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  1. Action and Purpose. [REVIEW]Raziel Abelson - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (6):178-192.
  2. The Mediating Self: Mead, Sartre, and Self-Determination.Mitchell Aboulafia - 1986 - Yale University Press.
  3. Agency, Consciousness, and Executive Control.Jesús H. Aguilar & Andrei A. Buckareff - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (1):21-30.
    On the Causal Theory of Action (CTA), internal proper parts of an agent such as desires and intentions are causally responsible for actions. CTA has increasingly come under attack for its alleged failure to account for agency. A recent version of this criticism due to François Schroeter proposes that CTA cannot provide an adequate account of either the executive control or the autonomous control involved in full-fledged agency. Schroeter offers as an alternative a revised understanding of the proper role of (...)
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  4. New Waves in Philosophy of Action.Jesús H. Aguilar, Andrei A. Buckareff & Keith Frankish (eds.) - 2010 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
  5. De l'Influence de la Pression Sur les Actions Chimiques.Georges Aime - 1900 - The Monist 10:311.
  6. Time and the Philosophy of Action.Roman Altshuler & Michael J. Sigrist (eds.) - 2016 - Routledge.
    Although scholarship in philosophy of action has grown in recent years, there has been little work explicitly dealing with the role of time in agency, a role with great significance for the study of action. As the articles in this collection demonstrate, virtually every fundamental issue in the philosophy of action involves considerations of time. The four sections of this volume address the metaphysics of action, diachronic practical rationality, the relation between deliberation and action, and the phenomenology of agency, providing (...)
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  7. Kinds of Reasons: An Essay in the Philosophy of Action.Maria Alvarez - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
    Understanding human beings and their distinctive rational and volitional capacities requires a clear account of such things as reasons, desires, emotions, and motives, and how they combine to produce and explain human behaviour. Maria Alvarez presents a fresh and incisive study of these concepts, centred on reasons and their role in human agency.
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  8. Reasons, Desires and Intentional Actions.Maria Alvarez - 2009 - In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave-Macmillan.
  9. The Good, the Bad, and the Trivial.Chrisoula Andreou - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):209-225.
    Dreadful and dreaded outcomes are sometimes brought about via the accumulation of individually trivial effects. Think about inching toward terrible health or toward an environmental disaster. In some such cases, the outcome is seen as unacceptable but is still gradually realized via an extended sequence of moves each of which is trivial in terms of its impact on the health or environment of those involved. Cases of this sort are not only practically challenging, they are theoretically challenging as well. For, (...)
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  10. Voluntary Bodily Movements.Thomas Annese - 1969 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2):159.
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  11. The Causation of Action.G. E. M. Anscombe - 2011 - In Mary Geach & Luke Gormally (eds.), Human life, action and ethics: essays by GEM Anscombe. Andrews UK. pp. 89-108.
  12. Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1981 - University of Minnesota Press.
    The intentionality of sensation -- The first person -- Substance -- The subjectivity of sensation -- Events in the mind -- Comments on Professor R.L. Gregory's paper on perception -- On sensations of position -- Intention -- Pretending -- On the grammar of "Enjoy" -- The reality of the past -- Memory, "experience," and causation -- Causality and determination -- Times, beginnings, and causes -- Soft determinism -- Causality and extensionality -- Before and after -- Subjunctive conditionals -- "Under a (...)
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  13. Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind: The Collected Philosophical Papers of G. E. M. Anscombe Volume Two.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1981 - Blackwell.
  14. Intentions, Personal Agency, and Contemporary Psychological Theory.Frederick Webster Ansoff - 1998 - Dissertation, Georgetown University
    Under many theories of motivation found in contemporary psychology there is no room for the concept of personal agency, that is of an individual who formulates and sets about realizing intentions. By intentions we refer to the content of announcements of causes of activity which the agent may or may not perform. Instead humans are typically conceived of as mere organisms which respond, release behaviors triggered by environmental cues or instinctual pressures, or sustain cybernetic regulatory systems which maintain set and (...)
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  15. Taylor, Richard: "Action and Purpose".D. M. Armstrong - 1966 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 44:231.
  16. Actions Are Not Events.Kent Bach - 1980 - Mind 89 (353):114-120.
  17. “Reason and Ethics”.Carla Bagnoli - 2011 - In N. Vassallo & C. Amoretti (eds.), Reason and Reasons. Ontos-Verlag.
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  18. The Exploration of Moral Life.Carla Bagnoli - 2011 - In Justin Broakes (ed.), Iris Murdoch, philosopher. Oxford University Press.
    The most distinctive feature of Murdoch's philosophical project is her attempt to reclaim the exploration of moral life as a legitimate topic of philosophical investigation. In contrast to the predominant focus on action and decision, she argues that “what we require is a renewed sense of the difficulty and complexity of the moral life and the opacity of persons. We need more concepts in terms of which to picture the substance of our being” (AD 293).1 I shall argue that to (...)
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  19. First-Personal Aspects of Agency.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (1-2):1-16.
    Abstract: On standard accounts, actions are caused by reasons (Davidson), and reasons are taken to be neural phenomena. Since neural phenomena are wholly understandable from a third-person perspective, standard views have no room for any ineliminable first-personal elements in an account of the causation of action. This article aims to show that first-person perspectives play essential roles in both human and nonhuman agency. Nonhuman agents have rudimentary first-person perspectives, whereas human agents—at least rational agents and moral agents—have robust first-person perspectives. (...)
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  20. Why Computers Can't Act.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1981 - American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (April):157-163.
    To be an agent, one must be able to formulate intentions. To be able to formulate intentions, one must have a first-person perspective. Computers lack a first-person perspective. So, computers are not agents.
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  21. Actions and Events: The Problem of Individuation.Monroe C. Beardsley - 1975 - American Philosophical Quarterly 12 (4):263 - 276.
    For the events "e" and "f" to be identical, They must have the same subject and spatio-Temporal location, And their (participial) property-Descriptions must belong to the same "modification set" (e.G., Reddening, Reddening slowly, Reddening in july). The same criterion applies to actions, Which are here treated strictly as a proper subclass of events (john's closing the door = the door's being closed by john = the door's becoming closed). Actions related by goldman's "causal generation" are therefore distinct, But those related (...)
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  22. Voluntary Action and Neural Causation.Hanoch Ben-Yami - 2014 - Cognitive Neuroscience 5:217-218.
    I agree with Nachev and Hacker’s general approach. However, their criticism of claims of covert automaticity can be strengthened. I first say a few words on what voluntary action involves and on the consequent limited relevance of brain research for the determination of voluntariness. I then turn to Nachev and Hacker’s discussion of possible covert automaticity and show why the case for it is weaker than they allow.
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  23. Two Conceptions of Mind and Action: Knowledge How and the Philosophical Theory of Intelligence.John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett - 2011 - In John Bengson & Marc Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford University Press. pp. 3-55.
    Perhaps it is a pity that the Theory of Knowledge and the Theory of Conduct have fallen into separate compartments. (It certainly was not so in Socrates’ time, as his interest in the relation between eidos and technê bears witness.) If we studied them together, perhaps we might have a better understanding of both. H.H. Price, Thinking and Representation..
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  24. Review of Berent En, How We Act: Causes, Reasons and Intentions[REVIEW]John Bishop - 2004 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (9).
  25. Causal deviancy and multiple intentions: a reply to James Montmarquet.John Bishop - 1985 - Analysis 45 (3):163.
  26. Intelligibility and the Guise of the Good.Paul Boswell - 2018 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 13 (1):1-31.
    According to the Guise of the Good, an agent only does for a reason what she sees as good. One of the main motivations for the view is its apparent ability to explain why action for a reason must be intelligible to its agent, for on this view, an action is intelligible just in case it seems good. This motivation has come under criticism in recent years. Most notably, Kieran Setiya has argued that merely seeing one’s action as good does (...)
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  27. Intending and Acting: Toward a Naturalized Action Theory.Myles Brand - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):49-54.
  28. Planning and the Stability of Intention.MichaelE Bratman - 1992 - Minds and Machines 2 (1):1-16.
    I sketch my general model of the roles of intentions in the planning of agents like us-agents with substantial resource limitations and with important needs for coordination. I then focus on the stability of prior intentions: their rational resistance to reconsideration. I emphasize the importance of cases in which one's nonreconsideration of a prior intention is nondeliberative and is grounded in relevant habits of reconsideration. Concerning such cases I argue for a limited form of two-tier consequentialism, one that is restricted (...)
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  29. Agent Causation as a Solution to the Problem of Action.Michael Brent - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (5):656-673.
    My primary aim is to defend a nonreductive solution to the problem of action. I argue that when you are performing an overt bodily action, you are playing an irreducible causal role in bringing about, sustaining, and controlling the movements of your body, a causal role best understood as an instance of agent causation. Thus, the solution that I defend employs a notion of agent causation, though emphatically not in defence of an account of free will, as most theories of (...)
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  30. Meditation and the Scope of Mental Action.Michael Brent & Candace Upton - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (1):52-71.
    While philosophers of mind have devoted abundant time and attention to questions of content and consciousness, philosophical questions about the nature and scope of mental action have been relatively neglected. Galen Strawson’s account of mental action, arguably the most well-known extant account, holds that cognitive mental action consists in triggering the delivery of content to one’s field of consciousness. However, Strawson fails to recognize several distinct types of mental action that might not reduce to triggering content delivery. In this paper, (...)
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  31. Co–Operation and Communication in Apes and Humans.Ingar Brinck & Peter Gärdenfors - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (5):484–501.
    We trace the difference between the ways in which apes and humans co–operate to differences in communicative abilities, claiming that the pressure for future–directed co–operation was a major force behind the evolution of language. Competitive co–operation concerns goals that are present in the environment and have stable values. It relies on either signalling or joint attention. Future–directed co–operation concerns new goals that lack fixed values. It requires symbolic communication and context–independent representations of means and goals. We analyse these ways of (...)
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  32. Consideraciones epistemológicas acerca del “sentido de agencia”. Epistemological Requirements of the Sense of Agency.Fernando Broncano - 2006 - Logos. Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica [Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España] 39:7-27.
    We discuss the conditions that the knowledge of an action must meet to reach the status of agency or complete intentional action. A first problem is to account how the subject appears in the action. We consider the model of a "sense of agency" and we oppose a theory of action control that does not take in charge the epistemological problems associated to the sense of agency model. Our claim is that epistemological requirements are intrinsic components of the agency, and (...)
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  33. Mental Overpopulation and Mental Action: Protecting Intentions From Mental Birth Control.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):49-65.
    Many philosophers of action afford intentions a central role in theorizing about action and its explanation. Furthermore, current orthodoxy in the philosophy of action has it that intentions play a causal role with respect to the etiology and explanation of action. But action theory is not without its heretics. Some philosophers have challenged the orthodox view. In this paper I examine and critique one such challenge. I consider David-Hillel Ruben's case against the need for intentions to play a causal role (...)
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  34. Can the Agency Theory Be Salvaged?Andrei A. Buckareff - 2001 - Philosophia Christi 3 (1):217-224.
    Some of the most salient features of Randolph Clarke's causal agent-causal theory of free action are explicated and his theory critiqued. It is shown that invoking agent-causation is unnecessary and makes his theory cumbersome. For insofar as Clarke seeks to render the agency theory more intelligible by appealing to event-causation as contributing to the generation of basic actions, his theory gravitates closer to a causal indeterminist theory of free action.
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  35. Causalisms Reconsidered.Andrei A. Buckareff & Jing Zhu - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (1):147-.
    We reply to Andrew Sneddon’s recent criticism of the causal theory of action (CTA) and critically examine Sneddon’s preferred alternative, minimal causalism. We show that Sneddon’s criticism of CTA is problematic in several respects, and therefore his conclusion that “the prospects for CTA look poor” is unjustified. Moreover, we show that the minimal causalism that Sneddon advocates looks rather unpromising and its merits that Sneddon mentions are untenable.
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  36. Action, Responsibility and the Ability to Do Otherwise.Justin Capes - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (1):1-15.
    Here it is argued that in order for something someone “does” to count as a genuine action, the person needn’t have been able to refrain from doing it. If this is right, then two recent defenses of the principle of alternative possibilities, a version of which says that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have refrained from doing it, are unsuccessful.
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  37. Action Reconceptualized: Human Agency and its Sources.David K. Chan - 2016 - Lexington Books.
    In re-examining the concepts of desire, intention, and trying, David K. Chan brings a fresh approach toward resolving many of the problems that have occupied philosophers of action for almost a century. This book not only presents a complete theory of human agency but also, by developing the conceptual tools needed to do moral philosophy, lays the groundwork for formulating an ethics that is rooted in a clear, intuitive, and coherent moral psychology.
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  38. Agency and Incompatibilism. [REVIEW]Randolph Clarke - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (3):519-525.
    This paper is part of a symposium discussing Helen Steward's A METAPHYSICS FOR FREEDOM. Steward argues for what she calls Agency Incompatibilism: agency itself is incompatible with determinism. This paper examines what Steward presents as her main argument for Agency Incompatibilism and finds it wanting.
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  39. Perceptual Activity and the Will.Thomas Crowther - 2009 - In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental Actions. Oxford University Press. pp. 173.
  40. On How to Act : Disjunctively.Jonathan Dancy - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 262--282.
  41. Action.Arthur C. Danto & D. G. Brown - 1970 - Philosophical Review 79 (4):582.
  42. I. Agency.Donald Davidson - 1971 - In Ausonio Marras, R. N. Bronaugh & Robert W. Binkley (eds.), Agent, Action, and Reason. University of Toronto Press. pp. 1-37.
  43. Theory of Action.Lawrence H. Davis - 1979 - Prentice-Hall.
  44. Analytical Philosophy of Action. [REVIEW]Lawrence H. Davis - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (4):99-107.
  45. "Action" and "Cause of Action".Philip E. Davis - 1962 - Mind 71 (281):93-95.
  46. How I Found My Way to the Written Word Through Visual Art.Laura Donkers - 2014 - Philosophy Study 4 (7):511-519.
    The author’s practice-led research explores “the act of living.” In order to advance this idea, the author has acquired skills in investigation and expressed her thinking through a descriptive and explanatory visual language. The author’s learning journey, while not unique, has not been an ordinary one. Initial academic failure to achieve in the school education system contributes to choosing a life working on the land and harbouring the belief that she is unable to learn academically. Still, the author has gained (...)
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  47. Are All Actions Movements of the Agent's Body?Julian Fink - 2011 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):52-64.
    Davidson famously contended that all actions are movements of the agent's body. It has been objected, however, that Davidson's view is incompatible with his own definition of primitive actions. This paper argues that this objection is based on an incorrect reading of Davidson's argument. I will show that by reading 'movements', in 'all actions are bodily movements', transitively, Davidson's definition of primitive actions ceases to contradict with his thesis that all actions are bodily movements.
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  48. The Division of Action in Thomas Aquinas. Flannery - 2009 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 83 (3):421 - 440.
    Aquinas accepts that (i) some kinds of voluntary action are (qua voluntary) “basic,” not divisible into (non-fictional) further kinds; (ii) a concrete individual action may belong to more than one basic kind; (iii) the basic kinds to which it belongs are determined by the agent’s intentions qua performing the action; (iv) some intentions may stand to others as means to ends; (v) there can be concrete individual actions in which the agent’s intended means are disordered with respect to the ends; (...)
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  49. Deliberate Action.Richard Foley - 1977 - Philosophical Review 86 (1):58-69.
  50. Action and Generality.Anton Ford - 2011 - In Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (eds.), Essays on Anscombe's Intention. Harvard University Press.
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