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  1. The Common Sense View of Sense-Perception.R. I. Aaron - 1958 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 58:1-14.
  2. Burge on Perception and the Disjunction Problem.Jon Altschul - 2015 - Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 30 (2):251-269.
    According to the Disjunction Problem, teleological theories of perceptual content are unable to explain why it is that a subject represents an F when an F causes the perception and not the disjunction F v G, given that the subject has mistaken G’s for F’s in the past. Without an adequate explanation these theories are stuck without an account of how non-veridical representation is possible, which would be an unsettling result. In this paper I defend Burge’s teleological theory of perception (...)
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  3. Content, Object, and Phenomenal Character.Marco Aurelio Sousa Alves - 2012 - Principia, an International Journal of Epistemology 16 (3):417-449.
    The view that perceptual experience has representational content, or the content view, has recently been criticized by the defenders of the so-called object view. Part of the dispute, I claim here, is based on a lack of grasp of the notion of content. There is, however, a core of substantial disagreement. Once the substantial core is revealed, I aim to: (1) reject the arguments raised against the content view by Campbell (2002), Travis (2004), and Brewer (2006); (2) criticize Brewer’s (2006, (...)
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  4. Naïve Realism and Unconscious Perception: A Reply to Berger and Nanay.Alfonso Anaya & Sam Clarke - 2017 - Analysis 77 (2):267-273.
    In a recent paper, Berger and Nanay consider, and reject, three ways of addressing the phenomenon of unconscious perception within a naïve realist framework. Since these three approaches seem to exhaust the options open to naïve realists, and since there is said to be excellent evidence that perception of the same fundamental kind can occur, both consciously and unconsciously, this is seen to present a problem for the view. We take this opportunity to show that all three approaches considered remain (...)
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  5. The Nature of Perception.Gavin Ardley - 1959 - Philosophy Today 3 (3):79-86.
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  6. Percepción y Pensamiento Espacial: La Veta Reduccionista Del Enfoque Enactivo.Ignacio Avila - 2015 - Ideas y Valores. Revista Colombiana de Filosofía 64:191-214.
    En este ensayo exploro cierta veta reduccionista del enfoque enactivo de Noë. Primero argumento que su concepción de nuestro encuentro perceptual con las propiedades intrínsecas de los objetos requiere una metafísica relacional revisionista para ser exitosa. Luego argumento que la propuesta de Noë sobre el rol de la percepción para el pensamiento espacial exige una concepción revisionista de nuestros conceptos espaciales cotidianos. Finalmente, sugiero que a la base de estas formas de revisionismo está una comprensión reduccionista de la egocentricidad perceptual (...)
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  7. Perception and Identity: Essays Presented to A. J. Ayer, with His Replies.A. J. Ayer & Graham Macdonald (eds.) - 1979 - Cornell University Press.
  8. Quinton's Variety of 'Experience'.H. Barnard - 1957 - Mind 66 (January):88-90.
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  9. The World of Perception.Robert N. Beck - 1980 - Philosophical Inquiry 2 (2-3):458-465.
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  10. Philosophical Analysis.Max Black - 1963 - Freeport, N.Y., Books for Libraries Press.
    Introduction MAX BLACK Nothing of any value can be said on method except through examples; but now, at the end of our course, we may collect certain general ...
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  11. Paradise Regained.Simon Blackburn - 2005 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 79 (1):1-14.
    In this paper I consider some of the vicissitudes that the epistemology of the empirical world has suffered in the last half-century. I cast doubt on some of the ruling metaphors of the area, and on the flight from empiricism and foundationalism that they have assisted. But I also reject attempts to secure a better epistemology that themselves collaborate with the same fundamental mistakes, and in particular that of a spatial conception of the mind.
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  12. On Not Seeing Double.David C. Blumenfeld - 1959 - Philosophical Quarterly 9 (July):264-266.
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  13. Situated Cognition, Dynamic Systems, and Art: On Artistic Creativity and Aesthetic Experience.Ingar Brinck - 2007 - Janus Head 9 (2):407-431.
    It is argued that the theory of situated cognition together with dynamic systems theory can explain the core of artistic practice and aesthetic experience, and furthermore paves the way for an account of how artist and audience can meet via the artist’s work. The production and consumption of art is an embodied practice, firmly based in perception and action, and supported by features of the local, agent-centered and global, socio-cultural contexts. Artistic creativity and aesthetic experience equally result from the dynamic (...)
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  14. On the Uses of Make-Perceive.Robert Briscoe - forthcoming - In Fiona Macpherson & Fabian Dorsch (eds.), Perceptual Memory and Perceptual Imagination (OUP).
    Human beings have the ability to ‘augment’ reality by superimposing mental imagery on the visually perceived scene. For example, when deciding how to arrange furniture in a new home, one might project the image of an armchair into an empty corner or the image of a painting onto a wall. The experience of noticing a constellation in the sky at night is also perceptual-imaginative amalgam: it involves both seeing the stars in the constellation and imagining the lines that connect them (...)
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  15. Cognitive Penetration and the Reach of Phenomenal Content.Robert Briscoe - 2015 - In Athanassios Raftopoulos & John Zeimbekis (eds.), Cognitive Penetrability. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter critically assesses recent arguments that acquiring the ability to categorize an object as belonging to a certain high-level kind can cause the relevant kind property to be represented in visual phenomenal content. The first two arguments, developed respectively by Susanna Siegel (2010) and Tim Bayne (2009), employ an essentially phenomenological methodology. The third argument, developed by William Fish (2013), by contrast, is supported by an array of psychophysical and neuroscientific findings. I argue that while none of these arguments (...)
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  16. Single-Mindedness: Language, Thought, and the First Person.Robert Briscoe - 2004 - Dissertation, Boston University
    Philosophy has always taken the asymmetry between self and other as one of its major themes. In this thesis, I examine the relation between an individual's knowledge of language from a first-person perspective, on the one hand, and characterization of her as a member of a linguistic community from a third-person perspective, on other. Focusing on Crispin Wright, I try in Chapter One to show that semantic antirealism cannot stably be combined with either communitarianism or constructivism about meaning. I also (...)
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  17. Seeming, Part I.Karl Britton - 1952 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 195:195-214.
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  18. Consciousness and Knowledge.Berit Brogaard & Elijah Chudnoff - forthcoming - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter focuses on the relationship between consciousness and knowledge, and in particular on the role perceptual consciousness might play in justifying beliefs about the external world. We outline a version of phenomenal dogmatism according to which perceptual experiences immediately, prima facie justify certain select parts of their content, and do so in virtue of their having a distinctive phenomenology with respect to those contents. Along the way we take up various issues in connection with this core theme, including the (...)
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  19. Phenomenology of Perception: Theories and Experimental Evidence.Carmelo Cali - 2017 - Brill | Rodopi.
    _Phenomenology of Perception: Theories and Experimental Evidence_ presents an interpretation of phenomenology as a set of commitments to discover the immanent grammar of perception by reviewing arguments and experimental results that are still important today for psychology and the cognitive sciences.
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  20. Experimental Phenomenology in Contemporary Perception Science.Carmelo Calì - 2008 - Teorie E Modelli 13 (1/2).
    Some issues heavily debated in perception sciences are presented: the explanatory gap and the experience measurement problem. The experimental phenomenology is said to provide substantive contribution to settle controversy over the phenome- nological adequacy of perception theory and models. An interpretation of experi- mental phenomenology as explanation of the perceptual manifold, and definition of relation varieties to eventually map onto other perception sciences’ domains is sketched.
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  21. Socially Extending the Mind Through Social Affordances.Eros Moreira de Carvalho - manuscript
    The extended mind thesis claims that at least some cognitive processes extend beyond the organism’s brain in that they are constituted by the organism’s actions on its surrounding environment. A more radical move would be to claim that social actions performed by the organism could at least constitute some of its mental processes. This can be called the socially extended mind thesis. Based on the notion of affordance as developed in the ecological psychology tradition, I defend the position that perception (...)
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  22. Sense-Impressions: A New Model.Maurice Charlesworth - 1979 - Mind 88 (January):24-44.
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  23. Attention, Fixation, and Change Blindness.Tony Cheng - 2017 - Philosophical Inquiries 5 (1):19-26.
    The topic of this paper is the complex interaction between attention, fixation, and one species of change blindness. The two main interpretations of the target phenomenon are the ‘blindness’ interpretation and the ‘inaccessibility’ interpretation. These correspond to the sparse view (Dennett 1991; Tye, 2007) and the rich view (Dretske 2007; Block, 2007a, 2007b) of visual consciousness respectively. Here I focus on the debate between Fred Dretske and Michael Tye. Section 1 describes the target phenomenon and the dialectics it entails. Section (...)
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  24. Phenomenal Specificity.Tony Cheng - 2014 - Dissertation, University College London
    The essay is a study of phenomenal specificity. By ‘phenomenal’ here we mean conscious awareness, which needs to be cashed out in detail throughout the study. Intuitively, one dimension of phenomenology is along with specificity. For example it seems appropriate to say that one’s conscious awareness in the middle of the visual field is in some sense more specific than the awareness in the periphery under normal circumstances. However, it is difficult to characterise the nature of phenomenal specificity in an (...)
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  25. Consciousness and the Flow of Attention.Tony Cheng - 2012 - Dissertation, City University of New York, Graduate Center
    Visual phenomenology is highly elusive. One attempt to operationalize or to measure it is to use ‘cognitive accessibility’ to track its degrees. However, if Ned Block is right about the overflow phenomenon, then this way of operationalizing visual phenomenology is bound to fail. This thesis does not directly challenge Block’s view; rather it motivates a notion of cognitive accessibility different from Block’s one, and argues that given this notion, degrees of visual phenomenology can be tracked by degrees of cognitive accessibility. (...)
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  26. Reichenbach on Observing and Perceiving.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1951 - Philosophical Studies 2 (April):45-48.
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  27. The Theory of Appearing.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1950 - In Max Black (ed.), Philosophical Analysis. Prentice-Hall.
  28. What Intuitions Are Like.Elijah Chudnoff - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):625-654.
    What are intuitions? According to doxastic views, they are doxastic attitudes or dispositions, such as judgments or inclinations to make judgments. According to perceptualist views, they are—like perceptual experiences—pre-doxastic experiences that—unlike perceptual experiences—represent abstract matters as being a certain way. In this paper I argue against doxasticism and in favor of perceptualism. I describe two features that militate against doxasticist views of perception itself: perception is belief-independent and perception is presentational. Then I argue that intuitions also have both features. The (...)
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  29. The Epistemic Unity of Perception.Elijah Chudnoff & David Didomenico - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):535-549.
    Dogmatists and phenomenal conservatives think that if it perceptually seems to you that p, then you thereby have some prima facie justification for believing that p. Increasingly, writers about these views have argued that perceptual seemings are composed of two other states: a sensation followed by a seeming. In this article we critically examine this movement. First we argue that there are no compelling reasons to think of perceptual seemings as so composed. Second we argue that even if they were (...)
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  30. Perceptual Learning and Perceptual Phenomenology (Network for Sensory Research/University of York Perceptual Learning Workshop, Question Three).Kevin Connolly, Dylan Bianchi, Craig French, Lana Kuhle & Andy MacGregor - manuscript
    This is an excerpt of a report that highlights and explores five questions that arose from the Network for Sensory Research workshop on perceptual learning and perceptual recognition at the University of York in March, 2012. This portion of the report explores the question: How does perceptual learning alter perceptual phenomenology?
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  31. What is the Problem of Perception?Tim Crane - 2005 - Synthesis Philosophica 2 (40):237-264.
    It will be obvious to anyone with a slight knowledge of twentieth-century analytic philosophy that one of the central themes of this kind of philosophy is the nature of perception: the awareness of the world through the five senses of sight, touch, smell, taste, and hearing. Yet it can seem puzzling, from our twenty-first-century perspective, why there is a distinctively philosophical problem of perception at all. For when philosophers ask ‘what is the nature of perception?’, the question can be confused (...)
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  32. The Problem of Perception.Tim Crane - 2005 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Sense-perception—the awareness or apprehension of things by sight, hearing, touch, smell and taste—has long been a preoccupation of philosophers. One pervasive and traditional problem, sometimes called “the problem of perception”, is created by the phenomena of perceptual illusion and hallucination: if these kinds of error are possible, how can perception be what it intuitively seems to be, a direct and immediate access to reality? The present entry is about how these possibilities of error challenge the intelligibility of the phenomenon of (...)
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  33. REVIEW: The Nature of Perception by John Foster and Perception and Reason by Bill Brewer.Tim Crane - unknown
  34. The Agential Profile of Perceptual Experience.Thomas Crowther - 2010 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (2pt2):219-242.
    Reflection on cases involving the occurrence of various types of perceptual activity suggests that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience can be partly determined by agential factors. I discuss the significance of these kinds of case for the dispute about phenomenal character that is at the core of recent philosophy of perception. I then go on to sketch an account of how active and passive elements of phenomenal character are related to one another in activities like watching and looking at (...)
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  35. Environmental Representation of the Body.Adrian Cussins - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):15-32.
    Much recent cognitive neuroscientific work on body knowledge is representationalist: “body schema” and “body images”, for example, are cerebral representations of the body (de Vignemont 2009). A framework assumption is that representation of the body plays an important role in cognition. The question is whether this representationalist assumption is compatible with the variety of broadly situated or embodied approaches recently popular in the cognitive neurosciences: approaches in which cognition is taken to have a ‘direct’ relation to the body and to (...)
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  36. Sense Experience and Physical Objects.E. E. Dawson - 1961 - Theoria 27 (2):49-57.
  37. Examining Knowledge of Geometry : Response to Wulf and Delson.Stanislas Dehaene, Véronique Izard, Pierre Pica & Elizabeth Spelke - 2006 - Science 312 (5778):1309-1310.
    La connaissances noyau de la géométrie euclidienne est liée au raisonnement déductif et non à la reconnaissance de motifs perceptuels.
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  38. Dretske on Non‐Epistemic Seeing.Erhan Demircioglu - forthcoming - Theoria.
    In this article, I make a distinction between two versions of non-epistemicism about seeing, and bring explicitly into view and argue against a particular version defended by Dretske. More specifically, I distinguish non-epistemic seeing as non-conceptual seeing, where concept possession is assumed to be cognitively demanding, from non-epistemic seeing as seeing without noticing, where noticing is assumed to be relatively cognitively undemanding. After showing that Dretske argues for the possibility of non-epistemic seeing in both senses of the term, I target (...)
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  39. Naïve Realism and Phenomenological Directness: Reply to Millar.Erhan Demircioglu - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1897-1910.
    In this paper, I respond to Millar’s recent criticism of naïve realism. Millar provides several arguments for the thesis that there are powerful phenomenological grounds for preferring the content view to naïve realism. I intend to show that Millar’s arguments are not convincing.
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  40. An Empirical Account of Appearance.John Dewey - 1927 - Journal of Philosophy 24 (17):449-463.
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  41. A Critique of Langsam's The Theory of Appearing Defended.George Djukic & Vladimir B. Popescu - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 112 (1):69-91.
    In this paper we consider, and reject, Harold Langsams defenceof the Theory of Appearing, in this journal (1997), in the faceof three standard arguments against it. These arguments are:the argument from hallucination; the argument from the samecause-same effect principle; and the argument from perceptualtime-gap.
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  42. The Data of Consciousness as Essences.Durant Drake - 1927 - Journal of Philosophy 24 (21):569-577.
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  43. Is Perception a Source of Reasons?Santiago Echeverri - 2013 - Theoria 79 (1):22-56.
    It is widely assumed that perception is a source of reasons (SR). There is a weak sense in which this claim is trivially true: even if one characterizes perception in purely causal terms, perceptual beliefs originate from the mind's interaction with the world. When philosophers argue for (SR), however, they have a stronger view in mind: they claim that perception provides pre- or non-doxastic reasons for belief. In this article I examine some ways of developing this view and criticize them. (...)
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  44. Are Our Spaces Made of Words?Jonathan C. W. Edwards - 2008 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (1):63-83.
    It is argued that both neuroscience and physics point towards a similar re-assessment of our concepts of space, time and 'reality', which, by removing some apparent paradoxes, may lead to a view which can provide a natural place for consciousness and language within biophysics. There are reasons to believe that relationships between entities in experiential space and time and in modern physicists' space and time are quite different, neither corresponding to our geometric schooling. The elements of the universe may be (...)
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  45. The Upsurge of Spontaneity and the Rise of Undivided Subject: The Role and Place of Merleau-Ponty in the Dreyfus-McDowell Debate.Andreas Elpidorou - 2009 - In Lauren Freeman (ed.), In/visibility: Perspectives on Inclusion and Exclusion. Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen.
  46. Independent Intentional Objects.Katalin Farkas - 2010 - In Tadeusz Czarnecki, Katarzyna Kijanija-Placek, Olga Poller & Jan Wolenski (eds.), The Analytical Way. College Publications.
    Intentionality is customarily characterised as the mind’s direction upon its objects. This characterisation allows for a number of different conceptions of intentionality, depending on what we believe about the nature of the objects or the nature of the direction. Different conceptions of intentionality may result in classifying sensory experience as intentional and nonintentional in different ways. In the first part of this paper, I present a certain view or variety of intentionality which is based on the idea that the intentional (...)
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  47. The Nature of Perception.Brice N. Fleming - 1962 - Review of Metaphysics 16 (December):259-295.
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  48. When I Look at a Tomato There is Much I Cannot See.Robert J. Fogelin - 1981 - The Monist 64 (January):109-123.
  49. Thomas Reid: Philosophy of Mind.Marina Folescu - 2015 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    This is an encyclopedia entry that can be accessed following this link: http://www.iep.utm.edu/reidmind/ -/- In philosophy of mind, Reid is most celebrated today for the arguments he gave in support of the position known as direct realism, which, at its most basic, states that the primary objects of sense perception are physical objects, not ideas in human minds. However, Reid’s philosophy of mind neither begins nor ends with perception. In addition to arguing for direct realism and, consequently, against “the way (...)
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  50. In/Visibility: Perspectives on Inclusion and Exclusion.Lauren Freeman & Andreas Elpidorou (eds.) - 2009 - Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen.
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