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The Perceptual Relation
Edited by Susanna Schellenberg (Rutgers - New Brunswick)
Assistant editor: Zhiguo Huang (Rutgers - New Brunswick)
About this topic
| Summary | There are three questions structuring the debate on perceptual relations. One question concerns the connection between perceptual relations to the environment and the representational content of experiences. Are perceptual relations or perceptual representations more fundamental in an account of the nature of perceptual experience? Austere relationalists have it that perceptual relations to the environment are more fundamental than any representations. Austere representationalists have it that representations are more fundamental than any perceptual relations to the environment. Hybrid views have it that perceptual experience is fundamentally both relational and representational. A second question is whether we are perceptually related to particulars or universals. Direct realists have it that we are perceptually related to particulars such as objects, events, and property-instances in our environment. Likewise, sense-data theorists have it that we are related to particulars, but understand the particulars in play to be strange particulars, namely sense-data. While it is compatible with a representationalist view to hold that we are perceptually related to particulars in our environment, at least some representationalists have it that we are perceptually related to properties and so to universals rather than particulars. A third question concerns the nature of the relation. Is the perceptual relation a causal relation, is it a sensory relation such as an awareness relation, or is it an epistemic relation such as an acquaintance relation? |
| Key works | Brewer 2007, Campbell 2002, Dretske 1981 |
| Introductions | Crane 2006, Schellenberg 2010 |
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The Causal Theory of Perception
- Seeing Without Discriminating.Ayoob Shahmoradi - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.What does the most fundamental type of perceptual (or mental) reference look like? One view suggests that perceptual reference requires representation-as, while another holds that it requires discriminating the perceived item. I distinguish five types of discrimination, three of which are personal-level and distinctively visual, and explain their implications and interrelations. Next, I argue that the plausibility of the claim that perceiving something requires discriminating it—rather than simply attributing properties to it—depends on the type of discrimination at issue. A weak (...)
- An attempt at a general solution to the problem of deviant causal chains.Shane Ward - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (2):374-395.Deviant causal chain problems arise in many settings. The most famous instance of the problem is the Gettier problem, but the problem also arises in the philosophy of action and perception. Usually, attempts to tackle these problems try to solve them individually. This paper takes a different approach: I propose a general solution to the problem. I begin by providing a solution to the deviant causal chain problem for skillful performance, and I argue that the solution can be extended to (...)
- Semiogenesis: Naturalizing Semiosic Haecceity and Temporal Irreversibility.J. Augustus Bacigalupi - 2024 - In Explorations in Dynamic Semiosis. Springer. Translated by E.M. Tragel.Time irreversibility is a central attribute of many process-oriented projects of semiosis, from Peirce’s endless semiosis to Valsiner’s Inter-modal Pre-construction Method. Grounding time irreversibility via an incrementally more rigorous system theoretic model can contribute to the efficacy of these semiotic process philosophies. If, for example, it can be shown that each moment in a semiosic system is distinct, even if related, to all other moments, then time irreversibility will have been demonstrated. This distinctness, or thisness, of the semiosic being, is (...)
- Perception as Controlled Hallucination.Justin Tiehen - 2023 - Analytic Philosophy 64 (4):355-372.“Perception is controlled hallucination,” according to proponents of predictive processing accounts of vision. I say they are right that something like this is a consequence of their view but wrong in how they have pursued the idea. The focus of my counterproposal is the causal theory of perception, which I develop in terms of a productive concept of causation. Cases of what otherwise seem like successful perception are instead mere veridical hallucination if predictive processing accounts are correct, I argue, because (...)
- Reliable color misrepresentation and color vision (in print), Special Issue: Brogaard, B. and French, R. (Eds).Dimitria Gatzia - 2024 - In Robert French & Berit Brogaard, The Roles of Representations in Visual Perception. Springer. pp. 179-197.Tracking theories of mental representation posit a privileged relation between color representations and the color properties of objects. Tracking theories of mental representation have been used to motivate color realism as they posit that the function of color vision is to represent the colors of objects. It has been argued that tracking theories have a major flaw, namely they cannot account for reliable misrepresentation. It has further been suggested that reliable color misrepresentation is a live possibility. In this chapter, I (...)
- Propositional Intentionalism and the Argument from Appearance.Zhiwei Gu - 2022 - Philosophia 51 (2):697-715.The argument from appearance for the content view or intentionalism attracts a lot of attention recently. In my paper, I follow Charles Travis to argue against the key premise that representational content can be ‘read off’ from a certain way that a thing looks to a subject. My arguments are built upon Travis’s original objection and a reinterpretation of Rodrick Chisholm’s comparative and noncomparative uses of appearance words. Byrne, Schellenberg and others interpret Travis’ ‘visual looks’ as Chisholm’s comparative use, and (...)
- The Elasticity of Perception: Undermining the (Non-)Conceptualism Debate.Endres Tobias - 2023 - Studia Kantiana 20 (2):153-165.In the current philosophy of perception, a debate about whether concepts permeate perceptual states in constituting the perceptual object or not has been widely discussed. Analytic philosophers and phenomenologists participate in this debate likewise, but it is also a debate in Kantian scholarship since the conceptualists’ thesis goes back to Kant’s Criticism and neo-Kantians already discussing such theory against any philosophy of immediate experience long before Wilfrid Sellars had started his attack against the so-called myth of the given. In light (...)
- The causal theory of perception.H. P. Grice - 1988 - In Jonathan Dancy, Perceptual knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 121-168.$45.11 new (collection) View on Amazon.comRemove from this listExport citation
Bookmark 29 citations - An Alternative to the Causal Theory of Perception.Todd Ganson - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (4):683-695.Proponents of the causal theory of perception have applied the theory to questions about which particular objects or events are perceived, which parts are perceived, and which properties are perceived. In each case they insist that successful perception is causally dependent on what is perceived. The causal theory rests on an important insight regarding the information-carrying role of perception. In order to succeed in this role, perception cannot be grounded in spurious correlations. But we can respect this insight without embracing (...)
- (2 other versions)A Direct Object of Perception.Mika Suojanen - 2015 - E-LOGOS – Electronic Journal for Philosophy 22 (1):28-36.I will use three simple arguments to refute the thesis that I appear to directly perceive a mind-independent material object. The theses I will use are similar to the time-gap argument and the argument from the relativity of perception. The visual object of imagination and the object of experience are in the same place. They also share common qualities such as the content, subjectivity, change in virtue of conditions of observers, and the like. This leads to the conclusion that both (...)
- (1 other version)An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge.Chung Him Kwok, Shane Ryan & Chienkuo Mi - 2022 - Episteme:1-14.This paper explores the prospects for a Pritchardean epistemological disjunctivist account of memory knowledge. We begin by providing an overview of Duncan Pritchard's epistemological disjunctivist account of perceptual knowledge, as well as the theoretical advantages of such an account. Drawing on that account, we present and motivate our own Pritchardean epistemological disjunctivist account of memory knowledge. After distinguishing different sorts of memory and the different roles that memory can play in knowledge acquisition, we set out our account and argue that (...)
- Defending Disjunctivism about Perception知覚についての選言説を擁護する.Tomohiro Yamashita - 2022 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 54 (2):71-91.
- Dispositionalism at Work: A Causal Theory of Perception.Christian Kanzian - 2021 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 77 (4):1297-1314.This paper seeks to show how a proper version of dispositionalism, taking powers as basic elements of reality, may figure as a causal theory of perception. On the basis of this argument, the paper draws some further conclusions, which may indicate the explanatory competence of such a disposition-affine theory of causality, for example in terms of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, as well as an ontological account of mere potentialities of active capacities to perceive and of “privations,” respectively.
- Seeing and Visual Reference.Kevin J. Lande - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2):402-433.Perception is a central means by which we come to represent and be aware of particulars in the world. I argue that an adequate account of perception must distinguish between what one perceives and what one's perceptual experience is of or about. Through capacities for visual completion, one can be visually aware of particular parts of a scene that one nevertheless does not see. Seeing corresponds to a basic, but not exhaustive, way in which one can be visually aware of (...)
- Multi-Factor Causal Disjunctivism: a Nyāya-Informed Account of Perceptual Disjunctivism.Anand Jayprakash Vaidya - 2020 - Sophia 60 (4):917-940.Perceptual disjunctivism is a controversial thesis about perception. One familiar characterization of the thesis maintains that there is no common epistemic kind that is present in both veridical and non-veridical cases of perception. For example, the good case, in which one sees a yellow lemon, and the bad case, in which one hallucinates a yellow lemon, share a specific first-person phenomenology, being indistinguishable from the first-person point of view; however, seeing a yellow lemon and hallucinating a yellow lemon do not, (...)
- (1 other version)The Problem of Perception.Tim Crane & Craig French - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.The Problem of Perception is a pervasive and traditional problem about our ordinary conception of perceptual experience. The problem is created by the phenomena of perceptual illusion and hallucination: if these kinds of error are possible, how can perceptual experience be what we ordinarily understand it to be: something that enables direct perception of the world? These possibilities of error challenge the intelligibility of our ordinary conception of perceptual experience; the major theories of experience are responses to this challenge.
- Reflective intuitions about the causal theory of perception across sensory modalities.R. Roberts, K. Allen & Kelly Schmidtke - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (2):257-277.Many philosophers believe that there is a causal condition on perception, and that this condition is a conceptual truth about perception. A highly influential argument for this claim is based on intuitive responses to Gricean style thought experiments. Do the folk share the intuitions of philosophers? Roberts et al. (2016) presented participants with two kinds of cases: Blocker cases (similar to Grice’s case involving a mirror and a pillar) and Non-Blocker cases (similar to Grice’s case involving a clock and brain (...)
- Material Objects as the Singular Subjects of Multimodal Perception.Mohan Matthen - 2023 - In Aleksandra Mroczko-Wrasowicz & Rick Grush, Sensory Individuals: Unimodal and Multimodal Perspectives. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 261–275.Higher animals need to identify and track material objects because they depend on interactions with them for nutrition, reproduction, and social interaction. This paper investigates the perception of material objects. It argues, first, that material objects are tagged, in all five external senses, as bearers of the features detected by them. This happens through a perceptual process, here entitled Generalized Completion, which creates the appearance of objects that have properties that transcend the activation of sensory receptors. The paper shows, secondly, (...)
- The Causal Theory of Perception.H. P. Grice - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske, Knowledge: readings in contemporary epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Reflective Intuitions about the Causal Theory of Perception across Sensory Modalities.Pendaran Roberts, Keith Allen & Kelly Schmidtke - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (2):257-277.Many philosophers believe that there is a causal condition on perception, and that this condition is a conceptual truth about perception. A highly influential argument for this claim is based on intuitive responses to Gricean-style thought experiments. Do the folk share the intuitions of philosophers? Roberts et al. (2016) presented participants with two kinds of cases: Blocker cases (similar to Grice’s case involving a mirror and a pillar) and Non-Blocker cases (similar to Grice’s case involving a clock and brain stimulation). (...)
- The Immediate Object of Perception: A Sense-datum.Mika Suojanen - 2017 - Turku: Reports from the Department of Philosophy.The question of what we immediately perceive from the first-person point of view has been an issue of philosophizing since the beginning of Western philosophy. However, many philosophers have not considered all theoretical and practical consequences concerning identity and causation in perceptual experience between a perceiver and the external world. Despite their meritorious studies, philosophers have failed to completely understand how the causal series of events affects what we immediately experience. Using facts relating to perceivers, logical reasoning, introspection, and philosophical (...)
- The Nature of Object of Perception and Its Role in the Knowledge Concerning the External World.Mika Suojanen - 2015 - Turku: University of Turku.Questions concerning perception are as old as the field of philosophy itself. Using the first-person perspective as a starting point and philosophical documents, the study examines the relationship between knowledge and perception. The problem is that of how one knows what one immediately perceives. The everyday belief that an object of perception is known to be a material object on grounds of perception is demonstrated as unreliable. It is possible that directly perceived sensible particulars are mind-internal images, shapes, sounds, touches, (...)
- (2 other versions)A Direct Object of Perception.Mika Suojanen - 2015 - E-Logos Electronic Journal for Philosophy 22 (1):28-36.I will use three simple arguments to refute the thesis that I appear to directly perceive a mind-independent material object. The theses I will use are similar to the time-gap argument and the argument from the relativity of perception. The visual object of imagination and the object of experience are in the same place. They also share common qualities such as the content, subjectivity, change in virtue of conditions of observers, and the like. This leads to the conclusion that both (...)
- On Schellenberg’s The Unity of Perception. [REVIEW]Ayoob Shahmoradi - manuscriptMy general worry is that Schellenberg’s arguments against naive realism, generalism, and Russellian representationalism do not seem to be successful. Thus her attempt at ruling these views out fails. Her main arguments rely on a shared premise whose plausibility, in the absence of an appropriate theory of particulars, is hard to assess (§2.1). Apart from that, these arguments rely on an under-specified notion of constitution; there seems to be no sense of the term that makes all the premises of her (...)
- A representationalist reading of Kantian intuitions.Ayoob Shahmoradi - 2021 - Synthese 198 (3):2169-2191.There are passages in Kant’s writings according to which empirical intuitions have to be (a) singular, (b) object-dependent, and (c) immediate. It has also been argued that empirical intuitions (d) are not truth-apt, and (e) need to provide the subject with a proof of the possibility of the cognized object. Having relied on one or another of the a-e constraints, the naïve realist readers of Kant have argued that it is not possible for empirical intuitions to be representations. Instead they (...)
- (1 other version)Berkeley: el papel de Dios en la teoría de la visión / The Role of God in Berkeley's Theory of Vision.Alberto Luis López - 2015 - Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía 49:27-52.Berkeley desarrolla su teoría de la visión en la obra de juventud Ensayo para una nueva teoría de la visión, que por lo general ha sido leída atendiendo sólo a sus aspectos científicos o perceptuales. En este artículo propongo una lectura distinta, que busca mostrar que el Ensayo no sólo atiende aspectos científicos sino, por el contrario, anticipa el inmaterialismo de obras posteriores. Esto lo hace porque Dios cumple un importante papel en él, lo cual se debe, entre otras cosas, (...)
- On Silhouettes, Surfaces and Sorensen.Thomas Raleigh - 2018 - In Thomas Crowther & Clare Mac Cumhaill, Perceptual Ephemera. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 194-218.In his book “Seeing Dark Things” (2008), Roy Sorensen provides many wonderfully ingenious arguments for many surprising, counter-intuitive claims. One such claim in particular is that when we a silhouetted object – i.e. an opaque object lit entirely from behind – we literally see its back-side – i.e. we see the full expanse of the surface facing away from us that is blocking the incoming light. Sorensen himself admits that this seems a tough pill to swallow, later characterising it as (...)
- The Best With What We Have: A Threefold Metaphysics of Perception.Andrea Bucci - 2018 - Brainfactor:1-11.In this paper I will try to outline a Metaphysics of Perception that takes for granted one of the central thesis of the metaphysical doctrine called Indirect Realism. Firstly, I will introduce the central thesis of Indirect Realism and then a special version of the Causal Theory of Perception that modifies in some fundamental respect one of the most influential version of Causal Theory of Perception designed by William Child.
- Perception naturalised: relocation and the sensible qualities.Paul Coates - 2017 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 3):809-829.This paper offers a partial defence of a Sellarsian-inspired form of scientific realism. It defends the relocation strategy that Sellars adopts in his project of reconciling the manifest and scientific images. It concentrates on defending the causal analysis of perception that is essential to his treatment of sensible qualities. One fundamental metaphysical issue in perception theory concerns the nature of the perceptual relation; it is argued that a philosophical exploration of this issue is continuous with the scientific investigation of perceptual (...)
- II*—Perception and Causation.Jenny Teichmann - 1971 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71 (1):29-42.Jenny Teichmann; II*—Perception and Causation, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 71, Issue 1, 1 June 1971, Pages 29–42, https://doi.org/10.1093/ar.
- V.—The Causal Theory of Perception.C. H. Whiteley - 1940 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 40 (1):89-102.
- New foundations for qualitative physics.Jean Petitot & Barry Smith - 1990 - In J. E. Tiles, G. T. McKee & G. C. Dean, Evolving knowledge in natural science and artificial intelligence. London: Pitman. pp. 231-49.Physical reality is all the reality we have, and so physical theory in the standard sense is all the ontology we need. This, at least, was an assumption taken almost universally for granted by the advocates of exact philosophy for much of the present century. Every event, it was held, is a physical event, and all structure in reality is physical structure. The grip of this assumption has perhaps been gradually weakened in recent years as far as the sciences of (...)
- Causation and perception: the puzzle unravelled.Alva Noe - 2003 - Analysis 63 (2):93-100.
- (1 other version)Animadversions on the Causal Theory of Perception.Gerald Vision - 1993 - Philosophical Quarterly 43 (172):344-357.
- (2 other versions)The Causal Theory of Perception.A. J. Ayer & L. J. Cohen - 1977 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 51 (1):105-142.
- (1 other version)Problems of Vision: Rethinking the Causal Theory of Perception.William Child - 1997 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):729-731.
- The Causal Theory of Visual Perception.John Heffner - 1981 - International Philosophical Quarterly 21 (3):301-330.
- Folk intuitions about the causal theory of perception.Pendaran Roberts, Keith Allen & Kelly Ann Schmidtke - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.It is widely held by philosophers not only that there is a causal condition on perception but also that the causal condition is a conceptual truth about perception. One influential line of argument for this claim is based on intuitive responses to a style of thought experiment popularized by Grice. Given the significance of these thought experiments to the literature, it is important to see whether the folk in fact respond to these cases in the way that philosophers assume they (...)
- Problems of Vision: Rethinking the Causal Theory of Perception.Alex Byrne - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (3):415.Problems of Vision is divided into three parts. The first part argues for the “insight at [the] core” of the causal theory of perception.
- 2. Causal Theories of Objects and Grice’s Causal Theory of Perception.Robert Greenberg - 2016 - In The Bounds of Freedom: Kant’s Causal Theory of Action. Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 14-40.
- The Causal Theory of Perception.H. P. Grice & Alan R. White - 1961 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 35 (1):121-168.
- (2 other versions)The Causal Theory of Perception.A. J. Ayer & L. J. Cohen - 1977 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 51 (1):105-142.
- The Objects of Perceptual Experience.Paul Snowdon & Howard Robinson - 1990 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 64 (1):121-166.
- (1 other version)Perception and Metaphysical Scepticism.Paul Coates - 1998 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 72 (1):1-28.In this paper I introduce and critically examine a paradox about perceiving that is in some ways analogous to the paradox about meaning which Kripke puts forward in his exegesis of Wittgenstein's views on Rule-following. When applied to vision, the paradox of perceiving raises a metaphysical scepticism about which object a person is seeing if he looks, for example, at an apple on a tree directly in front of him. Physical objects can be seen when their appearance is distorted in (...)
- (1 other version)XI*—Perception, Vision and Causation.Paul Snowdon - 1981 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81 (1):175-192.Paul Snowdon; XI*—Perception, Vision and Causation, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 81, Issue 1, 1 June 1981, Pages 175–192, https://doi.org/10.
- Two causation/perception constructions in French.Michel Achard - 1996 - Cognitive Linguistics 7 (4):315-358.
- Getting Objects for Free (Or Not): The Philosophy and Psychology of Object Perception.Gary Hatfield - 2009 - In Gary Carl Hatfield, Perception and cognition: essays in the philosophy of psychology. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 212-255.
- The Deviance in Deviant Causal Chains.Neil McDonnell - 2015 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):162-170.Causal theories of action, perception and knowledge are each beset by problems of so-called ‘deviant’ causal chains. For each such theory, counterexamples are formed using odd or co-incidental causal chains to establish that the theory is committed to unpalatable claims about some intentional action, about a case of veridical perception or about the acquisition of genuine knowledge. In this paper I will argue that three well-known examples of a deviant causal chain have something in common: they each violate Yablos proportionality (...)
- The Perception of Causality.A. Michotte, T. R. Miles & Elaine Miles - 1964 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 15 (59):254-259.
- Direct Perception in Mathematics: A Case for Epistemological Priority.Bart Kerkhove & Erik Myin - 2002 - Logique Et Analyse 45.Remove from this listExport citation Bookmark
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