This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories

84 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 84
  1. Telling as Joint Action: Comments on Richard Moran’s The Exchange of Words. [REVIEW]Krista Lawlor - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Vectors of Epistemic Insecurity.Emily Sullivan & Mark Alfano - forthcoming - In Ian James Kidd, Heather Battaly & Quassim Cassam (eds.), Vice Epistemology: Theory and Practice. Routledge.
    Epistemologists have addressed a variety of modal epistemic standings, such as sensitivity, safety, risk, and epistemic virtue. These concepts mark out the ways that beliefs can fail to track the truth, articulate the conditions needed for knowledge, and indicate ways to become a better epistemic agent. However, it is our contention that current ways of carving up epistemic modality ignore the complexities that emerge when individuals are embedded within a community and listening to a variety of sources, some of whom (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Critical Review of Richard Moran, The Exchange of Words. [REVIEW]Peter Graham - 2020 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2.
    Moran's book is sure to be widely read. It does more to bring to light the moral psychology characteristic of tellings understood as assurances than any other work I know. His book raises challenges for other views, introduces interesting and evocative distinctions, and puts together in one place Moran's sustained reflections on the way we provide others a distinctive kind of reason for belief though normatively binding ourselves though the exchange of words. I agree that assurances and acceptances in Moran's (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Assertion and Testimony.Edward Hinchman - 2020 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    [The version of this paper published by Oxford online in 2019 was not copy-edited and has some sense-obscuring typos. I have posted a corrected (but not the final published) version on this site. The version published in print in 2020 has these corrections.] Which is more fundamental, assertion or testimony? Should we understand assertion as basic, treating testimony as what you get when you add an interpersonal addressee? Or should we understand testimony as basic, treating mere assertion -- assertion without (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  5. Trust, Testimony, and Reasons for Belief.Rebecca Wallbank & Andrew Reisner - 2020 - In Kevin McCain & Scott Stapleford (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. London: Routledge.
    This chapter explores two kinds of testimonial trust, what we call ‘evidential trust’ and ‘non-evidential trust’ with the aim of asking how testimonial trust could provide epistemic reasons for belief. We argue that neither evidential nor non-evidential trust can play a distinctive role in providing evidential reasons for belief, but we tentatively propose that non-evidential trust can in some circumstances provide a novel kind of epistemic reason for belief, a reason of epistemic facilitation. The chapter begins with an extensive discussion (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Reliabilism and the Testimony of Robots.Billy Wheeler - 2020 - Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 24 (3):332-356.
    We are becoming increasingly dependent on robots and other forms of artificial intelligence for our beliefs. But how should the knowledge gained from the “say-so” of a robot be classified? Should it be understood as testimonial knowledge, similar to knowledge gained in conversation with another person? Or should it be understood as a form of instrument-based knowledge, such as that gained from a calculator or a sundial? There is more at stake here than terminology, for how we treat objects as (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Trust in a Social and Digital World.Mark Alfano & Colin Klein - 2019 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 1 (8):1-8.
  8. Umkämpfte Zeugenschaft: Der Fall Serena N. im Brennpunkt von Holocaust-Forschung, Psychoanalyse und Philosophie.Emmanuel Alloa - 2019 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 67 (6):1008-1023.
    The article focuses on a controversy between historians and psychoanalysts around the testimonial value of a Holocaust survivor. The survivor’s account of the Auschwitz uprising includes factual exaggerations, which has led historians to discard it. Psychoanalysts on the contrary stressed that the testimony accounted for something else: the possibility of resistance in the concentration camp, which gave the inmates hope in their struggle for survival. Survivors’ testimonies, so the argument, have both an epistemological and an ethical content. While philosophy’s insistence (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. Speech, the Affective, and the Insult in Not Being Believed: Rousseau and Adam Smith.Byron Davies - 2019 - The Adam Smith Review 11:53-66.
    In this paper, I investigate under-explored moments in Rousseau’s and Adam Smith’s writings in which each presents speech, and particularly testimony, as a manifestation of the desire for others’ recognition. I begin by considering some features of Rousseau’s understanding of amour-propre (or the desire for recognition from others) as well as that desire’s relevance for the conception of vocal speech (as in its nature passional) at the center of Rousseau’s Essay on the Origin of Languages. Since a feeling of insult (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. Das Zeugnis anderer.Nicola Mößner - 2019 - In Martin Grajner & Guido Melchior (eds.), Handbuch Erkenntnistheorie. Stuttgart, Germany: Springer. pp. 136-144.
    This is a survey article about testimony. It discusses questions concerning the nature and the epistemology of the division of epistemic labour.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. Testimony and Children’s Acquisition of Number Concepts.Helen De Cruz - 2018 - In Sorin Bangu (ed.), Naturalizing Logico-Mathematical Knowledge. Approaches from Philosophy, Psychology and Cognitive Science. London, UK: pp. 172-186.
    An enduring puzzle in philosophy and developmental psychology is how young children acquire number concepts, in particular the concept of natural number. Most solutions to this problem conceptualize young learners as lone mathematicians who individually reconstruct the successor function and other sophisticated mathematical ideas. In this chapter, I argue for a crucial role of testimony in children’s acquisition of number concepts, both in the transfer of propositional knowledge (e.g., the cardinality concept), and in knowledge-how (e.g., the counting routine).
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  12. Testimonial Pessimism.Rachel Elizabeth Fraser - 2018 - In Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne & Dani Rabinowitz (eds.), Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 203-227.
  13. Social Knowledge and Social Norms.Peter J. Graham - 2018 - In The Philosophy of Knowledge: A History. Volume IV: Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy. London: pp. 111-138.
    Social knowledge, for the most part, is knowledge through testimony. This essay separates knowledge from justification, characterizes testimony as a source of belief, explains why testimony is a source of knowledge, canvasses arguments for anti-reductionism and for reductionism in the reductionism vs. anti-reductionism debate, addresses counterexamples to knowledge transmission, defends a safe basis account of testimonial knowledge, and turns to social norms as a partial explanation for the reliability of testimony.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  14. The ‘Do It Yourself’ Paradigm: An Inquiry Into the Historical Roots of the Neglect of Testimony.Emmanuel Alloa - 2017 - Early Science and Medicine 22 (4):333-360.
    In contemporary social epistemology, the claim has been made that there is a traditional “neglect of testimonial knowledge,” and that in the history of epistemology, first-hand self-knowledge was invariably prioritised over secondary knowledge. While this paper acknowledges some truth in these statements, it challenges the given explanations: the mentioned neglect of testimonial knowledge is based not so much on a primacy of self-knowledge, but that of self-agency. This article retraces some crucial chapters of this ‘do-it-yourself’ paradigm: it considers the imperative (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  15. The Uses of Aesthetic Testimony.C. Thi Nguyen - 2017 - British Journal of Aesthetics 57 (1):19-36.
    The current debate over aesthetic testimony typically focuses on cases of doxastic repetition — where, when an agent, on receiving aesthetic testimony that p, acquires the belief that p without qualification. I suggest that we broaden the set of cases under consideration. I consider a number of cases of action from testimony, including reconsidering a disliked album based on testimony, and choosing an artistic educational institution from testimony. But this cannot simply be explained by supposing that testimony is usable for (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  16. Giving Robots a Voice: Testimony, Intentionality, and the Law.Billy Wheeler - 2017 - In Steve Thompson & Steven John Thompson (eds.), Androids, Cyborgs, and Robots in Contemporary Society and Culture. Hershey, PA, USA: pp. 1-34.
    Humans are becoming increasingly dependent on the ‘say-so' of machines, such as computers, smartphones, and robots. In epistemology, knowledge based on what you have been told is called ‘testimony' and being able to give and receive testimony is a prerequisite for engaging in many social roles. Should robots and other autonomous intelligent machines be considered epistemic testifiers akin to those of humans? This chapter attempts to answer this question as well as explore the implications of robot testimony for the criminal (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. A Critical Introduction to Testimony, by Axel Gelfert: London: Bloomsbury, 2014, Pp. Vi + 257, £22.99.David Coady - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):837-838.
  18. Oral History and The Epistemology of Testimony.Tim Kenyon - 2016 - Social Epistemology 30 (1):45-66.
    Social epistemology has paid little attention to oral historiography as a source of expert insight into the credibility of testimony. One extant suggestion, however, is that oral historians treat testimony with a default trust reflecting a standing warrant for accepting testimony. The view that there is such a standing warrant is sometimes known as the Acceptance Principle for Testimony. I argue that the practices of oral historians do not count in support of APT, all in all. Experts have commonly described (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  19. Is Testimonial Knowledge Second-Hand Knowledge?Federico Luzzi - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (4):899-918.
    Fricker has proposed that a hearer’s knowledge that p acquired through trusting a speaker requires the speaker to know that p, and that therefore testimonial knowledge through trust is necessarily second-hand knowledge. In this paper, I argue that Fricker’s view is problematic for four reasons: firstly, Fricker’s dismissal of a central challenge to the second-handedness of testimonial knowledge is based on a significant misrepresentation of this challenge; secondly, on closer scrutiny an important distinction Fricker wants to draw is compromised by (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. Epistemic Authority, by Linda Zagzebski.Richard Fumerton - 2015 - Mind 124 (495):999-1003.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. Testimony as Speech Act, Testimony as Source.Peter J. Graham - 2015 - In Chienkuo Mi, Ernest Sosa & Michael Slote (eds.), Moral and Intellectual Virtues in Western and Chinese Philosophy: The Turn toward Virtue. Routledge. pp. 121-144.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  22. Testimony: A Philosophical Introduction.Joseph Shieber - 2015 - Routledge.
    The epistemology of testimony has experienced a growth in interest over the last twenty-five years that has been matched by few, if any, other areas of philosophy. _Testimony: A Philosophical Introduction _provides an epistemology of testimony that surveys this rapidly growing research area while incorporating a discussion of relevant empirical work from social and developmental psychology, as well as from the interdisciplinary study of knowledge-creation in groups. The past decade has seen a number of scholarly monographs on the epistemology of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  23. On Testimony and Transmission.J. Adam Carter & Philip J. Nickel - 2014 - Episteme 11 (2):145-155.
    Jennifer Lackey’s case “Creationist Teacher,” in which students acquire knowledge of evolutionary theory from a teacher who does not herself believe the theory, has been discussed widely as a counterexample to so-called transmission theories of testimonial knowledge and justification. The case purports to show that a speaker need not herself have knowledge or justification in order to enable listeners to acquire knowledge or justification from her assertion. The original case has been criticized on the ground that it does not really (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  24. Interpersonal Epistemic Entitlements.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):159-183.
    In this paper I argue that the nature of our epistemic entitlement to rely on certain belief-forming processes—perception, memory, reasoning, and perhaps others—is not restricted to one's own belief-forming processes. I argue as well that we can have access to the outputs of others’ processes, in the form of their assertions. These two points support the conclusion that epistemic entitlements are “interpersonal.” I then proceed to argue that this opens the way for a non-standard version of anti-reductionism in the epistemology (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  25. Moral Testimony: One of These Things Is Just Like the Others.Daniel Groll & Jason Decker - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (1):54-74.
    What, if anything, is wrong with acquiring moral beliefs on the basis of testimony? Most philosophers think that there is something wrong with it, and most point to a special problem that moral testimony is supposed to create for moral agency. Being a good moral agent involves more than bringing about the right outcomes. It also involves acting with "moral understanding" and one cannot have moral understanding of what one is doing via moral testimony. And so, adherents to this view (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  26. Assurance and Warrant.Edward Hinchman - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14:1-58.
    Previous assurance-theoretic treatments of testimony have not adequately explained how the transmission of warrant depends specifically on the speaker’s mode of address – making it natural to suspect that the interpersonal element is not epistemic but merely psychological or action-theoretic. I aim to fill that explanatory gap: to specify exactly how a testifier’s assurance can create genuine epistemic warrant. In doing so I explain (a) how the illocutionary norm governing the speech act proscribes not lies but a species of bullshit, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  27. Agreement and Communication.Max Kölbel - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S1):101-120.
    I distinguish two notions of agreement in belief: believing the same content versus having beliefs that necessarily coincide/diverge in normative status. The second notion of agreement,, is clearly significant for the communication of beliefs amongst thinkers. Thus there would seem to be some prima facie advantage to choosing the conception of content operative in in such a way that the normative status of beliefs supervenes on their content, and this seems to be the prevailing assumption of many semanticists. I shall (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  28. When to Defer to Supermajority Testimony — and When Not.Christian List - 2014 - In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Essays in Collective Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 240-249.
    Pettit (2006) argues that deferring to majority testimony is not generally rational: it may lead to inconsistent beliefs. He suggests that “another ... approach will do better”: deferring to supermajority testimony. But this approach may also lead to inconsistencies. In this paper, I describe conditions under which deference to supermajority testimony ensures consistency, and conditions under which it does not. I also introduce the concept of “consistency of degree k”, which is weaker than full consistency by ruling out only “blatant” (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  29. Teaching and Telling.Will Small - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (3):372-387.
    Recent work on testimony has raised questions about the extent to which testimony is a distinctively second-personal phenomenon and the possible epistemic significance of its second-personal aspects. However, testimony, in the sense primarily investigated in recent epistemology, is far from the only way in which we acquire knowledge from others. My goal is to distinguish knowledge acquired from testimony (learning from being told) from knowledge acquired from teaching (learning from being taught), and to investigate the similarities and differences between the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  30. The Transmission of Skill.Will Small - 2014 - Philosophical Topics 42 (1):85-111.
    The ideas (i) that skill is a form of knowledge and (ii) that it can be taught are commonplace in both ancient philosophy and everyday life. I argue that contemporary epistemology lacks the resources to adequately accommodate them. Intellectualist and anti-intellectualist accounts of knowledge how struggle to represent the transmission of skill via teaching and learning (§II), in part because each adopts a fundamentally individualistic approach to the acquisition of skill that focuses on individual practice and experience; consequently, learning from (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  31. Anonymous Assertions.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2013 - Episteme 10 (2):135-151.
    This paper addresses how the anonymity of an assertion affects the epistemological dimension of its production by speakers, and its reception by hearers. After arguing that anonymity does have implications in both respects, I go on to argue that at least some of these implications derive from a warranted diminishment in speakers' and hearers' expectations of one another when there are few mechanisms for enforcing the responsibilities attendant to speech. As a result, I argue, anonymous assertions do not carry the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  32. Review of Paul Faulkner, Knowledge on Trust. [REVIEW]Peter J. Graham - 2013 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2013:n-n.
  33. Lockean Social Epistemology.Lisa McNulty - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 47 (4):524-536.
    Locke's reputation as a sceptic regarding testimony, and the resultant mockery by epistemologists with social inclinations, is well known. In particular Michael Welbourne, in his article ‘The Community of Knowledge’ (1981), depicts Lockean epistemology as fundamentally opposed to a social conception of knowledge, claiming that he ‘could not even conceive of the possibility of a community of knowledge’. This interpretation of Locke is flawed. Whilst Locke does not grant the honorific ‘knowledge’ to anything short of certainty, he nonetheless held what (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  34. Anscombe's 'Teachers'.Jeremy Wanderer - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 47 (2):204-221.
    This article is an investigation into G. E. M. Anscombe's suggestion that there can be cases where belief takes a personal object, through an examination of the role that the activity of teaching plays in Anscombe's discussion. By contrasting various kinds of ‘teachers’ that feature in her discussion, it is argued that the best way of understanding the idea of believing someone personally is to situate the relevant encounter within the social, conversational framework of ‘engaged reasoning’. Key features of this (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  35. The Cognitive Importance of Testimony.Jim Davies & David Matheson - 2012 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 16 (2):297-318.
    As a belief source, testimony has long been held by theorists of the mind to play a deeply important role in human cognition. It is unclear, however, just why testimony has been afforded such cognitive importance. We distinguish three suggestions on the matter: the number claim, which takes testimony’s cognitive importance to be a function of the number of beliefs it typically yields, relative to other belief sources; the reliability claim, which ties the importance of testimony to its relative truth-conduciveness; (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. Sanford Goldberg, Relying on Others. An Essay in Epistemology. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010.Lorenz Demey - 2012 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 74 (1):160-163.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37. Book: Learning From Words-by Jennifer Lackey.David Fraser - 2012 - Philosophy Now 88:44.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. II—Some Comments on Fricker's‘Stating and Insinuating’.John Hawthorne - 2012 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1):95-108.
    This discussion piece critically examines some of the key ideology that figures in Elizabeth Fricker's ‘Stating and Insinuating’, raises a number of queries about the details of Fricker's argumentation, and develops some ideas about the normative structure of testimony that relate to the themes of that paper.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  39. Knowledge on Affective Trust.Arnon Keren - 2012 - Abstracta 6 (S6):33-46.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  40. On the Alleged Perversity of the Evidential View of Testimony.Arnon Keren - 2012 - Analysis 72 (4):700-707.
    According to the evidential view of testimony (EVT), the epistemic value of testimony is its value as evidence. Richard Moran has argued that because testimony is deliberately produced with the intention of making audiences form a belief, its value as evidence for the attested proposition is diminished; as a result, EVT cannot explain why we regard testimony as such a significant source of knowledge. I argue that this argument against EVT fails, because there is no reason to think that the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  41. Knowledge on Trust * by Paul Faulkner.G. Longworth - 2012 - Analysis 72 (3):623-624.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. Responsibility for Testimonial Belief.Benjamin McMyler - 2012 - Erkenntnis 76 (3):337-352.
    According to so-called “credit views of knowledge,” knowledge is an achievement of an epistemic agent, something for which an agent is creditable or responsible. One influential criticism of the credit view of knowledge holds that the credit view has difficulty making sense of knowledge acquired from testimony. As Jennifer Lackey has argued, in many ordinary cases of the acquisition of testimonial knowledge, if anyone deserves credit for the truth of the audience’s belief it is the testimonial speaker rather than the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  43. Relying on Others: An Essay in Epistemology * By SANFORD C. GOLDBERG.M. Root - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):184-186.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. Lakṣaṇā as Inference.Nilanjan Das - 2011 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 39 (4-5):353-366.
    This paper questions a few assumptions of Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya’s theory of ordinary verbal cognition (laukika-śābdabodha). The meaning relation (vṛtti) is of two kinds: śakti (which gives us the primary referent of a word) and lakṣaṇā (which yields the secondary referent). For Gaṅgeśa, the ground (bīja) of lakṣaṇā is a sort of inexplicability (anupapatti) pertaining to the composition (anvaya) of word-meanings. In this connection, one notices that the case of lakṣaṇā is quite similar to that of one variety of postulation, namely, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  45. Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing.Kristie Dotson - 2011 - Hypatia 26 (2):236-257.
    Too often, identifying practices of silencing is a seemingly impossible exercise. Here I claim that attempting to give a conceptual reading of the epistemic violence present when silencing occurs can help distinguish the different ways members of oppressed groups are silenced with respect to testimony. I offer an account of epistemic violence as the failure, owing to pernicious ignorance, of hearers to meet the vulnerabilities of speakers in linguistic exchanges. Ultimately, I illustrate that by focusing on the ways in which (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   181 citations  
  46. Conversational Score, Assertion and Testimony.Max Kölbel - 2011 - In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 49--77.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  47. Testimony, Trust, and Authority.Benjamin McMyler - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    In Testimony, Trust, and Authority, Benjamin McMyler argues that philosophers have failed to appreciate the nature and significance of our epistemic dependence ...
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   59 citations  
  48. The Concept of Testimony.Nicola Mößner - 2011 - In Christoph Jäger & Winfried Löffler (eds.), Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreement, Papers of the 34. International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. pp. 207-209.
    Many contributors of the debate about knowledge by testimony concentrate on the problem of justification. In my paper I will stress a different point – the concept of testimony itself. As a starting point I will use the definitional proposal of Jennifer Lackey. She holds that the concept of testimony should be regarded as entailing two aspects – one corresponding to the speaker, the other one to the hearer. I will adopt the assumption that we need to deal with both (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. On the Nature of Testimony.Andrew Cullison - 2010 - Episteme 7 (2):114-127.
    This paper examines several recent positions on the nature of testimony and argues that all are unsatisfactory. The first section argues against narrow, broad, and moderate views. The second section argues against Jennifer Lackey's recent analysis of testimony. Her position is supposed to avoid the problems of the prior accounts, but still suffers from two problems. After discussing those problems, this paper offers and defends an alternative analysis of testimony.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  50. Some Varieties of Epistemic Injustice: Reflections on Fricker.Christopher Hookway - 2010 - Episteme 7 (2):151-163.
    Miranda Fricker's important study of epistemic injustice is focussed primarily on testimonial injustice and hermeneutic injustice. It explores how agents' capacities to make assertions and provide testimony can be impaired in ways that can involve forms of distinctively epistemic injustice. My paper identifies a wider range of forms of epistemic injustice that do not all involve the ability to make assertions or offer testimony. The paper considers some examples of some other ways in which injustice can prevent someone from participating (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
1 — 50 / 84