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  1. added 2020-05-19
    Does the Rose-Tinted Glasses Effect in Contemporary Physics Prevent Us From Explaining Consciousness?W. Baer - 2017 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (7-8):8-27.
    Anyone wearing rose-tinted glasses might be forgiven if s/he comes to the conclusion that the world out there is rosier than it actually is. With his Fish Story, Sir Arthur Eddington warned us how analogous illusions might have happened in our models of the physical world. His allegory describes how observer characteristics can be inadvertently assigned to the systems being observed. If Eddington's conjecture is applicable, the most fundamental properties of nature will turn out to be the construction rules of (...)
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  2. added 2020-04-15
    Events, Processes, and the Time of a Killing.Yair Levy - forthcoming - Ratio.
    The paper proposes a novel solution to the problem of the time of a killing (ToK), which persistently besets theories of act-individuation. The solution proposed claims to expose a crucial wrong-headed assumption in the debate, according to which ToK is essentially a problem of locating some event that corresponds to the killing. The alternative proposal put forward here turns on recognizing a separate category of dynamic occurents, viz. processes. The paper does not aim to mount a comprehensive defense of process (...)
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  3. added 2020-03-31
    Can the Mind Wander Intentionally?Samuel Murray & Kristina Krasich - unknown - Mind and Language:1-22.
    Mind wandering is typically operationalized as task-unrelated thought. Some argue for the need to distinguish between unintentional and intentional mind wandering, where an agent voluntarily shifts attention from task-related to task-unrelated thoughts. We reveal an inconsistency between the standard, task-unrelated thought definition of mind wandering and the occurrence of intentional mind wandering (together with plausible assumptions about tasks and intentions). This suggests that either the standard definition of mind wandering should be rejected or that intentional mind wandering is an incoherent (...)
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  4. added 2020-02-28
    The Backside of Habit: Notes on Embodied Agency and the Functional Opacity of the Medium.Maria Brincker - forthcoming - In Habits: Pragmatist Approaches from Cognitive Neuroscience to Social Science by Caruana F. & Testa I. (Eds.). Cambridge University Press.
    In this chapter what I call the “backside” of habit is explored. I am interested in the philosophical implications of the physical and physiological processes that mediate, and which allow for what comes to appear as almost magic; namely the various sensorimotor associations and integrations that allows us to replay our past experiences, and to in a certain sense perceive potential futures, and to act and bring about anticipated outcomes – without quite knowing how. Thus, the term “backside” is meant (...)
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  5. added 2020-02-28
    Dynamics of Action Identification.Robin R. Vollocher & Jomes Koufmon - 1996 - In P. Gollwitzer & John A. Bargh (eds.), The Psychology of Action: Linking Cognition and Motivation to Behavior. Guilford. pp. 260.
  6. added 2020-02-12
    Natural Agency: An Essay on the Causal Theory of Action.Hugh J. McCann - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):1008-1010.
  7. added 2020-02-12
    Analytical Philosophy of Action.Lawrence H. Davis - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (4):99-107.
  8. added 2019-11-23
    From Simple to Composite Agency: On Kirk Ludwig’s From Individual to Plural Agency.Olle Blomberg - 2019 - Journal of Social Ontology 5 (1):101-124.
    According to Kirk Ludwig, only primitive actions are actions in a primary and non-derivative sense of the term ‘action’. Ludwig takes this to imply that the notion of collective action is a façon de parler – useful perhaps, but secondary and derivative. I argue that, on the contrary, collective actions are actions in the primary and non-derivative sense. First, this is because some primitive actions are collective actions. Secondly, individual and collective composites of primitive actions are also actions in the (...)
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  9. added 2019-11-15
    Skilled Action.Wayne Christensen - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (11).
  10. added 2019-11-08
    Agency and Action.John Hyman & Helen Steward (eds.) - 2003 - Cambridge University Press.
    One of the most exciting developments in philosophy in the last fifty years is the resurgence in the philosophy of action. The concept of action now occupies a central place in ethics, metaphysics and jurisprudence. This collection of original essays, by some of the most astute and influential philosophers working in this area, covers the entire range of the philosophy of action. Topics covered include the nature of actions themselves; how the concepts of act, agent, cause and event are related (...)
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  11. added 2019-10-18
    The Problem of Action.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1978 - American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (2):157-162.
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  12. added 2019-07-29
    Agents in Movement.István Zoltán Zárdai - 2019 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 143:61-83.
    The paper discusses the category of one of the most fundamental expressions of agency, those movements of agents that are actions. There have been three dominant views of action since the 1960s: 1. the Causal Theory of Action, 2. the Tryings/Willings view, and 3. Agent Causation. These views claim that actions are: 1. events of bodily movements which have the right causes; 2. specific types of mental events causing events of bodily movements; 3. instances of the causal relationship between agents (...)
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  13. added 2019-07-21
    The Place of the Trace: Negligence and Responsibility.Samuel Murray - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (1):39-52.
    One popular theory of moral responsibility locates responsible agency in exercises of control. These control-based theories often appeal to tracing to explain responsibility in cases where some agent is intuitively responsible for bringing about some outcome despite lacking direct control over that outcome’s obtaining. Some question whether control-based theories are committed to utilizing tracing to explain responsibility in certain cases. I argue that reflecting on certain kinds of negligence shows that tracing plays an ineliminable role in any adequate control-based theory (...)
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  14. added 2019-06-06
    Two Conceptions of Reasons for Action.Ruth Chang - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):447-453.
    On a ‘comparative’ conception of practical reasons, reasons are like ‘weights’ that can make an action more or less rational. Bernard Gert adopts instead a ‘toggle’ conception of practical reasons: something counts as a reason just in case it alone can make some or other otherwise irrational action rational. I suggest that Gert’s conception suffers from various defects, and that his motivation for adopting this conception – his central claim that actions can be rational without there being reasons for them (...)
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  15. added 2019-06-06
    Freedom and Experience: Self-Determination Without Illusions.Magill Kevin - 1997 - London: author open access, originally MacMillan.
    Most of us take it for granted that we are free agents: that we can sometimes act so as to shape our own lives and those of others, that we have choices about how to do so and that we are responsible for what we do. But are we really justified in believing this? For centuries philosophers have argued about whether free will and moral responsibility are compatible with determinism or natural causation, and they seem no closer to agreeing about (...)
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  16. added 2019-06-06
    Review of Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behavior. [REVIEW]Michael J. Zimmerman - 1993 - Ethics 103 (4):839-841.
  17. added 2019-06-06
    Analytical Philosophy of Action. [REVIEW]H. M. - 1974 - Review of Metaphysics 27 (4):792-792.
    This book is a development of ideas originally set out in the author’s well known articles "Basic Actions" and "What We can Do." The announced aim of the book is to isolate a class of actions that are basic in the sense that we do not do them by doing some other action. As Danto expresses it in the preface, he wants to "wash away the contextual features which convert movements into gestures and vest the disposition of limbs with high (...)
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  18. added 2019-06-06
    Essays on Actions and Events.Donald Davidson - 1970 - Clarendon Press.
  19. added 2019-03-23
    G.E.M. Anscombe on the Analogical Unity of Intention in Perception and Action.Christopher Frey & Jennifer A. Frey - 2017 - Analytic Philosophy 58 (3):202-247.
    Philosophers of action and perception have reached a consensus: the term ‘intentionality’ has significantly different senses in their respective fields. But Anscombe argues that these distinct senses are analogically united in such a way that one cannot understand the concept if one focuses exclusively on its use in one’s preferred philosophical sub-discipline. She highlights three salient points of analogy: (i) intentional objects are given by expressions that employ a “description under which;” (ii) intentional descriptions are typically vague and indeterminate; and (...)
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  20. added 2019-02-09
    Basic Action and Practical Knowledge.Will Small - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.
    It is a commonplace in philosophy of action that there is and must be teleologically basic action: something done on an occasion without doing it by means of doing anything else. It is widely believed that basic actions are exercises of skill. As the source of the need for basic action is the structure of practical reasoning, this yields a conception of skill and practical reasoning as complementary but mutually exclusive. On this view, practical reasoning and complex intentional action depend (...)
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  21. added 2019-01-19
    Knowing How, Basic Actions, and Ways of Doing Things.Kevin Lynch - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (8):956-977.
    This paper investigates whether we can know how to do basic actions, from the perspective according to which knowing how to do something requires knowledge of a way to do it. A key argument from this perspective against basic know-how is examined and is found to be unsound, involving the false premise that there are no ways of doing basic actions. However, a new argument along similar lines is then developed, which contends that there are no ways of doing basic (...)
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  22. added 2018-08-04
    The Metaphysics of Action: Trying, Doing, Causing.David-Hillel Ruben - 2018 - London: Palgrave Macmillan.
    A discussion of three central ideas in action theory; trying to act, doing or acting, one's action causing further consequences.
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  23. added 2018-07-08
    Process, Action, and Experience.Rowland Stout (ed.) - 2018 - Oxford University Press.
    Process, Action, and Experience offers a radical new approach to the philosophy of mind and action, taking processes to be the central subject matter. An international team of contributors consider what kinds of things processes are, and explore the progressive nature of action and conscious experience.
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  24. added 2018-07-03
    Aristotle's Four Causes of Action.Bryan C. Reece - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):213-227.
    Aristotle’s typical procedure is to identify four causes of natural changes. Intentional action, a natural change, has standardly been treated as an exception: most think that Aristotle has the standard causalist account, according to which an intentional action is a bodily movement efficiently caused by an attitude of the appropriate sort. I show that action is not an exception to Aristotle’s typical procedure: he has the resources to specify four causes of action, and thus to articulate a powerful theory of (...)
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  25. added 2018-06-27
    E Pluribus Unum: A Defense of Davidson's Individuation of Action.Norvin Richards - 1976 - Philosophical Studies 29 (3):191 - 198.
  26. added 2018-06-18
    The Vague Time of a Killing.Kenneth Silver - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (6):1383-1400.
    The problem of the time of a killing concerns exactly when and where to locate our actions. It is a problem for many of our actions beyond killing, and there are versions of the problem that can be raised no matter where your theory locates actions in particular. To answer the problem, I claim that we should be guided to the referent of ‘the killing’ by examining the definition of ‘to kill.’ Once we have the correct definition, we can see (...)
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  27. added 2018-06-04
    A Biosemiotic Approach to the Problem of Structure and Agency.Shahram Rafieian - 2012 - Biosemiotics 5 (1):83-93.
    A human being is the simultaneous composite of several different levels of being, from atomic and subatomic to the level of complex social interaction, and these levels are nested within the individual hierarchically (lower levels giving rise to higher levels, etc.). One of the most important and influential approaches developed in the history of science has been that of systems theory and systemic thinking, in which the different levels of the hierarchy, and the interactions between those levels, are considered simultaneously. (...)
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  28. added 2018-03-22
    Skilled Action and the Double Life of Intention.Joshua Shepherd - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (2):286-305.
  29. added 2018-03-22
    Halfhearted Action and Control.Joshua Shepherd - 2017 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4.
    Some of the things we do intentionally we do halfheartedly. I develop and defend an account of halfheartedness with respect to action on which one is halfhearted with respect to an action A if one’s overall motivation to A is weak. This requires getting clear on what it is to have some level of overall motivation with respect to an action, and on what it means to say one’s overall motivation is weak or strong. After developing this account, I defend (...)
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  30. added 2018-03-22
    The Experience of Acting and the Structure of Consciousness.Joshua Shepherd - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy 114 (8):422-448.
    I offer an account of the experience of acting that demonstrates how agentive aspects of experience associated with the execution of intentions are richly integrated with perceptual aspects associated with parts of action taking place in the publicly observable world. On the view I elucidate, the experience of acting is often both an engagement with the world and a type of intimate acquaintance with it. In conscious action the agent consciously intervenes in the world and consciously experiences the world she (...)
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  31. added 2018-03-12
    Agency, Causality and Properties.Helen Steward - 2011 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):390-401.
    The paper argues against the very commonly held view that whenever a substance may be said to be the cause of something, a fuller and metaphysically more accurate understanding of the situation can always be obtained by looking to the properties in virtue of which that substance was able to bring about the effect in question. Paul Humphreys’ argument that when a substance is said to have produced an effect, it always turns out to be an aspect or property of (...)
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  32. added 2018-03-12
    Commitment and Action.A. Monga - 1976 - Indian Philosophical Quarterly 6 (2):333.
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  33. added 2018-03-09
    Why Intentions?Jesse M. Mulder - 2018 - Ratio 31 (S1):51-64.
    There is an influential conception of intentional agency in terms of just beliefs and desires. And there is an equally influential conception that adds intentions as separate ingredients. It remains disputed whether adding intentions is really necessary, and what difference that addition exactly makes. I argue that adding intentions is required, but only because and insofar as it makes room for a distinctively practical kind of reasoning. I critically consider Bratman's main considerations in support of adding intentions, viz., conduct-control, inertia, (...)
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  34. added 2018-03-07
    Bodily Movement and Its Significance.Will Small - 2016 - Philosophical Topics 44 (1):183-206.
    I trace the development of one aspect of Fred Stoutland’s thought about action by considering the central role given by contemporary philosophy of action to bodily movement. Those who tell the so-called standard story of action think that actions are bodily movements caused by beliefs and desires, that cause further effects in the world in virtue of which they can be described. Those who hold a disjunctive conception of bodily movement think that actions are bodily movements that involve intentions essentially, (...)
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  35. added 2018-03-07
    Practical Knowledge and the Structure of Action.Will Small - 2012 - In Günter Abel & James Conant (eds.), Rethinking Epistemology Volume 2. Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter. pp. 133-227.
    I argue that there is a cognition condition on intention and intentional action. If an agent is doing A intentionally, she has knowledge in intention that he is doing A. If an agent intends to do A, she has knowledge in intention that she is going to do A. In both cases, the agent has knowledge of eventual success, in this sense: she knows that it will be no accident if she ends up having done A. In both cases, the (...)
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  36. added 2018-02-17
    Agency and Alienation: A Theory of Human Presence.Jerome M. Segal - 1996 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    1 Action Theory q What is it to be an agent? • What is it to be passive rather than active? q What is an action? • On what basis do we make the distinction ...
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  37. added 2018-02-17
    Causal deviancy and multiple intentions: a reply to James Montmarquet.John Bishop - 1985 - Analysis 45 (3):163.
  38. added 2018-02-16
    Time and the Philosophy of Action.Roman Altshuler Michael J. Sigrist (ed.) - 2015 - Routledge.
    Although scholarship in philosophy of action has grown in recent years, there has been little work explicitly dealing with the role of time in agency—a role with great significance for the study of action theory. As the articles in this collection demonstrate, virtually every fundamental issue in the philosophy of action involves considerations of time. The four sections of this volume address the metaphysics of action, diachronic practical rationality, the relation between deliberation and action, and the phenomenology of agency, providing (...)
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  39. added 2018-02-16
    How Voluntary Are Minimal Actions?Joëlle Proust - unknown
    This book chapter aims at exploring how intentional a piece of behavior should be to count as an action, and how a minimal view on action, not requiring a richly intentional causation, may still qualify such a behavior as voluntary.
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  40. added 2018-02-02
    Alvin I. Goldman, a Theory of Human Action.Joseph Margolis - 1974 - Metaphilosophy 5 (4):348–364.
  41. added 2017-10-03
    Intelligibility and the Guise of the Good.Paul Boswell - 2018 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 13 (1):1-31.
    According to the Guise of the Good, an agent only does for a reason what she sees as good. One of the main motivations for the view is its apparent ability to explain why action for a reason must be intelligible to its agent, for on this view, an action is intelligible just in case it seems good. This motivation has come under criticism in recent years. Most notably, Kieran Setiya has argued that merely seeing one’s action as good does (...)
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  42. added 2017-09-26
    Human Behavior and Teleology: A Consequence Etiological Analysis of Basic Action.Jeffery Lewis Johnson - 1978 - Dissertation, University of California, Riverside
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  43. added 2017-09-19
    Experts and Deviants: The Story of Agentive Control.Wayne Wu - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):101-26.
    This essay argues that current theories of action fail to explain agentive control because they have left out a psychological capacity central to control: attention. This makes it impossible to give a complete account of the mental antecedents that generate action. By investigating attention, and in particular the intention-attention nexus, we can characterize the functional role of intention in an illuminating way, explicate agentive control so that we have a uniform explanation of basic cases of causal deviance in action as (...)
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  44. added 2017-07-20
    One Self Per Customer? From Disunified Agency to Disunified Self.David Lumsden & Joseph Ulatowski - 2017 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 55 (3):314-335.
    The notion of an agent and the notion of a self are connected, for agency is one role played by the self. Millgram argues for a disunity thesis of agency on the basis of extreme incommensurability across some major life events. We propose a similar negative thesis about the self, that it is composed of relatively independent threads reflecting the different roles and different mind-sets of the person's life. Our understanding of those threads is based on theories of the narrative (...)
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  45. added 2017-07-17
    Paul Katsafanas , Agency and the Foundations of Ethics: Nietzschean Constitutivism . Reviewed By. [REVIEW]Ariela Tubert - 2014 - Philosophy in Review 34 (6):316-318.
  46. added 2017-06-12
    Actions Without Events.Elias Savellos - 1988 - Southwest Philosophy Review 4 (2):17-27.
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  47. added 2017-05-31
    An Essay on Human Action.Carl Ginet & Michael J. Zimmerman - 1988 - Philosophical Review 97 (1):114.
  48. added 2017-05-29
    Springs of Action.Hugh J. McCann - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):979-982.
  49. added 2017-05-29
    Review of On Action, by Carl Ginet.Richard Malpas - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (1):134.
  50. added 2017-05-29
    Theory of Action.Charles Marks & Lawrence H. Davis - 1980 - Philosophical Review 89 (4):634.
1 — 50 / 258