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  1. added 2019-01-06
    Mindshaping and Robotics.Víctor Fernandez Castro - 2017 - In Raul Hakli & Johanna Seibt (eds.), Sociality and Normativity for Robots. Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality. Cham: Springer. pp. 115-135.
    Social robotics attempts to build robots able to interact with humans and other robots. Philosophical and scientific research in social cognition can provide social robotics research with models of social cognition to implement those models in mechanic agents. The aim of this paper is twofold: firstly, I present and defend a framework in social cognition known as mindshaping. According to it, human beings are biologically predisposed to learn and teach cultural and rational norms and complex cultural patterns of behavior that (...)
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  2. added 2019-01-06
    Regulation, Normativity and Folk Psychology.Victor Fernandez Castro - 2017 - Topoi 1 (Online First):1-11.
    Recently, several scholars have argued in support of the idea that folk psychology involves a primary capacity for regulating our mental states and patterns of behavior in accordance with a bunch of shared social norms and routines :259–281, 2015; Zawidzki, Philosophical Explorations 11:193–210, 2008; Zawidzki, Mindshaping: A new framework for understanding human social cognition, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2013). This regulative view shares with the classical Dennettian intentional stance its emphasis on the normative character of human socio-cognitive capacities. Given those similarities, (...)
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  3. added 2019-01-06
    Mindshaping: A New Framework for Understanding Human Social Cognition. [REVIEW]Víctor Fernandez Castro - 2015 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 34 (1):187´191.
  4. added 2019-01-06
    Dar forma a la mente.Víctor Fernandez Castro - 2015 - Thémata: Revista de Filosofía 51:433-442.
    El objetivo de este trabajo es exponer y analizar críticamente el libro de Tadeusz Zawidzki Mindshaping. Este libro presenta una visión alternativa a la visión estándar de la cognición social de acuerdo con la cual el eje central de nuestras capacidades socio-cognitivas es el mecanismo psicológico conocido como lectura de mentes. Por el contrario, el libro defiende que ciertos mecanismos de mindshaping dan forma a nuestra mente de manera que nuestra conducta es más cooperativa y fácilmente interpretable para los demás. (...)
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  5. added 2019-01-06
    Shaping Robotic Minds.Víctor Fernandez Castro - 2014 - In Johanna Seibt, Raul Hakli & Marco Norskov (eds.), Sociable Robots and the Future of Social Relations: Proceedings of Robo-Philosophy 2014. IOS Press. pp. 71-78.
  6. added 2018-08-08
    Theory of Mind and Non-Human Intelligence.Brandon Tinklenberg - 2016 - Shakelford, T.K. And V.A.Weekes-Shakelford (Eds.) Encyclopedia of Evolutionary Psychological Science. Springer.
    Comparative cognition researchers have long been interested in the nature of nonhuman animal social capacities. One capacity has received prolonged attention: mindreading, or “theory of mind” as it’s also called, is often seen to be the ability to attribute mental states to others in the service of predicting and explaining behavior. This attention is garnered in no small measure from interest into what accounts for the distinctive features of human social cognition and what are the evolutionary origins of those features. (...)
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  7. added 2018-07-01
    The Complementarity of Mindshaping and Mindreading.Uwe Peters - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-17.
    Why do we engage in folk psychology, that is, why do we think about and ascribe propositional attitudes such as beliefs, desires, intentions etc. to people? On the standard view, folk psychology is primarily for mindreading, for detecting mental states and explaining and/or predicting people’s behaviour in terms of them. In contrast, McGeer (1996, 2007, 2015), and Zawidzki (2008, 2013) maintain that folk psychology is not primarily for mindreading but for mindshaping, that is, for moulding people’s behavior and minds (e.g., (...)
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  8. added 2018-05-21
    Pučka psihologija: znanstvene perspektive realizma, eliminativizma i instrumentalizma.Marin Biondić - 2017 - Filozofska Istrazivanja 37 (3):559-578.
    U radu analiziram realisticki, eliminativisticki i instrumentalisticki pristup prema mental­nom diskursu pucke psihologije. Temeljna ideja razmatranje je pucke psihologije kao teorije koja objasnjava i predviđa ponasanje. Ako je pucka psihologija teorija, onda se mora moći reducirati na ili inkorporirati u dobro ucvrscene znanstvene fizikalne teorije, neuroznanost prvenstveno. Pitanje je, je li tako nesto barem principijelno moguce? Trebamo li ocekivati znanstvenu redukciju entiteta pucke psihologije ili je realno za ocekivati njenu eliminaciju iz znanstvenog objasnjenja i predviđanja ponasanja utoliko, ukoliko se ne (...)
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  9. added 2018-05-21
    Uvod u filozofiju psihologije.Nenad Miščević - 1990 - Zagreb: Grafički zavod Hrvatske.
  10. added 2018-05-12
    The Expressive Function of Folk Psychology.Victor Fernandez Castro - 2017 - Filosofia Unisinos 18 (1).
    The aim of this paper is to present a challenge to the received view in folk psychology. According to this challenge, the semantic assumption behind the received view, which considers that propositional attitude ascriptions are descriptions of the internal causally efficacious states underlying behavior, cannot account for the main function of reasons in terms of mental states.
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  11. added 2018-03-29
    Inferring Motives in Psychology and Psychoanalysis.Michael Lacewing - 2012 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 19 (3):197-212.
    Grünbaum argues that psychoanalysis cannot justify its inferences regarding motives using its own methodology, as only the employment of Mill’s canons can justify causal inferences (which inferences to motives are). I consider an argument offered by Hopkins regarding the nature and status of our everyday inferences from other people’s behavior to their motives that seeks to rebut Grünbaum’s charge by defending a form of inference to the best explanation that makes use of connections in intentional content between behavior and motives. (...)
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  12. added 2018-03-05
    A Unified Account of General Learning Mechanisms and Theory‐of‐Mind Development.Theodore Bach - 2014 - Mind and Language 29 (3):351-381.
    Modularity theorists have challenged that there are, or could be, general learning mechanisms that explain theory-of-mind development. In response, supporters of the ‘scientific theory-theory’ account of theory-of-mind development have appealed to children's use of auxiliary hypotheses and probabilistic causal modeling. This article argues that these general learning mechanisms are not sufficient to meet the modularist's challenge. The article then explores an alternative domain-general learning mechanism by proposing that children grasp the concept belief through the progressive alignment of relational structure that (...)
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  13. added 2018-02-21
    The Doxastic Status of Delusion and the Limits of Folk Psychology.José Eduardo Porcher - 2018 - In Inês Hipólito, Jorge Gonçalves & João G. Pereira (eds.), Schizophrenia and Common Sense: Explaining the Relation Between Madness and Social Values. New York: Springer.
    Clinical delusions are widely characterized as being pathological beliefs in both the clinical literature and in common sense. Recently, a philosophical debate has emerged between defenders of the commonsense position (doxasticists) and their opponents, who have the burden of pointing toward alternative characterizations (anti-doxasticists). In this chapter, I argue that both doxasticism and anti- doxasticism fail to characterize the functional role of delusions while at the same time being unable to play a role in the explanation of these phenomena. I (...)
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  14. added 2018-02-17
    Folk Psychological Narratives: The Sociocultural Basis of Understanding Reasons.Daniel D. Hutto - 2008 - Bradford.
    Established wisdom in cognitive science holds that the everyday folk psychological abilities of humans -- our capacity to understand intentional actions performed for reasons -- are inherited from our evolutionary forebears. In _Folk Psychological Narratives_, Daniel Hutto challenges this view and argues for the sociocultural basis of this familiar ability. He makes a detailed case for the idea that the way we make sense of intentional actions essentially involves the construction of narratives about particular persons. Moreover he argues that children (...)
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  15. added 2018-02-17
    Psychology’s Territories: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives From Different Disciplines.Mitchell G. Ash & Thomas Sturm (eds.) - 2007 - Erlbaum.
    This is an interdisciplinary collection of new essays by philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists and historians on the question: What has determined and what should determine the territory or the boundaries of the discipline named "psychology"? Both the contents - in terms of concepts - and the methods - in terms of instruments - are analyzed. Among the contributors are Mitchell Ash, Paul Baltes, Jochen Brandtstädter, Gerd Gigerenzer, Michael Heidelberger, Gerhard Roth, and Thomas Sturm.
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  16. added 2018-02-16
    Rediscovering Empathy: Agency, Folk Psychology, and the Human Sciences.Karsten Stueber - 2006 - Bradford.
    In this timely and wide-ranging study, Karsten Stueber argues that empathy is epistemically central for our folk-psychological understanding of other agents--that it is something we cannot do without in order to gain understanding of other minds. Setting his argument in the context of contemporary philosophy of mind and the interdisciplinary debate about the nature of our mindreading abilities, Stueber counters objections raised by some in the philosophy of social science and argues that it is time to rehabilitate the empathy thesis.Empathy, (...)
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  17. added 2017-12-22
    Computation, Representation and Content in Noncognitive Theories of Perception.Gary Hatfield - 1989 - In Stuart Silvers (ed.), ReRepresentation. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    Recent discussions in the philosophy of psychology have examined the use and legitimacy of such notions as ‘representation’, ‘content’, ‘computation’, and ‘inference’ within a scientific psychology. While the resulting assessments have varied widely, ranging from outright rejection of some or all of these notions to full vindication of their use, there has been notable agreement on the considerations deemed relevant for making an assessment. The answer to the question of whether the notion of, say, representational content may be admitted into (...)
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  18. added 2017-11-24
    Mindreaders: The Cognitive Basis of "Theory of Mind", by Ian Apperly. [REVIEW]Olle Blomberg - 2011 - Metapsychology Online Reviews 15 (13).
  19. added 2017-09-26
    Review of the Dialogical Mind: Common Sense and Ethics. [REVIEW]Edwin E. Gantt - 2017 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 37 (3):197-198.
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  20. added 2017-09-26
    L'ontologia del senso commune.Barry Smith - 2004 - In E. Agazzi (ed.), Valore E Limiti Del Senso Comune. Milan: FrancoAngeli. pp. 261-284.
    Common sense is on the one hand a certain set of processes of natural cognition – of speaking, reasoning, seeing, and so on. On the other hand common sense is a system of beliefs (of folk physics, folk psychology and so on). Over against both of these is the world of common sense, the world of objects to which the processes of natural cognition and the corresponding belief-contents standardly relate. What are the structures of this world? How does the scientific (...)
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  21. added 2017-09-26
    Kognitionsforskningens topologiske grundlag.Barry Smith - 2003 - Semikolon 3 (7):91-105.
    The paper introduces the concepts at the heart of point-set-topology and of mereotopology (topology founded in the non-atomistic theory of parts and wholes) in an informal and intuitive fashion. It will then seek to demonstrate how mereotopological ideas can be of particular utility in cognitive science applications. The prehistory of such applications (in the work of Husserl, the Gestaltists, of Kurt Lewin and of J. J. Gibson) will be sketched, together with an indication of the field of possibilities in linguistics, (...)
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  22. added 2017-09-26
    Folk Psychology and Mental Concepts.A. Goldman - 2000 - ProtoSociology 14:4-25.
    There are several different questions associated with the study of folk psychology: what is the nature of our commonsense concepts of mental states?, how do we attribute mental states, to ourselves and to other people?, and how do we acquire our concepts and skills at mental-state attribution?Three general approaches to these questions are examined and assessed: theory theory, simulation theory, and rationality theory. A preliminary problem is to define each of these approaches. Alternative definitions are explored, centering on which questions (...)
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  23. added 2017-09-26
    Belief and Desire Under the Elms.Consuelo Preti - 2000 - ProtoSociology 14:270-284.
    This paper begins with an exposition the apparent tension between externalist theories of content and common-sense belief/desire psychology, with a view to resolving the conflict between these two views. The second part of the paper is a criticism of Fodor’s reformulation of Twin Earth type cases.I argue that this attempt to mitigate the damage such cases do to the tenability of folk psychological explanation cannot work, because Twin Earth cases pose a metaphysical problem for content and explanation, not a nomological (...)
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  24. added 2017-07-18
    Understanding the Immediacy of Other Minds.Nivedita Gangopadhyay & Alois Pichler - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1305-1326.
    In this paper we address the epistemological debate between emerging perceptual accounts of knowing other minds and traditional theory of mind approaches to the problem of other minds. We argue that the current formulations of the debate are conceptually misleading and empirically unfounded. Rather, the real contribution of PA is to point out a certain ‘immediacy’ that characterizes episodes of mindreading. We claim that while the intuition of immediacy should be preserved for explaining the nature and function of some cognitive (...)
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  25. added 2017-07-18
    Mindreading in Adults: Evaluating Two-Systems Views.Peter Carruthers - 2017 - Synthese 194 (3):673-688.
    A number of convergent recent findings with adults have been interpreted as evidence of the existence of two distinct systems for mindreading that draw on separate conceptual resources: one that is fast, automatic, and inflexible; and one that is slower, controlled, and flexible. The present article argues that these findings admit of a more parsimonious explanation. This is that there is a single set of concepts made available by a mindreading system that operates automatically where it can, but which frequently (...)
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  26. added 2017-07-18
    Is Goal Ascription Possible in Minimal Mindreading?Stephen A. Butterfill & Ian A. Apperly - 2016 - Psychological Review 123 (2):228-233.
    In this response to the commentary by Michael and Christensen, we first explain how minimal mindreading is compatible with the development of increasingly sophisticated mindreading behaviours that involve both executive functions and general knowledge, and then sketch one approach to a minimal account of goal ascription.
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  27. added 2017-07-18
    Animal Mindreading and the Principle of Conservatism.Tyler K. Fagan - 2016 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (2):189-208.
    Skeptics about nonlinguistic mindreading often use an inferential rule of thumb—the principle of conservatism—to cast doubt on purported empirical evidence of mindreading abilities in nonlinguistic creatures. This principle, if warranted, would seem to count generally against explanatory hypotheses that posit nonlinguistic mindreading, instead favoring mere behavior-reading hypotheses. Using a test case from research with chimpanzees, I show that this principle is best understood as an appeal to parsimony; that, regardless of how one conceives of parsimony, the principle is unwarranted; and (...)
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  28. added 2017-07-18
    The Folk Psychological Spiral: Explanation, Regulation, and Language.Kristin Andrews - 2015 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (S1):50-67.
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  29. added 2017-07-18
    The Origins of Belief Representation: Monkeys Fail to Automatically Represent Others’ Beliefs.Alia Martin & Laurie R. Santos - 2014 - Cognition 130 (3):300-308.
  30. added 2017-07-18
    The Accidental Transgressor: Morally-Relevant Theory of Mind.Melanie Killen, Kelly Lynn Mulvey, Cameron Richardson, Noah Jampol & Amanda Woodward - 2011 - Cognition 119 (2):197-215.
  31. added 2017-07-18
    Intentional Action in Folk Psychology.Bertram F. Malle - 2010 - In Timothy O'Connor & Constantine Sandis (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Blackwell.
  32. added 2017-07-18
    Hisashi Nasu, Lester Embree, George Psathas, and Ilja Srubar , Alfred Schutz and His Intellectual Partners; Sandra P. Thomas and Howard R. Pollio, Listening to Patients, A Phenomenological Approach to Nursing Research and Practice; Matthew Ratcliffe, Rethinking Commonsense Psychology: A Critique of Folk Psychology, Theory of Mind and Simulation. [REVIEW]Valerie Malhotra Bentz, William Hamrick & Mary Beth Morrissey - 2010 - Schutzian Research. A Yearbook of Worldly Phenomenology and Qualitative Social Science 2:204-226.
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  33. added 2017-07-18
    Neural Resonance: Between Implicit Simulation and Social Perception. [REVIEW]Marc Slors - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (3):437-458.
    Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi have recently argued against a simulationist interpretation of neural resonance. Recognizing intentions and emotions in the facial expressions and gestures of others may be subserved by e.g. mirror neuron activity, but this does not mean that we first experience an intention or emotion and then project it onto the other. Mirror neurons subserve social cognition, according to Gallagher and Zahavi, by being integral parts of processes of enactive social perception. I argue that the notion of (...)
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  34. added 2017-07-18
    If Chimpanzees Are Mindreaders, Could Behavioral Science Tell? Toward a Solution of the Logical Problem.Robert Lurz - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (3):305-328.
    There is a persistent methodological problem in primate mindreading research, dubbed the 'logical problem,' over how to determine experimentally whether chimpanzees are mindreaders or just clever behavior-readers of a certain sort. The problem has persisted long enough that some researchers have concluded that it is intractable. The logical problem, I argue, is tractable but only with experimental protocols that are fundamentally different from those that have been currently used or suggested. In the first section, I describe what the logical problem (...)
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  35. added 2017-07-18
    Against Theory of Mind.Ivan Leudar & Alan Costall (eds.) - 2009 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
  36. added 2017-07-18
    Metacognition and Theory of Mind.Eleonora Papaleontiou-Louca - 2008 - Cambridge Scholars Press.
  37. added 2017-07-18
    Unconscious Vision and the Platitudes of Folk Psychology.Cara Spencer - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (3):309 – 327.
    Since we explain behavior by ascribing intentional states to the agent, many philosophers have assumed that some guiding principle of folk psychology like [Intentional States and Actions] must be true. [Intentional States and Actions]: If A and B are different actions, then the agents performing them must differ in their intentional states at the time they are performed. Recent results in the physiology of vision present a prima facie problem for this principle. These results show that some visual information that (...)
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  38. added 2017-07-18
    Domain-General Contributions to Social Reasoning: Theory of Mind and Deontic Reasoning Re-Explored.M. C. McKinnon & M. Moscovitch - 2007 - Cognition 102 (2):179-218.
  39. added 2017-07-18
    Ecology, Domain Specificity, and the Origins of Theory of Mind: Is Competition the Catalyst?Derek E. Lyons & Laurie R. Santos - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (5):481–492.
  40. added 2017-07-18
    Three Puzzles of Mindreading.Bertram F. Malle - 2005 - In B. Malle & S. Hodges (eds.), Other Minds: How Humans Bridge the Gap Between Self and Others. Guilford Press. pp. 26--43.
  41. added 2017-07-18
    Bertram F. Malle, How the Mind Explains Behavior: Folk Explanations, Meaning, and Social Interaction.W. L. Lee - 2005 - Philosophy in Review 25 (4):276-278.
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  42. added 2017-07-18
    Bertram F. Malle, How the Mind Explains Behavior: Folk Explanations, Meaning, and Social Interaction Reviewed By.Wendy Lynne Lee - 2005 - Philosophy in Review 25 (4):276-278.
  43. added 2017-07-18
    Mental Concepts: Casual Analysis.David M. Armstrong - 2004 - In R. L. Gregory (ed.), The Oxford Companion to the Mind. Oxford University Press. pp. 572--574.
  44. added 2017-07-18
    Attributions as Behavior Explanations: Toward a New Theory.Bertram Malle - manuscript
    Attribution theory has played a major role in social-psychological research. Unfortunately, the term attribution is ambiguous. According to one meaning, forming an attribution is making a dispositional (trait) inference from behavior; according to another meaning, forming an attribution is giving an explanation (especially of behavior). The focus of this paper is on the latter phenomenon of behavior explanations. In particular, I discuss a new theory of explanation that provides an alternative to classic attribution theory as it dominates the textbooks and (...)
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  45. added 2017-07-18
    Folk Theory of Mind: Conceptual Foundations of Social Cognition.Bertram F. Malle - 2003 - In [Book Chapter] (in Press).
    The human ability to represent, conceptualize, and reason about mind and behavior is one of the greatest achievements of human evolution and is made possible by a “folk theory of mind” — a sophisticated conceptual framework that relates different mental states to each other and connects them to behavior. This chapter examines the nature and elements of this framework and its central functions for social cognition. As a conceptual framework, the folk theory of mind operates prior to any particular conscious (...)
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  46. added 2017-07-18
    Simulation, Theory, and Cut Elimination.G. Graham White - 1999 - The Monist 82 (1):165--184.
    This paper is concerned. with the contrast between simulation- and deduction-based approaches to reasoning about physical objects. We show that linear logic can give a unified account of both simulation and deduction concerning physical objects; it also allows us to draw a principled distinction between simulation and deduction, since simulations correspond to cut-free proofs, whereas deductions correspond to proofs in general.
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  47. added 2017-07-18
    Shape Constancy and Theory of Mind: Is There a Link?Peter Mitchell & Laura M. Taylor - 1999 - Cognition 70 (2):167-190.
  48. added 2017-07-18
    What Does Commonsense Psychology Tell Us About Meaning?Mark Richard - 1997 - Noûs 31 (1):87-114.
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  49. added 2017-07-18
    The Many Faces of Belief: Reflections on Fodor's and the Child's Theory of Mind.Josef Perner - 1995 - Cognition 57 (3):241-269.
  50. added 2017-07-18
    A Conflation of Folk Psychologies: A Commentary on Stich's “What is a Theory of Mental Representation?”.Gerard O’Brien - unknown
    Stich begins his paper "What is a Theory of Mental Representation?" (1992) by noting that while there is a dizzying range of theories of mental representation in today's philosophical market place, there is very little self-conscious reflection about what a theory of mental representation is supposed to do. This is quite remarkable, he thinks, because if we bother to engage in such reflection, some very surprising conclusions begin to emerge. The most surprising conclusion of all, according to Stich, is that (...)
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