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  1. added 2018-01-19
    Trying the Impossible: Reply to Adams.Kirk A. Ludwig - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Research 20:563-570.
    This paper defends the autonomy thesis, which holds that one can intend to do something even though one believes it to be impossible, against attacks by Fred Adams. Adams denies the autonomy thesis on the grounds that it cannot, but must, explain what makes a particular trying, a trying for the aim it has in view. If the autonomy thesis were true, it seems that I could try to fly across the Atlantic ocean merely by typing out this abstract, a (...)
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  2. added 2017-11-20
    A Stronger Doctrine of Double Effect.Ben Bronner & Simon Goldstein - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (4):793-805.
    Many believe that intended harms are more difficult to justify than are harms that result as a foreseen side effect of one's conduct. We describe cases of harming in which the harm is not intended, yet the harmful act nevertheless runs afoul of the intuitive moral constraint that governs intended harms. We note that these cases provide new and improved counterexamples to the so-called Simple View, according to which intentionally phi-ing requires intending to phi. We then give a new theory (...)
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  3. added 2017-05-15
    Rational and Social Agency: The Philosophy of Michael Bratman. [REVIEW]Olle Blomberg - 2015 - Journal of Social Ontology 1 (2):377-379.
  4. added 2016-12-12
    Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency.Michael E. Bratman - 1999 - Cambridge University Press.
    This collection of essays by one of the most prominent and internationally respected philosophers of action theory is concerned with deepening our understanding of the notion of intention. In Bratman's view, when we settle on a plan for action we are committing ourselves to future conduct in ways that help support important forms of coordination and organization both within the life of the agent and interpersonally. These essays enrich that account of commitment involved in intending, and explore its implications for (...)
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  5. added 2016-08-21
    La philosohie de l'action.Renée Bilodeau - 2000 - In Pascal Engel (ed.), Précis de philosophie analytique. P.U.F.. pp. 189-212.
    Introduction à quelques problèmes de philosophie de l'action: la nature de l'action, l'individuation de l'action, la théorie causale, les raisons et les causes, les chaînes causales déviantes, la notion d'intention, la "simple view", les raisonnements pratiques.
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  6. added 2015-12-11
    The Simple View Again: A Brief Rejoinder.H. J. McCann - 2011 - Analysis 71 (2):293-295.
    In a recent issue of Analysis I gave a critique of some arguments made by Di Nucci concerning the so-called Simple View – the view that an agent performs an action intentionally only if he intends so to act. In turn Di Nucci offers a reply that concentrates on two points. The first has to do with a group of examples, one having to do with waking a flatmate, and the others with routine actions such as shifting gears while driving. (...)
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  7. added 2015-12-11
    A Not-so-Simple View of Intentional Action.David K. Chan - 1999 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (1):1–16.
    The Simple View (SV) holds that for someone to intentionally A, he must intend to A. Critics of SV point to intentional actions which, due to belief-conditions or consistency constraints, agents cannot intend. By recognizing species of intention which vary according to the agent's confidence in acting, I argue that the stringency of consistency constraints depends on the agent's confidence. A more sophisticated SV holds that the species of intending is related to the degree of intentionality of the action. Finally, (...)
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  8. added 2015-12-11
    The Intentional and the Intended.J. L. A. Garcia - 1990 - Erkenntnis 33 (2):191 - 209.
    The paper defends the thesis that for S to V intentionally is for S to V as (in the way) S intended to. For the normal agent the relevant sort of intention is an intention that one's intention to V generate an instance of one's V-ing along some (usually dimly-conceived) productive path. Such an account allows us to say some actions are intentional to a greater or lesser extent (a desirable option for certain cases of wayward causal chains), preserves the (...)
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