About this topic
Summary The knowledge argument against physicalism centers on the claim that complete physical knowledge does not enable knowledge of consciousness.  In Frank Jackson's formulation, Mary is brought up in a black-and-white room and learns the complete neuroscience of color processing in humans, but she still does not know what it is like to see red: she learns a new fact about color experience when she leaves her room and sees red for the first time.  Jackson argues that Mary knows all the physical facts but not all the facts about color experience, so some facts about color experience are not physical facts.  Physicalists have replied in many different ways.  Some argue that Mary gains an ability without learning a new fact.  Others argue that she gains acquaintance with a property without learning a new facts.  Others argue that she learns a fact she already knew under a new mode of presentation.
Key works Jackson's original papers on the knowledge argument are Jackson 1982 and Jackson 1986 (he changes his mind in 2003).  Nemirow 1990 and Lewis 1990 give the ability reply: on leaving the black-and-white room, Mary gains an ability without learning a new fact.  Loar 1990 gives the old-fact reply: Mary learns a fact she already knew under a new mode of presentation.  Conee 1985 gives the acquaintance reply: Mary gains acquaintance with a property without learning new facts.  Dennett 2006 argues that Mary could know about color experience from inside her room.  Two excellent collections of papers on the topic are Ludlow et al 2004 and Alter & Walter 2006.
Introductions Encyclopedia articles include Nida-Rumelin 2002, Alter 2005, and Gertler 2005Stoljar & Nagasawa 2003 is a thorough introduction including a historical discussion.
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  1. added 2020-04-19
    Phenomenal Consciousness.Manas Kumar Sahu - 2020 - Journal of Advances in Education and Philosophy 4 (4):160-166.
    The objective of this paper is to defend the non-reductive thesis of phenomenal consciousness. This paper will give an overview of the arguments for the non-reductive explanation of phenomenal consciousness and justify why the reductionist approach is implausible in the context of explaining phenomenal subjective experience. The debate between reductionist and non-reductionist on the project of Demystifying and Mystifying phenomenal consciousness is driven by two fundamental assumptions-1) Reductive-Naturalistic Objectivism, 2) Phenomenal Realism. There are several arguments for the irreducibility of phenomenal (...)
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  2. added 2020-03-17
    The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Physicalism and the Conceptual Analysis.Daniel Kostic - 2011 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual 24:05-17.
    This paper is divided into three sections. In the first section I briefly outline the background of the problem, i.e. Kripke’s modal argument (Kripke 1980). In the second section I present Chalmers’ account of two- dimensional semantics and two-dimensional argument against physicalism. In the third section I criticize Chalmers’ approach based on two crucial points, one is about necessity of identities and the other is about microphysi- cal descriptions and a priori derivation.
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  3. added 2019-12-31
    Knowing What an Experience Is Like and the Reductive Theory of Knowledge‐Wh.Kevin Lynch - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
    This article discusses a kind of knowledge classifiable as knowledge-wh but which seems to defy analysis in terms of the standard reductive theory of knowledge-wh ascriptions, according to which they are true if and only if one knows that p, where this proposition is an acceptable answer to the wh-question ‘embedded’ in the ascription. Specifically, it is argued that certain cases of knowing what an experience is like resist such treatment. I argue that in some of these cases, one can (...)
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  4. added 2019-11-08
    Mind and Illusion.Frank Jackson - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 53:251-271.
    Much of the contemporary debate in the philosophy of mind is concerned with the clash between certain strongly held intuitions and what science tells us about the mind and its relation to the world. What science tells us about the mind points strongly towards some version or other of physicalism. The intuitions, in one way or another, suggest that there is something seriously incomplete about any purely physical story about the mind.
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  5. added 2019-10-03
    Phenomenal Concepts and Physical Facts: A Dialogue with Mary.Tufan Kıymaz - forthcoming - Filozofia.
    This is a dialogue between an opponent of the phenomenal concept strategy and Mary from Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument. In this dialogue, Mary, who has complete physical knowledge about what it is like to see red, but has never seen red, is a physicalist and she defends the phenomenal concept strategy against her interlocutor’s objections. In the end, none of them is able to convince the other, but their conversation, through considerations of different versions of the knowledge argument and different (...)
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  6. added 2019-09-22
    Phenomenal Knowledge Why: The Explanatory Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism.Hedda Hassel Mørch - 2019 - In Sam Coleman (ed.), The Knowledge Argument. Cambridge University Press.
    Phenomenal knowledge is knowledge of what it is like to be in conscious states, such as seeing red or being in pain. According to the knowledge argument (Jackson 1982, 1986), phenomenal knowledge is knowledge that, i.e., knowledge of phenomenal facts. According to the ability hypothesis (Nemirow 1979; Lewis 1983), phenomenal knowledge is mere practical knowledge how, i.e., the mere possession of abilities. However, some phenomenal knowledge also seems to be knowledge why, i.e., knowledge of explanatory facts. For example, someone who (...)
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  7. added 2019-08-17
    Epistemic Gaps and the Mind-Body Problem.Thomas Foerster - 2019 - Dissertation, Cornell University
    This dissertation defends materialism from the epistemic arguments against materialism. Materialism is the view that everything is ultimately physical. The epistemic arguments against materialism claim that there is an epistemic gap between physical and phenomenal truths (for example, that knowing the physical truths does not put you in a position to know the phenomenal truths), and conclude from this that there is a corresponding gap in the world between physical and phenomenal truths, and materialism is false. -/- Chapter 1 introduces (...)
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  8. added 2019-06-16
    The Physical as the Nomalous.J. Goldwater - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (5-6):65-88.
    I argue physicalism should be characterized as the thesis that all behavior is law-governed. This characterization captures crucial desiderata for a formulation of physicalism, including its broad import and worldview defining features. It also has more local virtues, such as avoiding Hempel’s dilemma. A particularly important implication, I argue, is that this thesis makes the question of the mind’s physicality turn on what the mind can do- rather than what experience is like.
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  9. added 2019-06-13
    The Knowledge Argument.Sam Coleman (ed.) - 2019 - Cambridge University Press.
    Frank Jackson's knowledge argument imagines a super-smart scientist, Mary, forced to investigate the mysteries of human colour vision using only black and white resources. Can she work out what it is like to see red from brain-science and physics alone? The argument says no: Mary will only really learn what red looks like when she actually sees it. Something is therefore missing from the science of the mind, and from the 'physicalist' picture of the world based on science. This powerful (...)
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  10. added 2019-06-06
    God and Phenomenal Consciousness: A Novel Approach to Knowledge Arguments. By Yujin Nagasawa. Pp. Xiii, 162, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008, $85.00. [REVIEW]Bradford McCall - 2014 - Heythrop Journal 55 (1):144-145.
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  11. added 2019-06-06
    Review: Torin Alter and Sven Walter : Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. [REVIEW]István Aranyosi - 2008 - Mind 117 (467):665-669.
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  12. added 2019-06-06
    Dualism and Secondary Quality Eliminativism: Putting a New Spin on the Knowledge Argument.Emmett L. Holman - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (2):229-256.
    Frank Jackson formulated his knowledge argument as an argument for dualism. In this paper I show how the argument can be modified to also establish the irreducibility of the secondary qualities to the properties of physical theory, and ultimately "secondary quality eliminativism"-the view that the secondary qualities are physically uninstantiated. In addition to being of interest in its own right, this new argument provides a perspective to better see that certain popular would-be refutations of the knowledge argument do not work. (...)
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  13. added 2019-06-06
    A LLAN C HAPMAN, Mary Somerville and the World of Science. Bristol: Canopus Publishing, 2004. Pp. Ix+157. ISBN 0-9537868-4-6. £12.95. [REVIEW]Claire Brock - 2006 - British Journal for the History of Science 39 (2):297-298.
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  14. added 2019-06-06
    Jackson’s Empirical Assumptions.Stephen Stich & Jonathan M. Weinberg - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):637-643.
    Frank Jackson has given us an elegant and important book. It is, by a long shot, the most sophisticated defense of the use of conceptual analysis in philosophy that has ever been offered. But we also we find it a rather perplexing book, for we can’t quite figure out what Jackson thinks a conceptual analysis is. And until we get clearer on that, we’re not at all sure that conceptual analysis, as Jackson envisions it, is possible. The main reason for (...)
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  15. added 2019-06-06
    There’s Something About Mary: Phenomenal Consciousness and its Attributes.David Beisecker - 2000 - Southwest Philosophy Review 16 (2):143-152.
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  16. added 2019-06-06
    Understanding Rules.Laurence E. Nemirow - 1995 - Journal of Philosophy 92 (1):28-43.
  17. added 2019-06-06
    Novel Colours.Evan Thompson - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (3):321-349.
    Could there be genuinely novel colours — that is, visual qualities having a hue that bears a resemblance relation to red, green, yellow, and blue, yet is neither reddish, nor greenish, nor yellowish, nor blueish?1 And if there could be such colours, what would it be like to see them? How would the colours look? In his article,"Epiphenomenal Qualia,"2 Frank Jackson presents a philosophical thought experiment that raises these questions . Jackson asks us to imagine a perceiver named Fred who (...)
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  18. added 2019-06-06
    The Testament of Mary: The Gaelic Version of the Dormitio Mariae, Together with an Irish Latin Version. [REVIEW]Louis H. Gray - 1942 - Thought: Fordham University Quarterly 17 (4):757-758.
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  19. added 2019-06-06
    The Life of Chevalier Jackson: An Autobiography. [REVIEW]T. J. Dimitry - 1939 - Thought: Fordham University Quarterly 14 (4):652-652.
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  20. added 2019-06-06
    A Winter’s Journey of Mary Stuart.H. P. Eden - 1937 - Thought: Fordham University Quarterly 12 (3):476-489.
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  21. added 2019-06-05
    Book Review: Dangerous Memories: A Mosaic of Mary in ScriptureDangerous Memories: A Mosaic of Mary in Scripture by JohnsonElizabethContinuum, New York, 2004. 172 Pp., $ 13.95. ISBN 0-8264-1638-1. [REVIEW]Janyce C. Jorgensen - 2006 - Interpretation: A Journal of Bible and Theology 60 (2):231-232.
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  22. added 2019-06-05
    A Brief Look at Peter Jackson's Adapration of "The Fellowship of the Ring".Devin Brown - 2002 - The Chesterton Review 28 (3):438-439.
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  23. added 2019-05-29
    Mary's Powers of Imagination.Amy Kind - forthcoming - In Sam Coleman (ed.), The Knowledge Argument.
    One common response to the knowledge argument is the ability hypothesis. Proponents of the ability hypothesis accept that Mary learns what seeing red is like when she exits her black-and-white room, but they deny that the kind of knowledge she gains is propositional in nature. Rather, she acquires a cluster of abilities that she previously lacked, in particular, the abilities to recognize, remember, and imagine the color red. For proponents of the ability hypothesis, knowing what an experience is like simply (...)
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  24. added 2019-03-21
    What Acquaintance Teaches.Alex Grzankowski & Michael Tye - forthcoming - In Thomas Raleigh & Jonathan Knowles (eds.), Acquaintance: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
    In her black and white room, Mary doesn’t know what it is like to see red. Only after undergoing an experience as of something red and hence acquainting herself with red can Mary learn what it is like. But learning what it is like to see red requires more than simply becoming acquainted with it. To be acquainted with something is to know it, but such knowledge, as we argue, is object-knowledge rather than propositional-knowledge. To know what it is like (...)
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  25. added 2018-12-17
    Semantic Gaps and Protosemantics.Benj Hellie - 2019 - In Acacio de Barros & Carlos Montemayor (eds.), Mind and Quanta. Berlin: Springer.
    Semantic gaps between physical and mental discourse include the 'explanatory', 'epistemic' (Black-and-White Mary), and 'suppositional' (zombies) gaps; protosemantics is concerned with what is fundamental to meaning. Our tradition presupposes a truth-based protosemantics, with disastrous consequences for interpreting the semantic gaps: nonphysicalism, epiphenomenalism, separatism. Fortunately, an endorsement-based protosemantics, recentering meaning from the world to the mind, is technically viable, intuitively more plausible, and empirically more adequate. But, of present significance, it makes room for interpreting mental discourse as expressing simulations: this blocks (...)
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  26. added 2018-12-06
    Qualitative Attribution, Phenomenal Experience and Being.Mark Pharoah - 2018 - Biosemiotics 11 (3):427-446.
    I argue that the physiological, phenomenal and conceptual constitute a trichotomous hierarchy of emergent categories. I claim that each category employs a distinctive type of interactive mechanism that facilitates a meaningful kind of environmental discourse. I advocate, therefore, that each have a causal relation with the environment but that their specific class of mechanism qualifies distinctively the meaningfulness of that interaction and subsequent responses. Consequently, I argue that the causal chain of physical interaction feeds distinctive value-laden constructions that are ontologically (...)
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  27. added 2018-11-29
    A Practical Guide to Intellectualism.Yuri Cath - 2008 - Dissertation, Australian National University
    In this thesis I examine the view—known as intellectualism—that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that, or propositional knowledge. I examine issues concerning both the status of this view of knowledge-how and the philosophical implications if it is true. The ability hypothesis is an important position in the philosophy of mind that appeals to Gilbert Ryle’s famous idea that there is a fundamental distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that. This position appears to be inconsistent with the truth of intellectualism. However, I demonstrate (...)
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  28. added 2018-10-28
    What Gary Couldn’T Imagine in Advance.Tufan Kiymaz - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Research.
    I propose an anti-physicalist argument, namely, the imagination argument, and defend it against possible objections. My argument is inspired by Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument, or rather its misinterpretation by Daniel Dennett and Paul Churchland. They interpret the knowledge argument to be about the ability to imagine an unexperienced phenomenal state, which Jackson explicitly denies. The imagination argument, in its rudimentary form, can be briefly put as the following. Let Q be a visual phenomenal quality that is imaginable based on one’s (...)
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  29. added 2018-08-20
    Subjective Facts.Tim Crane - 2003 - In Hallvard Lillehammer & Gonzalo Rodriguez Pereyra (eds.), Real Metaphysics. London: Routledge. pp. 68-83.
    An important theme running through D.H. Mellor’s work is his realism, or as I shall call it, his objectivism: the idea that reality as such is how it is, regardless of the way we represent it, and that philosophical error often arises from confusing aspects of our subjective representation of the world with aspects of the world itself. Thus central to Mellor’s work on time has been the claim that the temporal A-series (previously called ‘tense’) is unreal while the B-series (...)
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  30. added 2018-06-05
    Dualism: How Epistemic Issues Drive Debates About the Ontology of Consciousness.Brie Gertler - forthcoming - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    A primary goal of this chapter is to highlight neglected epistemic parallels between dualism and physicalism. Both dualist and physicalist arguments employ a combination of empirical data and armchair reflection; both rely on considerations stemming from how we conceptualize certain phenomena; and both aim to establish views that are compatible with scientific results but go well beyond the deliverances of empirical science. -/- I begin the chapter by fleshing out the distinctive commitments of dualism, in a way that illuminates the (...)
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  31. added 2018-03-08
    Imagining, Recognizing and Discriminating: Reconsidering the Ability Hypothesis.Bence Nanay - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):699-717.
    According to the Ability Hypothesis, knowing what it is like to have experience E is just having the ability to imagine or recognize or remember having experience E. I examine various versions of the Ability Hypothesis and point out that they all face serious objections. Then I propose a new version that is not vulnerable to these objections: knowing what it is like to experience E is having the ability todiscriminate imagining or having experience E from imagining or having any (...)
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  32. added 2018-02-14
    The Ability Hypothesis: An Empirically Based Defense.Mahdi Zakeri & Majid Ghasemi - 2016 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):23-38.
    We defend Laurence Nemirow’s and David Lewis’s Ability Hypothesis against Paul Raymont’s criticisms in defense of Jackson’s Knowledge Argument. According to the Ability Hypothesis, what Mary lacked when she was in her black-and-white room was a set of abilities; she did not know how to recognize or imagine certain types of experience. Her subsequent discovery of what it is like to experience color amounts to no more than her acquiring these abilities. Appealing to the Molyneux test, Raymont has argued that (...)
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  33. added 2017-09-13
    Mind, Modality, and Meaning: Toward a Rationalist Physicalism.Gabriel Oak Rabin - 2013 - Dissertation, University of California Los Angeles
    This dissertation contains four independent essays addressing a cluster of related topics in the philosophy of mind. Chapter 1: “Fundamentality Physicalism” argues that physicalism can usefully be conceived of as a thesis about fundamentality. The chapter explores a variety of other potential formulations of physicalism (particularly modal formulations), contrasts fundamentality physicalism with these theses, and offers reasons to prefer fundamentality physicalism over these rivals. Chapter 2:“Modal Rationalism and the Demonstrative Reply to the Master Argument Against Physicalism” introduces the Master Argument (...)
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  34. added 2017-08-23
    E-PHYSICALISM - A PHYSICALIST THEORY OF PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS.Reinaldo J. Bernal - 2012 - Frankfurt, Germany: Ontos Verlag.
    This work advances a theory in the metaphysics of phenomenal consciousness, which the author labels “e-physicalism”. Firstly, he endorses a realist stance towards consciousness and physicalist metaphysics. Secondly, he criticises Strong AI and functionalist views, and claims that consciousness has an internal character. Thirdly, he discusses HOT theories, the unity of consciousness, and holds that the “explanatory gap” is not ontological but epistemological. Fourthly, he argues that consciousness is not a supervenient but an emergent property, not reducible and endowed with (...)
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  35. added 2017-07-25
    Grounding, Essence, and the Knowledge Argument.Philip Goff - forthcoming - In Sam Coleman (ed.), The Knowledge Argument. Cambridge University Press.
    Few these days dispute that the knowledge argument demonstrates an epistemic gap between the physical facts and the facts about experience. It is much more contentious whether that epistemic gap can be used to demonstrate a metaphysical gap of a kind that is inconsistent with physicalism. In this paper I will explore two attempts to block the inference from an epistemic gap to a metaphysical gap – the first from the phenomenal concept strategy, the second from Russellian monism – and (...)
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  36. added 2017-03-02
    There’s Something About Mary. [REVIEW]Derek Ball - 2014 - The Philosophers' Magazine 64:119-121.
  37. added 2017-02-16
    Extent of Physical Knowledge, The.Thomas O'Keefe - 1936 - Modern Schoolman 14:58.
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  38. added 2017-02-15
    “Lepers Outside The Gate”: Excavations At The Cemetery Of The Hospital Of St James And St Mary Magdalene, Chichester, 1986–87 And 1993. [REVIEW]Peregrine Horden - 2011 - Speculum 86 (1):239-240.
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  39. added 2017-02-15
    Lepers Outside the Gate: Excavations at the Cemetery of the Hospital of St. James and St. Mary Magdalene, Chichester, 1986-87 and 1993. [REVIEW]Philippe Charlier - 2010 - The Medieval Review 3.
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  40. added 2017-02-15
    Jackson's Classical Theory of Meaning.John Bigelow & Laura Schroeter - unknown
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  41. added 2017-02-15
    The Public Worth of Mary Somerville.Claire Brock - 2006 - British Journal for the History of Science 39 (2):255-272.
    This article assesses the reputation of Mary Somerville in the 1830s and suggests that critical confusion over her status in the changing world of early nineteenth-century science is not new. Drawing on Somerville’s own writings, contemporary newspaper and periodical reviews, political debates and unpublished manuscripts, Somerville's ‘uniqueness’ as a public figure is examined through the eyes of both the nascent scientific community of the time as well as the wider audience for her work. Somerville's status as a popularizer and an (...)
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  42. added 2017-02-15
    Jackson's Chameleons, Chamaeleo Jacksonii, Indoor Care, Feeding, and Breeding.S. Donoghue - 1996 - Vivarium 8:6-13.
  43. added 2017-02-15
    Catalogue of the Jackson Collection of Manuscript Fragments in the Royal Library, Windsor Castle, with a Memoir of Canon J. E. Jackson and a List of His Works. [REVIEW]Alison Stones - 1983 - Speculum 58 (3):1088-1089.
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  44. added 2017-02-14
    Mary Ann Cain..Nancy Christiansen - forthcoming - Intertexts: Reading Pedagogy in College Writing Classrooms.
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  45. added 2017-02-14
    Mary Ann Cain.George Kalamaras - forthcoming - Intertexts: Reading Pedagogy in College Writing Classrooms.
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  46. added 2017-02-14
    Science on the Fairgrounds: From Black to White Magic.Raichvarg Daniel - 2007 - Science & Education 16 (6):585.
  47. added 2017-02-14
    10 Phenomenal Knowledge.Earl Conee - 2004 - In Yujin Nagasawa, Peter Ludlow & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary. MIT Press. pp. 197.
  48. added 2017-02-14
    14 Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia.Terence Morgan - 2004 - In Yujin Nagasawa, Peter Ludlow & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary. MIT Press. pp. 301.
  49. added 2017-02-14
    The Knowledge Argument Can Be Introduced Through a Variety of Differ-Ent Illustrations. Here Are Three.(I) Consider a Complete Physical Theory of the Light Spectrum, Including the Effects Different Wavelengths of Light Have on the Neural Systems of Humans. There Are Also the Phenomenal Properties We Experience When We. [REVIEW]John Bigelow & Robert Pargetter - 2004 - In Yujin Nagasawa, Peter Ludlow & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary. MIT Press. pp. 179.
  50. added 2017-02-14
    Recontextualizing Knowledge: An Epistemological Ambiguity.Jyoti Prakash Bagchi - 2002 - Journal of Human Values 8 (2):157-163.
    The encounter of the cognitive apparatus with the phenomenal world had led to the emergence of independent thought processes either based on scientific method of enguiry or on meditative experiences. In the course of time these have developed into a systematized body of knowledge. They purport to provide peace and happiness, but when seduced by power a distorted value structure has been legitimized. The plethora of evidences suggest the 'self' has been incapacitated for long. The scientific experiences have been given (...)
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