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  1. Neo-Sellarsian Metaphilosophy.T. Parent - manuscript
    This draft now appears (in revised form) as the Preamble to _Self-Reflection for the Opaque Mind_. See http://philpapers.org/rec/PARSFT-3.
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  2. As True as 'You Think': Preserving the Core of Folk Psychology.Mark Sharlow - 2007
    In this paper I argue in defense of an important fragment of folk psychology. Specifically, I argue that many propositions about the ontology of mental states and about mental causation are true largely because of certain observable features of human linguistic behavior. I conclude that these propositions are immune to common avenues of eliminativist criticism. I compare and contrast this argument with some previous arguments about the truth of folk psychology.
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  3. Mindreading.Dorcas Chung - unknown - Proceedings of the Heraclitean Society 21.
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  4. Introduction to Folk Psychology: Pluralistic Approaches.Kristin Andrews, Shannon Spaulding & Evan Westra - forthcoming - Synthese.
    This introduction to the topical collection, Folk Psychology: Pluralistic Approaches reviews the origins and basic theoretical tenets of the framework of pluralistic folk psychology. It places special emphasis on pluralism about the variety folk psychological strategies that underlie behavioral prediction and explanation beyond belief-desire attribution, and on the diverse range of social goals that folk psychological reasoning supports beyond prediction and explanation. Pluralism is not presented as a single theory or model of social cognition, but rather as a big-tent research (...)
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  5. How Beliefs Are Like Colors.Devin Sanchez Curry - forthcoming - Synthese:1-30.
    Double dissociations between perceivable colors and physical properties of colored objects have led many philosophers to endorse relationalist accounts of color. I argue that there are analogous double dissociations between *attitudes* of belief—the beliefs that people attribute to each other in everyday life—and intrinsic *cognitive states* of belief—the beliefs that some cognitive scientists posit as cogs in cognitive systems—pitched at every level of psychological explanation. These dissociations provide good reason to refrain from conflating attitudes of belief with intrinsic cognitive states (...)
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  6. Street Smarts.Devin Sanchez Curry - forthcoming - Synthese:1-20.
    A pluralistic approach to folk psychology must countenance the evaluative, regulatory, predictive, and explanatory roles played by attributions of intelligence in social practices across cultures. Building off of the work of the psychologist Robert Sternberg and the philosophers Gilbert Ryle and Daniel Dennett, I argue that a relativistic interpretivism best accounts for the many varieties of intelligence that emerge from folk discourse. To be intelligent (in the sense invoked in folk psychological practices) is to be comparatively good at solving intellectual (...)
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  7. The Failure of Reductionism and the Triumph of Folk Psychology.N. Denijel - forthcoming - Theoria 41 (2):33-42.
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  8. Representation and Misrepresentation of Knowledge.Mikkel Gerken - forthcoming - Behavioral and Brain Sciences.
    I argue for three points: First, evidence of the primacy of knowledge representation is not evidence of primacy of knowledge. Second, knowledge-oriented mindreading research should also focus on misrepresentations and biased representations of knowledge. Third, knowledge-oriented mindreading research must confront the problem of the gold standard that arises when disagreement about knowledge complicates the interpretation of empirical findings.
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  9. The Cultural Evolution of Mind-Modelling.Richard Moore - forthcoming - Synthese 1.
    I argue that uniquely human forms of ‘Theory of Mind’ (or ‘ToM’) are a product of cultural evolution. Specifically, propositional attitude psychology is a linguistically constructed folk model of the human mind, invented by our ancestors for a range of tasks and refined over successive generations of users. The construction of these folk models gave humans new tools for thinking and reasoning about mental states—and so imbued us with abilities not shared by non-linguistic species. I also argue that uniquely human (...)
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  10. Folk Personality Psychology: Mindreading and Mindshaping in Trait Attribution.Evan Westra - forthcoming - Synthese:1-20.
    Character-trait attribution is an important component of everyday social cognition that has until recently received insufficient attention in traditional accounts of folk psychology. In this paper, I consider how the case of character-trait attribution fits into the debate between mindreading-based and broadly ‘pluralistic’ approaches to folk psychology. Contrary to the arguments of some pluralists, I argue that the evidence on trait understanding does not show that it is a distinct, non-mentalistic mode of folk-psychological reasoning, but rather suggests that traits are (...)
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  11. Interpretivism without judgement-dependence.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (2):611-615.
    In a recent article in this journal, Krzysztof Poslajko reconstructs—and endorses as probative—a dilemma for interpretivism first posed by Alex Byrne. On the first horn of the dilemma, the interpretivist takes attitudes to emerge in relation to an ideal interpreter (and thus loses any connection with actual folk psychological practices). On the second horn, the interpretivist takes attitudes to emerge in relation to individuals’ judgements (and thus denies the possibility of error). I show that this is a false dilemma. By (...)
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  12. Folk Psychology, Eliminativism, and the Present State of Connectionism.Vanja Subotić - 2021 - Theoria: Beograd 1 (64):173-196.
    Three decades ago, William Ramsey, Steven Stich & Joseph Garon put forward an argument in favor of the following conditional: if connectionist models that implement parallelly distributed processing represent faithfully human cognitive processing, eliminativism about propositional attitudes is true. The corollary of their argument (if it proves to be sound) is that there is no place for folk psychology in contemporary cognitive science. This understanding of connectionism as a hypothesis about cognitive architecture compatible with eliminativism is also endorsed by Paul (...)
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  13. Interpretivism and Norms.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (4):905-930.
    This article reconsiders the relationship between interpretivism about belief and normative standards. Interpretivists have traditionally taken beliefs to be fixed in relation to norms of interpretation. However, recent work by philosophers and psychologists reveals that human belief attribution practices are governed by a rich diversity of normative standards. Interpretivists thus face a dilemma: either give up on the idea that belief is constitutively normative or countenance a context-sensitive disjunction of norms that constitute belief. Either way, interpretivists should embrace the intersubjective (...)
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  14. The Origins of Mindreading: How Interpretive Socio-Cognitive Practices Get Off the Ground.Marco Fenici & Tadeusz Wieslaw Zawidzki - 2020 - Synthese:1-23.
    Recent accounts of mindreading—i.e., the human capacity to attribute mental states to interpret, explain, and predict behavior—have suggested that it has evolved through cultural rather than biological evolution. Although these accounts describe the role of culture in the ontogenetic development of mindreading, they neglect the question of the cultural origins of mindreading in human prehistory. We discuss four possible models of this, distinguished by the role they posit for culture: the standard evolutionary psychology model, the individualist empiricist model, the cultural (...)
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  15. Beyond the Human Standard in the Cognitive Domain: A Reply to Rodriguez' “Cognition Beyond the Human Domain”.Carrie Figdor - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (8):1204-1208.
    In "Cognition Beyond the Human Domain", Angel Garcia Rodriguez provides critical commentary on Pieces of Mind: The proper domain of psychological predicates (Oxford UP, 2018). In this reply, I argue that his alternative "No-Core" semantic proposal is not an alternative to the Literalist view I defend, but rather one way of elaborating that position.
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  16. Why Literalism is Still the Best Game in Town: Replies to Drayson, Machery, and Schwitzgebel.Carrie Figdor - 2020 - Mind and Language 35 (5):687-693.
    In Pieces of Mind: The Proper Domain of Psychological Predicates (Oxford UP, 2018), I argue that psychological predicates used to ascribe cognitive capacities to many nonhuman biological species should be interpreted literally with the same reference for humans and nonhumans alike. In this Mind & Language book symposium, I respond to comments and criticisms by Zoe Drayson, Edouard Machery, and Eric Schwitzgebel, and conclude that the Literalist position is still the best interpretation of these uses.
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  17. Self-deception, intentions and the folk-psychological explanation of action (in Croatian).Marko Jurjako - 2020 - Prolegomena: Časopis Za Filozofiju 19 (1):91-117.
    In the paper, I examine the conditions that are necessary for the correct characterization of the phenomenon of self-deception. Deflationists believe that the phenomenon of self-deception can be characterized as a kind of motivationally biased belief-forming process. They face the selectivity problem according to which the presence of a desire for something to be the case is not enough to produce a self-deceptive belief. Intentionalists argue that the solution to the selectivity problem consists in invoking the notion of intention. According (...)
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  18. Belief and Representation in Nonhuman Animals.Sarah Beth Lesson, Brandon Tinklenberg & Kristin Andrews - 2020 - In 2nd ed (ed.), Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology. pp. 370-383.
    It’s common to think that animals think. The cat thinks it is time to be fed, the monkey thinks the dominant is a threat. In order to make sense of what the other animals around us do, we ascribe mental states to them. The cat meows at the door because she wants to be let in. The monkey the monkey fails the test because he doesn’t remember the answer. -/- We explain animal actions in terms of their mental states, just (...)
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  19. Response to Evan Westra’s Review of “How We Understand Others”.Shannon Spaulding - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (6):883-887.
  20. '이상한 루프입니다'에 관한 리뷰 (I am a Strange Loop) Douglas Hofstadter (2000).Michael Richard Starks - 2020 - In 지구상의 지옥에 오신 것을 환영합니다 : 아기, 기후 변화, 비트 코인, 카르텔, 중국, 민주주의, 다양성, 역학, 평등, 해커, 인권, 이슬람, 자유주의, 번영, 웹, 혼돈, 기아, 질병, 폭력, 인공 지능, 전쟁. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 122-141.
    호프스타터 목사에 의해 근본주의 자연주의 교회의 최신 설교. 그의 훨씬 더 유명한 (또는 그 끊임없는 철학적 오류로 악명 높은) 작업 고델, 에셔, 바흐처럼, 그것은 피상적 인 타당성을 가지고 있지만, 하나는 철학적 인 것들과 실제 과학적 문제를 혼합 만연 한 사이언티즘것을 이해한다면 (즉, 유일한 진짜 문제는 우리가 재생해야하는 언어 게임이다) 다음 거의 모든 관심. 나는 진화 심리학과 비트겐슈타인의 작품에 기반한 분석을위한 프레임 워크를 제공합니다 (이후 내 최근 글에서 업데이트). 현대 의 두 시스템 보기에서인간의 행동에 대한 포괄적 인 최신 프레임 워크를 원하는 (...)
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  21. Getting to Know You: Accuracy and Error in Judgments of Character.Evan Westra - 2020 - Mind and Language 35 (5):583-600.
    Character judgments play an important role in our everyday lives. However, decades of empirical research on trait attribution suggest that the cognitive processes that generate these judgments are prone to a number of biases and cognitive distortions. This gives rise to a skeptical worry about the epistemic foundations of everyday characterological beliefs that has deeply disturbing and alienating consequences. In this paper, I argue that this skeptical worry is misplaced: under the appropriate informational conditions, our everyday character-trait judgments are in (...)
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  22. When is Mindreading Accurate? A Commentary on Shannon Spaulding’s How We Understand Others: Philosophy and Social Cognition. [REVIEW]Evan Westra - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (6):868-882.
    In How We Understand Others: Philosophy and Social Cognition, Shannon Spaulding develops a novel account of social cognition with pessimistic implications for mindreading accuracy: according to Spaulding, mistakes in mentalizing are much more common than traditional theories of mindreading commonly assume. In this commentary, I push against Spaulding’s pessimism from two directions. First, I argue that a number of the heuristic mindreading strategies that Spaulding views as especially error prone might be quite reliable in practice. Second, I argue that current (...)
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  23. Approaching Other Animals with Caution: Exploring Insights From Aquinas's Psychology.Daniel D. De Haan - 2019 - New Blackfriars 100 (1090):715-737.
    In this essay I explore the resources Thomas Aquinas provides for enquiries concerning the psychological abilities of nonhuman animals. I first look to Aquinas’s account of divine, angelic, human, and nonhuman animal naming, to help us articulate the contours of a ‘critical anthropocentrism’ that aims to steer clear of the mistakes of a na¨ıve anthropocentrism and misconceived avowals to entirely eschew anthropocentrism. I then address the need for our critical anthropocentrism both to reject the mental-physical dichotomy endorsed by ‘folk psychology’ (...)
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  24. Justification, Conversation, and Folk Psychology.Víctor Fernández Castro - 2019 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 34 (1):73-88.
    The aim of this paper is to offer a version of the so-called conversational hypothesis of the ontogenetic connection between language and mindreading (Harris 1996, 2005; Van Cleave and Gauker 2010; Hughes et al. 2006). After arguing against a particular way of understanding the hypothesis (the communicative view), I will start from the justificatory view in philosophy of social cognition (Andrews 2012; Hutto 2004; Zawidzki 2013) to make the case for the idea that the primary function of belief and desire (...)
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  25. Scientific Claims Are Constitutive of Common Sense About Health.Nada Gligorov - 2019 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42.
    Endorsing the view that commonsense conceptions are shaped by scientific claims provides an explanation for why microbiota-gut-brain research might become incorporated into commonsense notions of health. But scientific claims also shape notions of personal identity, which accounts for why they can become entrenched in common sense even after they have been refuted by science.
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  26. Eliminative Materialism and Ordinary Language.Daniel Lorca & Eric LaRock - 2019 - Philosophia Christi 21 (2):419-426.
    Advocates of eliminative materialism (EM) assure us that our current, ordinary approach to describing the mind will eventually be eliminated, instead of reduced, by a matured neuroscience. However, once we take into account the flexibility, explanatory power, and overall sophistication of ordinary language, then the promissory note offered by eliminative materialism loses all credibility. To bolster the preceding claim, we present three original problems for EM: the accountability problem, the substitution problem, and the discourse dependence problem.
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  27. The Complementarity of Mindshaping and Mindreading.Uwe Peters - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (3):533-549.
    Why do we engage in folk psychology, that is, why do we think about and ascribe propositional attitudes such as beliefs, desires, intentions etc. to people? On the standard view, folk psychology is primarily for mindreading, for detecting mental states and explaining and/or predicting people’s behaviour in terms of them. In contrast, McGeer (1996, 2007, 2015), and Zawidzki (2008, 2013) maintain that folk psychology is not primarily for mindreading but for mindshaping, that is, for moulding people’s behavior and minds (e.g., (...)
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  28. What is Mindreading?Shannon Spaulding - 2019 - WIREs Cognitive Science 11 (3).
    Theory of mind, also known as mindreading, refers to our ability to attribute mental states to agents in order to make sense of and interact with other agents. Recently, theorists in this literature have advanced a broad conception of mindreading. In particular, psychologists and philosophers have examined how we attribute knowledge, intention, mentalistically-loaded stereotypes, and personality traits to others. Moreover, the diversity of our goals in a social interaction – precision, efficiency, self/in-group protection – generates diversity in the mindreading processes (...)
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  29. Marking the Perception–Cognition Boundary: The Criterion of Stimulus-Dependence.Jacob Beck - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (2):319-334.
    Philosophy, scientific psychology, and common sense all distinguish perception from cognition. While there is little agreement about how the perception–cognition boundary ought to be drawn, one prominent idea is that perceptual states are dependent on a stimulus, or stimulus-dependent, in a way that cognitive states are not. This paper seeks to develop this idea in a way that can accommodate two apparent counterexamples: hallucinations, which are prima facie perceptual yet stimulus-independent; and demonstrative thoughts, which are prima facie cognitive yet stimulus-dependent. (...)
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  30. Beliefs as Inner Causes: The (Lack of) Evidence.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (6):850-877.
    Many psychologists studying lay belief attribution and behavior explanation cite Donald Davidson in support of their assumption that people construe beliefs as inner causes. But Davidson’s influential argument is unsound; there are no objective grounds for the intuition that the folk construe beliefs as inner causes that produce behavior. Indeed, recent experimental work by Ian Apperly, Bertram Malle, Henry Wellman, and Tania Lombrozo provides an empirical framework that accords well with Gilbert Ryle’s alternative thesis that the folk construe beliefs as (...)
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  31. The Cognitive Basis of Commonsense Morality.Nada Gligorov - 2018 - Journal of Cognitive Enhancement 2 (4):369-376.
    The established two tracks of neuroenhancement, moral and cognitive enhancements, rest on the characterization of commonsense morality as a set of static psychological dispositions. In this paper, I challenge this way of describing commonsense morality. I draw a parallel between commonsense psychology and commonsense morality, and I propose that the right way to characterize commonsense morality is as an empirically evaluable theory, with a structure similar to a scientific theory. I argue further that psychological dispositions to react in certain ways (...)
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  32. The Doxastic Status of Delusion and the Limits of Folk Psychology.José Eduardo Porcher - 2018 - In Inês Hipólito, Jorge Gonçalves & João G. Pereira (eds.), Schizophrenia and Common Sense: Explaining the Relation Between Madness and Social Values. New York: Springer.
    Clinical delusions are widely characterized as being pathological beliefs in both the clinical literature and in common sense. Recently, a philosophical debate has emerged between defenders of the commonsense position (doxasticists) and their opponents, who have the burden of pointing toward alternative characterizations (anti-doxasticists). In this chapter, I argue that both doxasticism and anti- doxasticism fail to characterize the functional role of delusions while at the same time being unable to play a role in the explanation of these phenomena. I (...)
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  33. How We Understand Others: Philosophy and Social Cognition.Shannon Spaulding - 2018 - New York, NY, USA: Routledge.
    In our everyday social interactions, we try to make sense of what people are thinking, why they act as they do, and what they are likely to do next. This process is called mindreading. Mindreading, Shannon Spaulding argues in this book, is central to our ability to understand and interact with others. Philosophers and cognitive scientists have converged on the idea that mindreading involves theorizing about and simulating others’ mental states. She argues that this view of mindreading is limiting and (...)
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  34. Mindreading Beyond Belief: A More Comprehensive Conception of How We Understand Others.Shannon Spaulding - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (11):e12526.
  35. Character and Theory of Mind: An Integrative Approach.Evan Westra - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (5):1217-1241.
    Traditionally, theories of mindreading have focused on the representation of beliefs and desires. However, decades of social psychology and social neuroscience have shown that, in addition to reasoning about beliefs and desires, human beings also use representations of character traits to predict and interpret behavior. While a few recent accounts have attempted to accommodate these findings, they have not succeeded in explaining the relation between trait attribution and belief-desire reasoning. On my account, character-trait attribution is part of a hierarchical system (...)
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  36. More Stereotypes, Please! The Limits of ‘Theory of Mind’ and the Need for Further Studies on the Complexity of Real World Social Interactions.Kristin Andrews - 2017 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 40.
  37. Folk Psychology as Mental Simulation.Luca Barlassina & Robert M. Gordon - 2017 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Mindreading (or folk psychology, Theory of Mind, mentalizing) is the capacity to represent and reason about others’ mental states. The Simulation Theory (ST) is one of the main approaches to mindreading. ST draws on the common-sense idea that we represent and reason about others’ mental states by putting ourselves in their shoes. More precisely, we typically arrive at representing others’ mental states by simulating their mental states in our own mind. This entry offers a detailed analysis of ST, considers theoretical (...)
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  38. Pučka psihologija: znanstvene perspektive realizma, eliminativizma i instrumentalizma.Marin Biondić - 2017 - Filozofska Istrazivanja 37 (3):559-578.
    U radu analiziram realisticki, eliminativisticki i instrumentalisticki pristup prema mental­nom diskursu pucke psihologije. Temeljna ideja razmatranje je pucke psihologije kao teorije koja objasnjava i predviđa ponasanje. Ako je pucka psihologija teorija, onda se mora moći reducirati na ili inkorporirati u dobro ucvrscene znanstvene fizikalne teorije, neuroznanost prvenstveno. Pitanje je, je li tako nesto barem principijelno moguce? Trebamo li ocekivati znanstvenu redukciju entiteta pucke psihologije ili je realno za ocekivati njenu eliminaciju iz znanstvenog objasnjenja i predviđanja ponasanja utoliko, ukoliko se ne (...)
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  39. Mindreading in Adults: Evaluating Two-Systems Views.Peter Carruthers - 2017 - Synthese 194 (3):673-688.
    A number of convergent recent findings with adults have been interpreted as evidence of the existence of two distinct systems for mindreading that draw on separate conceptual resources: one that is fast, automatic, and inflexible; and one that is slower, controlled, and flexible. The present article argues that these findings admit of a more parsimonious explanation. This is that there is a single set of concepts made available by a mindreading system that operates automatically where it can, but which frequently (...)
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  40. Folk Psychology and the Bayesian Brain.Joe Dewhurst - 2017 - In Thomas Metzinger & Wanja Wiese (eds.), Philosophy and Predictive Processing. Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group.
    Whilst much has been said about the implications of predictive processing for our scientific understanding of cognition, there has been comparatively little discussion of how this new paradigm fits with our everyday understanding of the mind, i.e. folk psychology. This paper aims to assess the relationship between folk psychology and predictive processing, which will first require making a distinction between two ways of understanding folk psychology: as propositional attitude psychology and as a broader folk psychological discourse. It will be argued (...)
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  41. Psychology, Personal and Subpersonal.Zoe Drayson - 2017 - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Explanations in psychology are described as personal when they attribute psychological phenomena to the person, as when we attribute beliefs and thought processes to each other, for example. By contrast, explanations in psychology are described as subpersonal when they attribute psychological phenomena below the level of the person, as occurs when scientists describe parts of the brain as representing or evaluating, for example. The practice of subpersonal psychology raises a number of philosophical issues: whether it is acceptable to attribute psychological (...)
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  42. Regulation, Normativity and Folk Psychology.Victor Fernandez Castro - 2017 - Topoi 39 (1):57-67.
    Recently, several scholars have argued in support of the idea that folk psychology involves a primary capacity for regulating our mental states and patterns of behavior in accordance with a bunch of shared social norms and routines :259–281, 2015; Zawidzki, Philosophical Explorations 11:193–210, 2008; Zawidzki, Mindshaping: A new framework for understanding human social cognition, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2013). This regulative view shares with the classical Dennettian intentional stance its emphasis on the normative character of human socio-cognitive capacities. Given those similarities, (...)
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  43. The Expressive Function of Folk Psychology.Victor Fernandez Castro - 2017 - Filosofia Unisinos 18 (1).
    The aim of this paper is to present a challenge to the received view in folk psychology. According to this challenge, the semantic assumption behind the received view, which considers that propositional attitude ascriptions are descriptions of the internal causally efficacious states underlying behavior, cannot account for the main function of reasons in terms of mental states.
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  44. Mindshaping and Robotics.Víctor Fernandez Castro - 2017 - In Raul Hakli & Johanna Seibt (eds.), Sociality and Normativity for Robots. Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality. Cham: Springer. pp. 115-135.
    Social robotics attempts to build robots able to interact with humans and other robots. Philosophical and scientific research in social cognition can provide social robotics research with models of social cognition to implement those models in mechanic agents. The aim of this paper is twofold: firstly, I present and defend a framework in social cognition known as mindshaping. According to it, human beings are biologically predisposed to learn and teach cultural and rational norms and complex cultural patterns of behavior that (...)
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  45. Understanding the Immediacy of Other Minds.Nivedita Gangopadhyay & Alois Pichler - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1305-1326.
    In this paper we address the epistemological debate between emerging perceptual accounts of knowing other minds and traditional theory of mind approaches to the problem of other minds. We argue that the current formulations of the debate are conceptually misleading and empirically unfounded. Rather, the real contribution of PA is to point out a certain ‘immediacy’ that characterizes episodes of mindreading. We claim that while the intuition of immediacy should be preserved for explaining the nature and function of some cognitive (...)
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  46. Review of the Dialogical Mind: Common Sense and Ethics. [REVIEW]Edwin E. Gantt - 2017 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 37 (3):197-198.
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  47. When Does ‘Folk Psychology’ Count as Folk Psychological?Eric Hochstein - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (4):1125-1147.
    It has commonly been argued that certain types of mental descriptions, specifically those characterized in terms of propositional attitudes, are part of a folk psychological understanding of the mind. Recently, however, it has also been argued that this is the case even when such descriptions are employed as part of scientific theories in domains like social psychology and comparative psychology. In this paper, I argue that there is no plausible way to understand the distinction between folk and scientific psychology that (...)
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  48. How We Think and Act Together.Shannon Spaulding - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (3):298-314.
    In this paper, I examine the challenges socially extended minds pose for mainstream, individualistic accounts of social cognition. I argue that individualistic accounts of social cognition neglect phenomena important to social cognition that are properly emphasized by socially extended mind accounts. Although I do not think the evidence or arguments warrant replacing individualistic explanations of social cognition with socially extended explanations, I argue that we have good reason to supplement our individualistic accounts so as to include the ways in which (...)
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  49. Is Goal Ascription Possible in Minimal Mindreading?Stephen A. Butterfill & Ian A. Apperly - 2016 - Psychological Review 123 (2):228-233.
    In this response to the commentary by Michael and Christensen, we first explain how minimal mindreading is compatible with the development of increasingly sophisticated mindreading behaviours that involve both executive functions and general knowledge, and then sketch one approach to a minimal account of goal ascription.
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  50. Animal Mindreading and the Principle of Conservatism.Tyler K. Fagan - 2016 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (2):189-208.
    Skeptics about nonlinguistic mindreading often use an inferential rule of thumb—the principle of conservatism—to cast doubt on purported empirical evidence of mindreading abilities in nonlinguistic creatures. This principle, if warranted, would seem to count generally against explanatory hypotheses that posit nonlinguistic mindreading, instead favoring mere behavior-reading hypotheses. Using a test case from research with chimpanzees, I show that this principle is best understood as an appeal to parsimony; that, regardless of how one conceives of parsimony, the principle is unwarranted; and (...)
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