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  1. Peter Godfrey -Smith (1986). Why Semantic Properties Won't Earn Their Keep. Philosophical Studies 50 (2):223-236.
  2. Andre J. Abath (2008). A Note on McDowell's Response to the Fineness of Grain Argument. Dialogue 47 (3-4):677-.
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  3. Laird Addis (2000). The Simplicity of Content. Metaphysica 1 (2):23-44.
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  4. Kenneth Aizawa & Frederick R. Adams (2005). Defending Non-Derived Content. Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):661-669.
    In ‘‘The Myth of Original Intentionality,’’ Daniel Dennett appears to want to argue for four claims involving the familiar distinction between original (or underived) and derived intentionality.
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  5. Peter Alward (2009). The Inessential Quasi-Indexical. Philosophical Studies 145 (2):235 - 255.
    In this paper, I argue, contra Perry, that the existence of locating beliefs does not require the abandonment of the analysis of belief as a relation between subjects and propositions. I argue that what the "problem of the essential indexical" reveals is that a complete explanation of behaviour requires both an explanation of the type of behaviour the agent engaged in and an explanation of why she engaged in it in the circumstances that she did. And I develop an account (...)
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  6. C. Anthony Anderson (ed.) (1990). Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Logic, Language, and Mind. Stanford: CSLI.
  7. D. Armstrong, C. B. Martin & U. T. Place (1996). In T. Crane. In Tim Crane (ed.), Dispositions: A Debate. New York: Routledge.
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  8. Moses J. Aronson (1941). BRINTON, CRANE. Nietzsche. Journal of Social Philosophy and Jurisprudence 7:94.
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  9. Thomas Baldwin & David Bell (1988). Phenomenology, Solipsism and Egocentric Thought. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 62 (1):27 - 60.
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  10. David Barton (1994). A Theory of Content and Other Essays. Review of Metaphysics 47 (4):812-814.
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  11. Samuel Birch (1785). Consilia: Or, Thoughts Upon Several Subjects.
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  12. Simon Blackburn (1988). Attitudes and Contents. Ethics 98 (3):501-517.
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  13. David Braun (2001). Russellianism and Explanation. Noûs 35 (s15):253-289.
    Many philosophers think that the Substitution Objection decisively refutes Russellianism. This objection claims that sentences (1) and (2) can differ in truth value. Therefore, it says, the sentences express different propositions, and so Russellianism is false.
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  14. David Braun (2001). Russellianism and Prediction. Philosophical Studies 105 (1):59 - 105.
    Russellianism (also called `neo-Russellianism, `Millianism, and `thenaive theory') entails that substitution of co-referring names inattitude ascriptions preserves truth value and proposition expressed.Thus, on this view, if Lucy wants Twain to autograph her book, thenshe also wants Clemens to autograph her book, even if she says ``I donot want Clemens to autograph my book''. Some philosophers (includingMichael Devitt and Mark Richard) claim that attitude ascriptions canbe used to predict behavior, but argue that if Russellianism weretrue, then this would not be so. (...)
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  15. David M. Braun (2000). Russellianism and Psychological Generalizations. Noûs 34 (2):203-236.
    (1) Harry believes that Twain is a writer. (2) Harry believes that Clemens is a writer. I say that this is Russellianism's most notorious consequence because it is so often used to argue against the view: many philosophers think that it is obvious that (1) and (2) can differ in truth value, and so they conclude that Russellianism is false. Let's call this the Substitution Objection to Russellianism.
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  16. Fernando Broncano (1999). Incompatibilidades en las teorías del contenido mental. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 18 (2).
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  17. Tyler Burge (2014). Reply to Rescorla and Peacocke: Perceptual Content in Light of Perceptual Constancies and Biological Constraints. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):485-501.
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  18. Alan Caden Burk (1973). Intentional Propositions 'de Dicto' and 'de Re' and Non-Propositional Seeing. Dissertation, Brown University
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  19. Elisabeth Camp (2004). The Generality Constraint and Categorial Restrictions. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):209–231.
    We should not admit categorial restrictions on the significance of syntactically well formed strings. Syntactically well formed but semantically absurd strings, such as ‘Life’s but a walking shadow’ and ‘Caesar is a prime number’, can express thoughts; and competent thinkers both are able to grasp these and ought to be able to. Gareth Evans’ generality constraint, though Evans himself restricted it, should be viewed as a fully general constraint on concept possession and propositional thought. For (a) even well formed but (...)
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  20. Charles E. Cardwell (1971). Gambling for Content. Journal of Philosophy 68 (23):860-864.
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  21. Kam-Yuen Cheng (2002). Narrow Content and Historical Accounts. Journal of Philosophical Research 27:101-113.
    Fodor’s Informational Semantics states that the content of a representation depends on the counterfactual relation between the representation and the represented. However, his theory suffers from the psychological explanation problem and the indeterminacy problem raised by twin cases. In response to these problems, Fodor has introduced narrow content and a mixed theory of content that combines a historical account with the counterfactual account. In The Elm and the Expert, he drops both of them for the reason that twin cases are (...)
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  22. Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (2013). Varieties of Intentional Objects. Semiotica 194 (194):189–206.
    In this paper I propose a certain classification of entities which are introduced in various theories of intentionality under the label ‘intentional objects’. Franz Brentano’s immanent objects, Alexius Meinong’s entities ‘beyond being and non-being’, or Roman Ingarden’s purely intentional objects can serve as examples of such entities. What they all have in common is that they have been introduced in order to extensionalise the so called ‘intentional contexts’ (‘intentional’ with ‘t’). But not all entities which function this way deserve the (...)
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  23. Jonathan Cohen (2013). Indexicality and the Puzzle of the Answering Machine. Journal of Philosophy 110 (1):5-32.
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  24. Eros Corazza (1994). Perspectival Thoughts and Psychological Generalizations. Dialectica 48 (3-4):307-36.
    SummaryAgainst an externalist view popularized, among others, by Evans and McDowell I shall show fiat object‐dependent thoughts are psychologically spurious. This version of externalism is contrasted with the picture that thoughts are object‐independent. It is argued that object‐independent thoughts are perspectival and context‐sensitive and that these perspectival thoughts, unlike object‐dependent thoughts: deal with delusion in an intuitive and elegant way; support psychological generalizations in a straightforward way; do not need to be fully articulated and, as such, fit with an economical (...)
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  25. Wesley D. Cray (2014). Inconstancy and Content. Dialectica 68 (3):337-353.
    According to David Lewis, many de re modal predications – that is, sentences such as ‘John McCain could have won the 2008 U.S. Presidential election’ and ‘Dwight could receive a promotion’ – are inconstant insofar as their truth values can vary alongside changes in our interests. In this paper, I argue that previous accounts of this inconstancy, such as those offered by Lewis and Harold Noonan, are inadequate. Linguistic data, I claim – specifically, agreement and disagreement data – tell against (...)
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  26. John Deely (2001). Contents in Detail. In Four Ages of Understanding: The First Postmodern Survey of Philosophy From Ancient Times to the Turn of the Twenty-First Century. University of Toronto Press.
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  27. Daniel C. Dennett, Two Black Boxes: A Fable.
    Once upon a time, there were two large black boxes, A and B, connected by a long insulated copper wire. On box A there were two buttons, marked *a* and *b*, and on box B there were three lights, red, green, and amber. Scientists studying the behavior of the boxes had observed that whenever you pushed the *a* button on box A, the red light flashed briefly on box B, and whenever you pushed the *b* button on box A, the (...)
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  28. Patrick K. Dooley (1994). The Pluralistic Philosophy of Stephen Crane. University of Illinois Press.
    Crane's fundamental philosophical view, Dooley finds, is that reality is comprised of changing and interrelated processes.
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  29. S. R. Ellis & U. J. Bucher (1992). Depth-Perception of Stereoscopically Presented Virtual Objects Interacting with Real Background Patterns. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 30 (6):443-443.
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  30. Anthony Everett (2015). The Objects of Thought, by Tim Crane. Mind 124 (496):1272-1278.
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  31. Michael Neil Fleming (1999). The Linguistic U-Turn in the Philosophy of Thought. Dissertation, The University of British Columbia (Canada)
    A central task of contemporary analytic philosophy is to develop an understanding of how our minds are connected to the external world. Arising from this task is the need to explain how thoughts represent things in the world. Giving such an explanation is the central endeavor of this dissertation---the aim being to contribute to our understanding of what it is for a subject to be thinking of a particular object. The structure of the dissertation is set, in part, by responding (...)
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  32. Graeme Forbes & Nathan Salmon (1987). Frege's Puzzle. Philosophical Review 96 (3):455.
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  33. Illocutionary Force (2007). Content, Mode, and Self-Reference. In Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), John Searle's Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning, and Mind. Cambridge University Press.
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  34. Hubertus Fremerey (2006). Some Thoughts on What We Call Real. Philosophy Pathways 117.
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  35. Rocco J. Gennaro (2015). The 'Of' of Intentionality and the 'Of' of Acquaintance. In S. Miguens, G. Preyer & C. Morando (eds.), Pre-Reflective Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. Routledge. pp. 317-341.
    I first provide some background on Sartre’s theory of consciousness and prereflective self-awareness, especially with respect to how it might be favorably compared to my own version of HOT theory. I then critically examine a few initial attempts to understand the ‘acquaintance’ relation and to link it with Sartre’s notion of prereflective self-awareness. I then briefly address a related problem often raised against HOT theory, namely, the problem of misrepresentation. I also critique several further attempts to explain the acquaintance relation (...)
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  36. Paul Gilbert (1994). The Puzzle of Experience. Philosophical Books 35 (2):124-125.
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  37. Juan-Carlos Gomez (1998). Some Thoughts About the Evolution of LADS, with Special Reference to TOM and SAM. In P. Carruthers & J. Boucher (eds.), Language and Thought. Cambridge University Press. pp. 76--93.
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  38. Aron Gurwitsch (1947). On the Object of Thought. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 7 (3):347-353.
  39. Keith Hall (2013). Acquaintance and Mental Files. Disputatio.
    Hall-Keith-J_Acquaintance-and-Mental-Files.
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  40. Andrew Hamilton (1984). A. Woodfield "Thought and Object". [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 34 (34):81.
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  41. Carsten Hansen & Georges Rey (2016). Files and Singular Thoughts Without Objects or Acquaintance: The Prospects of Recanati’s “Actualism”. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (2):421-436.
    We argue that Recanati burdens his otherwise salutary “Mental File” account of singular thought with an “Actualist” assumption that he has inherited from the discussion of singular thought since at least Evans, according to which singular thoughts can only be about actual objects: apparent singular thoughts involving “empty” terms lack truth-valuable content. This assumption flies in the face of manifestly singular thoughts involving not only fictional and mistakenly postulated entities, such as Zeus and the planet Vulcan, but also “perceptual inexistents,” (...)
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  42. Paul L. Harris (2001). The Veridicality Assumption. Mind and Language 16 (3):247–262.
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  43. Richard T. Heine, R. Terry Pivik & Charles P. Thompson (1966). Magnitude of the Doublet Effect as a Function of Location in a Verbal Maze. Journal of Experimental Psychology 72 (6):912.
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  44. James T. Higginbotham (1995). Contents. Atascadero: Ridgeview.
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  45. Amir Horowitz (2009). Individualism and Narrow Content. Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations 8:139-153.
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  46. Iii Harmon R. Holcomb (1993). The Puzzle of Experience. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 47 (1):170-171.
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  47. C. A. Anderson J. Owens (ed.) (1990). Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Logic, Language, and Mind. CSLI.
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  48. Max Kölbel (2008). Truth in Semantics. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):242-257.
    Semantic theories for natural languages purport to describe a central aspect of the meaning of natural language sentences. In doing so, they usually employ some notion of truth. Most semanticists, even those who have no objections to invoking propositions, will define a truth-predicate that applies to sentences. Some will also employ a notion of propositional truth. Both types of semanticist face the question whether and how the semantic notion(s) of truth they are employing is (are)related to the ordinary, pre-theoretic notion(s) (...)
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  49. Brian Loar (1988). Two Kinds of Content. In Robert H. Grimm & D. D. Merrill (eds.), Contents of Thought. University of Arizona Press. pp. 121--139.
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  50. S. F. MacLennan (1903). Existence and Content. Mind 12 (45):78-82.
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