context of the expectation of attitudinal-behavioural consistency which has long lain at the heart of bothmarketing science and social psychology. In practice, cognitively-inclined attitude theory and research leans on the contextual stance in order to formulate the heuristic overlay of mental interpretation in which it primarily presents its predictive and explicative accounts (...)
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  39. The Contextual Stance.Gordon R. Foxall - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):25-46.
    The contention that cognitive psychology and radical behaviorism yield equivalent accounts of decision making and problem solving is examined by contrasting a framework of cognitive interpretation, Dennett's intentional stance, with a corresponding interpretive stance derived from contextualism. The insistence of radical behaviorists that private events such as thoughts and feelings belong in a science of human behavior is indicted in view of their failure to provide a credible interpretation of complex human behavior. Dennett's interpretation of intentional systems is an exemplar (...)
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  40. The Social Stance.Peter Gärdenfors - 1994 - ProtoSociology 6:96-102.
    I argue that it is necessary to go beyond Dennett's notion of the "intentional stance" and adopt a social stance to certain phenomena. I introduce the notion of a social intention, which is an intention that cannot be replaced by individual intentions. The assumption of such intentions are helpful for understanding language and other social conventions. At the end of the article, I also discuss the relation between social intentions and social values.
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  41. The Intentional Stance: Developmental and Neurocognitive Perspectives.Richard Griffin - 2002 - In Andrew Brook & Don Ross (eds.), Daniel Dennett. Cambridge University Press.
    Nowhere in the psychological sciences has the philosophy of mind had more influence than on the child development literature generally referred to as children’s ‘theory of mind.’ Developmental journals may seem to be an unlikely place to find Brentano, Frege, and Dennett alongside descriptions of referential opacity and the principle of substitutivity, but it is not at all uncommon in this literature. While the many problems and complexities of the propositional attitude literature are still hotly debated by philosophers, and often (...)
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  42. Dennett, Drafts, and Phenomenal Realism.Robert Van Gulick - 1994 - Philosophical Topics 22 (1-2):443-455.
  43. Lifting the Veil of Morality: Choice Blindness and Attitude Reversals on a Self-Transforming Survey.Lars Hall, Petter Johansson & Thomas Strandberg - 2012 - PLoS ONE 7 (9):e45457. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.
    Every day, thousands of polls, surveys, and rating scales are employed to elicit the attitudes of humankind. Given the ubiquitous use of these instruments, it seems we ought to have firm answers to what is measured by them, but unfortunately we do not. To help remedy this situation, we present a novel approach to investigate the nature of attitudes. We created a self-transforming paper survey of moral opinions, covering both foundational principles, and current dilemmas hotly debated in the media. This (...)
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  44. Dennett, Daniel C., "The International Stance". [REVIEW]B. Hannan - 1990 - Mind 99:291.
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  45. Pattern and Being.John Haugeland - 1993 - In B. Dahlbom (ed.), Dennett and His Critics. Blackwell.
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  46. Is Design Relative or Real? Dennett on Intentional Relativism and Physical Realism.Reese M. Heitner - 2000 - Minds and Machines 10 (2):267-83.
    Dennett's intended rapprochement between physical realism and intentional relativism fails because it is premised upon conflicting arguments governing the status of design. Indeed, Dennett's remarks on design serve to highlight tensions buried deep within his theory. For inasmuch as Dennett succeeds in objectifying attributions of design, attributions of intentionality readily follow suit, leading to a form of intentional realism. But inasmuch as Dennett is successful in relativizing attributions of design, scientific realism at large is subject to renewed anti-realistic criticism. Dennettian-inspired (...)
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  47. Contrasting Approaches to the Legitimation of Intentional Language Within Comparative Psychology.Cecilia M. Heyes - 1987 - Behaviorism 15 (1):41-50.
    Dennett, a philosopher, and Griffin, an ethologist, have recently presented influential arguments promoting the extended use of intentional language by students of animal behavior. This essay seeks to elucidate and to contrast the claims made by each of these authors, and to evaluate their proposals primarily from the perspective of a practicing comparative psychologist or ethologist. While Griffin regards intentional terms as explanatory, Dennett assigns them a descriptive function; the issue of animal consciousness is central to Griffin's program and only (...)
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  48. Minds, Models and Mechanisms: A New Perspective on Intentional Psychology.Eric Hochstein - 2012 - Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 24 (4):547-557.
    In this article, I argue that intentional psychology (i.e. the interpretation of human behaviour in terms of intentional states and propositional attitudes) plays an essential role in the sciences of the mind. However, this role is not one of identifying scientifically respectable states of the world. Rather, I argue that intentional psychology acts as a type of phenomenological model, as opposed to a mechanistic one. I demonstrate that, like other phenomenological models in science, intentional psychology is a methodological tool with (...)
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  49. Physics, Biology, and Common-Sense Psychology.Jennifer Hornsby - 1992 - In David Charles & Kathleen Lennon (eds.), Reduction, Explanation and Realism. Oxford University Press.
  50. Macrocognition: A Theory of Distributed Minds and Collective Intentionality.Bryce Huebner - 2014 - Oxford University Press USA.
    This book develops a novel approach to distributed cognition and collective intentionality. It is argued that collective mentality should be only be posited where specialized subroutines are integrated in a way that yields skillful, goal-directed behavior that is sensitive to concerns that are relevant to a group as such.
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