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  1. added 2018-08-23
    Naturalismo Moral e Normatividade: Uma investigação sobre as origens e os limites da naturalização do fenômeno moral.Luca Nogueira Igansi - 2016 - Saarbrücken, Germany: Novas Edições Acadêmicas.
    O autor propõe uma investigação do naturalismo moral contemporâneo a partir das variadas formulações do argumento conhecido como a falácia naturalista, assim como do contraponto de algumas teorias não-naturalistas como as de G. E. Moore e John Rawls. A partir da análise destas formulações do argumento no contexto formal da metaética contemporânea, busca aferir a validade da falácia naturalista no contexto atual, bem como de seus limites na aplicação contra o naturalismo moral. O naturalismo moral é apresentado, então, numa versão (...)
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  2. added 2018-08-23
    A Falácia Naturalista na Metaética Contemporânea: Usos e Equívocos.L. N. Igansi - 2014 - Fundamento 1 (8):11-31.
    The naturalistic fallacy according to Moore and its relation to Hume will be analyzed for an exposition both clear and updated in contemporary formal logics, which will denounce its limited scope in current metaethics. I’ll identify the origins of the expression naturalistic fallacy in Moore and atempt to refne its meaning and use, contrasting its relationship to the open-question argument and Hume’s Law. Its application is identifed in four aspects: invalidly as the openquestion argument for not establishing a metaphysical connection (...)
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  3. added 2018-08-23
    Normatividade e Valor no Naturalismo Moral.Luca Nogueira Igansi - 2014 - Dissertation,
    Este trabalho investiga o naturalismo moral contemporâneo a partir das variadas formulações do argumento conhecido como a falácia naturalista, assim como do contraponto de algumas teorias não-naturalistas, em especial a de G. E. Moore. Parto da análise destas formulações do argumento no contexto formal da metaética contemporânea, buscando aferir a validade da falácia naturalista no contexto atual, bem como de seus limites na aplicação contra o naturalismo moral. Apresento então o naturalismo moral numa versão humeana, que sugere uma abordagem descritivista (...)
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  4. added 2018-07-30
    The Naturalistic Fallacy and the History of Metaethics.Neil Sinclair - forthcoming - In The Naturalistic Fallacy. Cambridge University Press.
    This chapter -- the first in the edited collection "The Naturalistic Fallacy" (Cambridge University Press 2019) -- locates the naturalistic fallacy within the context of the other claims Moore defends in Principia Ethica. I explore the notions of “definition” and “analysis” as Moore understood them and set out in detail the multiple interpretations of the fallacy and open question argument. I then take a broad view of the influence of the fallacy on the Century of metaethics that came after Moore, (...)
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  5. added 2018-04-30
    Contemporary Ethical Naturalism : A Comparative Metaethical Evaluation of Expressivism and Cornell Realism.Jorn Sonderholm - 2005 - Dissertation, St. Andrews
    This thesis contains a critical discussion of two metaethical theories: expressivism, as developed in the works of Simon Blackburn, and Cornell realism, as presented by Richard Boyd and David Brink. In the introduction, a distinction is made between external and internal accommodation projects for moral discourse and it is argued that the external accommodation project should be guided by acceptance of methodological naturalism. Expressivism and Cornell realism are then subjected to an extended comparative evaluation, and an answer is sought to (...)
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  6. added 2018-03-14
    Epistemic Reductionism and the Moral-Epistemic Disparity.Chris Heathwood - forthcoming - In Christos Kyriacou & Robin McKenna (eds.), Metaepistemology: Realism & Antirealism. Palgrave Macmillan.
    In previous work, I defend the following disparity between moral and epistemic facts: whereas moral facts are irreducibly normative, epistemic facts – facts such as that some subject is epistemically justified in believing something – are reducible to facts from some other domain (such as facts about probabilities). This moral-epistemic disparity is significant because it undercuts an important kind of argument for robust moral realism. My defense of epistemic reductionism and of the moral-epistemic disparity has been criticized by Richard Rowland (...)
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  7. added 2017-07-27
    Phenomenal, Normative, and Other Explanatory Gaps: A General Diagnosis.Neil Mehta - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    I assume that there exists a general phenomenon, the phenomenon of the explanatory gap, surrounding consciousness, normativity, intentionality, and more. Explanatory gaps are often thought to foreclose reductive possibilities wherever they appear. In response, reductivists who grant the existence of these gaps have offered countless local solutions. But typically such reductivist responses have had a serious shortcoming: because they appeal to essentially domain-specific features, they cannot be fully generalized, and in this sense these responses have been not just local but (...)
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  8. added 2017-05-30
    The Naturalistic Fallacy and Theological Ethics.Christian Miller - forthcoming - In Neil Sinclair (ed.), The Naturalistic Fallacy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    What views are the primary target of Moore’s fallacy and his open question argument? A common answer, I suspect, would be naturalistic approaches to morality. It is the naturalistic fallacy, after all. But in fact both his fallacy and his argument apply just as straightforwardly to supernatural approaches to morality as well. In this chapter, I focus specifically on how philosophers of religion have tried to grounds morality in God in ways that are clearly relevant to Moore’s project.
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  9. added 2017-02-20
    Desire-Based Reasons, Naturalism, and the Possibility of Vindication: Lessons From Moore and Parfit.Attila Tanyi - 2009 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):87-107.
    The aim of the paper is to critically assess the idea that reasons for action are provided by desires. I start from the claim that the most often employed meta-ethical background for the Model is ethical naturalism; I then argue against the Model through its naturalist background. For the latter purpose I make use of two objections that are both intended to refute naturalism per se. One is G.E. Moore’s Open Question Argument, the other is Derek Parfit’s Triviality Objection. I (...)
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  10. added 2017-02-10
    G. E. Moore. Early Philosophical Writings.Maria van der Schaar - 2012 - Journal of Value Inquiry 46 (4):511-514.
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  11. added 2017-01-25
    GE Moore's Contribution to the Discussion of the Concept of Good in Ethics.Z. Palovicova - 2001 - Filozofia 56 (2):82-89.
    The paper focuses on G. E. Moore's contribution to the discussion of the concept of good. Its aim is to explain Moore's understanding of this concept and his argument against naturalism and to call the attention to the more problematic aspects of his philosophical analysis of ethical concepts. The author also tries to show, why Moore's philosophy, in spite of its limitations, is still living in contemporary ethical dicourse.
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  12. added 2017-01-18
    Some Arguments Against G. E. Moore's View of the Function of "Good" in Ethics.Pepita Haezrahi - 1948 - Mind 57 (227):322-340.
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  13. added 2016-12-08
    Ethical Naturalism and Moral Twin Earth.Andrea Viggiano - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (2):213-224.
    In order to rebut G. E. Moore’s open question argument, ethical naturalists adopt a theory of direct reference for our moral terms. T. Horgan and M. Timmons have argued that this theory cannot be applied to moral terms, on the ground that it clashes with competent speakers’ linguistic intuitions. While Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment shows that our linguistic intuitions confirm the theory of direct reference, as applied to ‘water’, Horgan and Timmons devise a parallel thought experiment about moral terms, (...)
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  14. added 2016-09-06
    Reducing Reasons.Matthew Silverstein - 2016 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 10 (1):1-22.
    Reasons are considerations that figure in sound reasoning. This is considered by many philosophers to be little more than a platitude. I argue that it actually has surprising and far-reaching metanormative implications. The view that reasons are linked to sound reasoning seems platitudinous only because we tend to assume that soundness is a normative property, in which case the view merely relates one normative phenomenon (reasons) to another (soundness). I argue that soundness is also a descriptive phenomenon, one we can (...)
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  15. added 2016-08-29
    Ethics and Nature.Jay Elliott - 2006 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 3 (3):321-334.
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  16. added 2016-07-26
    Naturalism in Metaethics.Jussi Suikkanen - 2016 - In Kelly James Clark (ed.), Blackwell Companion to Naturalism. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 351-368.
    This chapter offers an introduction to naturalist views in contemporary metaethics. Such views attempt to find a place for normative properties (such as goodness and rightness) in the concrete physical world as it is understood by both science and common sense. The chapter begins by introducing simple naturalist conceptual analyses of normative terms. It then explains how these analyses were rejected in the beginning of the 20th Century due to G.E. Moore’s influential Open Question Argument. After this, the chapter considers (...)
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  17. added 2016-07-26
    Intuitions About Disagreement Do Not Support the Normativity of Meaning.Derek Baker - 2016 - Dialectica 70 (1):65-84.
    Allan Gibbard () argues that the term ‘meaning’ expresses a normative concept, primarily on the basis of arguments that parallel Moore's famous Open Question Argument. In this paper I argue that Gibbard's evidence for normativity rests on idiosyncrasies of the Open Question Argument, and that when we use related thought experiments designed to bring out unusual semantic intuitions associated with normative terms we fail to find such evidence. These thought experiments, moreover, strongly suggest there are basic requirements for a theory (...)
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  18. added 2016-07-26
    Epistemological Open Questions.Daniel Greco - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):509-523.
    While there has been a great deal of recent interest in parallels between metaethics and metaepistemology, there has been little discussion of epistemological analogues of the open question argument. This is somewhat surprising—the general trend in recent work is in the direction of emphasizing the continuity between metaethics and metaepistemology, and to treat metanormative questions as arising in parallel in these two normative domains. And while the OQA has been subjected to a wide variety of objections, it is still influential (...)
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  19. added 2016-07-26
    Semantic Challenges to Normative Realism.Tristram McPherson - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (2):126-136.
    Normative realists might be assumed to have few worries about semantics. After all, a realist might initially hope to simply adopt the best semantic theory about ordinary descriptive language. However, beginning with the non‐cognitivist appropriation of the open question argument, a number of philosophers have posed serious objections to the realist’s ability to offer a plausible semantic theory. This paper introduces the two most influential semantic challenges to normative realism: the open question argument, and the Moral Twin Earth argument. It (...)
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  20. added 2016-07-26
    Valeurs Et Émotions, les Perspectives du Néo-Sentimentalisme.Christine Tappolet - 2012 - Dialogue 51 (1):7-30.
    ABSTRACT: Neo-sentimentalism is the view that to judge that something has an evaluative property is to judge that some affective or emotional response is appropriate to it, but this view allows for radically different versions. My aim is to spell out what I take to be its most plausible version. Against its normative version, I argue that its descriptive version can best satisfy the normativity requirement that follows from Moore’s Open Question Argument while giving an answer to the Wrong Kind (...)
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  21. added 2016-07-26
    Values and Emotions: Neo-Sentimentalism's Prospects.Christine Tappolet - 2011 - In Carla Bagnoli (ed.), Morality and the Emotions. Oxford University Press.
    Neo-sentmentalism is the view that to judge that something has an evaluative property is to judge that some affective or emotional response is appropriate with respect to it. The difficulty in assessing neo-sentimentalism is that it allows for radically different versions. My aim is to spell out what I take to be its most plausible version. I distinguish between a normative version, which takes the concepts of appropriateness to be normative, and a descriptive version, which claims that appropriateness in emotions (...)
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  22. added 2016-07-26
    Does Semantic Naturalism Rest on a Mistake?Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay - 2011 - In Nuccetelli & Seay Susana & Gary (ed.), Ethical Naturalism: Current Debates. Cambridge University Press.
    More than a century ago, G. E. Moore famously attempted to refute ethical naturalism by offering the so-called open question argument (OQA), also charging that all varieties of ethical naturalism commit the naturalistic fallacy. Although there is consensus that OQA and the naturalistic-fallacy charge both fail, OQA is sometimes vindicated, but only as an argument against naturalistic semantic analyses. The naturalistic-fallacy charge, by contrast, usually finds no takers at all. This paper provides new grounds for an OQA thus restricted. But (...)
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  23. added 2016-07-26
    The Is-Ought Problem, the Open Question Argument, and the New Science of Morality.Radim Bělohrad - 2011 - Human Affairs 21 (3):262-271.
    The article deals with a recent attack by Sam Harris on two famous arguments that purport to establish a gap between factual and evaluative statements—Hume’s Is-Ought Problem and Moore’s Open Question Argument. I present the arguments, analyze the relationship between them and critically assess Harris’ attempt to refute them. I conclude that Harris’ attempt fails.
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  24. added 2016-07-26
    Euthyphro And The Open Question.Timo Kajamies - 2009 - Minerva - An Internet Journal of Philosophy 13:99-113.
    In his excellent introduction to metaethics, Alexander Miller argues that there are affinities between G. E.Moore's open-question argument and Socrates’ argumentation in Euthyphro dialogue. Miller is also led toask how Moore's argument can be disdained without being unsympathetic to Socrates’ argument. Thispaper answers to Miller's question by showing that the two arguments are quite different. It is also arguedthat the two arguments merit different assessments: one may well appreciate Socrates’ reasoning and yetbe unconvinced by Moore's.
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  25. added 2016-07-26
    Themes From G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics.Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (eds.) - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
    These thirteen original essays, whose authors include some of the world's leading philosophers, examine themes from the work of the Cambridge philosopher G. E. Moore (1873-1958), and demonstrate his considerable continuing influence on philosophical debate. Part I bears on epistemological topics, such as skepticism about the external world, the significance of common sense, and theories of perception. Part II is devoted to themes in ethics, such as Moore's open question argument, his non-naturalism, utilitarianism, and his notion of organic unities.
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  26. added 2016-07-26
    Russell's Moral Philosophy.Charles Pigden - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    A 27000 word survey of Russell’s ethics for the SEP. I argue that Russell was a meta-ethicist of some significance. In the course of his long philosophical career, he canvassed most of the meta-ethical options that have dominated debate in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries — naturalism, non-naturalism, emotivism and the error-theory (anticipating Stevenson and Ayer on the one hand and Mackie on the other), and even, to some extent, subjectivism and relativism. And though none of his theories quite worked (...)
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  27. added 2016-07-26
    Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution, Connectionism, and Moral Cognition.William D. Casebeer - 2003 - Bradford.
    In Natural Ethical Facts William Casebeer argues that we can articulate a fully naturalized ethical theory using concepts from evolutionary biology and cognitive science, and that we can study moral cognition just as we study other forms of cognition. His goal is to show that we have "softly fixed" human natures, that these natures are evolved, and that our lives go well or badly depending on how we satisfy the functional demands of these natures. Natural Ethical Facts is a comprehensive (...)
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  28. added 2016-07-26
    Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution, Connectionism, and Moral Cognition.William D. Casebeer - 2003 - Bradford.
    In Natural Ethical Facts William Casebeer argues that we can articulate a fully naturalized ethical theory using concepts from evolutionary biology and cognitive science, and that we can study moral cognition just as we study other forms of cognition. His goal is to show that we have "softly fixed" human natures, that these natures are evolved, and that our lives go well or badly depending on how we satisfy the functional demands of these natures. Natural Ethical Facts is a comprehensive (...)
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  29. added 2016-07-26
    Open Questions and Consequentialist Conditionals: Central Puzzles in Moorean Moral Philosophy.Jean-Paul Vessel - 2003 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst
    Moore's Open Question Arguments are among the most influential arguments in 20th Century metaethical thought. But, surprisingly, there is a fair amount of confusion concerning what the Open Question Arguments actually are, how the Moorean passages should be interpreted, and what they are intended to show. Thus, the early chapters are devoted to clarificatory matters, including the exposing of a variety of contemporary attacks upon Moore's arguments as misguided by indicating where they rest upon faulty interpretations of Moorean passages. Providing (...)
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  30. added 2016-07-26
    A New Theory of Noncognitivism.Wayne Fenske - 1995 - Dissertation, Dalhousie University (Canada)
    In the dissertation, I attempt to defend a new theory of noncognitivism. I do this by discussing four issues, three of which pertain to the views of a group of scholars who have come to be known as "The Cornell Moral Realists". One of the most impressive aspects of the Cornell metaethics is its theoretical expansiveness. It encompasses views in philosophy of language, philosophy of science, philosophical psychology, as well as normative ethics. As such, it serves as a useful foil (...)
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  31. added 2016-07-26
    Re-Thinking Ethical Naturalism: Nietzsche's ?Open Question? Argument. [REVIEW]Lee F. Kerckhove - 1994 - Man and World 27 (2):149-159.
  32. added 2016-07-26
    Troubles on Moral Twin Earth: The 'Open-Question Argument'Revived.Terence Horgan & Mark Timmons - 1992 - Philosophical Papers 21:153-175.
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  33. added 2016-07-26
    An Open Question Argument in Cicero.David Londey - 1984 - Apeiron 18 (2):144 - 147.
  34. added 2016-07-26
    Non-Cognitivism in Ethics: A Modest Proposal for its Diagnosis and Cure.Henry Veatch - 1966 - Ethics 76 (2):102-116.
    Non-Congnitivism relies for its defense upon g e moore's open question argument for a naturalistic fallacy. But this argument is invalid as applied to real definitions, Which are not analytic truths. G e moore's own conclusions about goodness are definitions in this sense. A definition of the good is possible. A valid one will allow for the non-Cognitivist's points that goodness reflects some pro-Attitude, That goodness is supervenient, And that goodness cannot be equated with the properties of a thing. An (...)
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  35. added 2016-07-26
    In Defense of Ethical Naturalism: An Examination of Certain Aspects of the Naturalistic Fallacy, with Particular Attention to the Logic of the Open Question Argument.John Frederick Lange - 1963 - Dissertation, Princeton University
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  36. added 2016-05-31
    Can Robert Adams Survive Moral Twin Earth?Luke Taylor - 2016 - Journal of Religious Ethics 44 (2):334-351.
    Richard Boyd and Robert Adams have both developed semantic accounts of moral terms based on Hilary Putnam's causal regulation theory for natural kind terms, according to which the terms in question refer to the properties which predominantly causally regulated the terms. However, Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons have mounted an objection to Boyd's semantics—their Moral Twin Earth argument. If this argument is successful against Boyd then it might be thought that it should also be successful against Adams, given the similarity (...)
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  37. added 2015-05-18
    Is "Good" Indefinable for the Same Reason That Terms Like "Yellow" or "Bitter" or "Pleasure" Are Indefinable?Thomas King - 1972 - Southwest Philosophical Studies.
  38. added 2015-05-14
    An Assumption of Extreme Significance: Moore, Ross and Spencer on Ethics and Evolution.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2016 - In Uri D. Leibowitz & Neil Sinclair (eds.), Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics: Debunking and Dispensability. Oxford University Press.
    In recent years there has been a growing interest among mainstream Anglophone moral philosophers in the empirical study of human morality, including its evolution and historical development. This chapter compares these developments with an earlier point of contact between moral philosophy and the moral sciences in the early decades of the Twentieth century, as manifested in some of the less frequently discussed arguments of G. E. Moore and W. D. Ross. It is argued that a critical appreciation of Moore and (...)
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  39. added 2015-04-08
    The Open-Question Argument and the Issue of Conceivability.Douglas B. Rasmussen - 1982 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 56:162-172.
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  40. added 2015-04-04
    The Open Question Argument in Moore and Hare.Lorin Wayne Browning - 1972 - Dissertation, Michigan State University
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  41. added 2015-03-23
    Direct Reference and the Open Question Argument.Niklas Möller - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (4):383-402.
    Moore's Open Question Argument has been heavily debated ever since it was presented over 100 years ago. In the current paper, it is argued that for the realist, and contrary to the received view by many theorists in the debate, the argument in fact lends strong support for non-naturalism. In particular, David Brink's naturalist defense utilizing direct reference theory is scrutinized. It is argued that an application of direct reference to moral kinds, rather than defusing the Open Question Argument, actually (...)
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  42. added 2015-03-19
    Moore's Open Question Argument.Bruno Verbeek - 2011 - In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  43. added 2015-03-18
    Open Question Arguments.Thomas Baldwin - 2010 - In John Skorupski (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Ethics. Routledge.
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  44. added 2014-12-18
    Moore's "New" Open Question Argument.Peter A. Sutton - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (4):681-693.
    For more than 100 years, metaethicists have overlooked the best version of G. E. Moore’s Open Question argument. This despite the fact that it appears on the same page of Principia Ethica as his other, weaker versions of the argument. This better Open Question Argument does not rely on introspection of the meanings of ethical terms, and so does not fall to the standard criticisms of Moore. In this paper, I present this ‘new’ Open Question Argument and show that Moore (...)
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  45. added 2014-04-15
    Desire-Based Reasons, Naturalism, and Tolerable Revisionism: Lessons From Moore and Parfit.Attila Tanyi - 2009 - Cuadernos de Anuario Filosófico 212:49-57.
    My aim in this paper is to critically assess the idea that reasons for action are provided by desires (the Desire-based Reasons Model or the Model). I start from the claim that the most often employed meta-ethical background for the Model is ethical naturalism; I then consider attempts to argue against the Model through its naturalism. I make use of two objections that are both intended to refute naturalism per se. One is the indirect version of G. E. Moore’s Open (...)
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  46. added 2014-03-31
    Troubles for New Wave Moral Semantics: The 'Open Question Argument' Revived.Terence Horgan & Mark Timmons - 1992 - Philosophical Papers 21 (3):153-175.
    (1992). TROUBLES FOR NEW WAVE MORAL SEMANTICS: THE ‘OPEN QUESTION ARGUMENT’ REVIVED. Philosophical Papers: Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 153-175. doi: 10.1080/05568649209506380.
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  47. added 2014-03-27
    Coherentist Naturalism in Ethics.James A. Ryan - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Research 25:471-487.
    After briefly arguing that neither (Kantian or utilitarian) rule-based ethics nor virtue ethics offers promise as a moral theory, I state that argument by analogy (i.e., deliberation within coherence constraints) is a satisfactory form of moral deliberation. I show that what is right must be whatever corresponds to the largest and most coherent set of a society’s moral values. Since we would not know how to interpret the claim that what is right might be repugnant to all our shared moral (...)
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  48. added 2014-03-23
    What Truth Does the Emotive-Imperative Answer to the Open-Question Argument Leave to Moral Judgments?David Braybrooke - 2003 - Journal of Value Inquiry 37 (3):341-352.
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  49. added 2014-03-23
    Agency and the Open Question Argument.Connie S. Rosati - 2003 - Ethics 113 (3):490-527.
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  50. added 2014-03-20
    The Open Question Argument: What It Isn't; and What It Is.Fred Feldman - 2005 - Philosophical Issues 15 (1):22–43.
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