This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related

Contents
105 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 105
  1. Testimony and the Scope of the A Priori.Peter Graham - forthcoming - In Dylan Dodd & Elia Zardini (eds.), Beyond Sense? New Essays on the Significance, Grounds, and Extent of the A Priori. Oxford University Press.
    Tyler Burge famously argues in his 1993 paper "Content Preservation" that it is not only a priori true that we enjoy a prima facie warrant to take what others assert as true, but also that there our warrant to believe what we are told in certain special cases is a priori. So just as our warrant for believing certain mathematical truths might be a priori, so too there are cases of belief through testimony that are a priori. Then in a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. (1 other version)Taking It Not at Face Value: A New Taxonomy for the Beliefs Acquired from Conversational AIs.Shun Iizuka - forthcoming - Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology.
    One of the central questions in the epistemology of conversational AIs is how to classify the beliefs acquired from them. Two promising candidates are instrument-based and testimony-based beliefs. However, the category of instrument-based beliefs faces an intrinsic problem, and a challenge arises in its application. On the other hand, relying solely on the category of testimony-based beliefs does not encompass the totality of our practice of using conversational AIs. To address these limitations, I propose a novel classification of beliefs that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. False Authorities.Christoph Jäger - forthcoming - Acta Analytica.
    An epistemic agent A is a false epistemic authority for others iff they falsely believe A to be in a position to help them accomplish their epistemic ends. A major divide exists between what I call "epistemic quacks", who falsely believe themselves to be relevantly competent, and "epistemic charlatans", i.e., false authorities who believe or even know that they are incompetent. Both types of false authority do not cover what Lackey (2021) calls "predatory experts": experts who systematically misuse their social-epistemic (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. (1 other version)Taking It Not at Face Value: A New Taxonomy for the Beliefs Acquired from Conversational AIs.Shun Iizuka - 2024 - Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 28 (2):219-235.
    One of the central questions in the epistemology of conversational AIs is how to classify the beliefs acquired from them. Two promising candidates are instrument-based and testimony-based beliefs. However, the category of instrument-based beliefs faces an intrinsic problem, and a challenge arises in its application. On the other hand, relying solely on the category of testimony-based beliefs does not encompass the totality of our practice of using conversational AIs. To address these limitations, I propose a novel classification of beliefs that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Epistemic Authority.Christoph Jäger - 2024 - In Jennifer Lackey & Aidan McGlynn (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    This handbook article gives a critical overview of recent discussions of epistemic authority. It favors an account that brings into balance the dictates of rational deference with the ideals of intellectual self-governance. A plausible starting point is the conjecture that neither should rational deference to authorities collapse into total epistemic submission, nor the ideal of mature intellectual self-governance be conflated with (illusions of) epistemic autarky.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  6. Interpersonal Reasoning: A Philosophical Psychology of Testimonial Trust.Berislav Marušić - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy:1-19.
    Anscombe famously said, “It is an insult and it may be an injury not to be believed.” But what is it to believe someone? My aim is to show that understanding what it is to believe someone requires a conception of a distinctive kind of interpersonal reasoning. To do so, I develop an analogy between interpersonal reasoning and an Anscombean conception of practical reasoning. I suggest that the distinctive ‘form’ of interpersonal reasoning is recognition. I furthermore argue that this is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Epistemología del testimonio kantiana y la akrasia (moral) epistémica.Felipe Alejandro Álvarez Osorio - 2023 - Otrosiglo 7 (2):301-322.
    En este artículo se emplea la epistemología del testimonio kantiana para analizar el concepto de _akrasia _epistémica (es decir, creer que p cuando se tienen motivos de orden epistémico para sostener que ¬p) en el caso de las teorías conspirativas. Se señala que las personas suelen mantener esa clase de discursos por motivos sociales (e.g. Pertenecer a un grupo que comparte esas ideas) antes que por una genuina incomprensión de la evidencia como tal, de modo que el problema es fundamentalmente (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Testimonial Justice Beyond Belief.Carolyn Culbertson - 2023 - Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 27 (2):317-330.
    This article examines the meaningful intervention that Gert-Jan Van der Heiden’s recent book, The Voice of Misery: A Continental Philosophy of Testimony, makes in the developing field of the philosophy of testimony. I argue that this intervention is accomplished through a phenomenological investigation into the nature of the testimonial object and of the demand that it makes upon one who bears witness. In taking such an approach, I argue, Van der Heiden initiates an ontological turn in the field of testimonial (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. Excessive testimony: When less is more.Finnur Dellsén - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 107 (2):525-540.
    This paper identifies two distinct dimensions of what might be called testimonial strength: first, in the case of testimony from more than one speaker, testimony can be said to be stronger to the extent that a greater proportion of the speakers give identical testimony; second, in both single-speaker and multi-speaker testimony, testimony can be said to the stronger to the extent that each speaker expresses greater conviction in the relevant proposition. These two notions of testimonial strength have received scant attention (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  10. Fictions that Purport to Tell the Truth.Neri Marsili - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (2):509-531.
    Can fictions make genuine assertions about the actual world? Proponents of the ‘Assertion View’ answer the question affirmatively: they hold that authors can assert, by means of explicit statements that are part of the work of fiction, that something is actually the case in the real world. The ‘Nonassertion’ View firmly denies this possibility. In this paper, I defend a nuanced version of the Nonassertion View. I argue that even if fictions cannot assert, they can indirectly communicate that what is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  11. Knowledge by Hearing: A Husserlian Antireductionist Phenomenology of Testimony.Michele Averchi - 2021 - Studia Phaenomenologica 21:63-85.
    In this paper, I argue that Husserl offers an important, although almost completely neglected so far, contribution to the reductionist/antireductionist debate about testimony. Through a phenomenological analysis, Husserl shows that testimony works through the constitution of an intentional intersubjective bond between the speaker and the hearer. In this paper I focus on the Logical Investigations, a 1914 manuscript now published as text 2 in Husserliana 20.2, and a 1931 manuscript now published as Appendix 12 in Husserliana 15. I argue that, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  12. Telling as Joint Action: comments on Richard Moran’s The Exchange of Words. [REVIEW]Krista Lawlor - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):701-707.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  13. Introduction: From Witnessing to Testimony.Paul Marinescu & Cristian Ciocan - 2021 - Studia Phaenomenologica 21:11-20.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. Eliot Michaelson and Andreas Stokke (eds.), Lying: Language, Knowledge, Ethics, and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 320. [REVIEW]Neri Marsili - 2021 - Utilitas 33 (4):502-505.
  15. Testimony and Engagement: On the Four Elements of Witnessing.Gert-Jan van der Heiden - 2021 - Studia Phaenomenologica 21:21-39.
    In order to develop a hermeneutic-phenomenological analysis of testimony, this essay will first argue that testimony is “said in many ways” without being homonymous and that contemporary epistemological approaches to testimony are not capable of accounting for all paradigmatic forms of testimony. Second, it is argued, following and extending the work of Paul Ricoeur, that by emphasizing the sense of engagement or Bezogenheit as a basic characteristic of testimony, we may find another approach to testimony that offers a phenomenological alternative (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  16. Critical Review of Richard Moran, The Exchange of Words. [REVIEW]Peter Graham - 2020 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2.
    This is a critical review of Moran's assurance view of testimony.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. Assertion and Testimony.Edward Hinchman - 2020 - In Goldberg Sanford (ed.), Oxford Handbook on Assertion. Oxford University Press.
    [The version of this paper published by Oxford online in 2019 was not copy-edited and has some sense-obscuring typos. I have posted a corrected (but not the final published) version on this site. The version published in print in 2020 has these corrections.] Which is more fundamental, assertion or testimony? Should we understand assertion as basic, treating testimony as what you get when you add an interpersonal addressee? Or should we understand testimony as basic, treating mere assertion -- assertion without (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  18. Corresponding reasons: on Richard Moran’s The Exchange of Words.Guy Longworth - 2020 - Philosophical Explorations 23 (3):271-280.
  19. Vectors of epistemic insecurity.Emily Sullivan & Mark Alfano - 2020 - In Ian James Kidd, Quassim Cassam & Heather Battaly (eds.), Vice Epistemology. New York, NY: Routledge.
    Epistemologists have addressed a variety of modal epistemic standings, such as sensitivity, safety, risk, and epistemic virtue. These concepts mark out the ways that beliefs can fail to track the truth, articulate the conditions needed for knowledge, and indicate ways to become a better epistemic agent. However, it is our contention that current ways of carving up epistemic modality ignore the complexities that emerge when individuals are embedded within a community and listening to a variety of sources, some of whom (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  20. Trust, Testimony, and Reasons for Belief.Rebecca Wallbank & Andrew Reisner - 2020 - In Scott Stapleford & Kevin McCain (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. New York: Routledge.
    This chapter explores two kinds of testimonial trust, what we call ‘evidential trust’ and ‘non-evidential trust’ with the aim of asking how testimonial trust could provide epistemic reasons for belief. We argue that neither evidential nor non-evidential trust can play a distinctive role in providing evidential reasons for belief, but we tentatively propose that non-evidential trust can in some circumstances provide a novel kind of epistemic reason for belief, a reason of epistemic facilitation. The chapter begins with an extensive discussion (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  21. Reliabilism and the Testimony of Robots.Billy Wheeler - 2020 - Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 24 (3):332-356.
    We are becoming increasingly dependent on robots and other forms of artificial intelligence for our beliefs. But how should the knowledge gained from the “say-so” of a robot be classified? Should it be understood as testimonial knowledge, similar to knowledge gained in conversation with another person? Or should it be understood as a form of instrument-based knowledge, such as that gained from a calculator or a sundial? There is more at stake here than terminology, for how we treat objects as (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  22. Trust in a social and digital world.Mark Alfano & Colin Klein - 2019 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 1 (8):1-8.
  23. Axel Gelfert, A Critical Introduction to Testimony, Londres, Bloomsbury. 2014. [REVIEW]Felipe Álvarez - 2019 - Mutatis Mutandis: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 14.
    Como una respuesta a la problemática mencionada, Axel Gelfert, profesor e investigador asociado en el Departamento de Filosofı́a de la Universidad de Singapur, publicó en 2014 su A critical introduction to testimony, el cual ha logrado posicionarse como una lectura obligatoria para aquellos interesados en la epistemologı́a del testimonio. En su libro se dedica a recorrer de manera propedéutica cada uno de los tópicos actuales de la epistemologı́a del testimonio, ello sin dejar de lado la profundidad y exhaustividad requerida para (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. Promising as Doxastic Entrustment.Jorah Dannenberg - 2019 - The Journal of Ethics 23 (4):425-447.
    I present a novel way to think about promising: Promising as Doxastic Entrustment. The main idea is that promising is inviting another to entrust her belief to you, and that taking a promiser’s word is freely choosing to accept this invitation. I explicate this through considering the special kind of reason for belief issued by a promiser: a reason whose rational status depends both on the will of the promiser to provide it, and on the will of the promisee to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  25. Speech, the Affective, and the Insult in Not Being Believed: Rousseau and Adam Smith.Byron Davies - 2019 - The Adam Smith Review 11:53-66.
    In this paper, I investigate under-explored moments in Rousseau’s and Adam Smith’s writings in which each presents speech, and particularly testimony, as a manifestation of the desire for others’ recognition. I begin by considering some features of Rousseau’s understanding of amour-propre (or the desire for recognition from others) as well as that desire’s relevance for the conception of vocal speech (as in its nature passional) at the center of Rousseau’s Essay on the Origin of Languages. Since a feeling of insult (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  26. Das Zeugnis anderer.Nicola Mößner - 2019 - In Martin Grajner & Guido Melchior (eds.), Handbuch Erkenntnistheorie. Stuttgart: Metzler. pp. 136-144.
    This is a survey article about testimony. It discusses questions concerning the nature and the epistemology of the division of epistemic labour.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. What is the Value of Faith For Salvation? A Thomistic Response to Kvanvig.James Dominic Rooney - 2019 - Faith and Philosophy 36 (4):463-490.
    Jonathan Kvanvig has proposed a non-cognitive theory of faith. He argues that the model of faith as essentially involving assent to propositions is of no value. In response, I propose a Thomistic cognitive theory of faith that both avoids Kvanvig’s criticism and presents a richer and more inclusive account of how faith is intrinsically valuable. I show these accounts of faith diverge in what they take as the goal of the Christian life: personal relationship with God or an external state (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  28. Testimony and Children’s Acquisition of Number Concepts.Helen De Cruz - 2018 - In Sorin Bangu (ed.), Naturalizing Logico-Mathematical Knowledge: Approaches From Psychology and Cognitive Science. New York: Routledge. pp. 172-186.
    An enduring puzzle in philosophy and developmental psychology is how young children acquire number concepts, in particular the concept of natural number. Most solutions to this problem conceptualize young learners as lone mathematicians who individually reconstruct the successor function and other sophisticated mathematical ideas. In this chapter, I argue for a crucial role of testimony in children’s acquisition of number concepts, both in the transfer of propositional knowledge (e.g., the cardinality concept), and in knowledge-how (e.g., the counting routine).
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  29. Testimonial Pessimism.Rachel Elizabeth Fraser - 2018 - In Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne & Dani Rabinowitz (eds.), Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 203-227.
  30. (1 other version)Social Knowledge and Social Norms.Peter J. Graham - 2018 - In Markos Valaris & Stephen Hetherington (eds.), Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy. London, UK: Bloomsbury Publishing. pp. 111-138.
    Social knowledge, for the most part, is knowledge through testimony. This essay is an overview of the epistemology of testimony. The essay separates knowledge from justification, characterizes testimony as a source of belief, explains why testimony is a source of knowledge, canvasses arguments for anti-reductionism and for reductionism in the reductionism vs. anti-reductionism debate, addresses counterexamples to knowledge transmission, defends a safe basis account of testimonial knowledge, and turns to social norms as a partial explanation for the reliability of testimony.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  31. (2 other versions)The epistemic significance of disagreement.Thomas Kelly - 2018 - In Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary epistemology: an anthology. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. pp. 167-196.
    Looking back on it, it seems almost incredible that so many equally educated, equally sincere compatriots and contemporaries, all drawing from the same limited stock of evidence, should have reached so many totally different conclusions---and always with complete certainty.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   101 citations  
  32. The Do It Yourself-Paradigm: An Inquiry into the Historical Roots of the Neglect of Testimony.Emmanuel Alloa - 2017 - Early Science and Medicine 22 (4):333 – 360.
    In contemporary social epistemology, the claim has been made that there is a traditional “neglect of testimonial knowledge,” and that in the history of epistemology, first-hand self-knowledge was invariably prioritised over secondary knowledge. While this paper acknowledges some truth in these statements, it challenges the given explanations: the mentioned neglect of testimonial knowledge is based not so much on a primacy of self-knowledge, but that of self-agency. This article retraces some crucial chapters of this ‘do-it-yourself’ paradigm: it considers the imperative (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. The uses of aesthetic testimony.C. Thi Nguyen - 2017 - British Journal of Aesthetics 57 (1):19-36.
    The current debate over aesthetic testimony typically focuses on cases of doxastic repetition — where, when an agent, on receiving aesthetic testimony that p, acquires the belief that p without qualification. I suggest that we broaden the set of cases under consideration. I consider a number of cases of action from testimony, including reconsidering a disliked album based on testimony, and choosing an artistic educational institution from testimony. But this cannot simply be explained by supposing that testimony is usable for (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  34. Giving Robots a Voice: Testimony, Intentionality, and the Law.Billy Wheeler - 2017 - In Steve Thompson (ed.), Androids, Cyborgs, and Robots in Contemporary Society and Culture. pp. 1-34.
    Humans are becoming increasingly dependent on the ‘say-so' of machines, such as computers, smartphones, and robots. In epistemology, knowledge based on what you have been told is called ‘testimony' and being able to give and receive testimony is a prerequisite for engaging in many social roles. Should robots and other autonomous intelligent machines be considered epistemic testifiers akin to those of humans? This chapter attempts to answer this question as well as explore the implications of robot testimony for the criminal (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. A Critical Introduction to Testimony, by Axel Gelfert: London: Bloomsbury, 2014, pp. vi + 257, £22.99.David Coady - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):837-838.
  36. Oral History and The Epistemology of Testimony.Tim Kenyon - 2016 - Social Epistemology 30 (1):45-66.
    Social epistemology has paid little attention to oral historiography as a source of expert insight into the credibility of testimony. One extant suggestion, however, is that oral historians treat testimony with a default trust reflecting a standing warrant for accepting testimony. The view that there is such a standing warrant is sometimes known as the Acceptance Principle for Testimony. I argue that the practices of oral historians do not count in support of APT, all in all. Experts have commonly described (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  37. Is Testimonial Knowledge Second-Hand Knowledge?Federico Luzzi - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (4):899-918.
    Fricker has proposed that a hearer’s knowledge that p acquired through trusting a speaker requires the speaker to know that p, and that therefore testimonial knowledge through trust is necessarily second-hand knowledge. In this paper, I argue that Fricker’s view is problematic for four reasons: firstly, Fricker’s dismissal of a central challenge to the second-handedness of testimonial knowledge is based on a significant misrepresentation of this challenge; secondly, on closer scrutiny an important distinction Fricker wants to draw is compromised by (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. Epistemic Authority, by Linda Zagzebski.Richard Fumerton - 2015 - Mind 124 (495):999-1003.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. Testimony as Speech Act, Testimony as Source.Peter J. Graham - 2015 - In Mi Chienkuo, Michael Slote & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Moral and Intellectual Virtues in Western and Chinese Philosophy: The Turn Toward Virtue. New York: Routledge. pp. 121-144.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  40. Testimony: A Philosophical Introduction.Joseph Shieber - 2015 - New York: Routledge.
    The epistemology of testimony has experienced a growth in interest over the last twenty-five years that has been matched by few, if any, other areas of philosophy. _Testimony: A Philosophical Introduction _provides an epistemology of testimony that surveys this rapidly growing research area while incorporating a discussion of relevant empirical work from social and developmental psychology, as well as from the interdisciplinary study of knowledge-creation in groups. The past decade has seen a number of scholarly monographs on the epistemology of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  41. On Testimony and Transmission.J. Adam Carter & Philip J. Nickel - 2014 - Episteme 11 (2):145-155.
    Jennifer Lackey’s case “Creationist Teacher,” in which students acquire knowledge of evolutionary theory from a teacher who does not herself believe the theory, has been discussed widely as a counterexample to so-called transmission theories of testimonial knowledge and justification. The case purports to show that a speaker need not herself have knowledge or justification in order to enable listeners to acquire knowledge or justification from her assertion. The original case has been criticized on the ground that it does not really (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  42. Interpersonal epistemic entitlements.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):159-183.
    In this paper I argue that the nature of our epistemic entitlement to rely on certain belief-forming processes—perception, memory, reasoning, and perhaps others—is not restricted to one's own belief-forming processes. I argue as well that we can have access to the outputs of others’ processes, in the form of their assertions. These two points support the conclusion that epistemic entitlements are “interpersonal.” I then proceed to argue that this opens the way for a non-standard version of anti-reductionism in the epistemology (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  43. Moral Testimony: One of These Things Is Just Like the Others.Daniel Groll & Jason Decker - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (1):54-74.
    What, if anything, is wrong with acquiring moral beliefs on the basis of testimony? Most philosophers think that there is something wrong with it, and most point to a special problem that moral testimony is supposed to create for moral agency. Being a good moral agent involves more than bringing about the right outcomes. It also involves acting with "moral understanding" and one cannot have moral understanding of what one is doing via moral testimony. And so, adherents to this view (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  44. Assurance and warrant.Edward Hinchman - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14:1-58.
    Previous assurance-theoretic treatments of testimony have not adequately explained how the transmission of warrant depends specifically on the speaker’s mode of address – making it natural to suspect that the interpersonal element is not epistemic but merely psychological or action-theoretic. I aim to fill that explanatory gap: to specify exactly how a testifier’s assurance can create genuine epistemic warrant. In doing so I explain (a) how the illocutionary norm governing the speech act proscribes not lies but a species of bullshit, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  45. Agreement and Communication.Max Kölbel - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (1):101-120.
    I distinguish two notions of agreement in belief: believing the same content versus having beliefs that necessarily coincide/diverge in normative status. The second notion of agreement,, is clearly significant for the communication of beliefs amongst thinkers. Thus there would seem to be some prima facie advantage to choosing the conception of content operative in in such a way that the normative status of beliefs supervenes on their content, and this seems to be the prevailing assumption of many semanticists. I shall (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  46. When to defer to supermajority testimony — and when not.Christian List - 2014 - In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Essays in Collective Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 240-249.
    Pettit (2006) argues that deferring to majority testimony is not generally rational: it may lead to inconsistent beliefs. He suggests that “another ... approach will do better”: deferring to supermajority testimony. But this approach may also lead to inconsistencies. In this paper, I describe conditions under which deference to supermajority testimony ensures consistency, and conditions under which it does not. I also introduce the concept of “consistency of degree k”, which is weaker than full consistency by ruling out only “blatant” (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  47. Teaching and telling.Will Small - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (3):372-387.
    Recent work on testimony has raised questions about the extent to which testimony is a distinctively second-personal phenomenon and the possible epistemic significance of its second-personal aspects. However, testimony, in the sense primarily investigated in recent epistemology, is far from the only way in which we acquire knowledge from others. My goal is to distinguish knowledge acquired from testimony (learning from being told) from knowledge acquired from teaching (learning from being taught), and to investigate the similarities and differences between the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  48. The Transmission of Skill.Will Small - 2014 - Philosophical Topics 42 (1):85-111.
    The ideas (i) that skill is a form of knowledge and (ii) that it can be taught are commonplace in both ancient philosophy and everyday life. I argue that contemporary epistemology lacks the resources to adequately accommodate them. Intellectualist and anti-intellectualist accounts of knowledge how struggle to represent the transmission of skill via teaching and learning (§II), in part because each adopts a fundamentally individualistic approach to the acquisition of skill that focuses on individual practice and experience; consequently, learning from (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  49. Anonymous assertions.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2013 - Episteme 10 (2):135-151.
    This paper addresses how the anonymity of an assertion affects the epistemological dimension of its production by speakers, and its reception by hearers. After arguing that anonymity does have implications in both respects, I go on to argue that at least some of these implications derive from a warranted diminishment in speakers' and hearers' expectations of one another when there are few mechanisms for enforcing the responsibilities attendant to speech. As a result, I argue, anonymous assertions do not carry the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  50. Review of Paul Faulkner, Knowledge on Trust. [REVIEW]Peter J. Graham - 2013 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2013:n-n.
1 — 50 / 105