Philosophy of Mind > Philosophy of Consciousness > Consciousness and Materialism > The Knowledge Argument
The Knowledge Argument
Edited by David Chalmers (New York University)
About this topic
Summary | The knowledge argument against physicalism centers on the claim that complete physical knowledge does not enable knowledge of consciousness. In Frank Jackson's formulation, Mary is brought up in a black-and-white room and learns the complete neuroscience of color processing in humans, but she still does not know what it is like to see red: she learns a new fact about color experience when she leaves her room and sees red for the first time. Jackson argues that Mary knows all the physical facts but not all the facts about color experience, so some facts about color experience are not physical facts. Physicalists have replied in many different ways. Some argue that Mary gains an ability without learning a new fact. Others argue that she gains acquaintance with a property without learning a new facts. Others argue that she learns a fact she already knew under a new mode of presentation. |
Key works | Jackson's original papers on the knowledge argument are Jackson 1982 and Jackson 1986 (he changes his mind in 2003). Nemirow 1990 and Lewis 1990 give the ability reply: on leaving the black-and-white room, Mary gains an ability without learning a new fact. Loar 1990 gives the old-fact reply: Mary learns a fact she already knew under a new mode of presentation. Conee 1985 gives the acquaintance reply: Mary gains acquaintance with a property without learning new facts. Dennet 2006 argues that Mary could know about color experience from inside her room. Two excellent collections of papers on the topic are Ludlow et al 2004 and Alter & Walter 2006. |
Introductions | Encyclopedia articles include Nida-Rumelin 2002, Alter 2005, and Gertler 2005. Stoljar & Nagasawa 2004 is a thorough introduction including a historical discussion. |
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Related categories
Siblings:
- Zombies and the Conceivability Argument (377)
- Kripke's Modal Argument Against Materialism (99)
- Arguments from Disembodiment (63)
- Other Anti-Materialist Arguments (130)
- Qualia and Materialism (253)
- Consciousness and Materialism, Misc (188)
- Phenomenal Concepts (272)
- Mind-Body Problem, General (764)
- What is it Like? (112)
- Conceptual Analysis and A Priori Entailment (87)
- Phenomenal Concepts (272)
- Color Experience (175)
- Color (1,292 | 738)
- Zombies and the Conceivability Argument (377)
- Kripke's Modal Argument Against Materialism (99)
- Other Anti-Materialist Arguments (130)
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Editorial team
General Editors:
David Bourget (Western Ontario) David Chalmers (ANU, NYU) Area Editors: David Bourget Gwen Bradford Berit Brogaard Margaret Cameron David Chalmers James Chase Rafael De Clercq Ezio Di Nucci Esa Diaz-Leon Barry Hallen Hans Halvorson Jonathan Ichikawa Michelle Kosch Øystein Linnebo JeeLoo Liu Paul Livingston Brandon Look Manolo Martínez Matthew McGrath Michiru Nagatsu Susana Nuccetelli Giuseppe Primiero Jack Alan Reynolds Darrell P. Rowbottom Aleksandra Samonek Constantine Sandis Howard Sankey Jonathan Schaffer Thomas Senor Robin Smith Daniel Star Jussi Suikkanen Aness Kim Webster Other editors Contact us Learn more about PhilPapers |