The Nature of Analytic Philosophy

This chapter sets out an optimistic view of philosophical progress.The key idea is that the historical record speaks in favor of there being progress at least if we are clear about what philosophical problems are, and what it takes to solve them. I end by asking why so many people tend toward a pessimistic view of philosophical progress.

A review of "Intellectual virtues: an essay in regulative epistemology" by Robert Roberts and Jay Wood.

A discussion of 'Introduzione alla filosofia analitica del linguaggio' edited by Marco Santambrogio.

Pinker는 (우리의 진화 된 타고난 심리학의 기본 설정으로 인해) 마음의 기능에 대한 특정 편견과 Wittgenstein이 독특하고 깊은 통찰력을 제공하기 때문에 철학자 (심리학자) Ludwig Wittgenstein의 유명한 의견으로 시작합니다. 언어, 사고 및 현실의 작업 (그가 다소 공동 확장 적이라고 보았 음)은 다른 곳에서는 발견되지 않았습니다. 이 책에는 위트 겐슈 타인에 대한 언급 만 있으며, 이는 그가 가장 훌륭하고 독창적 인 언어 분석 가라는 점을 고려하면 가장 불행한 일입니다.. 마지막 장에서, 플라톤의 동굴의 유명한 은유를 사용하여, 그는 아름답게 마음 (언어, 생각, 의도적 심리학)의 개요와 (...) 책을 요약 - 맹목적인 이기심의 제품, 우리의 유전자의 사본을 들고 가까운 친척에 대한 자동화 된 이타주의에 의해 약간만 중재 (포함 피트니스)-- 자동으로 작동하지만, 우리가 결코 희망을 부여하여 낙관적 인메모에 종료하려고 하지만, 우리는 결코 우리가 희망을 부여하여 낙관적 인 메모에 종료하려고 합니다. 핑커는 확실히 알고 있지만 우리의 심리학에 대한 훨씬 더 포함보다 제외된다는 사실에 대해 거의 말한다. 방치되거나 최소한의 주의를 기울이는 인간의 본성에 대한 창 중에는 수학과 기하학, 음악 및 사운드, 이미지, 이벤트 및 인과 관계, 온톨로지 (사물의 클래스 또는 우리가 알고있는 것), 대부분의 epistemology (우리가 알고있는 방법), 성향 (믿는, 생각, 판단, 의도 등) 행동의 의도적 인 심리학의 나머지, 신경 전달 물질과 entheogens, 영적 상태 (예를 들어, 사토리와 계몽, 뇌 자극 및 기록, 뇌 손상 및 행동 적자 와 장애, 게임과 스포츠, 결정 이론 (포함. 게임 이론과 행동 경제학), 동물 행동 (매우 작은 언어하지만 십억 년). 많은 책은 의도적 인 심리학의 이러한 각 영역에 대해 작성되었습니다. 이 책의 데이터는 설명이지, 왜 우리의 뇌가 이런 식으로 하는지 또는 어떻게 수행되는지를 보여주는 설명이 아닙니다. 우리는 어떻게 그들의 다양한 방법으로 문장을 사용하는 것을 알 수 있습니까 (즉, 모든 의미를 알고)? 이것은 더 기본적인 수준에서 작동 진화 심리학 – 비트 겐슈타인이 가장 활동적인 수준. 그리고 단어가 사용되는 맥락 = 비트겐슈타인이 개척한 경기장에 대한 관심이 부족합니다. 그럼에도불구하고, 이것은 고전적인 작품이며 이러한 주의사항으로 여전히 읽을 가치가 있습니다. 현대 의 두 systems보기에서인간의 행동에 대한 포괄적 인 최신 프레임 워크를 원하는 사람들은 내 책을 참조 할 수 있습니다'철학의 논리적 구조, 심리학, 민d와 루드비히 비트겐슈타인과 존 Searle의언어' 2nd ed (2019). 내 글의 더 많은 관심있는 사람들은 '이야기 원숭이를 볼 수 있습니다-철학, 심리학, 과학, 종교와 운명 행성에 정치 - 기사 및 리뷰 2006-2019 3 rd 에드 (2019) 및 21st 세기 4번째 에드 (2019) 및 기타에서 자살 유토피아 망상. (shrink)

A review of a collection of papers by Paul Ricoeur edited by Domenico Jervolino. The collection highlights Ricoeur's journey from the reflexive philosophy to analytic philosophy through hermeneutics.

Analytic philosophy has transgender trouble. In this paper, I explore potential explanations for this trouble, focusing on the notion of 'cisgender commonsense' and its place in philosophical methodology.

I reconstruct the background of ideas, concerns and intentions out of which Moore’s early essays, the preliminary version, and then the final version of Principia Ethica originated. I stress the role of religious concerns, as well as that of the Idealist legacy. I argue that PE is more a patchwork of rather diverging contributions than a unitary work, not to say the paradigm of a new school in Ethics. I add a comparison with Rashdall’s almost contemporary ethical work, suggesting that (...) the latter defends the same general claims in a different way, one that manages to pave decisive objections in a more plausible way. I end by suggesting that the emergence of Analytic Ethics was a more ambiguous phenomenon than the received view would make us believe, and that the wheat (or some other gluten-free grain) of this tradition, that is, what logic can do for philosophy, has to be separated from the chaff, that is, the confused and mutually incompatible legacies of Utilitarianism and Idealism. (shrink)

What is philosophy? How is it possible? This essay constitutes an attempt to contribute to a better understanding of what might be a good answer to either of these questions by reflecting on one particular characteristic of philosophy, specifically as it presents itself in the philosophical practice of Socrates, Plato and Wittgenstein. Throughout this essay, I conduct the systematic discussion of my topic in parallel lines with the historico-methodological comparison of my three main authors. First, I describe a certain neglected (...) aspect of the Socratic method. Then, exploring the flipside of this aspect, I show that despite the fact that both Socrates and Wittgenstein understand their philosophical approaches as being essentially directed at the particular problems and modes of understanding that are unique to single individuals, they nevertheless aspire to philosophical understanding of the more ‘mundane’ kind that is directed at the world. Finally, interpreting parts of Plato’s dialogues Phaedrus and Laches, I further develop my case for seeing the role of mutual understanding in philosophy as fundamentally twofold, being directed both at the individual and what they say (the word), and at things that are ‘external’ to this human relation at any particular moment of philosophical understanding (the world). (shrink)

Passare da Wittgenstein per arrivare a san Tommaso non è un percorso a ritroso, filosoficamente parlando. Lo sostengono importanti pensatori britannici della tradizione post-analitica come Peter Geach, Elizabeth Anscombe e Anthony Kenny, i quali propongono una lettura molto originale del Dottor Angelico e dell’autore delle Ricerche filosofiche. Roger Pouivet ricostruisce in Dopo Wittgenstein, san Tommaso i percorsi di una nuova e provocatoria corrente filosofica che ha preso il nome di “tomismo analitico” ed è una delle più coraggiose frontiere filosofiche di (...) oggi. (shrink)

In this paper I present a study about the notion of Analytical Thomism. I therefore propose a brief summary on the history of Thomism. Then I point out the resumption of the thought of Thomas that occurred in England at the end of the twentieth century by many authors, the first among them being Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe, Peter Geach and Anthony Kenny. These authors operated within the analytical horizon and began to take an interest in Thomas. In light of (...) this historical path, one can see how tradition and innovation are closely intertwined. I therefore propose an argument on the notion of Analytical Thomism, in light of the outlined historical process and the research now discussed. (shrink)

I discuss the way in which the cleavage between the Continental and the Anglo-American philosophies originated, the images of both philosophical worlds, the converging rediscoveries from the Seventies, as well as recent ecumenical or anti-ecumenical strategies. I argue that pragmatism provides an important counterinstance to both the familiar self-images and to fashionable ecumenical or anti-ecumenical strategies. My conclusions are: Continental philosophy does not exist; less obviously, also analytic philosophy does not exist, or does not exist any longer as a current (...) or a paradigm; what does exist is, on the one hand, philosophy of language and, on the other, philosophy of mind, that is, two disciplines; the dissolution of analytic philosophy as a school has been extremely fruitful, precisely in so far as it has left room for disciplines and research programmes; what is left, of the Anglo-American/Continental cleavage is primarily differences in styles, depending partly on intellectual traditions, partly owing to sociology, history, institutional frameworks; these differences should not be blurred by rash ecumenical; besides, theoretical differences are alive as ever, but within both camps; finally, there is indeed a lag in the appropriation of intellectual techniques by most schools of ‘Continental’ philosophy, and this should be overcome through appropriation of what the best ‘analytic’ philosophers have produced. (shrink)

Nowadays philosophy is characterized by such heterogeneous intellectual practices that its very unity and coherence seem endangered. What is especially disconcerting is that most authors manage to largely ignore the very existence of methodological positions radically different from their own. Fortunately, there have been exceptions, and the present volume focuses on one of them: the failed debate that took place between John Searle and Jacques Derrida. -/- This book thoroughly analyses that exchange, contextualizing it within the respective philosophical traditions of (...) the two thinkers, with the general aim of turning their dispute into what it was not: a respectful, sensible and fruitful controversy. This episode is thus taken as an opportunity to reflect on the peculiar nature of philosophy as an intellectual practice, and to discuss some of its main themes: language as an instrument for communication, the intentionality of consciousness, and difference as a constitutive element of every text. (shrink)

● Sergio Cremaschi, The non-existing Island. I discuss the way in which the cleavage between the Continental and the Anglo-American philosophies originated, the (self-)images of both philosophical worlds, the converging rediscoveries from the Seventies, as well as recent ecumenic or anti-ecumenic strategies. I argue that pragmatism provides an important counter-instance to both the familiar self-images and to the fashionable ecumenic or anti-ecumenic strategies. My conclusions are: (i) the only place where Continental philosophy exists (as Euro-Communism one decade ago) is America; (...) (ii) less obviously, also analytic philosophy does not exist, or does no more exist as a current or a paradigm; what does exist is, on the one hand, philosophy of language and, on the other, philosophy of mind, that is, two disciplines; (iii) the dissolution of analytic philosophy as a school has been extremely fruitful, precisely in so far as it has left room for disciplines and research programmes; (iv) what is left, of the Anglo-American/Continental cleavage is primarily differences in styles, depending partly on intellectual traditions, partly owing to sociology, history, institutional frameworks; these differences should not be blurred by rash ecumenism; besides, theoretical differences are alive as ever, but within both camps; finally, there is indeed a lag (not a difference) in the appropriation of intellectual techniques by most schools of 'Continental' philosophy, and this should be overcome through appropriation of what the best 'analytic' philosophers have produced. -/- ● Michael Strauss, Language and sense-perception: an aspect of analytic philosophy. To test an assertion about one fact by comparing it with perceived reality seems quite unproblematic. But the very possibility of such a procedure is incompatible with the intellectualistic basis of logical positivism and atomism (as it is for example to be found in Russell's Analysis of Mind). According to the intellectualistic approach pure sensation is meaningless. Sensation receives its meaning and order from the intellect through interpretation, which is performed with the help of linguistic tools, i.e. words and sentences. Before being interpreted, sensation is not a picture or a representation, it is neither true nor false, neither an illusion nor knowledge; it does not tell us anything; it is a lifeless and order-less matter. But how can a thought (or a proposition) be compared with such a lifeless matter? This difficulty confronts the intellectualist, if on the one hand he admits the necessity of comparing thought with sense-perception, and on the other hand presupposes that we possess only intellectual and no immediate perceptual understanding of what we see and hear. In this paper I give a critical exposition of three attempts, made by Russell, Neurath and Wittgenstein, to solve this problem. The first attempt adheres to strict conventionalism, the second tends to naturalism and the third leads to an amended, very moderate version of conventionalism. This amended conventionalism looks at sense impressions as being a peculiar language, which includes primary symbols, i.e. symbols not founded on convention and not being in need of interpretation. -/- ● Ernst Tugendhat, Phenomenology and language analysis. The paper, first published in German in 1970, by which Tugendhat gave a start to the German rediscovery of analytic philosophy. The author stages a confrontation between phenomenology and language analysis. He argues that language analysis does not differ from phenomenology as far as the topics dealt with are concerned; instead, both currents are quite different in method. The author argues that language-analytic philosophy does not simply lay out of the mainstream of transcendental philosophy, but that instead it challenges this tradition on the very level of foundations. The author criticizes the linguistic-analytic approach centred on the subject as well as any object-centred approach, while proposing inter-subjective understanding through language as the new universal framework. This is, when construed in so general terms, the same program of hermeneutics, though in a more basic version. -/- ● Jürgen Habermas, Language game, intention and meaning. On a few suggestions by Sellars and Wittgenstein. -/- The paper, first published in German in 1975, in which Habermas announces his own linguistic turn through a discovery of speech acts. In this essay the author wants to work out a categorical framework for a communicative theory of society; he takes Wittgenstein's concept of language game as a Leitfade and, besides, he takes advantage also of Wilfried Sellars's quasi-transcendental account of the genesis of intentionality. His goal is to single out the problems connected with a theory of consciousness oriented in a logical-linguistic sense. -/- ● Zvie Bar-On, Isomorphism of speech acts and intentional states. -/- This essay presents the problem of the formal relationship between speech acts and intentional states as an essential part of the perennial philosophical question of the relation between language and thought. I attempt to show how this problem had been dealt with by two prominent philosophers of different camps in our century, Edmund Husserl and John Searle. Both of them wrote extensively about the theory of intentionality. I point out an interesting, as it were unintended, continuity of their work on that theory. Searle started where Husserl left off 80 years earlier. Their meeting point could be used as the first clue in our search. They both adopted in effect the same distinction between two basic aspects of the intentional experience: its content or matter, and its quality or mode. Husserl did not yet have the concept of a speech act as contradistinguished from an intentional state. The working hypothesis, however, which he suggested, could be used as a second clue for the further elaboration of the theory. The relationship of the two levels, the mental and the linguistic, which remained for Husserl in the background only, became the cornerstone of Searle' s inquiry. He employed the speech act as the model and analysed the intentional experience by means of the conceptual apparatus of his own theory of speech acts. This procedure enabled him to mark out a number of parallelisms and correlations between the two levels. This procedure explains the phenomenon of the partial isomorphism of speech acts and intentional states. -/- ● Roberta de Monticelli, Ontology. A dialogue among the linguistic philosopher, the naturalist, and the phenomenological philosopher. -/- This paper proposes a comparison between two main ways of conceiving the role and scope of that fundamental part of philosophy (or of "first" philosophy) which is traditionally called "ontology". One way, originated within the analytic tradition, consists of two main streams, namely philosophy of language and (contemporary) philosophy of mind, the former yielding "reduced ontology" and the latter "neo-Aristotelian ontology". The other way of conceiving ontology is exemplified by "phenomenological ontology" (more precisely, the Husserlian, not the Heideggerian version). Ontology as a theory of reference ("reduced" ontology, or ontology as depending on semantics) is presented and justified on the basis of some classical thesis of traditional philosophy of language (from Frege to Quine). "Reduced ontology" is shown to be identifiable with one level of a traditional, Aristotelian ontology, namely the one which corresponds to one of the four "senses of being" listed in Aristotle's Metaphysics: "being" as "being true". This identification is justified on the basis of Franz Brentano's "rules for translation" of the Aristotelian table of judgements in terms of (positive and negative) existential judgments such as are easily translatable into sentences of first order predicate logic. The second part of the paper is concerned with "neo-Aristotelian ontology", i.e. with naturalism and physicalism as the main ontological options underlying most of contemporary discussion in the philosophy of mind. The qualification of such options as "neo-Aristotelian" is justified; the relationships between "neo-Aristotelian ontology" and "reduced ontology" are discussed. In the third part the fundamental tenet of "phenomenological ontology" is identified by the thesis that a logical theory of existence and being does capture a sense of "existing" and "being" which, even though not the basic one, is grounded in the basic one. An attempt is done of further clarifying this "more basic" sense of "being". An argument making use of this supposedly "more basic" sense is advanced in favour of a "phenomenological ontology". -/- ● Kuno Lorenz, Analytic Roots in Dialogic Constructivism. -/- Both in the Vienna Circle ad in Russell's early philosophy the division of knowledge into two kinds (or two levels), perceptual and conceptual, plays a vital role. Constructivism in philosophy, in trying to provide a pragmatic foundation - a knowing-how - to perceptual as well as conceptual competences, discovered that this is dependent on semiotic tools. Therefore, the "principle of method" had to be amended by the "principle of dialogue". Analytic philosophy being an heir of classical empiricism, conceptually grasping the "given", and constructive philosophy being an heir of classical rationalism, perceptually providing the "constructed", merge into dialogical constructivism, a contemporary development of ideas derived especially from the works of Charles S. Peirce (his pragmatic maxim as a means of giving meaning to signs) and of Ludwig Wittgenstein (his language games as tools of comparison for understanding ways of life). -/- 7. Albrecht Wellmer, "Autonomy of meaning" and "principle of charity" from the viewpoint of the pragmatics of language. -/- In this essay I present an interpretation of the principle of the autonomy of meaning and of the principle of charity, the two main principles of Davidson's semantic view of truth, showing how both principles may fit in a perspective dictated by the pragmatics of language. I argue that (I) the principle of the autonomy of meaning may be thoroughly reformulated in terms of the pragmatics of language, (ii) the principle of charity needs a supplement in terms of pragmatics of language in order to become really enlightening as a principle of interpretation. Besides, I argue that: (i) on the one hand, the fundamental thesis of Habermas on the pragmatic theory of meaning ("we understand a speech act when we know what makes it admissible") is correlated with the seemingly intentionalist thesis according to which we understand a speech act when we know what a speaker means; (ii) on the other hand, to say that the meaning competence of a competent speaker is basically a competence about a potential of reasons (or also of possible justifications) which is inherently connected with the meaning of statements, or with their use in utterances. -/- ● Rüdiger Bubner, The convergence of analytic and hermeneutic philosophy -/- This paper argues that the analytic philosophy does not exist, at least as understood by its original programs. Differences in the analytic camp have always been bigger than they were believed to be. Now these differences are coming to the fore thanks to a process of dissolution of dogmatism. Philosophical analysis is led by its own inner logic towards questions that may be fairly qualified as hermeneutic. Recent developments in analytic philosophy, e.g. Davidson, seem to indicate a growing convergence of themes between philosophical analysis and hermeneutics; thus, the familiar opposition of Anglo-Saxon and Continental philosophy might soon belong to history. The fact of an ongoing appropriation of analytical techniques by present-day German philosophers may provide a basis for a powerful argument for the unity of philosophizing, beyond its strained images privileging one technique of thinking and rejecting the remainder. Actual philosophical practice should take the dialogue between the two camps more seriously; in fact, the processes described so far are no danger to philosophical work. They may be a danger for parochial approaches to philosophizing; indeed, contrary to what happens in the natural sciences, Thomas Kuhn's "normal science" developing within the framework of one fixed paradigm is not typical for philosophical thinking. And in philosophy innovating revolutions are symptoms more of vitality than of crisis. -/- ● Karl-Otto Apel, The impact of analytic philosophy on my intellectual biography. -/- In my paper I try to reconstruct the history of my Auseinandersetzung mit - as I called it - "language-analytical" philosophy (including even Peircean semiotics) since the late Fifties. The heuristics of my study was predetermined by two main motives of my beginnings: the hermeneutic turn of phenomenology and the transformation of "transcendental philosophy" in the light of the "language a priori". Thus, I took issue with the early and the later Wittgenstein, logical positivism, and post-Wittgensteinian and post-empiricist philosophy of science (i.e. G.H. von Wright and the renewal of the "explanation vs understanding controversy" as well as the debate between Th. Kuhn and Popper/Lakatos); besides, with speech act theory and the debate about "transcendental arguments" since Strawson. The "pragmatic turn", started already by C.L. Morris and the later Carnap, led me to study also the relationship between Wittgensteinian "use" theory of meaning and of truth. This resulted on my side in something like a program of "transcendental semiotics", i.e. "transcendental pragmatics" and "transcendental hermeneutics". -/- ● Ben-Ami Scharfstein, A doubt on both their houses: the blindness to non-western philosophies. The burden of my criticism is that contemporary European philosophers of all kinds have continued to think as if there were no true philosophy but that of the West. For the most part, the existentialists have been oblivious of their Eastern congeners; the hermeneuticians have yet to stretch their horizons beyond the most familiar ones; and the analysts remain unaware of the analyses and linguistic sensitivities of the ancient non-European philosophers. Briefly, ignorance still blinds almost all contemporary Western philosophers to the rich, variegated philosophical traditions outside of their familiar orbit. Both Continental and Anglo-Americans have lost the breadth of view that once characterized such thinkers as Herder and the Humboldts. The blindness that has resulted is not simply that of individual Western philosophers but of our whole, still parochial philosophical culture. (shrink)

This paper concentrates on the resurrection of the journey of analytic philosophy from the perspective of ‘critical thinking,’ a tool of proper thought and understanding. To define an era of philosophy as analytic seems indeed a difficult attempt. However, my attempt would be to look up a few positions from the monumental thoughts of Frege, Russell, Carnap, Wittgenstein, Quine, and Putnam on their ‘analysis’ minded outlooks that developed in different ways basing on logic, scientific spirit, conceptual, language etc. Analytic philosophers (...) intend to intertwine between word and world in terms of mind and language guided by critical analysis that I think remarkably encompassed by clarity, truth, analysis, accuracy, and open-mindedness. My attempt would be to resurge the philosophical development of analytic philosophy in different periods that enormously nourished by the idea of ‘critical thinking’ and the analysis of natural language. (shrink)

Phänomenologie und sprachanalytische Philosophie, die erstere mit den Namen Husserl und Heidegger verbunden, die letztere mit Wittgenstein, waren die beiden dominierenden philosophischen Strömungen des 20. Jahrhunderts. Das Spannungsverhältnis zwischen Phänomenologie und Sprachanalyse ergibt sich auf dem Hintergrund ihrer gemeinsamen Problembestände, vornehmlich in der Philosophie des Geistes, der Philosophie der Wahrnehmung und der Bedeutungstheorie. Konvergenzen sind erst im letzten Drittel des Jahrhunderts sichtbar geworden, wobei die Rezeption phänomenologischen Gedankenguts durch analytische Philosophen (Chisholm, Searle, Føllesdal, Danto, Evans, Tugendhat) intensiver war als die (...) in umgekehrter Richtung. Die Konvergenzen betreffen die neuen Theorien der Intentionalität, die Renaissance des Themas „Bewusstsein” und die Debatte um die Qualia. Der Band versammelt zwölf Beiträge einschlägig ausgewiesener Philosophen aus Deutschland, Schweden, Norwegen, der Schweiz und den USA. (shrink)

A study in philosophical methodology aimed at providing a clear view of the scope and limits of philosophical inquiry.

In this chapter, I revisit the question of the philosophical significance of the Great War upon the trajectory of philosophy in the twentieth century. While accounts of this are very rare in philosophy, and this is itself symptomatic, those that are given are also strangely implausible. They usually assert one of two things: that the War had little or no philosophical significance because most of the major developments had already begun, or—at the opposite extreme—they maintain that nothing was ever the (...) same in philosophy (as elsewhere). On the latter view, the creation of the so-called analytic-continental ‘divide’ is but one notable philosophical consequence of the Great War. I want here to steer a middle-way between these positions, both having a grain of truth but over-playing their respective hands. (shrink)

Throughout much of the twentieth century, the relationship between analytic and continental philosophy has been one of disinterest, caution or hostility. Recent debates in philosophy have highlighted some of the similarities between the two approaches and even envisaged a post-continental and post-analytic philosophy. Opening with a history of key encounters between philosophers of opposing camps since the late nineteenth century - from Frege and Husserl to Derrida and Searle - the book goes on to explore in detail the main methodological (...) differences between the two approaches. This covers a very wide range of topics, from issues of style and clarity of exposition to formal methods arising from logic and probability theory. The final section of this book presents a balanced critique of the two schools' approaches to key issues such as time, truth, subjectivity, mind and body, language and meaning, and ethics. "Analytic versus Continental" is the first sustained analysis of both approaches to philosophy, examining the limits and possibilities of each. It provides a clear overview of a much-disputed history and, in highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of both traditions, also offers future directions for both continental and analytic philosophy. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been a huge resurrection of interest in the idea of ‘analysis,’ encompassing on analytic philosophy. As with any major philosophical movement, it is futile to define or classify any precision of what makes someone an analytic thinker. However, drawing on the startling works by Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Dummett and Putnam I clear up some strands, portended by the observation that language is the sole medium of analytic philosophy, so the main focus of analytic philosophy is (...) to understand the structure of language, thought, and meaning. Analytic philosophy pursues a critical analysis on the interface between word and world interrelation in terms of natural language guided by analysis, reasons, clarity and reflective thoughts. In this paper, I will reflect on what this means and why analytic philosophy deserves an initial importance. (shrink)

A review of Peter Unger's Empty Ideas (OUP 2014).

This book presents a sympathetic yet critical treatment of the major philosophical attempts to define a viable project for philosophy in the face of historical changes. McCarthy, then, proposes a comprehensive, critical, and methodological strategy of epistemic integration that fully respects the progressive and pluralistic character of contemporary science and common sense. The programs of Frege, Husserl, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Sellers, Dewey, Quine, and Rorty are carefully presented and an assessment is made of their merits and limitations. This assessment results in (...) a defense of Lonergan’s integrative strategy — a nuanced philosophical strategy around which a gathering center could be built. McCarthy presents Lonergan’s work as containing the firm outline and partial execution of a philosophical project continuous with philosophy’s historic purposes and equal to the exigences of the present. The book examines a broad range of seminal topics and, after extended dialectical treatment of them, develops a coherent account of their interdependence. These topics include psychologism, intentionality, the limits of naturalism, semantical and epistemic realism, historical belonging, epistemic invariance, foundational analysis, the limitation of logic and of the linguistic turn, generalized empirical method, the interdependence of mind and language, the interplay of nature and history, and the critical appropriation of tradition. (shrink)

One of the most striking features of twentieth-century philosophy has been its obsession with language. For the most part, this phenomenon is greeted with hostile incredulity by external observers. Surely, they say, if philosophy is the profound and fundamental discipline which it has purported to be for more than two millennia, it must deal with something more serious than mere words, namely the things they stand for, and ultimately the essence of reality or of the human mind.

The author contends that analysis is dependent on the criteria of "the scientific world-View." otherwise, There would be "no basis for excluding analyses which were simply precise formulations of unverifiable realms of being.".

This article makes four claims. First, that the analytic/Continental split in political theory stems from an unarticulated disagreement about human nature, with analytics believing we have an innate set of mostly compatible moral and political inclinations, and Continentals seeing such things as alterable products of historical contingency. Second, that we would do better to talk of Continental-political-theory versus Rawlsian-political-philosophy, given that the former avoids arguments over principles, whilst the latter leaves genuine analytic philosophy behind. Third, that Continentals suffer from a (...) lack of such arguments, even by their own lights, whilst Rawlsians suffer from inconsistencies within the thought-patterns on which their principles depend. Fourth, that there is an alternative method – ‘normative behaviourism’ – that at least tries to move beyond the problems of both approaches, whilst sharing an idea of ‘praxis’ with the first, and an idea of deriving-principles-from-existing-judgements with the second. (shrink)

Philosophy has never delivered on its promise to settle the great moral and religious questions of human existence, and even most philosophers conclude that it does not offer an established body of disciplinary knowledge. Gary Gutting challenges this view by examining detailed case studies of recent achievements by analytic philosophers such as Quine, Kripke, Gettier, Lewis, Chalmers, Plantinga, Kuhn, Rawls, and Rorty. He shows that these philosophers have indeed produced a substantial body of disciplinary knowledge, but he challenges many common (...) views about what philosophers have achieved. Topics discussed include the role of argument in philosophy, naturalist and experimentalist challenges to the status of philosophical intuitions, the importance of pre-philosophical convictions, Rawls' method of reflective equilibrium, and Rorty's challenge to the idea of objective philosophical truth. The book offers a lucid survey of recent analytic work and presents a new understanding of philosophy as an important source of knowledge. (shrink)

The present book “Proceedings of the Symposia on Philosophy” edited by Late Prof. Ajit Kumar Sinha is a scholarly work, published by the Department of Philosophy, Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra in 1966. It is collection of papers presented by eminent scholars at two symposia held at the Department of Philosophy, Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra on 22nd and on 23rd March, 1965. The symposium "Concept of Philosophy in the mid-twentieth century" was held on March 22, 1965, and the symposium "Critique of the Value-system (...) in India during Post- independence era" was held on March 23, 1965. The ten papers included in this edited work focus on the critique of value system in India as well as the conception of philosophy in the mid-twentieth century. The present online version of this book has a great relevance in the present times as we had the print edition in a limited number. Moreover, online version can reach worldwide readers. So we are publishing this book online in its original form as it appeared in 1966. Late Prof. (Dr.) A.K.Sinha was an eminent contemporary philosopher of India and the former Chairperson of the Department of Philosophy, Kurukshetra. Under the benign guidance of Prof. Sinha, the Department reached to high mark scholarship. He also contributed near about 20 books in the field of philosophy and allied subjects. (shrink)

This important collection of essays details some of the more significant methodological and philosophical differences that have separated the two traditions, as ...

Ferrater Mora's paper is devoted to the thesis that man makes his own life--a person constituting himself historically. Harris's lecture is a two-pronged attack on contemporary analytic philosophy. One part of the argument attempts to show that the enterprise is self-refuting, based on an epistemology of naive positivistic empiricism which most of its present proponents have themselves rejected. The other part of the argument is ad hominem, showing the urgent necessity for a synthetic and constructive philosophy which will be able (...) to develop a way of life and system of values capable of stemming the drift toward nuclear self-annihilation. Prior, starting with the MacTaggart-Broad time puzzle and digressing backward through St. Augustine, offers an adverbial analysis of time and tenses, based on the theory that there are only things, not events, and that things are present tense, when they are.--W. G. E. (shrink)

Reviews the book, Minding the gap: Epistemology and philosophy of science in the two traditions by Christopher Norris . In this book, the author takes issue with the all-too-frequently held view that there can be no productive engagement between mainstream analytic philosophers and thinkers in the contemporary Continental tradition. The main focus here is to reveal the various concerns each of these two traditions share—concerns that have often been obscured by narrowly parochial interests and the desire to stake out distinct (...) philosophical territories. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

In recent years numerous attempts have been made by analytic philosophers to _naturalize _various different domains of philosophical inquiry. All of these attempts have had the common goal of rendering these areas of philosophy amenable to empirical methods, with the intention of securing for them the supposedly objective status and broad intellectual appeal currently associated with such approaches. This volume brings together internationally recognised analytic philosophers, including Alvin Plantinga, Peter van Inwagen and Robert Audi, to question the project of naturalism. (...) The articles investigate what it means to _naturalize_ a domain of philosophical inquiry and look at how this applies to the various sub-disciplines of philosophy including epistemology, metaphysics and the philosophy of the mind. The issue of whether naturalism is desirable is raised and the contributors take seriously the possibility that excellent analytic philosophy can be undertaken without naturalization. Controversial and thought-provoking, _Analytic Philosophy Without Naturalism_ examines interesting and contentious methodological issues in analytic philosophy and explores the connections between philosophy and science. (shrink)

In trying to answer the question What is analytic philosophy? I shall follow two methodological principles. (i) The first was suggested by Peter Hacker and reads: ‘Any characterisation of “analytic philosophy” which excludes Moore, Russell and the later Wittgenstein, as well as the leading figures of post War analytic philosophy [for us these are John Wisdom, Ryle, Austin, Strawson and Dummett], must surely be rejected.’ (Hacker 1996a, p. 247) The correct definition of analytic philosophy must cohere with the philosophy of (...) its generally recognized founding fathers. (ii) Any characterisation of ‘analytic philosophy’ which was massively represented in the history of philosophy in the past, must be rejected too. To be sure, Moore, Russell and Wittgenstein, and later also Ryle, Austin and their friends, were doing a type of philosophy which they consciously understood as new—it was intrinsically New Philosophy. The problem was only that this newness was difficult to identify and define. (shrink)

This article responds to those critiques addressed to Badiou's work by the Anglo-Saxon commentators that concern the schematism and formalism of his set-theory based ontology, which is considered to not be able to describe concrete empirical situations. Discussing the work of Carnap and Quine, the author poses the question what these concepts actually mean within the analytical philosophical tradition and if equivalents of the concepts of concrete and empirical can be found in Badiou's philosophy. The concepts of the event and (...) the truth procedure respectively can be seen as such. However, since Badiou is not an empiricist nor a pragmatist, but a materialist, these questions can only find their answers from within the horizon of materialist dialectics. (shrink)

Die erste, noch unveröffentlichte, Vorlesung über die Transzendentale Logik wurde von Fichte in Berlin während des SS 1812 gelesen.