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  1. Identity and Reference.A. J. Ayer - 1975 - Philosophia 5 (3):171-192.
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  2. The Non-Transitivity of the Contingent and Occasional Identity Relations.Ralf M. Bader - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (1):141-152.
    This paper establishes that the occasional identity relation and the contingent identity relation are both non-transitive and as such are not properly classified as identity relations. This is achieved by appealing to cases where multiple fissions and fusions occur simultaneously. These cases show that the contingent and occasional identity relations do not even satisfy the time-indexed and world-indexed versions of the transitivity requirement and hence are non-transitive relations.
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  3. The Ontological Status of Persons.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):370-388.
    Throughout his illustrious career, Roderick Chisholm was concerned with the nature of persons. On his view, persons are what he called ‘entia per se.’ They exist per se, in their own right. I too have developed an account of persons—I call it the ‘Constitution View’—an account that is different in important ways from Chisholm’s. Here, however, I want to focus on a thesis that Chisholm and I agree on: that persons have ontological significance in virtue of being persons. Although I’ll (...)
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  4. Lowe on Modalities de Re.Tom Baldwin - 1984 - Mind 93 (370):252-255.
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  5. The Logical Contingency of Identity.Hanoch Ben-Yami - forthcoming - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy.
    I show that intuitive and logical considerations do not justify introducing Leibniz’s Law of the Indiscernibility of Identicals in more than a limited form, as applying to atomic formulas. Once this is accepted, it follows that Leibniz’s Law generalises to all formulas of the first-order Predicate Calculus but not to modal formulas. Among other things, identity turns out to be logically contingent.
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  6. Kripke on Identity and Necessity.David Bostock - 1977 - Philosophical Quarterly 27 (109):313-324.
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  7. Best Candidates and Theories of Identity.Andrew Brennan - 1986 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 29 (1-4):423-438.
    Attacks on ?closest continuer? and ?best candidate? theories of identity have something correct in them while still failing to discredit the theories they oppose. What follows from Noonan's and Wiggins's objections to such theories is that they need to be so formulated as not to deny the necessity of identity. The best metaphysics for best?candidate theories to adopt is one in which everyday objects are taken to transcend, in a certain sense, their life histories in given worlds. This metaphysics also (...)
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  8. Composition as a Kind of Identity.Phillip Bricker - 2016 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (3):264-294.
    Composition as identity, as I understand it, is a theory of the composite structure of reality. The theory’s underlying logic is irreducibly plural; its fundamental primitive is a generalized identity relation that takes either plural or singular arguments. Strong versions of the theory that incorporate a generalized version of the indiscernibility of identicals are incompatible with the framework of plural logic, and should be rejected. Weak versions of the theory that are based on the idea that composition is merely analogous (...)
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  9. Identity As Necessity : Nozick's Objection—Kripke Replies.Mahasweta Chaudhury - 1989 - Indian Philosophical Quarterly 16 (3):283.
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  10. Brute Facts, the Necessity of Identity, and the Identity of Indiscernibles.Charles B. Cross - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (1):1-10.
    In ‘Two Spheres, Twenty Spheres, and the Identity of Indiscernibles,’ Della Rocca argues that any counterexample to the PII would involve ‘a brute fact of non-identity [. . .] not grounded in any qualitative difference.’ I respond that Adams's so-called Continuity Argument against the PII does not postulate qualitatively inexplicable brute facts of identity or non-identity if understood in the context of Kripkean modality. One upshot is that if the PII is understood to quantify over modal as well as non-modal (...)
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  11. Causal Independence, the Identity of Indiscernibles, and the Essentiality of Origins.Charles B. Cross - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (5):277-291.
    In his well-known 1952 dialogue Max Black describes a counterexample to the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII). The counterexample is a world containing nothing but two purportedly indiscernible iron spheres. Reflecting on Black's example, Robert Adams uses the possibility of a world containing two almost indiscernible spheres to argue for the possibility of the indiscernible spheres world. One of Adams's almost indiscernible spheres has a small impurity, and, Adams writes, "Surely... the absence of the impurity would not make (...)
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  12. Is Water Necessarily Identical to H2o?Barnett David - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 98 (1):95 - 108.
    The “scientific essentialist” doctrine asserts that the following are examples of a posteriori necessary identities: water is H2O; gold is the element with atomic number 79; and heat is the motion of molecules. Evidence in support of this assertion, however, is difficult to find. Both Hilary Putnam and Saul Kripke have argued convincingly for the existence of a posteriori necessities. Furthermore, Kripke has argued for the existence of a posteriori necessary identities in regard to a particular class of statements involving (...)
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  13. The Ontological Status of Identity.Robert Anthony Delfino - 2001 - Dissertation, State University of New York at Buffalo
    This dissertation is an investigation of the ontological status of identity . The preface is a discussion of how foundational and important metaphysical issues concerning identity are for philosophy in general, and of some of the problems that have plagued the study of identity historically. ;In chapter one various issues concerning identity are framed and the metaphysical issues are divided into two main genera: persistence problems and ontological problems. The primary attention of the dissertation is not given to persistence problems, (...)
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  14. Psychological Continuity and the Necessity of Identity.Robert Francescotti - 2010 - American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (4):337-350.
    In attempting to understand personal identity, it is common practice to imagine a person existing at some time t and a person existing at a time t* , and then to ask, What does it take for person x at t to be the same person as person y at t*?The Psychological Continuity Approach answers: there is a relation, R, of psychological continuity such that person x at t is the same person as person y at t* if and only (...)
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  15. The Metaphysics of Identity.André Gallois - 2016 - Routledge.
    The philosophy problem of identity and the related problem of change go back to the ancient Greek philosophers and fascinated later figures including Leibniz, Locke and Hume. Heraclitus argued that one could not swim in the same river twice because new waters were ever flowing in. When is a river not the same river? If one removes one plank at a time when is a ship no longer a ship? What is the basic nature of identity and persistence? This book (...)
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  16. Necessity and Identity.L. F. Goble - 1972 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):55 - 72.
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  17. Neural Materialism, Pain's Badness, and a Posteriori Identities.Irwin Goldstein - 2004 - In Maite Ezcurdia, Robert Stainton & Christopher Viger (eds.), Canadian Journal of Philosophy. University of Calgary Press. pp. 261-273.
    Orthodox neural materialists think mental states are neural events or orthodox material properties of neutral events. Orthodox material properties are defining properties of the “physical”. A “defining property” of the physical is a type of property that provides a necessary condition for something’s being correctly termed “physical”. In this paper I give an argument against orthodox neural materialism. If successful, the argument would show at least some properties of some mental states are not orthodox material properties of neural events. Opposing (...)
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  18. Necessity, Identity and Time.Lars Gundersen - 2002 - Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 37:37.
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  19. Can Persistence Be a Matter of Convention?Tobias Hansson Wahlberg - 2011 - Axiomathes 21 (4):507-529.
    This paper asks whether persistence can be a matter of convention. It argues that in a rather unexciting de dicto sense persistence is indeed a matter of convention, but it rejects the notion that persistence can be a matter of convention in a more substantial de re sense. However, scenarios can be imagined that appear to involve conventional persistence of the latter kind. Since there are strong reasons for thinking that such conventionality is impossible, it is desirable that our metaphysical-cum-semantic (...)
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  20. Laws of Form: Why Spencer-Brown is Missing the Point.Claus Janew - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 2 (6):885-886.
    What George Spencer-Brown wants to rationalize out of existence is alternation itself – the prerequisite of his whole operation. By that he simplifies (identifies) more than he says. And he does not say all that is important.
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  21. Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
  22. Identity and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1971 - In Milton K. Munitz (ed.), Identity and Individuation. New York University Press. pp. 135-164.
    are synthetic a priori judgements possible?" In both cases, i~thas usually been t'aken for granted in fife one case by Kant that synthetic a priori judgements were possible, and in the other case in contemporary,'d-". philosophical literature that contingent statements of identity are ppss. ible. I do not intend to deal with the Kantian question except to mention:ssj~".
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  23. Rigidity, Occasional Identity and Leibniz' Law.Simon Langford & Murali Ramachandran - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (201):518-526.
    André Gallois (1998) attempts to defend the occasional identity thesis (OIT), the thesis that objects which are distinct at one time may nonetheless be identical at another time, in the face of two influential lines of argument against it. One argument involves Kripke’s (1971) notion of rigid designation and the other, Leibniz’s law (affirming the indiscernibility of identicals). It is reasonable for advocates of (OIT) to question the picture of rigid designation and the version of Leibniz’s law that these arguments (...)
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  24. On the Alleged Necessity of True Identity Statements.E. J. Lowe - 1982 - Mind 91 (364):579-584.
    A highly contentious issue in recent philosophy of logic has been the question of whether there can be contingently true identity statements. In this paper I want to investigate a possible loop-hole in the standard argument of the necessitarians (i.e., those who maintain that any true identity statement is necessarily true).
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  25. In Defense of the Necessity of Identity.William G. Lycan - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (10):572-574.
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  26. Arguments by Leibniz’s Law in Metaphysics.Ofra Magidor - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (3):180-195.
    Leibniz’s Law (or as it sometimes called, ‘the Indiscerniblity of Identicals’) is a widely accepted principle governing the notion of numerical identity. The principle states that if a is identical to b, then any property had by a is also had by b. Leibniz’s Law may seem like a trivial principle, but its apparent consequences are far from trivial. The law has been utilised in a wide range of arguments in metaphysics, many leading to substantive and controversial conclusions. This article (...)
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  27. On a Misguided Argument for the Necessity of Identity.Ari Maunu - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Research.
    There is a certain popular argument, deriving from Ruth Barcan and Saul Kripke, from the conjunction of the Principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals (PInI, for short) and the Principle of the Necessity of Self-Identity to the Thesis of the Necessity of Identity. My purpose is to show that this argument does not work, not at least in the form it is often presented. I also give a correct formulation of the argument and point out that PInI is not even (...)
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  28. The Principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals Requires No Restrictions.Ari Maunu - forthcoming - Synthese:1-8.
    There is a certain argument against the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals, or the thesis that whatever is true of a thing is true of anything identical with that thing. In this argument, PInI is used together with the self-evident principle of the necessity of self-identity to reach the conclusion Open image in new window, which is held to be paradoxical and, thus, fatal to PInI. My purpose is to show that the argument in question does not have this (...)
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  29. Necessary A Posteriori Identity Truths: Fregeanism Beats Direct Reference Theory.Ari Maunu - 2018 - Axiomathes 28 (1):73-80.
    I argue that Fregeanism with respect to proper names—the view that modes of presentation are relevant to the contents of proper names—is able to account for the thesis that there are necessarily true a posteriori identity propositions such as the one expressed in “Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus”, whereas the Direct Reference Theory—according to which the semantic function of certain expressions, e.g., proper names, is only to pick out an object —is able to deal with only their necessary truth. Thus, (...)
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  30. Identity and Time.George Myro - 1997 - In Michael C. Rea (ed.), Material Constitution. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 148.
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  31. Theoretical Identities May Not Be Necessary.Alik Pelman - 2014 - Analysis 74 (3):412-422.
    Following insights from the New Theory of Reference, it has become widely accepted that theoretical identities like ‘water = H2O' are necessary. However, some have challenged this claim. I propose yet another challenge in the form of a sceptical argument. The argument is based on the contention that the necessity of theoretical identities is dependent upon criteria of identity. Thus, a theoretical identity is necessary given one criterion of identity but contingent given another. Since we do not know which criteria (...)
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  32. Necessary Identity.M. J. Pendlebury - 1975 - Philosophical Papers 4 (1):12-20.
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  33. A Situationalist Solution to the Ship of Theseus Puzzle.Martin Pickup - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (5):973-992.
    This paper outlines a novel solution to the Ship of Theseus puzzle. The solution relies on situations, a philosophical tool used in natural language semantics among other places. The core idea is that what is true is always relative to the situation under consideration. I begin by outlining the problem before briefly introducing situations. I then present the solution: in smaller situations the candidate is identical to Theseus’s ship. But in larger situations containing both candidates these identities are neither true (...)
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  34. Problems About Material and Formal Modes in the Necessity of Identity.Lawrence D. Roberts - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (10):562-572.
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  35. Identity and Necessity.Kripke Saul - 1971 - In Milton Karl Munitz (ed.), Identity and Individuation. New York: New York University Press.
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  36. Weakly Classical Theories of Identity.Joshua Schechter - 2011 - Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (4):607-644.
    There are well-known quasi-formal arguments that identity is a "strict" relation in at least the following three senses: (1) There is a single identity relation and a single distinctness relation; (2) There are no contingent cases of identity or distinctness; and (3) There are no vague or indeterminate cases of identity or distinctness. However, the situation is less clear cut than it at first may appear. There is a natural formal theory of identity that is very close to the standard (...)
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  37. The Dynamic Process of Being : Two Process-Ontological Theories of Personal Identity.Daniel R. Siakel - 2014 - Process Studies 43 (2):4-28.
    The purpose of this article is to introduce, interpret, and develop two incompatible process -ontological theories of personal identity that have received little attention in analytic metaphysics. The first theory derives from the notion of personal identity proposed in Alfred North Whitehead’s philosophy, but I interpret this notion differently from previous commentators. The Whiteheadian theory may appeal to those who believe that personal identity involves an entity or entities that are essentially dynamic, but has nothing to do with diachronic objectual (...)
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  38. On the Modal Content of A Posteriori Necessities.Tuomas E. Tahko - 2009 - Theoria 75 (4):344-357.
    This paper challenges the Kripkean interpretation of a posteriori necessities. It will be demonstrated, by an analysis of classic examples, that the modal content of supposed a posteriori necessities is more complicated than the Kripkean line suggests. We will see that further research is needed concerning the a priori principles underlying all a posteriori necessities. In the course of this analysis it will emerge that the modal content of a posteriori necessities can be best described in terms of a Finean (...)
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  39. 'Identity' Without Identity.Alessandro Torza - 2012 - Mind 121 (481):67-95.
    I introduce and defend the semantic notion of counterfactual identity, distinguishing it from the metaphysical notion of transworld identity. After showing that Lewis's counterpart theory misconstrues counterfactual identity facts, I outline and motivate a ‘Leibnizian counterpart theory’ where the notion of counterfactual identity is adequately modelled. Finally, I show that counterfactual identity can be characterized without relying on some implausible features of Lewis's theory of conditionals.
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  40. Explanation and Individual Essence.Márta Ujvári - 2017 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 13 (2):23-42.
    In this paper I show that a novel ontic reading of explanation, intending to capture the de re essential features of individuals, can support the qualitative view of individual essences. It is argued further that the putative harmful consequences of the Leibniz Principle (PII) and its converse for the qualitative view can be avoided, provided that individual essences are not construed in the style of the naïve bundle theory with set-theoretical identity- conditions. Adopting either the more sophisticated two-tier BT or, (...)
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  41. Plural Quantification and Modality.Gabriel Uzquiano - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (2pt2):219-250.
    Identity is a modally inflexible relation: two objects are necessarily identical or necessarily distinct. However, identity is not alone in this respect. We will look at the relation that one object bears to some objects if and only if it is one of them. In particular, we will consider the credentials of the thesis that no matter what some objects are, an object is necessarily one of them or necessarily not one of them.
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  42. Necessary Identity and Necessary Existence.Timothy Williamson - 1990 - In Rudolf Haller & Johannes Brandl (eds.), Wittgenstein - Towards a Re-Evaluation: Proceedings of the 14th International Wittgenstein-Symposium, Vol. I. Holder-Pichler-Tempsky.
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  43. Modality and Identity: A Defense.N. L. Wilson - 1965 - Journal of Philosophy 62 (18):471-477.
  44. Identity and Modality.John Woods - 1975 - Philosophia 5 (1-2):69-120.
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  45. Proper Names and the Necessity of Identity Statements.Michael Wreen - 1998 - Synthese 114 (2):319-335.
    An identity statement flanked on both sides with proper names is necessarily true, Saul Kripke thinks, if it's true at all. Thus, contrary to the received view – or at least what was, prior to Kripke, the received view – a statement like(A) Hesperus is Phosphorus.
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  46. Identity, Essence, and Indiscernibility.Stephen Yablo - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (6):293-314.