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  1. added 2020-01-05
    Williamson, Closure, and KK.Daniel Immerman - forthcoming - Synthese.
    Closure principles say that if you know some proposition which entails a second and you meet further conditions then you know the second. In this paper I construct an argument against closure principles which turns on the idea that knowing a proposition requires that one's belief-forming process be reliable. My argument parallels an influential argument offered by Timothy Williamson against KK principles -- principles that say that if you know some proposition and you meet further conditions then you know that (...)
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  2. added 2019-09-18
    Indicative Conditionals Without Iterative Epistemology.Ben Holguín - forthcoming - Noûs.
    This paper argues that two widely accepted principles about the indicative conditional jointly presuppose the falsity of one of the most prominent arguments against epistemological iteration principles. The first principle about the indicative conditional, which has close ties both to the Ramsey test and the “or-to-if” inference, says that knowing a material conditional suffices for knowing the corresponding indicative. The second principle says that conditional contradictions cannot be true when their antecedents are epistemically possible. Taken together, these principles entail that (...)
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  3. added 2019-07-20
    When Do Introspection Axioms Matter for Multi-Agent Epistemic Reasoning?Wesley H. Holliday, Yifeng Ding & Cedegao Zhang - 2019 - Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science 297:121–139.
    The early literature on epistemic logic in philosophy focused on reasoning about the knowledge or belief of a single agent, especially on controversies about "introspection axioms" such as the 4 and 5 axioms. By contrast, the later literature on epistemic logic in computer science and game theory has focused on multi-agent epistemic reasoning, with the single-agent 4 and 5 axioms largely taken for granted. In the relevant multi-agent scenarios, it is often important to reason about what agent A believes about (...)
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  4. added 2019-06-06
    Savoir Que L’on Sait. La Question de la Transparence Dans les Attitudes Épistémiques: Dialogue.Neil Kennedy - 2009 - Dialogue 48 (3):451-478.
    RÉSUMÉ : Dans cet article, je réévalue les arguments pour et contre certaines thèses concernant la connaissance d’ordre supérieur afin d’évaluer leur portée réelle sur les principes d’introspection positive et négative. Je défends l’idée que la locution «savoir que l’on sait» possède au moins deux interprétations notoires : l’une, plus courante, dite «transparentiste», valide le principe d’introspection positive et l’autre, moins courante, dite «agrippéenne», endosse certaines critiques de ce principe. ABSTRACT: In this paper, I revisit arguments for and against various (...)
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  5. added 2019-03-11
    Enough is Enough: Austin on Knowing.Guy Longworth - 2018 - In Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), Interpreting J. L. Austin: Critical Essays. Oxford, UK: pp. 186–205.
  6. added 2019-02-19
    Luminosity and the KK Thesis.Robert Stalnaker - 2015 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism: New Essays. Cambridge University Press. pp. 19-40.
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  7. added 2019-02-09
    Disappearing Diamonds: Fitch-Like Results in Bimodal Logic.Weng San - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (6):1003-1016.
    Augment the propositional language with two modal operators: □ and ■. Define ⧫ to be the dual of ■, i.e. ⧫=¬■¬. Whenever (X) is of the form φ → ψ, let (X⧫) be φ→⧫ψ . (X⧫) can be thought of as the modally qualified counterpart of (X)—for instance, under the metaphysical interpretation of ⧫, where (X) says φ implies ψ, (X⧫) says φ implies possibly ψ. This paper shows that for various interesting instances of (X), fairly weak assumptions suffice for (...)
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  8. added 2019-01-08
    Argument Williamsona przeciwko KK-tezie.Grzegorz Lisowski - 2017 - Diametros 52:81-95.
    The KK-principle can be defined as follows: “For any subject x : if x knows that p, then she is always in a position to know that she knows that p ”. This principle has been widely accepted in the history of philosophy. However, in contemporary epistemology it is considered controversial and regarded as an important part of the debate concerning the nature of knowledge. One of the arguments against the KK-principle has been presented by Timothy Williamson and it involves (...)
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  9. added 2018-10-11
    Abominable KK Failures.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1227-1259.
    KK is the thesis that if you can know p, you can know that you can know p. Though it’s unpopular, a flurry of considerations has recently emerged in its favour. Here we add fuel to the fire: standard resources allow us to show that any failure of KK will lead to the knowability and assertability of abominable indicative conditionals of the form ‘If I don’t know it, p’. Such conditionals are manifestly not assertable—a fact that KK defenders can easily (...)
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  10. added 2018-09-08
    On a Flawed Argument Against the KK Principle.S. Okasha - 2013 - Analysis 73 (1):80-86.
    Externalists in epistemology often reject the KK principle – which says that if a person knows that p, then they know that they know that p. This paper argues that one standard argument against the KK principle that many externalists make is fallacious, as it involves illicit substitution into an intensional context. The fallacy is exposed and discussed.
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  11. added 2018-05-27
    Higher Order Ignorance Inside the Margins.Sam Carter - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1789-1806.
    According to the KK-principle, knowledge iterates freely. It has been argued, notably in Greco, that accounts of knowledge which involve essential appeal to normality are particularly conducive to defence of the KK-principle. The present article evaluates the prospects for employing normality in this role. First, it is argued that the defence of the KK-principle depends upon an implausible assumption about the logical principles governing iterated normality claims. Once this assumption is dropped, counter-instances to the principle can be expected to arise. (...)
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  12. added 2018-02-16
    Mr. Magoo’s Mistake.Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (2):289-306.
    Timothy Williamson has famously argued that the principle should be rejected. We analyze Williamson's argument and show that its key premise is ambiguous, and that when it is properly stated this premise no longer supports the argument against. After canvassing possible objections to our argument, we reflect upon some conclusions that suggest significant epistemological ramifications pertaining to the acquisition of knowledge from prior knowledge by deduction.
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  13. added 2017-11-25
    Does Ought Imply Ought Ought?Daniel Immerman - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (273):702-716.
    Knows-knows principles in epistemology say that if you know some proposition, then you are in a position to know that you know it. This paper examines the viability of analogous principles in ethics, which I call ought-ought principles. Several epistemologists have recently offered new defences of KK principles and of other related principles, and there has recently been an increased interest in examining analogies between ethics and epistemology, and so it seems natural to examine whether defences of KK and related (...)
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  14. added 2017-05-31
    Knowledge-to-Fact Arguments Can Deliver Knowledge.Daniel Immerman - 2018 - Analysis 78 (1):52-56.
    In a recent paper, Murali Ramachandran endorses a principle that he thinks can help us solve the surprise test puzzle and cause problems for a Williamsonian argument against KK principles. But in this paper I argue that his principle is false and as a result it cannot do either.
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  15. added 2017-05-31
    Kumārila and Knows-Knows.Daniel Immerman - 2018 - Philosophy East and West 68 (2):408-422.
    This essay defends a principle that promises to help illuminate the nature of reflective knowledge. The principle in question belongs to a broader category called knows-knows principles, or KK principles for short. Such principles say that if you know some proposition, then you're in a position to know that you know it.KK principles were prominent among various historical philosophers and can be fruitfully integrated with many views in contemporary epistemology and beyond—and yet almost every contemporary analytic epistemologist thinks that they (...)
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  16. added 2017-05-30
    Taking a Chance on KK.Jeremy Goodman & Bernhard Salow - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):183-196.
    Dorr et al. present a case that poses a challenge for a number of plausible principles about knowledge and objective chance. Implicit in their discussion is an interesting new argument against KK, the principle that anyone who knows p is in a position to know that they know p. We bring out this argument, and investigate possible responses for defenders of KK, establishing new connections between KK and various knowledge-chance principles.
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  17. added 2017-05-30
    The Externalist’s Guide to Fishing for Compliments.Bernhard Salow - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):691-728.
    Suppose you’d like to believe that p, whether or not it’s true. What can you do to help? A natural initial thought is that you could engage in Intentionally Biased Inquiry : you could look into whether p, but do so in a way that you expect to predominantly yield evidence in favour of p. This paper hopes to do two things. The first is to argue that this initial thought is mistaken: intentionally biased inquiry is impossible. The second is (...)
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  18. added 2016-12-08
    Safety, Explanation, Iteration.Daniel Greco - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):187-208.
    This paper argues for several related theses. First, the epistemological position that knowledge requires safe belief can be motivated by views in the philosophy of science, according to which good explanations show that their explananda are robust. This motivation goes via the idea—recently defended on both conceptual and empirical grounds—that knowledge attributions play a crucial role in explaining successful action. Second, motivating the safety requirement in this way creates a choice point—depending on how we understand robustness, we'll end up with (...)
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  19. added 2016-12-08
    A Priori Skepticism and the KK Thesis.James R. Beebe - 2015 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (4):315-326.
    _ Source: _Page Count 12 In a previous article, I argued against the widespread reluctance of philosophers to treat skeptical challenges to our a priori knowledge of necessary truths with the same seriousness as skeptical challenges to our a posteriori knowledge of contingent truths. Hamid Vahid has recently offered several reasons for thinking the unequal treatment of these two kinds of skepticism is justified, one of which is a priori skepticism’s seeming dependence upon the widely scorned kk thesis. In the (...)
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  20. added 2016-12-08
    Self-Knowledge and the KK Principle.Conor McHugh - 2010 - Synthese 173 (3):231-257.
    I argue that a version of the so-called KK principle is true for principled epistemic reasons; and that this does not entail access internalism, as is commonly supposed, but is consistent with a broad spectrum of epistemological views. The version of the principle I defend states that, given certain normal conditions, knowing p entails being in a position to know that you know p. My argument for the principle proceeds from reflection on what it would take to know that you (...)
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  21. added 2016-12-08
    Self-Knowledge and Embedded Operators.Timothy Williamson - 1996 - Analysis 56 (4):202-209.
    Queen Anne is dead, and it is a fallacy to substitute a definite description for another designator of the same object in stating the content of someone’s propositional attitudes. The fallacy can take subtle forms, as when Godel’s incompleteness theorems are used to argue against mechanistic views of mind. Some instances of the fallacy exemplify a more general logical phenomenon: the set of principles satisfied by one sentential operator can differ from, and even contradict, the set of principles satisfied by (...)
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  22. added 2016-12-05
    Inexact Knowledge with Introspection.Denis Bonnay & Paul Égré - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (2):179-227.
    This paper supersedes an ealier version, entitled "A Non-Standard Semantics for Inexact Knowledge with Introspection", which appeared in the Proceedings of "Rationality and Knowledge". The definition of token semantics, in particular, has been modified, both for the single- and the multi-agent case.
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  23. added 2016-12-05
    Margin for Error and the Transparency of Knowledge.Jérôme Dokic & Paul Égré - 2009 - Synthese 166 (1):1-20.
    In chapter 5 of Knowledge and its Limits, T. Williamson formulates an argument against the principle (KK) of epistemic transparency, or luminosity of knowledge, namely “that if one knows something, then one knows that one knows it”. Williamson’s argument proceeds by reductio: from the description of a situation of approximate knowledge, he shows that a contradiction can be derived on the basis of principle (KK) and additional epistemic principles that he claims are better grounded. One of them is a reflective (...)
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  24. added 2016-11-28
    Lewis on Iterated Knowledge.Bernhard Salow - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1571-1590.
    The status of the knowledge iteration principles in the account provided by Lewis in “Elusive Knowledge” is disputed. By distinguishing carefully between what in the account describes the contribution of the attributor’s context and what describes the contribution of the subject’s situation, we can resolve this dispute in favour of Holliday’s claim that the iteration principles are rendered invalid. However, that is not the end of the story. For Lewis’s account still predicts that counterexamples to the negative iteration principle ) (...)
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  25. added 2016-07-03
    Doubting Assertion.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (3):1-13.
    One main argument that has been offered in support of the Knowledge Account of Assertion is that it successfully makes sense of a variety of Moorean-paradoxical claims. David Sosa has objected to the Knowledge Account by arguing that it does not generalize satisfactorily to make sense of the oddity of iterated conjunctions of the form “p but I don’t know whether I know that p”. Recently, Martin Montminy has offered a defense of the Knowledge Account. In this paper, I show (...)
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  26. added 2016-05-11
    Transparency and the KK Principle.Nilanjan Das & Bernhard Salow - 2018 - Noûs 52 (1):3-23.
    An important question in epistemology is whether the KK principle is true, i.e., whether an agent who knows that p is also thereby in a position to know that she knows that p. We explain how a “transparency” account of self-knowledge, which maintains that we learn about our attitudes towards a proposition by reflecting not on ourselves but rather on that very proposition, supports an affirmative answer. In particular, we show that such an account allows us to reconcile a version (...)
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  27. added 2016-03-16
    Lotteries And Contexts.Peter Baumann - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):415-428.
    There are many ordinary propositions we think we know. Almost every ordinary proposition entails some "lottery proposition" which we think we do not know but to which we assign a high probability of being true (for instance: “I will never be a multi-millionaire” entails “I will not win this lottery”). How is this possible - given that some closure principle is true? This problem, also known as “the Lottery puzzle”, has recently provoked a lot of discussion. In this paper I (...)
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  28. added 2016-02-26
    The Infinitely Iterated Labyrinth: Conceivability and Higher-Order Knowledge.Shane Maxwell Wilkins - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (3):509-516.
    Some time ago I wrote a paper about conceivability and knowledge. An anonymous referee rejected it on the grounds that the result had already been established in a short story by Jorge Luis Borges. Intrigued, I looked for the story but found no mention of it in Louis and Ziche’s extensive bibliography. I spent months consulting archives and electronic records to no avail. I had begun to doubt whether the story even existed when I had the curious good luck to (...)
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  29. added 2016-01-08
    Hope, Knowledge, and Blindspots.Jordan Dodd - 2017 - Synthese 194 (2):531-543.
    Roy Sorensen introduced the concept of an epistemic blindspot in the 1980s. A proposition is an epistemic blindspot for some individual at some time if and only if that proposition is consistent but unknowable by that individual at that time. In the first half of this paper, I extend Sorensen work on blindspots by arguing that there exist blindspots that essentially involve hopes. In the second half, I show how such blindspots can contribute to and impair different pursuits of self-understanding. (...)
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  30. added 2015-11-07
    Epistemic Theories of Truth: The Justifiability Paradox Investigated.Vincent C. Müller & Christian Stein - 1996 - In C. Martínez Vidal, U. Rivas Monroy & L. Villegas Forero (eds.), Verdad: Lógica, Representatión y Mundo. Universidade de Santiago de Compostela. pp. 95-104.
    Epistemic theories of truth, such as those presumed to be typical for anti-realism, can be characterised as saying that what is true can be known in principle: p → ◊Kp. However, with statements of the form “p & ¬Kp”, a contradiction arises if they are both true and known. Analysis of the nature of the paradox shows that such statements refute epistemic theories of truth only if the the anti-realist motivation for epistemic theories of truth is not taken into account. (...)
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  31. added 2015-09-21
    Williamson on Knowledge.Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.) - 2009 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Eighteen leading philosophers offer critical assessments of Timothy Williamson's ground-breaking work on knowledge and its impact on philosophy today. They discuss epistemological issues concerning evidence, defeasibility, scepticism, testimony, assertion, and perception, and debate Williamson's central claim that knowledge is a mental state.
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  32. added 2015-09-16
    The Solution to the Surprise Exam Paradox.Ken Levy - 2009 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (2):131-158.
    The Surprise Exam Paradox continues to perplex and torment despite the many solutions that have been offered. This paper proposes to end the intrigue once and for all by refuting one of the central pillars of the Surprise Exam Paradox, the 'No Friday Argument,' which concludes that an exam given on the last day of the testing period cannot be a surprise. This refutation consists of three arguments, all of which are borrowed from the literature: the 'Unprojectible Announcement Argument,' the (...)
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  33. added 2015-09-04
    Could KK Be OK?Daniel Greco - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy 111 (4):169-197.
    In this paper I present a qualified defense of the KK principle. In section one I introduce two popular arguments against the KK principle, along with an example in which these arguments seem to prove too much. In section two I provide a simple formal model of knowledge in which KK holds, and which I argue provides an attractive analysis of the example from section one. I go on argue that when this model is combined with contextualism, we can retain (...)
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  34. added 2015-04-13
    Chisholm, Internalism, and Knowing That One Knows.Christopher Conn - 2001 - American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (4):333 - 347.
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  35. added 2015-04-13
    On Knowing That One Knows the Logic of Skepticism and Theory.Richard Bosley - 1993
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  36. added 2015-03-03
    Epistemic Logic and Epistemology.Wesley H. Holliday - forthcoming - In Sven Ove Hansson Vincent F. Hendricks (ed.), Handbook of Formal Philosophy. Springer.
    This chapter provides a brief introduction to propositional epistemic logic and its applications to epistemology. No previous exposure to epistemic logic is assumed. Epistemic-logical topics discussed include the language and semantics of basic epistemic logic, multi-agent epistemic logic, combined epistemic-doxastic logic, and a glimpse of dynamic epistemic logic. Epistemological topics discussed include Moore-paradoxical phenomena, the surprise exam paradox, logical omniscience and epistemic closure, formalized theories of knowledge, debates about higher-order knowledge, and issues of knowability raised by Fitch’s paradox. The references (...)
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  37. added 2015-03-03
    The Many Faces of Closure and Introspection: An Interactive Perspective.Patrick Allo - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (1):91-124.
    In this paper I present a more refined analysis of the principles of deductive closure and positive introspection. This analysis uses the expressive resources of logics for different types of group knowledge, and discriminates between aspects of closure and computation that are often conflated. The resulting model also yields a more fine-grained distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge, and places Hintikka’s original argument for positive introspection in a new perspective.
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  38. added 2015-03-03
    Decidability for Some Justification Logics with Negative Introspection.Thomas Studer - 2013 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 78 (2):388-402.
    Justification logics are modal logics that include justifications for the agent's knowledge. So far, there are no decidability results available for justification logics with negative introspection. In this paper, we develop a novel model construction for such logics and show that justification logics with negative introspection are decidable for finite constant specifications.
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  39. added 2015-03-03
    Reasoning-Based Introspection.Olivier Gossner & Elias Tsakas - 2012 - Theory and Decision 73 (4):513-523.
    We show that if an agent reasons according to standard inference rules, the truth and introspection axioms extend from the set of non-epistemic propositions to the whole set of propositions. This implies that the usual axiomatization of partitional possibility correspondences is redundant, and provides a justification for truth and introspection that is partly based on reasoning.
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  40. added 2015-03-03
    Knowledge Versus Understanding: The Cost of Avoiding Gettier.Mikael Janvid - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (2):183-197.
    In the current discussion on epistemic value, several philosophers argue that understanding enjoys higher epistemological significance and epistemic value than knowledge—the epistemic state the epistemological tradition has been preoccupied with. By noting a tension between the necessary conditions for understanding in the perhaps most prominent of these philosophers, Jonathan Kvanvig, this paper disputes the higher epistemological relevance of understanding. At the end, on the basis of the results of the previous sections, some alternative comparative contrasts between knowledge and understanding are (...)
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  41. added 2015-03-03
    ?K: A Non-Fregean Logic of Explicit Knowledge.Steffen Lewitzka - 2011 - Studia Logica 97 (2):233-264.
    We present a new logic -based approach to the reasoning about knowledge which is independent of possible worlds semantics.? k is a non- Fregean logic whose models consist of propositional universes with subsets for true, false and known propositions. Knowledge is, in general, not closed under rules of inference; the only valid epistemic principles are the knowledge axiom K i??? and some minimal conditions concerning common knowledge in a group. Knowledge is explicit and all forms of the logical omniscience problem (...)
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  42. added 2015-03-03
    Improbable Knowing.Timothy Williamson - 2011 - In T. Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press.
    Can we turn the screw on counter-examples to the KK principle (that if one knows that P, one knows that one knows that P)? The idea is to construct cases in which one knows that P, but the epistemic status for one of the proposition that one knows that P is much worse than just one’s not knowing it. Of course, since knowledge is factive, there can’t be cases in which one knows that P and knows that one doesn’t know (...)
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  43. added 2015-03-03
    Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive Invariantism, and Knowledge of Knowledge.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):213–235.
    §I schematises the evidence for an understanding of ‘know’ and other terms of epistemic appraisal that embodies contextualism or subject-sensitive invariantism, and distinguishes between those two approaches. §II argues that although the cases for contextualism and sensitive invariantism rely on a principle of charity in the interpretation of epistemic claims, neither approach satisfies charity fully, since both attribute metalinguistic errors to speakers. §III provides an equally charitable anti-sceptical insensitive invariantist explanation of much of the same evidence as the result of (...)
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  44. added 2015-03-03
    Common Belief with the Logic of Individual Belief.Giacomo Bonanno - 2000 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 46 (1):49-52.
    The logic of common belief does not always reflect that of individual beliefs. In particular, even when the individual belief operators satisfy the KD45 logic, the common belief operator may fail to satisfy axiom 5. That is, it can happen that neither is A commonly believed nor is it common belief that A is not commonly believed. We identify the intersubjective restrictions on individual beliefs that are incorporated in axiom 5 for common belief.
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  45. added 2015-03-03
    Knowledge of Knowledge and of Lack of Knowledge in the Charmides.T. F. Morris - 1989 - International Studies in Philosophy 21 (1):49-61.
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  46. added 2015-03-03
    Formal Studies in Epistemic and Doxastic Logic.Myles Francis Mcnally - 1982 - Dissertation, Temple University
    A number of related fully quantified epistemic-doxastic logics are developed from a study of various epistemic principles. These logics countence constructions such as "Everyone knows that ...", hence are more expressive then Hintikka's epistemic-doxastic logic. A two sorted presupposition-free base logic is employed to distinguish those things capable of knowledge and belief from those which are not, and to distinguish denoting from non-denoting terms. Logics for both concurrent and virtual senses of "Knowledge" and "belief" are developed, both axiomatically and semantically. (...)
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  47. added 2015-03-03
    Knowledge and Belief.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
  48. added 2015-02-18
    Skepticism, Information, and Closure: Dretske’s Theory of Knowledge.Christoph Jäger - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):187 - 201.
    According to Fred Dretske's externalist theory of knowledge a subject knows that p if and only if she believes that p and this belief is caused or causally sustained by the information that p. Another famous feature of Dretske's epistemology is his denial that knowledge is closed under known entailment. I argue that, given Dretske's construal of information, he is in fact committed to the view that both information and knowledge are closed under known entailment. Hence, if it is true (...)
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  49. added 2014-10-04
    The KK-Principle, Margins for Error, and Safety.Murali Ramachandran - 2012 - Erkenntnis 76 (1):121-136.
    This paper considers, and rejects, three strategies aimed at showing that the KK-principle fails even in most favourable circumstances (all emerging from Williamson’s Knowledge and its Limits ). The case against the final strategy provides positive grounds for thinking that the principle should hold good in such situations.
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  50. added 2014-10-04
    Williamson on Scepticism and Rationality.David Owens - 2004 - Philosophical Books 45 (4):306-312.
    We are often in no position to know whether p is true but, it is widely held, where we do know that p, we are always in a position to know that we know that p: knowledge is luminous. In Chapter 4 of Knowledge and Its Limits Williamson argues that knowledge is not luminous and with this conclusion in hand he hopes to see off the sceptic, amongst other things.
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