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  1. added 2019-01-05
    In Search of Enlightenment by Reading Samuel Beckett’s Waiting for Godot.Syed Ismyl Mahmood Rizvi - 2015 - Literaria: An International Journal of New Literature Across the World 5 (1-2):37-55.
    Beckett’s philosophical indebtedness has long been recognised – especially in conjunction with Dante, Descartes and Geulincx. In this article, I examine Beckettian universal values of Enlightenment, which will be exposed as self-serving mystifications that rationalize and instrumentalize the meaning of life. In this context, the awareness of the Enlightenment nature of Beckett’s writing in Waiting for Godot will be analysed along with the freedom appeal of his reader as he strives to attain the enlightenment.
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  2. added 2018-11-30
    Random and Systematic Error in the Puzzle of the Unmarked Clock.Randall G. McCutcheon - manuscript
    A puzzle of an unmarked clock, used by Timothy Williamson to question the KK principle, was separately adapted by David Christensen and Adam Elga to critique a principle of Rational Reflection. Both authors, we argue, flout the received relationship between ideal agency and the classical distinction between systematic and random error, namely that ideal agents are subject only to the latter. As a result, these criticisms miss their mark.
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  3. added 2018-11-12
    Unbounded Expectations and the Shooting Room.Randall McCutcheon - manuscript
    Several treatments of the Shooting Room Paradox have failed to recognize the crucial role played by its involving a number of players unbounded in expectation. We indicate Reflection violations and/or Dutch Book vulnerabilities in extant ``solutions''and show that the paradox does not arise when the expected number of participants is finite; the Shooting Room thus takes its place in the growing list of puzzles that have been shown to require infinite expectation. Recognizing this fact, we conclude that prospects for a (...)
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  4. added 2018-10-04
    Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain.Kevin Dorst - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Assume that it is your evidence that determines what opinions you should have. I argue that since you should take peer disagreement seriously, evidence must have two features. (1) It must sometimes warrant being modest: uncertain what your evidence warrants, and (thus) uncertain whether you’re rational. (2) But it must always warrant being guided: disposed to treat your evidence as a guide. Surprisingly, it is very difficult to vindicate both (1) and (2). But diagnosing why this is so leads to (...)
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  5. added 2018-07-30
    “P and I Will Believe That Not-P”: Diachronic Constraints on Rational Belief.Luc Bovens - 1995 - Mind 104 (416):737-760.
    I provide a taxonomy of the various circumstances under which one might reasonably say "P and I will believe that not-P" or violate the Reflection Principle.
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  6. added 2018-07-30
    The Future Variant of Moore's Paradox.Luc Bovens - 1995 - In Jaakko Hintikka (ed.), The British Tradition in 20th Century Philosophy: Proceedings of the 17th International Wittgenstein-Symposium. Vienna, Austria: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
    I provide a taxonomy of the various circumstances under which one might reasonably say "P and I will believe that not-P" or violate the Reflection Principle.
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  7. added 2018-07-29
    The Puzzle of the Hats.Luc Bovens & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2010 - Synthese 172 (1):57-78.
    The Puzzle of the Hats is a betting arrangement which seems to show that a Dutch book can be made against a group of rational players with common priors who act in the common interest and have full trust in the other players’ rationality. But we show that appearances are misleading—no such Dutch book can be made. There are four morals. First, what can be learned from the puzzle is that there is a class of situations in which credences and (...)
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  8. added 2018-07-29
    A Dutch Book for Group Decision-Making?Luc Bovens & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2009 - In Benedikt Löwe, Eric Pacuit & Jan-Willem Romeijn (eds.), Foundations of the Formal Sciences Vi: Probabilistic Reasoning and Reasoning With Probabilities. Studies in Logic. London UK: College Publication. pp. 91-101.
    The Puzzle of the Hats is a betting arrangement which seems to show that a Dutch book can be made against a group of rational players with common priors who act in the common interest and have full trust in the other players’ rationality. But we show that appearances are misleading—no such Dutch book can be made. There are four morals. First, what can be learned from the puzzle is that there is a class of situations in which credences and (...)
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  9. added 2018-02-17
    Bets on Hats: On Dutch Books Against Groups, Degrees of Belief as Betting Rates, and Group-Reflection.Luc Bovens & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2011 - Episteme 8 (3):281-300.
    The Puzzle of the Hats is a puzzle in social epistemology. It describes a situation in which a group of rational agents with common priors and common goals seems vulnerable to a Dutch book if they are exposed to different information and make decisions independently. Situations in which this happens involve violations of what might be called the Group-Reflection Principle. As it turns out, the Dutch book is flawed. It is based on the betting interpretation of the subjective probabilities, but (...)
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  10. added 2018-01-06
    Iterated Reflection Principles and the Ω-Rule.Ulf R. Schmerl - 1982 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 47 (4):721-733.
  11. added 2017-10-16
    Basic‐Know And Super‐Know.Anna Mahtani - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Sometimes a proposition is ‘opaque’ to an agent: he doesn't know it, but he does know something about how coming to know it should affect his or her credence function. It is tempting to assume that a rational agent's credence function coheres in a certain way with his or her knowledge of these opaque propositions, and I call this the ‘Opaque Proposition Principle’. The principle is compelling but demonstrably false. I explain this incongruity by showing that the principle is ambiguous: (...)
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  12. added 2017-05-30
    The Externalist’s Guide to Fishing for Compliments.Bernhard Salow - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):691-728.
    Suppose you’d like to believe that p, whether or not it’s true. What can you do to help? A natural initial thought is that you could engage in Intentionally Biased Inquiry : you could look into whether p, but do so in a way that you expect to predominantly yield evidence in favour of p. This paper hopes to do two things. The first is to argue that this initial thought is mistaken: intentionally biased inquiry is impossible. The second is (...)
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  13. added 2016-12-08
    Credence and Self-Location.Peter J. Lewis - 2010 - Synthese 175 (3):369-382.
    All parties to the Sleeping Beauty debate agree that it shows that some cherished principle of rationality has to go. Thirders think that it is Conditionalization and Reflection that must be given up or modified; halfers think that it is the Principal Principle. I offer an analysis of the Sleeping Beauty puzzle that allows us to retain all three principles. In brief, I argue that Sleeping Beauty’s credence in the uncentered proposition that the coin came up heads should be 1/2, (...)
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  14. added 2016-12-08
    Personhood and Future Belief: Two Arguments for Something Like Reflection.Simon J. Evnine - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (1):91-110.
    This paper offers two new arguments for a version of Reflection, the principle that says, roughly, that if one knew now what one would believe in the future, one ought to believe it now. The most prominent existing argument for the principle is the coherence-based Dutch Strategy argument advanced by Bas van Fraassen (and others). My two arguments are quite different. The first is a truth-based argument. On the basis of two substantive premises, that people’s beliefs generally get better over (...)
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  15. added 2016-12-08
    Belief and the Will.Bas C. Van Fraassen - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (5):235-256.
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  16. added 2016-10-27
    Chance, Credence and Circles.Fabrizio Cariani - 2017 - Episteme 14 (1):49-58.
    This is a discussion of Richard Pettigrew's book "Accuracy and the Laws of Credence". I target Pettigrew's application of the accuracy framework to derive chance-credence principles. My principal contention is that Pettigrew's preferred version of the argument might in one sense be circular and, moreover, that Pettigrew's premises have content that go beyond that of standard chance-credence principles.
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  17. added 2016-07-21
    Some Problems for Conditionalization and Reflection.Frank Arntzenius - 2003 - Journal of Philosophy 100 (7):356-370.
  18. added 2016-04-26
    Deference, Respect and Intensionality.Anna Mahtani - 2016 - Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    This paper is about the standard Reflection Principle :235–256, 1984) and the Group Reflection Principle :478–502, 2007; Bovens and Rabinowicz in Episteme 8:281–300, 2011; Titelbaum in Quitting certainties: a Bayesian framework modeling degrees of belief, OUP, Oxford, 2012; Hedden in Mind 124:449–491, 2015). I argue that these principles are incomplete as they stand. The key point is that deference is an intensional relation, and so whether you are rationally required to defer to a person at a time can depend on (...)
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  19. added 2016-03-07
    Conditionalization, Reflection, and Self-Knowledge.Jonathan Weisberg - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 135 (2):179-197.
    Van Fraassen famously endorses the Principle of Reflection as a constraint on rational credence, and argues that Reflection is entailed by the more traditional principle of Conditionalization. He draws two morals from this alleged entailment. First, that Reflection can be regarded as an alternative to Conditionalization – a more lenient standard of rationality. And second, that commitment to Conditionalization can be turned into support for Reflection. Van Fraassen also argues that Reflection implies Conditionalization, thus offering a new justification for Conditionalization. (...)
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  20. added 2016-02-01
    Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings.Antony Eagle (ed.) - 2010 - Routledge.
    _Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings_ is the first anthology to collect essential readings in this important area of philosophy. Featuring the work of leading philosophers in the field such as Carnap, Hájek, Jeffrey, Joyce, Lewis, Loewer, Popper, Ramsey, van Fraassen, von Mises, and many others, the book looks in depth at the following key topics: subjective probability and credence probability updating: conditionalization and reflection Bayesian confirmation theory classical, logical, and evidential probability frequentism physical probability: propensities and objective chances. The book (...)
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  21. added 2016-01-05
    Conditionalization, a New Argument For.Bas van Fraassen - 1999 - Topoi 18 (2):93-96.
    Probabilism in epistemology does not have to be of the Bayesian variety. The probabilist represents a person''s opinion as a probability function; the Bayesian adds that rational change of opinion must take the form of conditionalizing on new evidence. I will argue that this is the correct procedure under certain special conditions. Those special conditions are important, and instantiated for example in scientific experimentation, but hardly universal. My argument will be related to the much maligned Reflection Principle (van Fraassen, 1984, (...)
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  22. added 2015-12-07
    Rational Reflection.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):121-140.
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  23. added 2015-12-07
    The Pragmatic Stance, Whither Dutch Books and Money Pumps?John Cantwell - 2002 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):319-336.
    The view that decision methods can only be justified by appeal to pragmatic considerations is defended. Pragmatic considerations are viewed as providing the underlying subject matter of decision theories. It is argued that other approaches fail to provide grounds for a normative decision theory.It is argued that preferences that can lead to pragmatically adverse outcomes in a relevantly similar possible decision situation are pragmatically unsound, even if the decision situation never arises. This rebuts several standard objections to money-pump and Dutch (...)
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  24. added 2015-09-28
    Lost in Translation: Unknowable Propositions in Probabilistic Frameworks.Eleonora Cresto - 2017 - Synthese 194 (10):3955-3977.
    Some propositions are structurally unknowable for certain agents. Let me call them ‘Moorean propositions’. The structural unknowability of Moorean propositions is normally taken to pave the way towards proving a familiar paradox from epistemic logic—the so-called ‘Knowability Paradox’, or ‘Fitch’s Paradox’—which purports to show that if all truths are knowable, then all truths are in fact known. The present paper explores how to translate Moorean statements into a probabilistic language. A successful translation should enable us to derive a version of (...)
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  25. added 2015-09-13
    Dutch Strategies for Diachronic Rules: When Believers See the Sure Loss Coming.Brad Armendt - 1992 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:217 - 229.
    Two criticisms of Dutch strategy arguments are discussed: One says that the arguments fail because agents who know the arguments can use that knowledge to avoid Dutch strategy vulnerability, even though they violate the norm in question. The second consists of cases alleged to be counterexamples to the norms that Dutch strategy arguments defend. The principle of Reflection and its Dutch strategy argument are discussed, but most attention is given to the rule of Conditionalization and to Jeffrey's rule for fallible (...)
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  26. added 2015-09-12
    Is There a Dutch Book Argument for Probability Kinematics?Brad Armendt - 1980 - Philosophy of Science 47 (4):583-588.
    Dutch Book arguments have been presented for static belief systems and for belief change by conditionalization. An argument is given here that a rule for belief change which under certain conditions violates probability kinematics will leave the agent open to a Dutch Book.
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  27. added 2015-08-25
    Deference Done Right.Richard Pettigrew & Michael G. Titelbaum - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14:1-19.
    There are many kinds of epistemic experts to which we might wish to defer in setting our credences. These include: highly rational agents, objective chances, our own future credences, our own current credences, and evidential probabilities. But exactly what constraint does a deference requirement place on an agent's credences? In this paper we consider three answers, inspired by three principles that have been proposed for deference to objective chances. We consider how these options fare when applied to the other kinds (...)
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  28. added 2015-06-23
    Reflection and Self‐Trust.Aaron Bronfman - 2015 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):75-82.
    The Reflection principle expresses a kind of epistemic deference to one's future self. There is a plausible intuitive argument to the effect that, if one believes one will reason well and gain information over time, then one ought to satisfy Reflection. There are also associated formal arguments that show that, if one's beliefs about one's current and future selves meet certain criteria, then one is committed by the axioms of probability to satisfy Reflection. The formal arguments, however, rely on an (...)
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  29. added 2015-04-13
    Self‐Respect Regained.Adam Rieger Jake Chandler - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (2pt2):311-318.
    In a recent article, David Christensen casts aspersions on a restricted version of van Fraassen's Reflection principle, which he dubs ‘Self‐Respect’. Rejecting two possible arguments for sr, he concludes that the principle does not constitute a requirement of rationality. In this paper we argue that not only has Christensen failed to make a case against the aforementioned arguments, but that considerations pertaining to Moore's paradox indicate that sr, or at the very least a mild weakening thereof, is indeed a plausible (...)
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  30. added 2015-03-30
    Epistemic Probability.Colin Howson & Paul Castell - 1996 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 70 (1):63 - 94.
  31. added 2015-03-20
    In Defense of Reflection.Simon M. Huttegger - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (3):413-433.
  32. added 2015-02-02
    Reflecting on Finite Additivity.Leendert Huisman - 2015 - Synthese 192 (6):1785-1797.
    An infinite lottery experiment seems to indicate that Bayesian conditionalization may be inconsistent when the prior credence function is finitely additive because, in that experiment, it conflicts with the principle of reflection. I will show that any other form of updating credences would produce the same conflict, and, furthermore, that the conflict is not between conditionalization and reflection but, instead, between finite additivity and reflection. A correct treatment of the infinite lottery experiment requires a careful treatment of finite additivity. I (...)
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  33. added 2014-10-27
    Revealing the Beauty Behind the Sleeping Beauty Problem.Ioannis Mariolis - manuscript
    A large number of essays address the Sleeping Beauty problem, which undermines the validity of Bayesian inference and Bas Van Fraassen's 'Reflection Principle'. In this study a straightforward analysis of the problem based on probability theory is presented. The key difference from previous works is that apart from the random experiment imposed by the problem's description, a different one is also considered, in order to negate the confusion on the involved conditional probabilities. The results of the analysis indicate that no (...)
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  34. added 2014-10-27
    A Devastating Example for the Halfer Rule.Vincent Conitzer - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):1985-1992.
    How should we update de dicto beliefs in the face of de se evidence? The Sleeping Beauty problem divides philosophers into two camps, halfers and thirders. But there is some disagreement among halfers about how their position should generalize to other examples. A full generalization is not always given; one notable exception is the Halfer Rule, under which the agent updates her uncentered beliefs based on only the uncentered part of her evidence. In this brief article, I provide a simple (...)
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  35. added 2014-06-09
    Dutch Books, Coherence, and Logical Consistency.Anna Mahtani - 2015 - Noûs 49 (3):522-537.
    In this paper I present a new way of understanding Dutch Book Arguments: the idea is that an agent is shown to be incoherent iff he would accept as fair a set of bets that would result in a loss under any interpretation of the claims involved. This draws on a standard definition of logical inconsistency. On this new understanding, the Dutch Book Arguments for the probability axioms go through, but the Dutch Book Argument for Reflection fails. The question of (...)
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  36. added 2014-05-14
    Reflection, Conditionalization and Indeterminacy About the Future.Michael J. Shaffer - 2014 - The Reasoner 8:65-66.
    This paper shows that any view of future contingent claims that treats such claims as having indeterminate truth values or as simply being false implies probabilistic irrationality. This is because such views of the future imply violations of reflection, special reflection and conditionalization.
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  37. added 2014-04-03
    A Small Reflection Principle for Bounded Arithmetic.Rineke Verbrugge & Albert Visser - 1994 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 59 (3):785-812.
    We investigate the theory IΔ 0 + Ω 1 and strengthen [Bu86. Theorem 8.6] to the following: if NP ≠ co-NP. then Σ-completeness for witness comparison formulas is not provable in bounded arithmetic. i.e. $I\delta_0 + \Omega_1 + \nvdash \forall b \forall c (\exists a(\operatorname{Prf}(a.c) \wedge \forall = \leq a \neg \operatorname{Prf} (z.b))\\ \rightarrow \operatorname{Prov} (\ulcorner \exists a(\operatorname{Prf}(a. \bar{c}) \wedge \forall z \leq a \neg \operatorname{Prf}(z.\bar{b})) \urcorner)).$ Next we study a "small reflection principle" in bounded arithmetic. We prove that for (...)
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  38. added 2014-04-02
    A Reflection Principle and its Applications to Nonstandard Models.James H. Schmerl - 1995 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 60 (4):1137-1152.
  39. added 2014-04-01
    Two Principles of Bayesian Epistemology.William Talbott - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 62 (2):135-150.
  40. added 2014-03-31
    Some Problems for Conditionalization and Reflection.Frank Arntzenius - 2003 - Journal of Philosophy 100 (7):356-370.
  41. added 2014-03-31
    A New Argument for Conditionalization.Bas C. Van Fraassen - 1999 - Topoi 18:93-96.
  42. added 2014-03-31
    Reflections on Reflection: Van Fraassen on Belief.Mitchell S. Green & Christopher R. Hitchcock - 1994 - Synthese 98 (2):297 - 324.
    In Belief and the Will, van Fraassen employed a diachronic Dutch Book argument to support a counterintuitive principle called Reflection. There and subsequently van Fraassen has put forth Reflection as a linchpin for his views in epistemology and the philosophy of science, and for the voluntarism (first-person reports of subjective probability are undertakings of commitments) that he espouses as an alternative to descriptivism (first-person reports of subjective probability are merely self-descriptions). Christensen and others have attacked Reflection, taking it to have (...)
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  43. added 2014-03-31
    Diachronic Rationality.Patrick Maher - 1992 - Philosophy of Science 59 (1):120-141.
    This is an essay in the Bayesian theory of how opinions should be revised over time. It begins with a discussion of the principle that van Fraassen has dubbed "Reflection". This principle is not a requirement of rationality; a diachronic Dutch argument, that purports to show the contrary, is fallacious. But under suitable conditions, it is irrational to actually implement shifts in probability that violate Reflection. Conditionalization and probability kinematics are special cases of the principle not to implement shifts that (...)
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  44. added 2014-03-27
    Belief and the Will.Bas C. van Fraassen - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. Routledge. pp. 235-256.
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  45. added 2014-03-27
    Reflection and Disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
    How should you take into account the opinions of an advisor? When you completely defer to the advisor's judgment, then you should treat the advisor as a guru. Roughly, that means you should believe what you expect she would believe, if supplied with your extra evidence. When the advisor is your own future self, the resulting principle amounts to a version of the Reflection Principle---a version amended to handle cases of information loss. When you count an advisor as an epistemic (...)
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  46. added 2014-03-27
    Belief and the Problem of Ulysses and the Sirens.Bas C. Van Fraassen - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 77 (1):7-37.
    This is surely a bit of Socrates' famous irony. He draws the analogy to explain how his friends should regard poetry as they regretfully banish it from the ideal state. But lovers were no more sensible then than they are now. The advice to banish poetry, undermined already by Plato's own delight and skill in drama, is perhaps undermined still further by this evocation of a 'sensible' lover who counts love so well lost. Yet Socrates' image is one of avowed (...)
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  47. added 2014-03-19
    Epistemic Unities.Simon J. Evnine - 2003 - Erkenntnis 59 (3):365 - 388.
    I bring together social ontology and social epistemology by consideringsocial entities (``epistemic unities'') that are constituted by the holdingof epistemic relations between their members. In particular, I focus onthe relation of taking someone as an expert. Among the types of structuresexamined are ones with a single expert and one or more non-experts whomay or may not know of each other's situation; and ones with more thanone expert, including cases in which the relation between the experts ishierarchical and cases in which (...)
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  48. added 2014-03-17
    Epistemic Self-Respect.David Christensen - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):319-337.
  49. added 2014-03-17
    Levi on Money Pumps and Diachronic Dutch Books.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2006 - In Erik J. Olsson (ed.), Knowledge and Inquiry: Essays on the Pragmatism of Isaac Levi. Cambridge University Press.
    The paper's focus is on pragmatic arguments for various ‘rationality constraints’ on a decision maker’s state of mind: on his beliefs or preferences. An argument of this kind purports to show that a violator of a given constraint can be exposed to a decision problem in which he will act to his guaranteed disadvantage. Dramatically put, he can be exploited by a clever bookie who doesn’t know more than the agent himself. Examples of pragmatic arguments of this kind are synchronic (...)
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  50. added 2014-03-09
    Distorted Reflection.Rachael Briggs - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (1):59-85.
    Diachronic Dutch book arguments seem to support both conditionalization and Bas van Fraassen's Reflection principle. But the Reflection principle is vulnerable to numerous counterexamples. This essay addresses two questions: first, under what circumstances should an agent obey Reflection, and second, should the counterexamples to Reflection make us doubt the Dutch book for conditionalization? In response to the first question, this essay formulates a new "Qualified Reflection" principle, which states that an agent should obey Reflection only if he or she is (...)
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