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  1. Why Credences Are Not Beliefs.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    A question of recent interest in epistemology and philosophy of mind is how belief and credence relate to each other. A number of philosophers argue for a belief-first view of the relationship between belief and credence. On the belief-first view, what is it to have a credence just is to have a particular kind of belief, that is, a belief whose content involves probabilities or epistemic modals. Here, I argue against the belief-first view: specifically, I argue that it cannot account (...)
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  2. Rules of Belief and the Normativity of Intentional Content.Derek Green - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-11.
    Mental content normativists hold that the mind’s conceptual contents are essentially normative. Many hold the view because they think that facts of the form “subject S possesses concept c” imply that S is enjoined by rules concerning the application of c in theoretical judgments. Some opponents independently raise an intuitive objection: even if there are such rules, S’s possession of the concept is not the source of the enjoinment. Hence, these rules do not support mental content normativism. Call this the (...)
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  3. Book Review of Perception, Realism, and the Problem of Reference. [REVIEW]Jennifer Matey - 2012 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 1.
  4. The Intentionality and Intelligibility of Moods.Jonathan Mitchell - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):118-135.
    This article offers an account of moods as distinctive kinds of personal level affective-evaluative states, which are both intentional and rationally intelligible in specific ways. The account contrasts with those who claim moods are non-intentional, and so also arational. Section 1 provides a conception of intentionality and distinguishes moods, as occurrent experiential states, from other states in the affective domain. Section 2 argues moods target the subject’s total environment presented in a specific evaluative light through felt valenced attitudes (the Mood-Intentionality (...)
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  5. Content in a Dynamic Context.Una Stojnić - 2019 - Noûs 53 (2):394-432.
    The standing tradition in theorizing about meaning, since at least Frege, identifies meaning with propositions, which are, or determine, the truth-conditions of a sentence in a context. But a recent trend has advocated a departure from this tradition: in particular, it has been argued that modal claims do not express standard propositional contents. This non-propositionalism has received different implementations in expressivist semantics and certain kinds of dynamic semantics. They maintain that the key aspect of interpretation of modal claims is the (...)
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  6. How Do We Know Things with Signs? A Model of Semiotic Intentionality.Manuel Gustavo Isaac - 2017 - IfCoLog Journal of Logics and Their Applications 10 (4):3683-3704.
    Intentionality may be dealt with in two different ways: either ontologically, as an ordinary relation to some extraordinary objects, or epistemologically, as an extraordinary relation to some ordinary objects. This paper endorses the epistemological view in order to provide a model of semiotic intentionality defined as the meaning-and-cognizing process that constitutes to power of the mind to be about something on the basis of a semiotic system. After a short introduction that presents the components of semiotic intentionality (viz. sign, act, (...)
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  7. The Prenective View of Propositional Content.Robert Trueman - 2018 - Synthese 195 (4):1799-1825.
    Beliefs have what I will call ‘propositional content’. A belief is always a belief that so-and-so: a belief that grass is green, or a belief that snow is white, or whatever. Other things have propositional content too, such as sentences, judgments and assertions. The Standard View amongst philosophers is that what it is to have a propositional content is to stand in an appropriate relation to a proposition. Moreover, on this view, propositions are objects, i.e. the kind of thing you (...)
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  8. Propositional Content. [REVIEW]Indrek Reiland - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (1):132-136.
  9. Truth in Semantics.Max Kölbel - 2008 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):242-257.
    Semantic theories for natural languages purport to describe a central aspect of the meaning of natural language sentences. In doing so, they usually employ some notion of truth. Most semanticists, even those who have no objections to invoking propositions, will define a truth-predicate that applies to sentences. Some will also employ a notion of propositional truth. Both types of semanticist face the question whether and how the semantic notion(s) of truth they are employing is (are)related to the ordinary, pre-theoretic notion(s) (...)
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  10. The Deflation of Belief Contents.Robert J. Stainton - 1996 - Critica 28 (84):63-82.
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  11. Mental Explicitness: The Case of Representational Contents.Pierre Steiner - 2005 - Abstracta 2 (1):3-23.
    This paper aims at answering the question “When is informational content explicitly represented in a cognitive system?”. I first distinguish the explicitness this question is about from other kinds of explicitness that are currently investigated in philosophy of mind, and situate the components of the question within the various conceptual frameworks that are used to study mental representations. I then present and criticize, on conceptual and empirical grounds, two basic ways of answering the question, the first one coming from the (...)
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  12. Between Thoughts and Things: The Status of Meanings.Thomas D. Sullivan - 1976 - New Scholasticism 50 (1):85-95.
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  13. Contents in Detail.John Deely - 2001 - In Four Ages of Understanding: The First Postmodern Survey of Philosophy From Ancient Times to the Turn of the Twenty-First Century. University of Toronto Press.
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  14. Some Thoughts...; Continued From P. 6.Mark Weinstein - 1988 - Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 2 (2):9-9.
  15. Mental Files: Replies to My Critics.François Recanati - 2013 - Disputatio 5 (36):207-242.
    My responses to seven critical reviews of my book *Mental Files* published in a special issue of the journal Disputatio, edited by F. Salis. The reviewers are: Keith Hall, David Papineau, Annalisa Coliva and Delia Belleri, Peter Pagin, Thea Goodsell, Krista Lawlor and Manuel Garcia-Carpintero.
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  16. What Is the Role of Consciousness in Demonstrative Thought?Declan Smithies - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy 108 (1):5-34.
    Perception enables us to think demonstrative thoughts about the world around us, but what must perception be like in order to play this role? Does perception enable demonstrative thought only if it is conscious? This paper examines three accounts of the role of consciousness in demonstrative thought, which agree that consciousness is essential for demonstrative thought, but disagree about why it is. First, I consider and reject the accounts proposed by Gareth Evans in The Varieties of Reference and by John (...)
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  17. How Can One Person Represent Another?A. Phillips Griffiths & Richard Wollheim - 1960 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 34 (1):187-224.
  18. IX.—The Object of Thought and Real Being.G. F. Stout - 1911 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 11 (1):187-205.
  19. Tim Crane, The Objects of Thought, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, Xii + 182 Pp., £27.50 , ISBN 978-0-19-968274-4. [REVIEW]Alberto Voltolini - 2016 - Dialectica 70 (2):245-252.
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  20. Files and Singular Thoughts Without Objects or Acquaintance: The Prospects of Recanati’s “Actualism”.Carsten Hansen & Georges Rey - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (2):421-436.
    We argue that Recanati burdens his otherwise salutary “Mental File” account of singular thought with an “Actualist” assumption that he has inherited from the discussion of singular thought since at least Evans, according to which singular thoughts can only be about actual objects: apparent singular thoughts involving “empty” terms lack truth-valuable content. This assumption flies in the face of manifestly singular thoughts involving not only fictional and mistakenly postulated entities, such as Zeus and the planet Vulcan, but also “perceptual inexistents,” (...)
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  21. Crane on Concepts and Experiential Content.D. McFarland - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):54-58.
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  22. Against Absence-Dependent Thoughts.H. W. Noonan - 2004 - Analysis 64 (1):92-93.
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  23. The Objects of Thought, by Tim Crane. [REVIEW]Anthony Everett - 2015 - Mind 124 (496):1272-1278.
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  24. The 'Of' of Intentionality and the 'Of' of Acquaintance.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2015 - In S. Miguens, G. Preyer & C. Morando (eds.), Pre-Reflective Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. Routledge. pp. 317-341.
    I first provide some background on Sartre’s theory of consciousness and prereflective self-awareness, especially with respect to how it might be favorably compared to my own version of HOT theory. I then critically examine a few initial attempts to understand the ‘acquaintance’ relation and to link it with Sartre’s notion of prereflective self-awareness. I then briefly address a related problem often raised against HOT theory, namely, the problem of misrepresentation. I also critique several further attempts to explain the acquaintance relation (...)
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  25. Anti-Normativism Evaluated.Ulf Hlobil - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):376-395.
    I argue that recent attempts to show that meaning and content are not normative fail. The two most important arguments anti-normativists have presented are what I call the ‘argument from constitution’ and the ‘argument from guidance’. Both of these arguments suffer from the same basic problem: they overlook the possibility of focusing on assessability by norms, rather than compliance with norms or guidance by norms. Moreover, I argue that the anti-normativists arguments fail even if we ignore this basic problem. Thus, (...)
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  26. The Objects of Thought by Tim Crane. [REVIEW]Michelle Montague - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):335-339.
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  27. Propositional Attitudes, Intentional Contents and Other Representationalist Myths.Hans Johann Glock - unknown
  28. Acquaintance and Mental Files.Keith Hall - 2013 - Disputatio.
    Hall-Keith-J_Acquaintance-and-Mental-Files.
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  29. The Cognitive Significance of Mental Files.Peter Pagin - 2013 - Disputatio 5 (36):133-145.
    Pagin-Peter_The-cognitive-significance-of-mental-files.
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  30. Consilia: Or, Thoughts Upon Several Subjects.Samuel Birch - 1785
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  31. Intentionality and its Objects.Michelle Irmengard Montague - 2002 - Dissertation, University of Colorado at Boulder
    A full explication of the phenomenon of intentionality must explain the aboutness or object-directedness of thought and give a theory of the objects that we are related to in thought. I chose to approach the topic of intentionality by investigating the objects of the attitudes. Thus, my dissertation answers a central question concerning intentionality: what are the objects of thought? ;My main thesis is that the objects of thought are constructions. By explicating and developing Pavel Tichy's theory of constructions, I (...)
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  32. The Linguistic U-Turn in the Philosophy of Thought.Michael Neil Fleming - 1999 - Dissertation, The University of British Columbia (Canada)
    A central task of contemporary analytic philosophy is to develop an understanding of how our minds are connected to the external world. Arising from this task is the need to explain how thoughts represent things in the world. Giving such an explanation is the central endeavor of this dissertation---the aim being to contribute to our understanding of what it is for a subject to be thinking of a particular object. The structure of the dissertation is set, in part, by responding (...)
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  33. Between de Dicto and de Re: De Objecto Attitudes.Tero Tulenheimo Manuel Rebuschi - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (245):828-838.
    Hintikka's second generation epistemic logic introduces a syntactic device allowing to express independence relations between certain logical constants. De re knowledge attributions can be reformulated in terms of quantifier independence, but the reformulation does not extend to non‐factive attitudes like belief. There, formulae with independent quantifiers serve to express a new type of attitude, intermediate between de dicto and de re, called ‘de objecto’: in each possible world compatible with the agent's belief, there is an individual with the specified property (...)
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  34. Brinton, Crane, The Anatomy of Revolution.Kirchheimer Kirchheimer - 1939 - Studies in Philosophy and Social Science 8:254.
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  35. Brinton, Crane, A Decade of Revolution.Trinkaus Trinkaus - 1935 - Studies in Philosophy and Social Science 4:292.
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  36. How Can One Person Represent Another?A. Griffiths & Richard Wollheim - 1960 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 34:187-224.
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  37. BRINTON, CRANE. Nietzsche.Moses J. Aronson - 1941 - Journal of Social Philosophy and Jurisprudence 7:94.
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  38. Content and Confirmation.Kenneth Bruce Gemes - 1991 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    Philosophers of science, including the inductivist Carnap and the deductivist Popper, share the notion that the content of a proposition is given by its consequence class. I argue that this notion of content is unintuitive and inappropriate for many of the formal needs of philosophers of science. The basic problem is that given this notion of content, for any arbitrary p and q, $\lceil$p v q$\rceil$ will count as part of the content of both p and q. So any arbitrary (...)
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  39. The Fall and Rise of Representational Content.Kevin Edwin Possin - 1984 - Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin - Madison
    Recently, appeals to the representational content of psychological states, for the purposes of individuating those states and explaining behavior, have come under attack by a position called methodological solipsism . Because the rationale behind this attack is best appreciated after looking at the theoretical trends in contemporary cognitive psychology, I provide a brief survey of cognitive and folk psychology's theoretical commitments concerning the content of psychological states. While cognitive psycholgy largely inherits its commitments to psychological state content from folk psychology, (...)
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  40. Content Determination in Perceptual States.Douglass Munro Smith - 1998 - Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin - Madison
    The project in this essay will be to chart a naturalist theory of content for perceptual states, where the content is constituted by that state of the world picked out by a proposition telling us what it is that is believed, desired, etc. We will focus on the perceptual states of desire and vision, and only on contents involving physical objects. ;We will begin by doing an overview of some recent attempts to define function. We will consider a treatment by (...)
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  41. Individuating Intentionality Via Narrow Content.George H. Miller - 1994 - Dissertation, Temple University
    In this essay I argue that there is a sense in which phenomenological content determines the object of a conscious experience. "Phenomenological content" consists of the senses and sense-structures which become apparent when a subject engages in phenomenological reflection. An introduction to phenomenology is provided for those who are unfamiliar with its practice and literature. ;Various philosophers have argued that the sense of a verbal expression does not determine its reference. Ronald McIntyre has maintained that the arguments against the determination (...)
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  42. Intentional Propositions 'de Dicto' and 'de Re' and Non-Propositional Seeing.Alan Caden Burk - 1973 - Dissertation, Brown University
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  43. On the Metaphysics of Belief.Cara Spencer - 1998 - Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
    There is a traditional picture of belief, according to which someone's having a belief is that person's standing in a certain relation to an abstract object, a proposition. My dissertation examines the metaphysical demands that two problems for this picture of belief make on these abstract objects. The first problem comes to us from Frege's "On Sense and Reference," and the second concerns a certain sort of one's beliefs about oneself, which I call "indexical beliefs." ;Frege notes that someone can (...)
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  44. Thoughts Animals Can Think: Attributing Beliefs and Describing Content.Kevin J. Krein - 2001 - Dissertation, University of Toronto (Canada)
    One of the problems that arises in attempts to attribute thoughts to non-human animals is that is difficult to find sentences of human language that accurately express the content of those thoughts. I argue that semantic theories that do not depend on an understanding of propositional content as being linguistic in nature can provide a helpful perspective from which to approach questions about the content of the beliefs of non-language-using animals. In particular, I consider Robert Stalnaker's possible worlds semantics and (...)
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  45. PEACOCKE, C.: "Sense and Content". [REVIEW]M. Smith - 1985 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63:372.
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  46. Some Thoughts on What We Call Real.Hubertus Fremerey - 2006 - Philosophy Pathways 117.
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  47. Traces, Documents, and the Puzzle of “Permanent Acts”.Enrico Terrone - 2014 - The Monist 97 (2):161-178.
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  48. A. Woodfield "Thought and Object". [REVIEW]Andrew Hamilton - 1984 - Philosophical Quarterly 34 (34):81.
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  49. C. Peacocke, "Sense and Content". [REVIEW]John Campbell - 1986 - Philosophical Quarterly 36 (43):278.
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  50. Tim Crane, The Mechanical Mind.Tatiana Sedová - 2005 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 12 (3):351-353.
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