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  1. P. F. Strawson Was Neither an Externalist nor an Internalist About Moral Responsibility.Benjamin De Mesel - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 29 (1):199-214.
    Internalism about moral responsibility is the view that moral responsibility is determined primarily by an agent's mental states; externalism is the view that moral responsibility is determined primarily by an agent's overt behaviour and by circumstances external to the agent. In a series of papers, Michelle Ciurria has argued that most if not all current accounts of moral responsibility, including Strawsonian ones, are internalist. Ciurria defends externalism against these accounts, and she argues that, in contrast to his contemporary followers, P.F. (...)
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  2. The Hard Problem of AI Rights.Adam J. Andreotta - 2021 - AI and Society 36 (1):19-32.
    In the past few years, the subject of AI rights—the thesis that AIs, robots, and other artefacts (hereafter, simply ‘AIs’) ought to be included in the sphere of moral concern—has started to receive serious attention from scholars. In this paper, I argue that the AI rights research program is beset by an epistemic problem that threatens to impede its progress—namely, a lack of a solution to the ‘Hard Problem’ of consciousness: the problem of explaining why certain brain states give rise (...)
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  3. Linking Metacognition and Mindreading: Evidence From Autism and Dual-Task Investigations.Toby Nicholson, David M. Williams, Sophie E. Lind, Catherine Grainger & Peter Carruthers - 2021 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 150 (2):206-220.
    Questions of how we know our own and other minds, and whether metacognition and mindreading rely on the same processes, are longstanding in psychology and philosophy. In Experiment 1, children/adolescents with autism (who tend to show attenuated mindreading) showed significantly lower accuracy on an explicit metacognition task than neurotypical children/adolescents, but not on an allegedly metacognitive implicit one. In Experiment 2, neurotypical adults completed these tasks in a single-task condition or a dual-task condition that required concurrent completion of a secondary (...)
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  4. Seeing Seeing.Ben Phillips - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (1):24-43.
    I argue that we can visually perceive others as seeing agents. I start by characterizing perceptual processes as those that are causally controlled by proximal stimuli. I then distinguish between various forms of visual perspective-taking, before presenting evidence that most of them come in perceptual varieties. In doing so, I clarify and defend the view that some forms of visual perspective-taking are “automatic”—a view that has been marshalled in support of dual-process accounts of mindreading.
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  5. When Time Becomes Personal. Aging and Personal Identity.Christian Sternad - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (2):311-319.
    Aging is an integral part of human existence. The problem of aging addresses the most fundamental coordinates of our lives but also the ones of the phenomenological method: time, embodiment, subjectivity and intersubjectivity, and even the social norms that grow into the very notion of aging as such. In my article, I delineate a phenomenological analysis of aging and show how such an analysis connects with the debate concerning personal identity: I claim that aging is not merely a physical process, (...)
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  6. Interpretational Complexities in Developmental Research and a Piagetian Reading of the False-Belief Task.Alla Choifer - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-30.
    Theorizing about children’s early development is beset with interpretational complexities. I argue that there is a general tendency to over-interpret the experimental findings, and that one of the main causes of this is the difficulty of disengaging from our adult frame of reference when theorizing about the young child’s mind. One domain where this holds is children’s ability to differentiate themselves from others. In relation to this I first critically analyze some cases of interpretational complexities, and then apply my methodological (...)
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  7. Donald Davidson and the Source of Self-Knowledge.Louise Röska-Hardy - 2011 - In Jeff Malpas (ed.), Dialogues with Davidson: New Perspectives on his Philosophy J. Malpas (ed.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2011, 371-404. Cambridge, MA: pp. 371-404.
    This chapter focuses on Davidson’s discussion regarding the phenomenon of self-knowledge and its puzzling features, and how he has placed it in a central place within his philosophy. This chapter begins by providing an overview of the concept of “psychological self-knowledge,” which is considered unlike any other form of knowledge. In contrast to our knowledge of the rest of the world or our knowledge of others’ mental states, we usually know the contents of our current mental states without recourse to (...)
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  8. The Conscious Life - the Dream We Live In.Tudor Cosmin Ciocan - 2017 - Dialogo 3 (2):65-71.
    It is most likely for anyone to ask himself at least once if it would be possible to live in a dream? Questioning the fabric of “reality” we live in consciously was one of the main doubts man ever had. It is so likely for us to answer positive to it due to so many factors; starting from the many and various facets of reality each individual envision the world, from the enormous differences we all have while perceiving and defining (...)
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  9. The Theory of a Multilayered Reality. Being Real or Being Thought as Real.Tudor Cosmin Ciocan - 2016 - Dialogo 3 (1):145-159.
    The experiments of quantum physics indicate that an electron will change its behavior/ reality depending on whether or not the electron is being observed as if the particle is aware that it is being observed. The reality thus is presumed to be, or only to be thought of as a scenario that can be altered, changed, or imagined differently depending on the observer or the screenwriter. Our historical development made us think that the reality has as many facets as we (...)
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  10. Understanding A.I. — Can and Should We Empathize with Robots?Susanne Schmetkamp - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (4):881-897.
    Expanding the debate about empathy with human beings, animals, or fictional characters to include human-robot relationships, this paper proposes two different perspectives from which to assess the scope and limits of empathy with robots: the first is epistemological, while the second is normative. The epistemological approach helps us to clarify whether we can empathize with artificial intelligence or, more precisely, with social robots. The main puzzle here concerns, among other things, exactly what it is that we empathize with if robots (...)
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  11. Other Minds Are Neither Seen Nor Inferred.Mason Westfall - forthcoming - Synthese:1-21.
    How do we know about other minds on the basis of perception? The two most common answers to this question are that we literally perceive others' mental states, or that we infer their mental states on the basis of perceiving something else. In this paper, I argue for a different answer. On my view, we don't perceive mental states, and yet perceptual experiences often immediately justify mental state attributions. In a slogan: other minds are neither seen nor inferred. I argue (...)
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  12. Empiricist Intuitions Arise from an Ontological Dissonance: Reply to Carruthers.I. Berent - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (7-8):220-229.
    People are systematically biased against the possibility that ideas are innate. Berent (2020) traces these attitudes to an ontological dissonance, arising from the collision of two fundamental principles of human cognition -- dualism and essentialism. Carruthers (this issue) challenges this hypothesis and attributes our empiricist bias primarily to mindreading intuitions. Here, I counter Carruthers' concerns and show that mindreading cannot be the sole source of the empiricist bias. Specifically, mindreading fails to explain why our empiricist intuitions depend on the perceived (...)
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  13. How Mindreading Might Mislead Cognitive Science.P. Carruthers - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (7-8):195-219.
    This article explores three ways in which a cognitively entrenched mindreading (or 'theory of mind') system may bias our thinking as cognitive scientists. One issues in a form of tacit dualism, impacting scientific debates about phenomenal consciousness. Another leads us to think that our own minds are easier to know than they really are, influencing debates about self-knowledge, and about mindreading itself. And the third results in a bias in favour of empiricist over nativist accounts of cognitive development. The discussion (...)
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  14. The Pairing Account of Infant Direct Social Perception.S. Vincini - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (1-2):173-205.
    This paper evaluates Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological notion of pairing in light of a representative variety of findings and views in contemporary developmental psychology. This notion belongs to the direct social perception framework, which suggests that the fundamental access to other minds is intuitive, or perceptual. Pairing entails that the perception of other minds relies merely on first-person embodied experience and domain-general processes. For this reason, pairing is opposed to cognitive nativist views that assume specialized mechanisms for low-level mental state (...)
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  15. What Do False-Belief Tests Show?Pierre Jacob - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (1):1-20.
    In a paper published in Psychological Review, Tyler Burge has offered a unified non-mentalistic account of a wide range of social cognitive developmental findings. His proposal is that far from attributing mental states, young children attribute to humans the same kind of internal generic states of sensory registration that biologists attribute to e.g. snails and ticks. Burge’s proposal deserves close attention: it is especially challenging because it departs from both the mentalistic and all the non-mentalistic accounts of the data so (...)
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  16. Commentary on Bozzi’s Untimely Meditations on the Relation Between Self and Non-Self.Robert M. Kelly & Barry Smith - 2019 - In Ivana Bianchi & Richard Davies (eds.), Paolo Bozzi’s Experimental Phenomenology. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 125-129.
    Independently of whether an object of experience becomes a candidate for being a part of the self or a part of the external world, it is always given to us as just an object of experience. The observer-observed relation can be seen as a type of relation with many instances, both between the self and different objects of experience and between any given object of experience and different selves. The self is situated in a spatial grid, where the latter can (...)
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  17. Mapping the Minds of Others.Alexandria Boyle - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (4):747-767.
    Mindreaders can ascribe representational states to others. Some can ascribe representational states – states with semantic properties like accuracy-aptness. I argue that within this group of mindreaders, there is substantial room for variation – since mindreaders might differ with respect to the representational format they take representational states to have. Given that formats differ in their formal features and expressive power, the format one takes mental states to have will significantly affect the range of mental state attributions one can make, (...)
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  18. Inner Privacy of Conscious Experiences and Quantum Information.Danko D. Georgiev - 2020 - Biosystems 187:104051.
    The human mind is constituted by inner, subjective, private, first-person conscious experiences that cannot be measured with physical devices or observed from an external, objective, public, third-person perspective. The qualitative, phenomenal nature of conscious experiences also cannot be communicated to others in the form of a message composed of classical bits of information. Because in a classical world everything physical is observable and communicable, it is a daunting task to explain how an empirically unobservable, incommunicable consciousness could have any physical (...)
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  19. Husserl's 'Pairing' Relation and the Role of Others in Infant Perception.S. Bredlau - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (3-4):8-30.
    Focusing on Husserl's account of a 'pairing' relation in the Cartesian Meditations and contemporary research on infant development, I argue that our most fundamental experience of other people is one of 'living through' them as perceivers engaged with the natural and cultural world that we, too, can perceive, rather than one of facing off against them as thinkers engaged with ideas that are not immediately accessible to us. I begin with Husserl's insight that we do not simply perceive other human (...)
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  20. Structure and Openness in the Development of Self in Infancy.N. Rossmanith & V. Reddy - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (1-2):237-257.
    From early infancy, structures are created in engaging with the world. Increasingly complex forms of self, other, and world emerge with shared rhythms, affective patterns and interpersonal routines, cultural norms, concepts and symbols, and so on. These open up an increasing number of possibilities for new kinds and levels of engagement and for further developing a world together. However, these same structures, becoming more rigid, salient, and perhaps reified with time, may obscure or obstruct engagement and constrain development. We explore (...)
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  21. Beliefs Concerning the Nature of Consciousness.J. A. Reggia, D. W. Huang & G. Katz - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (5-6):146-171.
    The opinions that people hold about the nature of consciousness are important not only to researchers in philosophy and science, but also in many professional fields such as clinical medicine, law, and education. However, in spite of this importance and how controversial the topic is, there is remarkably little empirical data concerning what these opinions are. Here we describe the results of a multi-year survey of university students concerning their beliefs about the nature of consciousness and about what entities are (...)
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  22. Perception of Others' Minds: The Problem of Modalities, Shared Nature, and Theatre: Comment on Avramides' 'On Seeing That Others Have Thoughts and Feelings'.A. Eydam - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (1-2):156-159.
  23. On Seeing That Others Have Thoughts and Feelings.A. Avramides - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (1-2):138-155.
    We sometimes use perceptual language in connection with the minds of others. In this paper I explore the extent to which we can take our language here at face value. Fred Dretske separates out a knowledge-that and a knowledge-what question in connection with our knowledge of others, and claims that we can give a perceptual account of the latter but not the former. In this paper I follow Dretske in separating out questions here, but argue that Dretske does not go (...)
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  24. Inter-Affectivity and Intersubjectivity: Two Sides of the Same Coin?: Comment on De Jaegher's 'How We Affect Each Other'.V. Fantasia - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (1-2):133-137.
  25. The Constitution of the 'We' Between Connectedness and Differentiation: Clinical Implications: Comment on Zahavi's 'You, Me, and We: The Sharing of Emotional Experience'.L. Galbusera - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (1-2):107-111.
  26. Collective Affectivity as a Flux of You, Me, and We: Comment on Zahavi's 'You, Me, and We: The Sharing of Emotional Experience'.Z. O. Guney - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (1-2):102-106.
  27. Tensions Theoretical and Theorized: Comment on Di Paolo's 'Interative Time-Travel'.J. Z. Elias - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (1-2):75-79.
  28. What Frege Asked Alex the Parrot: Inferentialism, Number Concepts, and Animal Cognition.Erik Nelson - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (2):206-227.
    While there has been significant philosophical debate on whether nonlinguistic animals can possess conceptual capabilities, less time has been devoted to considering 'talking' animals, such as parrots. When they are discussed, their capabilities are often downplayed as mere mimicry. The most explicit philosophical example of this can be seen in Brandom's frequent comparisons of parrots and thermostats. Brandom argues that because parrots (like thermostats) cannot grasp the implicit inferential connections between concepts, their vocal articulations do not actually have any conceptual (...)
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  29. Communication of Existence: Søren Kierkegaard and Gabriel Marcel.Jörg Disse - 2018 - Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook 23 (1):311-328.
    The article compares Kierkegaard’s and Marcel’s comprehension of existence and communication of existence. With reference to the notion of existence, both authors (independently from each other) develop the idea of a second reflection that includes a theory of communication. But whereas Kierkegaard conceives communication strictly within a first person perspective, Marcel establishes a kind of second person perspective. For this reason and despite a strong common basis in their views, different aspects of communication of existence are put forward by them.
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  30. Husserls Paradoxie der Intersubjektivität. Zur hermeneutischen Dimension der Transzendentalphänomenologie.Michael Wallner - 2011 - In I. Römer (ed.), Subjektivität und Intersubjektivität in der Phänomenologie. Würzburg, Deutschland: pp. 95-107.
    This paper provides an answer to a specific kind of critique against Husserl's theory of intersubjectivity.
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  31. Animal Consciousness.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2018 - Springer: Encyclopedia of Animal Cognition and Behavior.
    This chapter addresses the extent to which nonhuman animals are conscious. Most important perhaps is what criteria should be used in making such a determination.
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  32. Beyond Cognition: Philosophical Issues in Autism.Emma Peng Chien - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Alberta
    This dissertation explores philosophical issues in autism and defends a new version of the enactive approach to autism and social cognition. The discussion in this dissertation centres around the question “why do autistics encounter social interaction problems?”, addressing this question in ways that raise broader philosophical issues. Within the philosophy of mind, these include the problem of other minds, the nature of emotions, and narratives and their role in understanding the self. Beyond cognition, such issues are intertwined with questions in (...)
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  33. Computer Proof, Apriori Knowledge, and Other Minds The Sixth Philosophical Perspectives Lecture.Tyler Burge - 1998 - Noûs 32 (S12):1-37.
  34. Comment on “Empirical Realism and Other Minds”.Hilary Putnam - 1979 - Philosophical Investigations 2 (4):71-72.
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  35. Imagination and Other Minds. [REVIEW]Peter Forrest - 1986 - Behavior and Philosophy 14 (1):57.
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  36. Berkeley's Alleged Solipsism.Richard J. Van Iten - 1962 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 16 (61/62):447-452.
    Reprinted in Colin Murray Turbayne, ed., 'A Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge / George Berkeley, with Critical Essays' (Bobbs-Merrill, 1970): 47-56.
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  37. Other Minds.John O. Wisdom - 1943 - Mind 52:289.
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  38. Insects and the Problem of Simple Minds: Are Bees Natural Zombies?Sean Allen-Hermanson - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (8):389-415.
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  39. Thomas Nagel, Wie ist es, eine Fledermaus zu sein?Ulrich Diehl (ed.) - 2016 - Reclam.
    Kann ein Mensch wirklich verstehen, wie es ist, eine Fledermaus zu sein? Natürlich nicht. Er kann sich nur vorstellen, wie es sich anfühlen könnte. Nagel zeigt damit dem Menschen die Grenzen seiner Erkenntnis- und Empathiefähigkeit auf. Radikal, provokativ und erhellend zugleich, ist der Essay von 1974 einer der am häufigsten zitierten philosophischen Aufsätze des 20. Jahrhunderts. Ulrich Diehl erklärt in einem Nachwort die besondere Bedeutung und spannende Wirkungsgeschichte dieses Klassikers der Philosophie des Geistes.
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  40. Scepticism and the First Person.Bruce Aune - 1969 - Philosophical Review 78 (1):119.
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  41. Our Knowledge of Other Minds.Julius Weinberg - 1946 - Philosophical Review 55 (5):555.
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  42. Do We Know How We Know Our Own Minds Yet?Pierre Jacob - 2003 - In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.
    In traditional epistemology, psychological self-knowledge is taken to be the paradigm of privleged a priori knowledge. According to an influential incompatibilist line of thought, traditional epistemic features attributed to psychological self-knowledge are supposed to be inconsistent with content externalism. In this paper, I examine one prominent compatibilist response by an advocate of content externalism, i.e., Fred Dretske's answer tot he incompatibilist argument, based on the model of displaced perceptual knowledge. I discuss the costs and benefits of his answer.
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  43. Other Minds.Godfrey Vesey - 1973 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 7:149-161.
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  44. I. Knowledge of Other Minds.Norman Malcolm - 1958 - Journal of Philosophy 55 (23):969.
  45. Our Knowledge of Other Minds.W. W. Spencer - 1927 - Journal of Philosophy 24 (9):225.
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  46. Evolution and the Problem of Other Minds.Elliott Sober - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (7):365.
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  47. Other Minds, Rationality and Analogy.Jane Heal - 2000 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1):1-19.
  48. IV.—Our Knowledge of Other Minds.H. H. Price - 1932 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 32 (1):53-78.
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  49. IX—Wittgenstein and Physicalism.James Hopkins - 1975 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75 (1):121-146.
    Wittgenstein's private language argument refutes the Cartesian conception of the mind and thereby clears the way for a physicalistic understanding of phenomenology.
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  50. VI.—Our Knowledge of Other Minds.Nathalie A. Duddington - 1919 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 19 (1):147-178.
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