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  1. added 2019-01-23
    Naturalism, Realism, and the Neuroscience of Death Experience.James Goetz - manuscript
    Medical neuroscience researchers conducted a multicenter observational study with structured interviews of cardiac arrest patients revived by CPR. The study says the following: the patients exhibited no clinically detectable consciousness during cardiac arrest, while previous research indicates that brain activity completely ceases with 20-30 seconds of cardiac arrest; 39% of the interviewed patients reported detailed memories from their cardiac arrest; 6% of the interviewed patients reported detailed memories that also cohere with a near-death experience defined by Greyson. The researchers propose (...)
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  2. added 2018-09-06
    A New Twist to the No Miracles Argument for the Success of Science.K. Brad Wray - 2018 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 69:86-89.
    J. D. Trout has recently developed a new defense of scientific realism, a new version of the No Miracles Argument. I critically evaluate Trout’s novel defense of realism. I argue that Trout’s argument for scientific realism and the related explanation for the success of science are self-defeating. In the process of arguing against the traditional realist strategies for explaining the success of science, he inadvertently undermines his own argument.
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  3. added 2018-09-04
    An Argument Against Global No Miracles Arguments.Florian J. Boge - forthcoming - Synthese:1-23.
    Howson famously argues that the no-miracles argument, stating that the success of science indicates the approximate truth of scientific theories, is a base rate fallacy: it neglects the possibility of an overall low rate of true scientific theories. Recently a number of authors has suggested that the corresponding probabilistic reconstruction is unjust, as it concerns only the success of one isolated theory. Dawid and Hartmann, in particular, suggest to use the frequency of success in some field of research R to (...)
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  4. added 2018-07-29
    Resisting Scientific Realism.Brad Wray - 2018 - Cambridge University Press.
    In this book K. Brad Wray provides a comprehensive survey of the arguments against scientific realism. In addition to presenting logical considerations that undermine the realists' inferences to the likely truth or approximate truth of our theories, he provides a thorough assessment of the evidence from the history of science. He also examines grounds for a defence of anti-realism, including an anti-realist explanation for the success of our current theories, an account of why false theories can be empirically successful, and (...)
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  5. added 2018-03-22
    Truth and Success, Again: Reply to Held on Generalist Versus Particularist (Anti-) Realism.Matteo Morganti - 2012 - The Reasoner 6 (6).
  6. added 2018-03-22
    Truth and Success: Reply to Held.Matteo Morganti - 2011 - The Reasoner 5 (7):106-107.
    A reply to Carsten Held's Analysis paper arguing for the unworkability of the traditional scientific realist inference from the success of scientific theories to their (probable) truth.
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  7. added 2018-02-25
    Realism and the Limits of Explanatory Reasoning.Juha Saatsi - 2018 - In The Routledge Handbook of Scientific Realism. London: Routledge. pp. 200-211.
    This chapter examines issues surrounding inference to the best explanation, its justification, and its role in different arguments for scientific realism, as well as more general issues concerning explanations’ ontological commitments. Defending the reliability of inference to the best explanation has been a central plank in various realist arguments, and realists have drawn various ontological conclusions from the premise that a given scientific explanation best explains some phenomenon. This chapter stresses the importance of thinking carefully about the nature of explanation (...)
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  8. added 2017-11-01
    The Anti-Induction for Scientific Realism.Seungbae Park - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (3):329-342.
    In contemporary philosophy of science, the no-miracles argument and the pessimistic induction are regarded as the strongest arguments for and against scientific realism, respectively. In this paper, I construct a new argument for scientific realism which I call the anti-induction for scientific realism. It holds that, since past theories were false, present theories are true. I provide an example from the history of science to show that anti-inductions sometimes work in science. The anti-induction for scientific realism has several advantages over (...)
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  9. added 2017-10-31
    Newman’s Objection and the No Miracles Argument.Robert Smithson - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (5):993-1014.
    Structural realists claim that we should endorse only what our scientific theories say about the structure of the unobservable world. But according to Newman’s Objection, the structural realist’s claims about unobservables are trivially true. In recent years, several theorists have offered responses to Newman’s Objection. But a common complaint is that these responses “give up the spirit” of the structural realist position. In this paper, I will argue that the simplest way to respond to Newman’s Objection is to return to (...)
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  10. added 2017-07-13
    The Unificatory Power of Scientific Realism.Seungbae Park - 2017 - Disputatio 9 (44):59–73.
    The no-miracles argument (Putnam, 1975) holds that science is successful because successful theories are (approximately) true. Frost-Arnold (2010) objects that this argument is unacceptable because it generates neither new predictions nor unifications. It is similar to the unacceptable explanation that opium puts people to sleep because it has a dormative virtue. I reply that on close examination, realism explains not only why some theories are successful but also why successful theories exist in current science. Therefore, it unifies the disparate phenomena.
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  11. added 2017-06-27
    Truth: Explanation, Success, and Coincidence.Will Gamester - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (5):1243-1265.
    Inflationists have argued that truth is a causal-explanatory property on the grounds that true belief facilitates practical success: we must postulate truth to explain the practical success of certain actions performed by rational agents. Deflationists, however, have a seductive response. Rather than deny that true belief facilitates practical success, the deflationist maintains that the sole role for truth here is as a device for generalisation. In particular, each individual instance of practical success can be explained only by reference to a (...)
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  12. added 2017-04-19
    Justifying the Special Theory of Relativity with Unconceived Methods.Park Seungbae - 2018 - Axiomathes 28 (1):53-62.
    Many realists argue that present scientific theories will not follow the fate of past scientific theories because the former are more successful than the latter. Critics object that realists need to show that present theories have reached the level of success that warrants their truth. I reply that the special theory of relativity has been repeatedly reinforced by unconceived scientific methods, so it will be reinforced by infinitely many unconceived scientific methods. This argument for the special theory of relativity overcomes (...)
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  13. added 2017-03-20
    Predictive Success, Partial Truth and Skeptical Realism.Gauvain Leconte - unknown
    Realists argue that mature theories enjoying predictive success are approximately and partially true, and that the parts of the theory necessary to this success are retained through theory-change and worthy of belief. I examine the paradigmatic case of the novel prediction of a white spot in the shadow of a circular object, drawn from Fresnel's wave theory of light by Poisson in 1819. It reveals two problems in this defence of realism: predictive success needs theoretical idealizations and fictions on the (...)
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  14. added 2017-02-13
    Does the Miracle Argument Embody a Base Rate Fallacy?Cornelis Menke - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 45:103-108.
    One way to reconstruct the miracle argument for scientific realism is to regard it as a statistical inference: since it is exceedingly unlikely that a false theory makes successful predictions, while it is rather likely that an approximately true theory is predictively successful, it is reasonable to infer that a predictively successful theory is at least approximately true. This reconstruction has led to the objection that the argument embodies a base rate fallacy: by focusing on successful theories one ignores the (...)
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  15. added 2017-02-07
    What is Wrong with the Miracle Argument??☆.Martin Carrier - 1991 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 22 (1):23-36.
    One of the arguments advanced in favor of scientific realism is the 'miracle argument'. It says that for the anti-realist the predictive success of science appears as an utter miracle. This argument indeed has some prima facie plausibility, provided that it is sharpened by construing "predictive success" as prediction of previously unknown laws and the occurrence of a consilience of inductions. Still, the history of science teaches us that it is possible to arrive at predictive success in this sense by (...)
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  16. added 2017-02-06
    Greece.Stathis Psillos - unknown
    1. I have argued in my (1999, chapter 4) that the no-miracles argument (NMA) should be seen as a grand IBE. The way I read it, NMA is a philosophical argument which aims to defend the reliability of scientific methodology in producing approximately true theories. More specifically, I took it that NMA is a two-part (or two-stage) argument. Here is its structure.
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  17. added 2017-02-06
    The Uniformity Principle Vs. The Disuniformity Principle.Seungbae Park - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (2):213-222.
    The pessimistic induction is built upon the uniformity principle that the future resembles the past. In daily scientific activities, however, scientists sometimes rely on what I call the disuniformity principle that the future differs from the past. They do not give up their research projects despite the repeated failures. They believe that they will succeed although they failed repeatedly, and as a result they achieve what they intended to achieve. Given that the disuniformity principle is useful in certain cases in (...)
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  18. added 2017-01-22
    Realism, Miracles, and the Common Cause.James Robert Brown - 1982 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:98 - 106.
    The principle of the common cause, which gets its justification from the miracle arguments, probably constitutes the best reason for being a scientific realist. However, results in quantum mechanics steming from the work of Bell raise difficulties which anti-realists have been quick to seize. The author tries to overcome the problem and save scientific realism by reformulating the principle of the common cause so that a distinction is made between a priori and a posteriori correlations.
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  19. added 2017-01-15
    The No Miracles Argument and the Base Rate Fallacy.Leah Henderson - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4):1295-1302.
    The no miracles argument is one of the main arguments for scientific realism. Recently it has been alleged that the no miracles argument is fundamentally flawed because it commits the base rate fallacy. The allegation is based on the idea that the appeal of the no miracles argument arises from inappropriate neglect of the base rate of approximate truth among the relevant population of theories. However, the base rate fallacy allegation relies on an assumption of random sampling of individuals from (...)
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  20. added 2017-01-14
    The Probabilistic No Miracles Argument.Jan Sprenger - 2016 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 6 (2):173-189.
    This paper develops a probabilistic reconstruction of the No Miracles Argument in the debate between scientific realists and anti-realists. The goal of the paper is to clarify and to sharpen the NMA by means of a probabilistic formalization. In particular, we demonstrate that the persuasive force of the NMA depends on the particular disciplinary context where it is applied, and the stability of theories in that discipline. Assessments and critiques of "the" NMA, without reference to a particular context, are misleading (...)
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  21. added 2016-12-08
    Structural Correspondence, Indirect Reference, and Partial Truth: Phlogiston Theory and Newtonian Mechanics.Gerhard Schurz - 2011 - Synthese 180 (2):103-120.
    This paper elaborates on the following correspondence theorem (which has been defended and formally proved elsewhere): if theory T has been empirically successful in a domain of applications A, but was superseded later on by a different theory T* which was likewise successful in A, then under natural conditions T contains theoretical expressions which were responsible for T’s success and correspond (in A) to certain theoretical expressions of T*. I illustrate this theorem at hand of the phlogiston versus oxygen theories (...)
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  22. added 2016-12-08
    Reliabilism and the Abductive Defence of Scientific Realism.Valeriano Iranzo - 2008 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 39 (1):115-120.
    According to the “no-miracles argument” (NMA), truth is the best explanation of the predictive-instrumental success of scientific theories. A standard objection against NMA is that it is viciously circular. In Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth Stathis Psillos has claimed that the circularity objection can be met when NMA is supplemented with a reliabilist approach to justification. I will try to show, however, that scientific realists cannot take much comfort from this policy: if reliabilism makes no qualifications about the domain (...)
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  23. added 2016-12-08
    Realist Ennui and the Base Rate Fallacy.P. D. Magnus & Craig Callender - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (3):320-338.
    The no-miracles argument and the pessimistic induction are arguably the main considerations for and against scientific realism. Recently these arguments have been accused of embodying a familiar, seductive fallacy. In each case, we are tricked by a base rate fallacy, one much-discussed in the psychological literature. In this paper we consider this accusation and use it as an explanation for why the two most prominent `wholesale' arguments in the literature seem irresolvable. Framed probabilistically, we can see very clearly why realists (...)
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  24. added 2016-10-23
    Epistemic Selectivity, Historical Threats, and the Non-Epistemic Tenets of Scientific Realism.Timothy D. Lyons - 2017 - Synthese 194 (9):3203-3219.
    The scientific realism debate has now reached an entirely new level of sophistication. Faced with increasingly focused challenges, epistemic scientific realists have appropriately revised their basic meta-hypothesis that successful scientific theories are approximately true: they have emphasized criteria that render realism far more selective and, so, plausible. As a framework for discussion, I use what I take to be the most influential current variant of selective epistemic realism, deployment realism. Toward the identification of new case studies that challenge this form (...)
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  25. added 2016-06-07
    Extensional Scientific Realism Vs. Intensional Scientific Realism.Seungbae Park - 2016 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 59:46-52.
    Extensional scientific realism is the view that each believable scientific theory is supported by the unique first-order evidence for it and that if we want to believe that it is true, we should rely on its unique first-order evidence. In contrast, intensional scientific realism is the view that all believable scientific theories have a common feature and that we should rely on it to determine whether a theory is believable or not. Fitzpatrick argues that extensional realism is immune, while intensional (...)
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  26. added 2016-02-14
    Why Should We Be Pessimistic About Antirealists and Pessimists?Seungbae Park - 2017 - Foundations of Science 22 (3):613-625.
    The pessimistic induction over scientific theories holds that present theories will be overthrown as were past theories. The pessimistic induction over scientists holds that present scientists cannot conceive of future theories just as past scientists could not conceive of present theories. The pessimistic induction over realists :4321–4330, 2013) holds that present realists are wrong about present theories just as past realists were wrong about past theories. The pessimistic induction over antirealist theories :3–21, 2014) holds that the latest antirealist explanation of (...)
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  27. added 2015-12-02
    Explanatory Rivals and the Ultimate Argument.Finnur Dellsén - 2015 - Theoria 82 (3):217-237.
    Although many aspects of Inference to the Best Explanation have been extensively discussed, very little has so far been said about what it takes for a hypothesis to count as a rival explanatory hypothesis in the context of IBE. The primary aim of this article is to rectify this situation by arguing for a specific account of explanatory rivalry. On this account, explanatory rivals are complete explanations of a given explanandum. When explanatory rivals are conceived of in this way, I (...)
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  28. added 2015-11-13
    Historical Inductions: New Cherries, Same Old Cherry-Picking.Moti Mizrahi - 2015 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 29 (2):129-148.
    In this article, I argue that arguments from the history of science against scientific realism, like the arguments advanced by P. Kyle Stanford and Peter Vickers, are fallacious. The so-called Old Induction, like Vickers's, and New Induction, like Stanford's, are both guilty of confirmation bias—specifically, of cherry-picking evidence that allegedly challenges scientific realism while ignoring evidence to the contrary. I also show that the historical episodes that Stanford adduces in support of his New Induction are indeterminate between a pessimistic and (...)
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  29. added 2015-10-31
    A Reply to Patton's "Incommensurability and the Bonfire of the Meta-Theories".Moti Mizrahi - 2015 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4 (10):51-53.
  30. added 2015-09-18
    The Shaky Game +25, Or: On Locavoracity.Laura Ruetsche - 2015 - Synthese 192 (11):3425-3442.
    Taking Arthur Fine’s The Shaky Game as my inspiration, and the recent 25th anniversary of the publication of that work as the occasion to exercise that inspiration, I sketch an alternative to the “Naturalism” prevalent among philosophers of physics. Naturalism is a methodology eventuating in a metaphysics. The methodology is to seek the deep framework assumptions that make the best sense of science; the metaphysics is furnished by those assumptions and supported by their own support of science. The alternative presented (...)
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  31. added 2015-09-15
    New Realism and Scientific Realism.Matteo Morganti - 2012 - Quaestio 12:535-549.
    The recent ‘new realist’ wave in philosophy reacts to the postmodernist/deconstructivist rejection of the notions of truth and objectivity by affirming the priority of the real over the subjective and socially constructed. Crucial in this dynamics is, among other things, the refusal of the anti-scientific stance integral to the non-realist view. In light of this, it is advisable to look at the new realism vs. antirealism debate from the perspective of the seemingly more local dispute concerning scientific realism vs. antirealism. (...)
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  32. added 2015-07-17
    O realismo interno confrontado com "seus inimigos".Edna de Souza Alves - 2007 - Trans/Form/Ação 30 (2):75-91.
    Our investigation on Hilary Putnam’s internal realist perspective(internalism) traces parallels and identifies differences between Putnam’s ideasand their antipodes: metaphysical realist (externalism) and radical relativist. Ourresearch has focused upon the contemporary debate in which it is inserted, par-ticularly, upon the challenge that radical relativism to impose on contemporaryepistemology. Such challenge will not be surmounted through classical project tofind absolute certainties. The history of science to point out that theories are notnets that to catch the reality as it is in itself. But (...)
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  33. added 2015-06-23
    Ontic Structural Realism and Modality.Nora Berenstain & James Ladyman - 2012 - In Elaine Landry & Dean Rickles (eds.), Structural Realism: Structure, Object, and Causality. Springer.
    There is good reason to believe that scientific realism requires a commitment to the objective modal structure of the physical world. Causality, equilibrium, laws of nature, and probability all feature prominently in scientific theory and explanation, and each one is a modal notion. If we are committed to the content of our best scientific theories, we must accept the modal nature of the physical world. But what does the scientific realist’s commitment to physical modality require? We consider whether scientific realism (...)
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  34. added 2015-05-28
    Explanatory Failures of Relative Realism.Seungbae Park - 2015 - Epistemologia 38 (1):16-28.
    Scientific realism (Putnam 1975; Psillos 1999) and relative realism (Mizrahi 2013) claim that successful scientific theories are approximately true and comparatively true, respectively. A theory is approximately true if and only if it is close to the truth. A theory is comparatively true if and only if it is closer to the truth than its competitors are. I argue that relative realism is more skeptical about the claims of science than it initially appears to be and that it can explain (...)
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  35. added 2015-05-27
    What is Hacking’s Argument for Entity Realism?Boaz Miller - 2016 - Synthese 193 (3):991-1006.
    According to Ian Hacking’s Entity Realism, unobservable entities that scientists carefully manipulate to study other phenomena are real. Although Hacking presents his case in an intuitive, attractive, and persuasive way, his argument remains elusive. I present five possible readings of Hacking’s argument: a no-miracle argument, an indispensability argument, a transcendental argument, a Vichian argument, and a non-argument. I elucidate Hacking’s argument according to each reading, and review their strengths, their weaknesses, and their compatibility with each other.
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  36. added 2015-05-25
    Realism Versus Surrealism.Seungbae Park - 2016 - Foundations of Science 21 (4):603-614.
    Realism and surrealism claim, respectively, that a scientific theory is successful because it is true, and because the world operates as if it is true. Lyons :891–901, 2003) criticizes realism and argues that surrealism is superior to realism. I reply that Lyons’s criticisms against realism fail. I also attempt to establish the following two claims: Realism and surrealism lead to a useful prescription and a useless prescription, respectively, on how to make an unsuccessful theory successful. Realism and surrealism give the (...)
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  37. added 2015-02-03
    Peter Smith, "Realism and the Progress of Science". [REVIEW]Adam Morton - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (28):288.
    I describe Smith's very modest aims and argue that there is an over-expenditure of sophisticated philosophy of language to defend a common sense realism about relatively recent science.
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  38. added 2015-01-07
    Inductivist Strategies for Scientific Realism.Valeriano Iranzo - 2012 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 101 (1):241-268.
    Philip Kitcher has developed a sort of inductivist-reliabilist justification for scientific realism. After distinguishing his argument from a well-known abductivist one (the "no-miracles" argument), I will argue that Kitcher's proposal cannot adequately meet the antirealist challenge. Firstly, it begs the question against the antirealists; secondly, it can hardly support a plausible - piecemeal - scientific realism. I will explore an alternative inductivist approach that exploits correlations between theoretical properties and empirical success. On my view, its prospects for avoiding the aforementioned (...)
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  39. added 2015-01-07
    Structural Correspondence Between Theories and Convergence to Truth.Gerhard Schurz - 2011 - Synthese 179 (2):307 - 320.
    This paper utilizes a logical correspondence theorem (which has been proved elsewhere) for the justification of weak conceptions of scientific realism and convergence to truth which do not presuppose Putnam's no-miracles-argument (NMA). After presenting arguments against the reliability of the unrestricted NMA in Sect. 1, the correspondence theorem is explained in Sect. 2. In Sect. 3, historical illustrations of the correspondence theorem are given, and its ontological consequences are worked out. Based on the transitivity of the concept of correspondence, a (...)
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  40. added 2015-01-07
    How the Growth of Science Ends Theory Change.Ludwig Fahrbach - 2011 - Synthese 180 (2):139-155.
    This paper outlines a defense of scientific realism against the pessimistic meta- induction which appeals to the phenomenon of the exponential growth of science. Here, scientific realism is defined as the view that our current successful scientific theories are mostly approximately true, and pessimistic meta- induction is the argument that projects the occurrence of past refutations of successful theories to the present concluding that many or most current successful scientific theories are false. The defense starts with the observation that at (...)
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  41. added 2015-01-07
    The No-Miracles Argument, Reliabilism, and a Methodological Version of the Generality Problem.Mark Newman - 2010 - Synthese 177 (1):111 - 138.
    The No-Miracles Argument (NMA) is often used to support scientific realism. We can formulate this argument as an inference to the best explanation this accusation of circularity by appealing to reliabilism, an externalist epistemology. In this paper I argue that this retreat fails. Reliabilism suffers from a potentially devastating difficulty known as the Generality Problem and attempts to solve this problem require adopting both epistemic and metaphysical assumptions regarding local scientific theories. Although the externalist can happily adopt the former, if (...)
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  42. added 2015-01-07
    Scientific Prediction and the Underdetermination of Scientific Theory Building.Richard Dawid - unknown
    According to the no miracles argument, scientific realism provides the only satisfactory explanation of the predictive success of science. It is argued in the present article that a different explanatory strategy, based on the posit of limitations to the underdetermination of scientific theory building by the available empirical data, offers a more convincing understanding of scientific success.
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  43. added 2015-01-07
    Platonism and Anti-Platonism: Why Worry?Mary Leng - 2005 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 19 (1):65 – 84.
    This paper argues that it is scientific realists who should be most concerned about the issue of Platonism and anti-Platonism in mathematics. If one is merely interested in accounting for the practice of pure mathematics, it is unlikely that a story about the ontology of mathematical theories will be essential to such an account. The question of mathematical ontology comes to the fore, however, once one considers our scientific theories. Given that those theories include amongst their laws assertions that imply (...)
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  44. added 2015-01-07
    Why the No-Miracles Argument Fails.Carl Matheson - 1998 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 12 (3):263 – 279.
    The chief argument for scientific realism is the no-miracles argument, according to which the approximate truth of our current scientific theories can be inferred from their success through time. To date, anti-realist responses to the argument have been unconvincing, largely because of their anti-realistic presuppositions. In this paper, it is shown that realists cannot pre-emptively dismiss the problem of the underdetermination of theory by evidence, and that the no-miracles argument fails because it does nothing to dispel the threat posed by (...)
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  45. added 2014-10-20
    Novel Predictions and the No Miracle Argument.Mario Alai - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (2):297-326.
    Predictivists use the no miracle argument to argue that “novel” predictions are decisive evidence for theories, while mere accommodation of “old” data cannot confirm to a significant degree. But deductivists claim that since confirmation is a logical theory-data relationship, predicted data cannot confirm more than merely deduced data, and cite historical cases in which known data confirmed theories quite strongly. On the other hand, the advantage of prediction over accommodation is needed by scientific realists to resist Laudan’s criticisms of the (...)
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  46. added 2014-10-20
    Levin and Ghins on the “No Miracle” Argument and Naturalism.Mario Alai - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (1):85-110.
    On the basis of Levin’s claim that truth is not a scientific explanatory factor, Michel Ghins argues that the “no miracle” argument (NMA) is not scientific, therefore scientific realism is not a scientific hypothesis, and naturalism is wrong. I argue that there are genuine senses of ‘scientific’ and ‘explanation’ in which truth can yield scientific explanations. Hence, the NMA can be considered scientific in the sense that it hinges on a scientific explanation, it follows a typically scientific inferential pattern (IBE), (...)
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  47. added 2014-10-20
    Abduction and Inference to the Best Explanation.Valeriano Iranzo - 2007 - Theoria 22 (3):339-346.
    Aliseda’s Abductive Reasoning is focused on the logical problem of abduction. My paper, in contrast, deals with the epistemic problems raised by this sort of inference. I analyze the relation between abduction and inference to the best explanation (IBE). Firstly a heuristic and a normative interpretation of IBE are distinguished. The epistemic problem is particularly pressing for the latter interpretation, since it is devoid of content without specific epistemic criteria for separating acceptable explanations from those which are not. Then I (...)
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  48. added 2014-05-18
    The No‐Miracles Argument for Realism: Inference to an Unacceptable Explanation.Greg Frost‐Arnold - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (1):35-58.
    I argue that a certain type of naturalist should not accept a prominent version of the no-miracles argument (NMA). First, scientists (usually) do not accept explanations whose explanans-statements neither generate novel predictions nor unify apparently disparate established claims. Second, scientific realism (as it appears in the NMA) is an explanans that makes no new predictions and fails to unify disparate established claims. Third, many proponents of the NMA explicitly adopt a naturalism that forbids philosophy of science from using any methods (...)
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  49. added 2014-03-28
    A Pessimistic Induction Against Scientific Antirealism.Seungbae Park - 2014 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 21 (1):3-21.
    There are nine antirealist explanations of the success of science in the literature. I raise difficulties against all of them except the latest one, and then construct a pessimistic induction that the latest one will turn out to be problematic because its eight forerunners turned out to be problematic. This pessimistic induction is on a par with the traditional pessimistic induction that successful present scientific theories will be revealed to be false because successful past scientific theories were revealed to be (...)
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  50. added 2014-03-28
    Partial Convergence and Approximate Truth.Duncan Macintosh - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (1):153-170.
    Scientific Realists argue that it would be a miracle if scientific theories were getting more predictive without getting closer to the truth; so they must be getting closer to the truth. Van Fraassen, Laudan et al. argue that owing to the underdetermination of theory by data (UDT) for all we know, it is a miracle, a fluke. So we should not believe in even the approximate truth of theories. I argue that there is a test for who is right: suppose (...)
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