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  1. Folk Psychology and Social Inference: Everyday Solutions to the Problem of Other Minds.Daniel Robert Ames - 1999 - Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley
    In the course of everyday life, perceivers make sense of one another with speed and confidence, judging intentions, forming impressions, predicting a person's next move. But what is the nature of such social inferences and how do they unfold? Building on the work of philosophers and developmental psychologists, I argue that, at its core, person perception is bound up with the so-called problem of other minds: the inference of other people's thoughts, feelings, beliefs, and desires. While this folk psychological approach (...)
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  2. Unified Social Cognition.Norman H. Anderson - 2008 - Psychology Press.
    Unified theory of cognition -- Psychological laws -- Foundations of person cognition -- Functional theory of attitudes -- Attitude integration theories -- Comparisons of attitude theories -- Moral algebra -- Group dynamics -- Cognitive theory of judgment-decision -- General theory -- Experimental methods -- Unified science of psychology.
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  3. The Folk Psychological Spiral: Explanation, Regulation, and Language.Kristin Andrews - 2015 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (S1):50-67.
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  4. Pluralistic Folk Psychology and Varieties of Self-Knowledge: An Exploration.Kristin Andrews - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):282-296.
    Turning the techniques we use to understand other people onto ourselves can provide an insight into the types of self-knowledge that may be possible for us. Adopting Pluralistic Folk Psychology, according to which we understand others not primarily by thinking about invisible beliefs and desires that cause behavior, but instead by modeling others as people - with rich characters, relationships, past histories, cultural embeddedness, personality traits, and so forth. A preliminary investigation shows that we understand ourselves at least in terms (...)
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  5. Do Apes Read Minds?: Toward a New Folk Psychology.Kristin Andrews - 2012 - MIT Press.
    Andrews argues for a pluralistic folk psychology that employs different kinds of practices and different kinds of cognitive tools (including personality trait attribution, stereotype activation, inductive reasoning about past behavior, and ...
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  6. Telling Stories Without Words.Kristin Andrews - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (6-8):6-8.
    In this review article of Dan Hutto's bok Folk Psychological Narratives: The Sociocultural Basis of Understanding Reasons, I argue that we can take a functional approach to FP that identifies it with the practice of explaining behaviour -- that is, we can understand folk psychology as having the purpose of explaining behaviour and promoting social cohesion by making others’ behaviour comprehensible, without thinking that this ability must be limited to those with linguistic abilities. One reason for thinking that language must (...)
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  7. Telling Tales.Kristin Andrews - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (2):227-235.
    In the twenty-five or so years since Paul Churchland proposed its elimination, defenders of folk psychology have argued for the ubiquity of propositional attitude attribution in human social cognition. If we didn’t understand others in terms of their beliefs and desires, we would see others as ‘‘baffling ciphers’’ and it would be ‘‘the end of the world’’. Because the world continues, and we seem to predict and explain what others do with a remarkable degree of accuracy, the advocates of folk (...)
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  8. It's in Your Nature: A Pluralistic Folk Psychology.Kristin Andrews - 2008 - Synthese 165 (1):13 - 29.
    I suggest a pluralistic account of folk psychology according to which not all predictions or explanations rely on the attribution of mental states, and not all intentional actions are explained by mental states. This view of folk psychology is supported by research in developmental and social psychology. It is well known that people use personality traits to predict behavior. I argue that trait attribution is not shorthand for mental state attributions, since traits are not identical to beliefs or desires, and (...)
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  9. The Functions of Folk Psychology.Kristin Andrews - manuscript
    The debates about the form of folk psychology and the potential eliminability of folk psychology rest on a particular view about how humans understand other minds. That is, though folk psychology is described as --œour commonsense conception of psychological phenomena--� (Churchland 1981, p. 67), there have been implicit assumptions regarding the nature of that commonsense conception. It has been assumed that folk psychology involves two practices, the prediction and explanation of behavior. And it has been assumed that one cognitive mechanism (...)
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  10. How to Learn From Our Mistakes.Kristin Andrews - 2004 - Philosophical Explorations 7 (3):247 – 263.
    A new approach to developing models of folk psychology is suggested, namely that different models exist for different folk psychological practices. This point is made through an example: the explanation and justification of morally heinous actions. Human folk psychology in this area is prone to a specific error of conflating an explanation for behaviour with a justification of it. An analysis of the error leads me to conclude that simulation is used to generate both explanations and justifications of heinous acts. (...)
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  11. On Predicting Behavior.Kristin Andrews - manuscript
    I argue that the behavior of other agents is insufficiently described in current debates as a dichotomy between tacit theory (attributing beliefs and desires to predict behavior) and simulation theory (imagining what one would do in similar circumstances in order to predict behavior). I introduce two questions about the foundation and development of our ability both to attribute belief and to simulate it. I then propose that there is one additional method used to predict behavior, namely, an inductive strategy.
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  12. Predicting Mind: Belief Attribution in Philosophy and Psychology.Kristin Alexandra Andrews - 2000 - Dissertation, University of Minnesota
    There are two problems with many philosophical theories of the mind and language: they almost always focus exclusively on normal adult humans, excluding others such as children, people with autism, and animals, and they are often developed without regard to the relevant scientific research. In my dissertation, I explain why this is a problem. First, I argue that we should accept the existence of animal minds, and that we should use the methods of experimental psychology and cognitive ethology in order (...)
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  13. Anthropomorphism, Anthropectomy, and the Null Hypothesis.Kristin Andrews & Brian Huss - 2014 - Biology and Philosophy 29 (5):711-729.
    We examine the claim that the methodology of psychology leads to a bias in animal cognition research against attributing “anthropomorphic” properties to animals . This charge is examined in light of a debate on the role of folk psychology between primatologists who emphasize similarities between humans and other apes, and those who emphasize differences. We argue that while in practice there is sometimes bias, either in the formulation of the null hypothesis or in the preference of Type-II errors over Type-I (...)
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  14. The Folk Psychology of Consciousness.Adam Arico, Brian Fiala, Robert F. Goldberg & Shaun Nichols - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (3):327-352.
    This paper proposes the ‘AGENCY model’ of conscious state attribution, according to which an entity's displaying certain relatively simple features (e.g. eyes, distinctive motions, interactive behavior) automatically triggers a disposition to attribute conscious states to that entity. To test the model's predictions, participants completed a speeded object/attribution task, in which they responded positively or negatively to attributions of mental properties (including conscious and non-conscious states) to different sorts of entities (insects, plants, artifacts, etc.). As predicted, participants responded positively to conscious (...)
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  15. Toward Formalizing Common-Sense Psychology: An Analysis of the False-Belief Task.Konstantine Arkoudas & Selmer Bringsjord - 2008 - In Tu-Bao Ho & Zhi-Hua Zhou (eds.), Pricai 2008: Trends in Artificial Intelligence. Springer. pp. 17--29.
  16. Mental Concepts: Casual Analysis.David M. Armstrong - 2004 - In R. L. Gregory (ed.), The Oxford Companion to the Mind. Oxford University Press. pp. 572--574.
  17. Information Processing Constraints on the Acquisition of a Theory of Mind.Mariangela Artuso - 1998
  18. False-Belief Understanding and Social Competence.Janet Wilde Astington - 2003 - In B. Repacholi & V. Slaughter (eds.), Individual Differences in Theory of Mind: Implications for Typical and Atypical Development. Hove, E. Sussex: Psychology Press.
  19. Dispositional Beliefs and Dispositions to Believe.Robert N. Audi - 1994 - Noûs 28 (4):419-34.
  20. The Explanation of Human Action in Common Sense and Contemporary Psychology.Robert Nemir Audi - 1967 - Dissertation, University of Michigan
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  21. Structure-Mapping: Directions From Simulation to Theory.Theodore Bach - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (1):23-51.
    The theory of mind debate has reached a “hybrid consensus” concerning the status of theory-theory and simulation-theory. Extant hybrid models either specify co-dependency and implementation relations, or distribute mentalizing tasks according to folk-psychological categories. By relying on a non-developmental framework these models fail to capture the central connection between simulation and theory. I propose a “dynamic” hybrid that is informed by recent work on the nature of similarity cognition. I claim that Gentner’s model of structure-mapping allows us to understand simulation (...)
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  22. Rethinking Commonsense Psychology: A Critique of Folk Psychology, Theory of Mind and Simulation - by Matthew Ratcliffe.James Baillie - 2008 - Philosophical Books 49 (2):172-175.
  23. Rethinking Commonsense Psychology: A Critique of Folk Psychology, Theory of Mind and Simulation ‐ by Matthew Ratcliffe.James Baillie - 2008 - Philosophical Books 49 (2):172-175.
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  24. Folk Psychology.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1999 - In Rob Wilson & Frank Keil (eds.), MIT Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. MIT Press.
    In recent years, folk psychology has become a topic of debate not just among philosophers, but among development psychologists and primatologists as well.
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  25. What is This Thing Called 'Commonsense Psychology'?Lynne Rudder Baker - 1999 - Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):3-19.
    What is this thing called ‘Commonsense Psychology’? The first matter to settle is what the issue is here. By ‘commonsense psychology,’ I mean primarily the systems of describing, explaining and predicting human thought and action in terms of beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, expectations, intentions and other so-called propositional attitudes. Although commonsense psychology encompasses more than propositional attitudes--e.g., emotions, traits and abilities are also within its purview--belief-desire reasoning forms the core of commonsense psychology. Commonsense psychology is what we use to explain (...)
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  26. On the Attribution of Mental States.Juraj Banovsky - 2013 - Filozofia 68 (6):530-538.
  27. Computer Modeling and the Fate of Folk Psychology.John A. Barker - 2002 - Metaphilosophy 33 (1-2):30-48.
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  28. Folk Psychology as Mental Simulation.Luca Barlassina & Robert M. Gordon - 2017 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Mindreading (or folk psychology, Theory of Mind, mentalizing) is the capacity to represent and reason about others’ mental states. The Simulation Theory (ST) is one of the main approaches to mindreading. ST draws on the common-sense idea that we represent and reason about others’ mental states by putting ourselves in their shoes. More precisely, we typically arrive at representing others’ mental states by simulating their mental states in our own mind. This entry offers a detailed analysis of ST, considers theoretical (...)
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  29. Simulative Reasoning, Common-Sense Psychology and Artificial Intelligence.John A. Barnden - 1995 - In Martin Davies & Tony Stone (eds.), Mental Simulation: Evaluations and Applications. Blackwell. pp. 247--273.
  30. Without a Theory of Mind One Cannot Participate in a Conversation.Simon Baron-Cohen - 1988 - Cognition 29 (1):83-84.
  31. Marking the Perception–Cognition Boundary: The Criterion of Stimulus-Dependence.Jacob Beck - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-16.
    Philosophy, scientific psychology, and common sense all distinguish perception from cognition. While there is little agreement about how the perception–cognition boundary ought to be drawn, one prominent idea is that perceptual states are dependent on a stimulus, or stimulus-dependent, in a way that cognitive states are not. This paper seeks to develop this idea in a way that can accommodate two apparent counterexamples: hallucinations, which are prima facie perceptual yet stimulus-independent; and demonstrative thoughts, which are prima facie cognitive yet stimulus-dependent. (...)
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  32. Folk-Psychological Explanations.Jonathan Bennett - 1991 - In John D. Greenwood (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology. Cambridge University Press. pp. 176.
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  33. The Interface Problem and the Scope of Commonsense Psychology: Reply to Paternoster.José Luis Bermúdez - 2006 - SWIF Philosophy of Mind Review 5 (3).
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  34. Commonsense Psychology and the Interface Problem: Reply to Botterill.José Luis Bermúdez - 2006 - SWIF Philosophy of Mind Review 5 (3).
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  35. Thinking Without Words.José Luis Bermúdez - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
    Thinking Without Words provides a challenging new theory of the nature of non-linguistic thought. Jose Luis Bermudez offers a conceptual framework for treating human infants and non-human animals as genuine thinkers. The book is written with an interdisciplinary readership in mind and will appeal to philosophers, psychologists, and students of animal behavior.
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  36. The Domain of Folk Psychology.Jose Luis Bermudez - 2003 - In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 25–48.
    My topic in this paper is social understanding. By this I mean the cognitive skills underlying social behaviour and social coordination. Normal, encultured, non-autistic and non-brain-damaged human beings are capable of an impressive degree of social coordination. We navigate the social world with a level of skill and dexterity fully comparable to that which we manifest in navigating the physical world. In neither sphere, one might think, would it be a trivial matter to identify the various competences which underly this (...)
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  37. The Domain of Folk Psychology.José Luis Bermúdez - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 53:25-48.
    My topic in this paper is social understanding. By this I mean the cognitive skills underlying social behaviour and social coordination. Normal, encultured, non-autistic and non-brain-damaged human beings are capable of an impressive degree of social coordination. We navigate the social world with a level of skill and dexterity fully comparable to that which we manifest in navigating the physical world. In neither sphere, one might think, would it be a trivial matter to identify the various competences which underly this (...)
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  38. Historical Explanation, Folk Psychology, and Narrative.Mark Bevir - 2000 - Philosophical Explorations 3 (2):152 – 168.
    This paper argues that history differs from natural science in relying on folk psychology and so narrative explanations. In narratives, actions, beliefs, and pro-attitudes are joined by conditional and volitional connections. Conditional connections exist when beliefs and pro-attitudes pick up themes from one another Volitional connections exist when agents command themselves to do something having decided to do it because of a pro-attitude they hold. The paper defends the epistemic legitimacy of narratives by arguing we have legitimate grounds for postulating (...)
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  39. Theory, Observation, and Drama.Simon W. Blackburn - 1992 - Mind and Language 7 (1-2):187-203.
  40. Mindreaders: The Cognitive Basis of "Theory of Mind", by Ian Apperly. [REVIEW]Olle Blomberg - 2011 - Metapsychology Online Reviews 15 (13).
  41. The Perceived Intentionality of Groups.Paul Bloom & Csaba Veres - 1999 - Cognition 71 (1):B1-B9.
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  42. A Defense of Folk Psychology.Paul K. Blunt - 1992 - International Philosophical Quarterly 32 (4):487-498.
  43. Common Sense Naturalized.Radu J. Bogdan - unknown
    Almost everybody believes, but nobody has conclusively shown, that common sense psychology is a descriptive body of knowledge about the mind, the way physics is about elementary particles or medicine about bodily conditions. Of course, common sense psychology helps itself to many notions about the mind. This does not show that common sense psychology is about the mind. Physics also helps itself to plenty of mathematical notions, without being about mathematical entities and relations. Employment of notions about the mind does (...)
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  44. Minding Minds: Evolving a Reflexive Mind by Interpreting Others.Radu J. Bogdan - 2003 - MIT Press.
    In this book, Radu Bogdan proposes that humans think reflexively because they interpret each other's minds in social contexts of cooperation, communication, ...
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  45. Interpreting Minds: The Evolution of a Practice.Radu J. Bogdan - 1997 - MIT Press/Bradford Books.
  46. The Architectural Nonchalance of Commonsense Psychology.Radu J. Bogdan - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (2):189-205.
    Eliminativism assumes that commonsense psychology describes and explains the mind in terms of the internal design and operation of the mind. If this assumption is invalidated, so is eliminativism. The same conditional is true of intentional realism. Elsewhere (Bogdan 1991) I have argued against this 'folk- theory-theory' assumption by showing that commonsense psychology is not an empirical prototheory of the mind but a biosocially motivated practice of coding, utilizing, and sharing information from and about conspecifics. Here, without presupposing a specific (...)
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  47. Mind and Common Sense: Philosophical Essays on Commonsense Psychology.Radu J. Bogdan (ed.) - 1991 - Cambridge University Press.
    The contributors to this volume examine current controversies about the importance of common sense psychology for our understanding of the human mind. Common sense provides a familiar and friendly psychological scheme by which to talk about the mind. Its categories (belief, desire, intention, consciousness, emotion, and so on) tend to portray the mind as quite different from the rest of nature, and thus irreducible to physical matters and its laws. In this volume a variety of positions on common sense psychology (...)
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  48. Mind and Common Sense: Philosophical Essays on Common Sense Psychology.Radu J. Bogdan (ed.) - 1991 - Cambridge University Press.
    The contributors to this volume examine recent controversies about the importance of common sense psychology for our understanding of the human mind. Common sense provides a familiar and friendly psychological scheme by which to talk about the mind. Its categories tend to portray the mind as quite different from the rest of nature, and thus irreducible to physical matters and its laws. In this volume a variety of positions on common sense psychology from critical to supportive, from exegetical to speculative, (...)
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  49. The Folklore of the Mind.Radu J. Bogdan - 1991 - In R. Bogdan (ed.), Mind and Common Sense. Cambridge University Press.
    A distinguished wise man, Emil Cioran, with whom I share a country of birth and the thought that follows, said once that the two most interesting things in life are gossip and metaphysics. I can hardly think of a more self evident and enjoyable truth, if wisely construed. This volume combines the two pleasures, for it is an exercise in the metaphysics of wise gossip, of how we make sense of each other, and how, as a result we interpret, explain, (...)
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  50. Mental Attitudes and Common Sense Psychology: The Case Against Elimination.Radu J. Bogdan - 1988 - Noûs 22 (3):369-398.
    Aside from brute force, there are several philosophically respectable ways of eliminating the mental. In recent years the most popular elimination strategy has been directed against our common sense or folk psychological understanding of the mental. The strategy goes by the name of eliminative materialism (or eliminativism, in short). The motivation behind this strategy seems to be the following. If common sense psychology can be construed as the principled theory of the mental, whose vocabulary and principles implicitly define what counts (...)
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