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1 — 50 / 113
  1. added 2020-05-23
    Savage's Response to Allais as Broomean Reasoning.Franz Dietrich, Antonios Staras & Robert Sugden - manuscript
    Leonard Savage famously contravened his own theory when first confronting the Allais Paradox, but then convinced himself that he had made an error. We examine the formal structure of Savage’s ‘error-correcting’ reasoning in the light of (i) behavioural economists’ claims to identify the latent preferences of individuals who violate conventional rationality requirements and (ii) John Broome’s critique of arguments which presuppose that rationality requirements can be achieved through reasoning. We argue that Savage’s reasoning is not vulnerable to Broome’s critique, but (...)
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  2. added 2019-12-30
    Can Deflationism Save Interpretivism?Krzysztof Poslajko - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (2):709-725.
    The aim of this paper is to show that the interpretivist account of propositional attitudes fails even at the most plausible reading that treats this theory as a version of the deflationary approach to existence coupled with a metaphysical claim about the judgement-dependence of propositional attitudes. It will be argued that adopting a deflationary reading of interpretivism allows this theory to avoid the common charge of fictionalism, according to which interpretivists cannot maintain realism about attitudes as their theory becomes a (...)
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  3. added 2019-06-06
    Intentional Concepts in Cognitive Neuroscience.Samuli Pöyhönen - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (1):93-109.
    In this article, I develop an account of the use of intentional predicates in cognitive neuroscience explanations. As pointed out by Maxwell Bennett and Peter Hacker, intentional language abounds in neuroscience theories. According to Bennett and Hacker, the subpersonal use of intentional predicates results in conceptual confusion. I argue against this overly strong conclusion by evaluating the contested language use in light of its explanatory function. By employing conceptual resources from the contemporary philosophy of science, I show that although the (...)
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  4. added 2019-06-06
    Beyond the Marketing Philosophy: Context and Intention in the Explanation of Consumer Choice.Gordon R. Foxall - 2004 - Philosophy of Management 4 (1):67-85.
    The intentional stance and the contextual stance are inextricably interdependent in the production of a comprehensive explanation and means of predicting complex human behaviour. This is illustrated in the context of the expectation of attitudinal-behavioural consistency which has long lain at the heart of bothmarketing science and social psychology. In practice, cognitively-inclined attitude theory and research leans on the contextual stance in order to formulate the heuristic overlay of mental interpretation in which it primarily presents its predictive and explicative accounts (...)
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  5. added 2019-06-06
    Dennett and the Quest for Real Meaning: In Defense of a “Myth”.David Beisecker - 2002 - Philosophy in the Contemporary World 9 (1):11-18.
    In several recent pieces, Daniel Dennett has advanced a line of reasoning purporting to show that we should reject the idea that there is a tenable distinction to be drawn between the manner in which we represent the way things are and the manner in which "blessedly simple" intentional systems like thermostats and frogs represent the way things are. Through a series of thought experiments, Dennett aims to show that philosophers of mind should abandon their preoccupation with "real meaning as (...)
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  6. added 2019-06-06
    Witnessed Behavior and Dennett’s Intentional Stance.Stephen Webb - 1994 - Philosophical Topics 22 (1/2):457-470.
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  7. added 2019-06-05
    Propositional Attitudes, Intentionality and Lawful Behaviors.Luiz Henrique de A. Dutra - 2003 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 7 (1-2):93-114.
    This paper aims to discuss Quine’s last analysis of propositional attitudes as involving intentionality and as regards human action and the very subject matter of social sciences. As to this problem, Quine acquiesces in both Davidson’s anomalous monism and Dennett’s intentional stance. An alternative analysis is here presented, which is based on Howard Rachlin’s teleological behaviorism. Some problems regarding this approach are also considered. Intentionality and rationality are still to be saved, but they are construed according to a lawful perspective (...)
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  8. added 2019-06-05
    Dennett's Journey Towards Panpsychism.R. A. Sharpe - 1989 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 32 (2):233-240.
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  9. added 2018-10-09
    Descartes' Mistake: How Afterlife Beliefs Challenge the Assumption That Humans Are Intuitive Cartesian Substance Dualists.K. Mitch Hodge - 2008 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 8 (3-4):387-415.
    This article presents arguments and evidence that run counter to the widespread assumption among scholars that humans are intuitive Cartesian substance dualists. With regard to afterlife beliefs, the hypothesis of Cartesian substance dualism as the intuitive folk position fails to have the explanatory power with which its proponents endow it. It is argued that the embedded corollary assumptions of the intuitive Cartesian substance dualist position (that the mind and body are diff erent substances, that the mind and soul are intensionally (...)
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  10. added 2018-05-21
    Računala, mozak i ljudski um.Nenad Miščević & Nenad Smokrović (eds.) - 2001 - Rijeka: Izdavački centar Rijeka.
  11. added 2018-02-18
    Can Science Explain Consciousness?Bruiger Dan - manuscript
    For diverse reasons, the problem of phenomenal consciousness is persistently challenging. Mental terms are characteristically ambiguous, researchers have philosophical biases, secondary qualities are excluded from objective description, and philosophers love to argue. Adhering to a regime of efficient causes and third-person descriptions, science as it has been defined has no place for subjectivity or teleology. A solution to the “hard problem” of consciousness will require a radical approach: to take the point of view of the cognitive system itself. To facilitate (...)
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  12. added 2018-02-16
    Psychology in Perspective.Huw Price - 1994 - In John O'Leary-Hawthorne & Michaelis Michael (eds.), Philosophy in Mind. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 83--98.
    [email: huw@extro.su.oz.au] If recent literature is to be our guide, the main place of philosophy in the study of the mind would seem to be to determine the place of psychology in the study of the world. One distinctive kind of answer to this question begins by noting the central role of intentionality in psychology, and goes on to argue that this sets psychology apart from the natural sciences. Sometimes to be thus set apart is to be exiled, or rejected, (...)
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  13. added 2017-09-03
    Pleasures of the Communicative Conception.Uku Tooming - 2014 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 90 (1):253-272.
    In this paper, I criticize Christopher Gauker’s approach to the attributions of desire which identi es them with commands on behalf of others. ese are sup- posed to be needed in situations wherein such commands have to be quali ed in some way. I argue that his account doesn’t manage to make explicit the need for the concept of desire, and I defend my alternative according to which desires are related to our understanding of how commands on a person’s behalf (...)
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  14. added 2017-08-08
    The Unity of Unconsciousness.Tim Crane - 2017 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 117 (1):1-21.
    What is the relationship between unconscious and conscious intentionality? Contemporary philosophy of mind treats the contents of conscious 10 intentional mental states as the same kind of thing as the contents of un- conscious mental states. According to the standard view that beliefs and desires are propositional attitudes, for example, the contents of these states are propositions, whether or not the states are conscious or unconscious. I dispute this way of thinking of conscious and unconscious content, and propose an alternative, (...)
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  15. added 2017-02-16
    The Social Stance.Peter Gärdenfors - 1994 - ProtoSociology 6:96-102.
    I argue that it is necessary to go beyond Dennett's notion of the "intentional stance" and adopt a social stance to certain phenomena. I introduce the notion of a social intention, which is an intention that cannot be replaced by individual intentions. The assumption of such intentions are helpful for understanding language and other social conventions. At the end of the article, I also discuss the relation between social intentions and social values.
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  16. added 2017-02-11
    Discourse Markers as Stance Markers: Well in Stance Alignment in Conversational Interaction.Tomoko I. Sakita - 2013 - Pragmatics and Cognition 21 (1):81-116.
    Stance is inherent in conversational interaction and is interactional in nature. When speakers take a stance, they pay attention to both prior stances and stance relations, as well as to the anticipated consequences of their stancetaking. They manage stance relations as a way of dealing with the “sociocognitive relations” of intersubjectivity (Du Bois 2007). Using the dialogic framework proposed by Du Bois, this paper shows that the discourse marker Well in American English works as a resource for the management of (...)
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  17. added 2017-02-07
    Towards a Theory of Reflexive Intentional Systems.Lukas Böök - 1999 - Synthese 118 (1):105 - 117.
    (1) Intentional system: a system whose behaviour we may reliably predict via the intentional strategy, i.e., by interpreting its behaviour as a (more or less) rational consequence of its beliefs and desires. (2) Reflexive intentional system: a system that is able to interpret itself via the intentional strategy, and whose behaviour is, thus, influenced by an understanding of itself. All intentional systems behave in a meaningful way, but only reflexive intentional systems are aware of the meaning, Hence, only the latter (...)
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  18. added 2017-01-27
    Dennett's Compatibilism Considered.Julian Gatenby Puttergill - unknown
    My basic concern in this thesis is to examine the details behind Dennett's attempt to reconcile the notions of mechanism and responsibility. In the main this involves an examination of how he tries to secure a compatibilism between mechanistic and intentional explanations by developing a systematised conception of intentional explanation. I begin by briefly discussing the various notions needed for understanding what is at stake in the area and where the orthodoxy on the matter lies. As such the first three (...)
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  19. added 2017-01-25
    The Intentional Nature of Self-Sustaining Systems.J. Scott Jordan & Byron A. Heidenreich - 2010 - Mind and Matter 8 (1):45-62.
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  20. added 2017-01-22
    The Personal Stance.Carol Rovane - 1994 - Philosophical Topics 22 (1/2):351-396.
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  21. added 2017-01-22
    Dennett, Drafts, and Phenomenal Realism.Robert Van Gulick - 1994 - Philosophical Topics 22 (1-2):443-455.
  22. added 2017-01-21
    The Design-Based Approach to the Study of Mind (in Humans, Other Animals, and Machines), Including the Study of Behaviour Involving Mental Processes.Aaron Sloman - manuscript
    When scientists attempt to explain observations of behaviour in humans and other animals, they often use language that evolved for informal discourse among people engaged in every day social interaction, like this: What does the infant/child/adult/chimp/crow perceive/understand/learn/intend? What is he/she/it conscious of? What does he/she/it experience/enjoy/desire? What is he/she/it attending to? Why did he/she/it do X, start Xing, stop Xing, speed up Xing...? Does he/she/it know that...? What did/does he/she/it expect will happen, if...? Similar comments can be made about the (...)
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  23. added 2017-01-21
    Brainstorms: Philosophic Essays on Mind & Psychology. By Daniel C. Dennett. Montgomery, Vt.: Bradford Books. 1978. Pp. Xxii, 353. [REVIEW]Mark Thornton - 1981 - Dialogue 20 (3):610-616.
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  24. added 2017-01-18
    Intentional Systems Theory.Daniel Dennett - 2011 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
  25. added 2017-01-18
    Symmetry Between the Intentionality of Minds and Machines? The Biological Plausibility of Dennett’s Account.Bence Nanay - 2006 - Minds and Machines 16 (1):57-71.
    One of the most influential arguments against the claim that computers can think is that while our intentionality is intrinsic, that of computers is derived: it is parasitic on the intentionality of the programmer who designed the computer-program. Daniel Dennett chose a surprising strategy for arguing against this asymmetry: instead of denying that the intentionality of computers is derived, he endeavours to argue that human intentionality is derived too. I intend to examine that biological plausibility of Dennett’s suggestion and show (...)
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  26. added 2017-01-18
    Dennett on Intrinsic Intentionality.Natika Newton - 1992 - Analysis 52 (1):18-23.
  27. added 2017-01-18
    Contrasting Approaches to the Legitimation of Intentional Language Within Comparative Psychology.Cecilia M. Heyes - 1987 - Behaviorism 15 (1):41-50.
    Dennett, a philosopher, and Griffin, an ethologist, have recently presented influential arguments promoting the extended use of intentional language by students of animal behavior. This essay seeks to elucidate and to contrast the claims made by each of these authors, and to evaluate their proposals primarily from the perspective of a practicing comparative psychologist or ethologist. While Griffin regards intentional terms as explanatory, Dennett assigns them a descriptive function; the issue of animal consciousness is central to Griffin's program and only (...)
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  28. added 2017-01-17
    The Intentional Stance.Patricia Kitcher - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (1):126.
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  29. added 2017-01-15
    Two Improvements to the Intentional Stance Theory: Hutto and Satne on Naturalizing Content.Marc Slors - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (3):579-591.
    In this paper I assess the extent to which Daniel Dennett’s Intentional Stance Theory fits into the overall proposal for a programme on naturalizing mental content outlined by Daniel Hutto and Glenda Satne in this issue. I argue that in order to fit the proposal, two changes need to be made: the reality of intentional states should not be grounded in the reality of behavioral patterns but in the ascription-independent status of Ur-intentionality that is the at the root of all (...)
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  30. added 2017-01-15
    Daniel Dennett's Intuition Pumps. [REVIEW]Brendan Shea - 2015 - Reason Papers 37 (2).
    A review of Daniel Dennett's Intuition Pumps (W.V. Norton: 2013).
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  31. added 2017-01-14
    Dennett’s Strategy for Naturalizing Intentionality: An Innovative Play at Second Base.Tadeusz Zawidzki - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (3):593-609.
    I briefly review the three basic strategies for naturalizing intentionality discussed by Haugeland 4:383–427, 1990, and Hutto and Satne, recounting their deficits. Then, I focus on Dennett’s version of what Haugeland calls the “second-base … neo-behaviorist” strategy. After briefly explaining Dennett’s proposal, I defend it against four common objections: circularity, relativity, under-specified rationality, and failure to track robustly natural facts. I conclude by recounting the advantages of Dennettian neo-behaviorism over the neo-Cartesian and neo-pragmatist alternatives, as well as Hutto and Satne’s (...)
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  32. added 2016-12-12
    What Can Be Learned From Brainstorms?Robert Cummins - 1981 - Philosophical Topics 12 (1):83-92.
  33. added 2016-12-08
    Inconsistency and Interpretation.Lisa Bortolotti - 2003 - Philosophical Explorations 6 (2):109-123.
    Abstract In this paper I discuss one apparent counterexample to the rationality constraint on belief ascription. The fact that there are inconsistent believers does not seem compatible with the idea that only rational creatures can be ascribed beliefs. I consider Davidson's explanation of the possibility of inconsistent believers and claim that it involves a reformulation of the rationality constraint in terms of the believers' subscription to norms of rationality. I shall argue that Davidson's strategy is partially successful, but that the (...)
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  34. added 2016-12-08
    Reduction, Explanation, and Realism.K. Lennon & D. Charles (eds.) - 1992 - Oxford University Press.
    Reduction has long been a favourite method of analysis in all areas of philosophy, but in recent years there has been a reaction against it. The contributors to this volume examine the motivations for such anti-reductionist views and assess their coherence and success in a number of fields.
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  35. added 2016-10-25
    Fictionalism and the Folk.Adam Toon - 2016 - The Monist 99 (3):280-295.
    Mental fictionalism is the view that, even if mental states do not exist, it is useful to talk as if they do. Mental states are useful fictions. Recent philosophy of mind has seen a growing interest in mental fictionalism. To date, much of the discussion has concerned the general features of the approach. In this paper, I develop a specific form of mental fictionalism by drawing on Kendall Walton’s work on make-believe. According to the approach I propose, talk of mental (...)
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  36. added 2015-10-11
    The Normative Character of Interpretation and Mental Explanation.Paul D. Thorn - 1998 - Dissertation, Simon Fraser University
    This essay is devoted to the study of useful ways of thinking about the nature of interpretation, with particular attention being given to the so called normative character of mental explanation. My aim of illuminating the nature of interpretation will be accomplished by examining several views, some of which are common to both Donald Davidson and Daniel Dennett, concerning its unique characteristics as a method of prediction and explanation. Moreover, some of the views held by Davidson and Dennett will be (...)
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  37. added 2015-09-27
    The Rationality Assumption.Richard Dub - 2015 - In Carlos Muñoz-Suárez & Felipe De Brigard (eds.), Content and Consciousness Revisited. With Replies by Daniel Dennett. Springer. pp. 93-110.
    Dennett has long maintained that one of the keystones of Intentional Systems Theory is an assumption of rationality. To deploy the Intentional Stance is to presume from the outset that the target of interpretation is rational. This paper examines the history of rationality constraints on mental state ascription. I argue that the reasons that Dennett and his philosophical brethren present for positing rationality constraints are not convincing. If humans are found to be rational, this will not be because a presumption (...)
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  38. added 2015-08-16
    Minds, Models and Mechanisms: A New Perspective on Intentional Psychology.Eric Hochstein - 2012 - Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 24 (4):547-557.
    In this article, I argue that intentional psychology (i.e. the interpretation of human behaviour in terms of intentional states and propositional attitudes) plays an essential role in the sciences of the mind. However, this role is not one of identifying scientifically respectable states of the world. Rather, I argue that intentional psychology acts as a type of phenomenological model, as opposed to a mechanistic one. I demonstrate that, like other phenomenological models in science, intentional psychology is a methodological tool with (...)
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  39. added 2015-04-04
    Dennett, Daniel C., "The International Stance". [REVIEW]B. Hannan - 1990 - Mind 99:291.
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  40. added 2015-03-22
    The Free Floating Rationales of Evolution.Daniel C. Dennett - 2012 - Rivista di Filosofia 103 (2):185-200.
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  41. added 2015-03-22
    Intentionality and Authorship.J. Hvorecky - 2003 - Filozofia 58 (1):56-61.
    In the midst of the 1980 Daniel Dennett published a series of papers on the problematic of the Self. The resolution offered by Dennett is rather unconventional in philosophy and it might appear as contradicting several contemporary theoretical as well as experimental works in this field. The latter appeal namely to conside_rably different sources of the development of human Self. The aim of the paper is to show, that understanding the resolution offered by Dennett as an attempt at explaining just (...)
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  42. added 2015-03-22
    The Grammar of Subjecthood: Wittgenstein, Deconstruction and Dennett's Intentional Stance.Wendy Lynne Lee-Lampshire - 1992 - Dissertation, Marquette University
    The problem that this essay will address is that of devising a viable use for psychological and intentional terms, in short, discourse concerning what-it-is-to-be-a-subject or "subjecthood" in light of, first, Derrida's deconstruction of the transcendental subject and, second, the materialist claim that recent advances in science effectively antiquate any viable role in empirical psychology for the use of terms traditionally associated with mind. I will argue that Wittgenstein's remarks concerning, among other things, the use of psychological terms, private mental objects (...)
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  43. added 2015-03-22
    Dennett, D. C., The Intentional Stance. [REVIEW]St Cuypers - 1990 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 52:350.
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  44. added 2015-03-22
    The Intentional Stance by Daniel Dennett. [REVIEW]Sydney Shoemaker - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):212-216.
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  45. added 2015-03-22
    The Intentional Stance.Susan J. Brison - 1989 - Philosophical Books 30 (3):169-172.
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  46. added 2015-03-22
    Daniel C. Dennett, The Intentional Stance Reviewed By.Warren Dow - 1988 - Philosophy in Review 8 (8):300-304.
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  47. added 2015-03-22
    Daniel C. Dennett, The Intentional Stance. [REVIEW]Warren Dow - 1988 - Philosophy in Review 8:300-304.
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  48. added 2015-03-22
    Dennett, D. C., "The Intentional Stance". [REVIEW]D. Jacquette - 1988 - Mind 97:619.
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  49. added 2015-03-20
    The Expressive Stance: Intentionality, Expression, and Machine Art.Adam Linson - 2013 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 5 (2):195-216.
    This paper proposes a new interpretive stance for interpreting artistic works and performances that is relevant to artificial intelligence research but also has broader implications. Termed the expressive stance, this stance makes intelligible a critical distinction between present-day machine art and human art, but allows for the possibility that future machine art could find a place alongside our own. The expressive stance is elaborated as a response to Daniel Dennett's notion of the intentional stance, which is critically examined with respect (...)
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  50. added 2015-03-19
    Book Review. The Intentional Stance. D Dennett. [REVIEW]Sydney Shoemaker - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):212-16.
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