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  1. In Defense of Epistemic Circularity.David J. Alexander - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (3):223-241.
    In this paper I defend epistemic circularity by arguing that the “No Self-Support” principle (NSS) is false. This principle, ultimately due to Fumerton ( 1995 ), states that one cannot acquire a justified belief in the reliability of a source of belief by trusting that very source. I argue that NSS has the skeptical consequence that the trustworthiness of all of our sources ultimately depends upon the trustworthiness of certain fundamental sources – sources that we cannot justifiably believe to be (...)
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  2. What's the Matter with Epistemic Circularity?David James Barnett - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (2):177-205.
    If the reliability of a source of testimony is open to question, it seems epistemically illegitimate to verify the source’s reliability by appealing to that source’s own testimony. Is this because it is illegitimate to trust a questionable source’s testimony on any matter whatsoever? Or is there a distinctive problem with appealing to the source’s testimony on the matter of that source’s own reliability? After distinguishing between two kinds of epistemically illegitimate circularity—bootstrapping and self-verification—I argue for a qualified version of (...)
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  3. Why Reliabilism Does Not Permit Easy Knowledge.Kelly Becker - 2013 - Synthese 190 (17):3751-3775.
    Reliabilism furnishes an account of basic knowledge that circumvents the problem of the given. However, reliabilism and other epistemological theories that countenance basic knowledge have been criticized for permitting all-too-easy higher-level knowledge. In this paper, I describe the problem of easy knowledge, look briefly at proposed solutions, and then develop my own. I argue that the easy knowledge problem, as it applies to reliabilism, hinges on a false and too crude understanding of ‘reliable’. With a more plausible conception of ‘reliable’, (...)
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  4. Basic Knowledge and Easy Understanding.Kelly Becker - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (2):145-161.
    Reliabilism is a theory that countenances basic knowledge, that is, knowledge from a reliable source, without requiring that the agent knows the source is reliable. Critics (especially Cohen 2002 ) have argued that such theories generate all-too-easy, intuitively implausible cases of higher-order knowledge based on inference from basic knowledge. For present purposes, the criticism might be recast as claiming that reliabilism implausibly generates cases of understanding from brute, basic knowledge. I argue that the easy knowledge (or easy understanding) criticism rests (...)
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  5. Solving the Problem of Easy Knowledge.Tim Black - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):597-617.
    Stewart Cohen argues that several epistemological theories fall victim to the problem of easy knowledge: they allow us to know far too easily that certain sceptical hypotheses are false and that how things seem is a reliable indicator of how they are. This problem is a result of the theories' interaction with an epistemic closure principle. Cohen suggests that the theories should be modified. I argue that attempts to solve the problem should focus on closure instead; a new and plausible (...)
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  6. Reliabilism, Bootstrapping, and Epistemic Circularity.Jochen Briesen - 2013 - Synthese 190 (18):4361-4372.
    Pretheoretically we hold that we cannot gain justification or knowledge through an epistemically circular reasoning process. Epistemically circular reasoning occurs when a subject forms the belief that p on the basis of an argument A, where at least one of the premises of A already presupposes the truth of p. It has often been argued that process reliabilism does not rule out that this kind of reasoning leads to justification or knowledge. For some philosophers, this is a reason to reject (...)
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  7. Bootstrapping, Evidentialist Internalism, and Rule Circularity.Anthony Brueckner - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):591-597.
    Bootstrapping, evidentialist internalism, and rule circularity Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-7 DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9876-9 Authors Anthony Brueckner, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  8. Bootstrapping and Knowledge of Reliability.Anthony Brueckner & Christopher T. Buford - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (3):407–412.
    This is a critical discussion of a paper on the problem of bootstrapping by Jose Zalabardo.
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  9. Bootstrapping, Defeasible Reasoning, and a Priori Justification.Stewart Cohen - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):141-159.
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  10. Why Basic Knowledge is Easy Knowledge.Stewart Cohen - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):417 - 430.
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  11. Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge.Stewart Cohen - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):309-329.
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  12. Easy Knowledge Makes No Difference: Reply to Wielenberg.Juan Comesaña & Carolina Sartorio - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (2):221–224.
    We have recently proposed a diagnosis of what goes wrong in cases of ‘easy-knowledge.’ Erik Wielenberg argues that there are cases of easy knowledge thatour proposal cannot handle. In this note we reply to Wielenberg, arguing that our proposal does indeed handle his cases.
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  13. Epistemic Levels, the Problem of Easy Knowledge and Skepticism.Tito Flores - 2009 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 54 (2):109-129.
    O problema do conhecimento fácil tem sido definido na literatura epistemológica contemporânea com um problema que nasce de duas formas distintas. O propósito deste ensaio é mostrar que essas supostas maneiras diferentes de gerar o mesmo problema em verdade originam dois problemas distintos, que requerem respostas distintas. Um deles está relacionado à aquisição fácil (inaceitável) de conhecimento de primeira-ordem e o outro à aquisição fácil (inaceitável) de conhecimento de segunda-ordem. Além disso, é apresentada a maneira como o infinitismo, a teoria (...)
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  14. The Number of Moons Is Not a Number. Towards a Comprehensive Linguistic Approach to Frege's Commitment Puzzle.Borys Jastrzębski - 2016 - Filozofia Nauki 24 (2 (94)):31-49.
    Comprehensive Linguistic Approach to Frege's Commitment Puzzle There is a puzzle, noticed by Frege, about inferences from sentences like (F1) "Jupiter has four moons" to sentences like (F2) "The number of moons of Jupiter is four". They seem to be truth-conditionally equivalent but, apparently, they say something about completely different things. (F1) seems to be about moons, while (F2) about numbers. This phenomenon raises several puzzles about semantics, syntax, and is one of main tools of easy ontology. Recently, new linguistic (...)
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  15. Reflective Knowledge and Epistemic Circularity.C. S. I. Jenkins - 2011 - Philosophical Papers 40 (3):305-325.
    Abstract This paper examines the kind of epistemic circularity which, according to Ernest Sosa, is unavoidably entailed whenever one has what he calls ?reflective? knowledge (that is, knowledge that p such that the knower reflectively endorses the reliability of the epistemic sources by which she came to her belief that p). I begin by describing the relevant kind of circularity and its role in Sosa's epistemology, en route presenting and resisting Sosa's arguments that this kind of circularity is not vicious. (...)
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  16. ``Closure Matters: Skepticism and Easy Knowledge".Peter Klein - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14:165--184.
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  17. Epistemic conservatism.Rodrigo Laera - 2013 - Filosofia Unisinos 14 (3):176-188.
    The present paper aims to revisit the virtues and disadvantages of epistemic conservatism, which claims that it is rational to adhere to a belief until there is evidence to the contrary. Two main theses are put forward: first, while conservatism presents several epistemological flaws, from a contextualist point of view it is not only desirable but also is essential to knowledge accumulation in everyday life; second, conservatism provides a solution to sceptical challenges and to the problem of easy knowledge.
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  18. Reliabilism, Circularity, and the Pyrrhonian Problematic.Markus Lammenranta - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Research 28:311-328.
    To solve the ancient Pyrrhonian problematic, it is not enough to show that knowledge and justified belief are possible. They must be shown to be actual. It is argued that the attempts by the main advocates of reliabilism, William Alston, Alvin Goldman, and Ernest Sosa, fail to solve the problematic because they fall under the Agrippan modes of circularity and hypothesis. There is also another sort of response implicit in their discussion. It is not to try to solve the problematic, (...)
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  19. Reliabilism and Circularity.Markus Lammenranta - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):111-124.
    Reliabilists have often noticed a kind of circularity in their reasoning, but they have insisted that the circularity in question is not vicious. On the contrary, they think typically that reliabilism resolves even the traditional problems of circularity. It is argued in the paper that there is a real problem of circularity that relates to the method by which we are supposed arrive at our epistemology. Different methods are considered, including methodism and particularism that Roderick Chisholm distinguishes as possible responses (...)
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  20. Epistemic Circularity Again.Noah Lemos - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):254–270.
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  21. Closure Provides No Relief From the Problem of Easy Knowledge.Matthew Lockard - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (2):461-469.
    Closure principles loom large in recent internalist critiques of epistemic externalism. Cohen (Philos Phenomenol Res 65:309–329, 2002, Philos Phenomenol Res 70:417–430, 2005), Vogel (J Philos 97:602–623, 2000), and Fumerton (Meta-Epistemology and skepticism. Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, 1995) argue that, given closure, epistemic externalism is committed to the possibility of implausibly easy knowledge. By contrast, Zalabardo (Philos Rev 114:33–61, 2005) proposes that epistemic closure actually precludes the possibility of easy knowledge, and appeals to closure principles to solve the problem of easy (...)
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  22. Basic Knowledge and Conditions on Knowledge.Mark McBride - 2017 - Open Book Publishers.
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  23. Davies on Easy Knowledge.Mark McBride - 2014 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 4 (1):1-20.
    Stewart Cohen considers a case where his son wants a red table for his room. Cohen and his son go to the furniture store. Cohen’s son is concerned that the table his father is considering purchasing, which appears red, may in fact be white with red lights shining on it. Cohen responds with the following reasoning: The table looks red. The table is red. If the table is red, then it is not white with red lights shining on it. The (...)
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  24. Zalabardo on Easy Knowledge.Mark McBride - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Research 38:177-188.
    Stewart Cohen (2002; 2005) considers a case where his son wants a red table for his room. Cohen and his son go to the furniture store. Cohen’s son is concerned that the table his father is considering purchasing, which appears red, may in fact be white with red lights shining on it. Cohen responds with the following reasoning:(WARRANT FOR 1) The table looks red.(EK) (1) The table is red.(2) If the table is red, then it is not white with red (...)
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  25. Sensitivity has Multiple Heterogeneity Problems: A Reply to Wallbridge.Guido Melchior - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1741-1747.
    In this paper, I defend the heterogeneity problem for sensitivity accounts of knowledge against an objection that has been recently proposed by Wallbridge in Philosophia. I argue in, 479–496, 2015) that sensitivity accounts of knowledge face a heterogeneity problem when it comes to higher-level knowledge about the truth of one’s own beliefs. Beliefs in weaker higher-level propositions are insensitive, but beliefs in stronger higher-level propositions are sensitive. The resulting picture that we can know the stronger propositions without being in a (...)
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  26. Easy Knowledge, Closure Failure, or Skepticism: A Trilemma.Guido Melchior - 2016 - Metaphilosophy 47 (2):214-232.
    This article aims to provide a structural analysis of the problems related to the easy knowledge problem. The easy knowledge problem is well known. If we accept that we can have basic knowledge via a source without having any prior knowledge about the reliability or accuracy of this source, then we can acquire knowledge about the reliability or accuracy of this source too easily via information delivered by the source. Rejecting any kind of basic knowledge, however, leads into an infinite (...)
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  27. The Heterogeneity Problem for Sensitivity Accounts.Guido Melchior - 2015 - Episteme 12 (4):479-496.
    Offering a solution to the skeptical puzzle is a central aim of Nozick's sensitivity account of knowledge. It is well-known that this account faces serious problems. However, because of its simplicity and its explanatory power, the sensitivity principle has remained attractive and has been subject to numerous modifications, leading to a of sensitivity accounts. I will object to these accounts, arguing that sensitivity accounts of knowledge face two problems. First, they deliver a far too heterogeneous picture of higher-level beliefs about (...)
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  28. Skepticism: Lehrer Versus Mooreanism.Guido Melchior - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (1):47-58.
    I will compare Lehrer’s anti-skeptical strategy from a coherentist point of view with the anti-skeptical strategy of the Mooreans. I will argue that there are strong similarities between them: neither can present a persuasive argument to the skeptic and both face the problem of easy knowledge in one way or another. However, both can offer a complete and self-explanatory explanation of knowledge although Mooreanism can offer the more natural one. Hence, one has good reasons to prefer Mooreanism to Lehrer’s anti-skeptical (...)
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  29. A Contextualist Solution to the Problem of Easy Knowledge.Ram Neta - 2005 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):183-206.
    Many philosophers hold some verion of the doctrine of "basic knowledge". According to this doctrine, it's possible for S to know that p, even if S doesn't know the source of her knowledge that p to be reliable or trustworthy. Stewart Cohen has recently argued that this doctrine confronts the problem of easy knowledge. I defend basic knowledge against this criticism, by providing a contextualist solution to the problem of easy knowledge.
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  30. Truth-Tracking and the Problem of Reflective Knowledge.Joseph Salerno - unknown
    In “Reliabilism Leveled” Jonathan Vogel (2000) provides a strong case against epistemic theories that stress the importance of tracking/sensitivity conditions. A tracking/sensitivity condition is to be understood as some version of the following counterfactual: (T) ~p oÆ ~Bp (T) says that s would not believe p, if p were false. Among other things, tracking is supposed to express the external relation that explains why some justified true beliefs are not knowledge. Champions of the condition include Robert Nozick (1981) and, more (...)
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  31. Later Wittgenstein and the Problem of Easy Knowledge.Scott Scheall - 2011 - Philosophical Investigations 34 (3):268-286.
    Consider the following epistemological principle:KR: A knowledge source K can yield knowledge for subject S only if S knows K is reliable.Traditional epistemologists face a dilemma: either reject KR and confront what Stewart Cohen calls “the Problem of Easy Knowledge” or embrace KR and deny that unreflective beings can possess knowledge. In order to avoid this dilemma, an epistemological theory must allow for knowledge on the part of unreflective beings without falling prey to the problem of easy knowledge. I argue (...)
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  32. Reflective Knowledge: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume Ii.Ernest Sosa - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
    Reflective Knowledge draws together ground-breaking work in epistemology by Ernest Sosa. He argues for a reflective virtue epistemology based on virtuous circularity, shows how this idea may be found explicitly or just below the surface in such illustrious predecessors as Descartes and Moore, and defends the view against its rivals.
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  33. Is Justification Easy or Impossible? Getting Acquainted with a Middle Road.Samuel Taylor - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):2987-3009.
    Can a belief source confer justification when we lack antecedent justification for believing that it’s reliable? A negative answer quickly leads to skepticism. A positive answer, however, seems to commit one to allowing pernicious reasoning known as “epistemic bootstrapping.” Puzzles surrounding bootstrapping arise because we illicitly assume either that justification requires doxastic awareness of a source’s epistemic credentials or that there is no requirement that a subject be aware of these credentials. We can resolve the puzzle by splitting the horns (...)
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  34. Is Knowledge Easy -- Or Impossible? Externalism as the Only Alternative to Skepticism.James Van Cleve - 2003 - In Stephen Luper (ed.), The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays. Ashgate.
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  35. The Preface Paradox and the Problem of Easy Knowledge.Jonathan Weisberg - manuscript
    The preface paradox is a problem for everyone; you don’t need to be committed to any special epistemological theory to face the problem it raises. The problem of easy knowledge is supposed to be different in this respect. It is generally thought to arise only for those who believe there is such a thing as basic knowledge, i.e. knowledge acquired through a source that one does not know to be reliable or trustworthy. Because it is thought to arise only for (...)
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  36. The Bootstrapping Problem.Jonathan Weisberg - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (9):597-610.
    Bootstrapping is a suspicious form of reasoning that verifies a source's reliability by checking it against itself. Theories that endorse such reasoning face the bootstrapping problem. This article considers which theories face the problem, and surveys potential solutions. The initial focus is on theories like reliabilism and dogmatism, which allow one to gain knowledge from a source without knowing that it is reliable. But the discussion quickly turns to a more general version of the problem that does not depend on (...)
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  37. Bootstrapping in General.Jonathan Weisberg - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):525-548.
    The bootstrapping problem poses a general challenge, afflicting even strongly internalist theories. Even if one must always know that one’s source is reliable to gain knowledge from it, bootstrapping is still possible. I survey some solutions internalists might offer and defend the one I find most plausible: that bootstrapping involves an abuse of inductive reasoning akin to generalizing from a small or biased sample. I also argue that this solution is equally available to the reliabilist. The moral is that the (...)
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  38. Difference-Making and Easy Knowledge: Reply to Comesaña and Sartorio.Erik J. Wielenberg - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (1):141-146.
    Juan Comesaña and Carolina Sartorio have recently proposed a diagnosis of what goes wrong in apparently illegitimate cases of ‘bootstrapping’ one’s way toexcessively easy knowledge. They argue that in such cases the bootstrapper bases at least one of her beliefs on evidence that does not evidentially support the proposition believed. I explicate the principle that underlies Comesaña and Sartorio’s diagnosis of such cases and show that their account of what goes wrong in such cases is mistaken.
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  39. Externalism, Skepticism, and the Problem of Easy Knowledge.José L. Zalabardo - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (1):33-61.
    The paper deals with a version of the principle that a belief source can be a knowledge source only if the subject knows that it is reliable. I argue that the principle can be saved from the main objections that motivate its widespread rejection: the claim that it leads to skepticism, the claim that it forces us to accept counterintuitive knowledge ascriptions and the claim that it is incompatible with reliabilist accounts of knowledge. I argue that naturalist epistemologists should reject (...)
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