The Synthetic A Priori

SummaryThe paper is concerned with the connection between Kant's conception of transcendental schematism and his analysis of the conditions of the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments. After dealing with some of the standard objections to Kant's theory, I argue that transcendental schemata must be construed as pure intuitions. I then point out that the Principles of Pure Understanding are a set of synthetic a priori judgments which assert the function of the various schemata as necessary conditions of the possibility (...) of experience, and that each of these judgments involves the relation of a pure concept to pure intuition . Finally, I argue that the connection between a category and its schema must itself be both synthetic and a priori. It therefore requires a “deduction”, which Kant himself does not provide, but which I endeavor, in part, to provide for him. (shrink)

This book critically examines some widespread views about the semantic phenomenon of reference and the cognitive phenomenon of singular thought. It begins with a defense of the view that neither is tied to a special relation of causal or epistemic acquaintance. It then challenges the alleged semantic rift between definite and indefinite descriptions on the one hand, and names and demonstratives on the other—a division that has been motivated in part by appeals to considerations of acquaintance. Drawing on recent work (...) in semantics, the book explores a more unified account of all four types of expression, according to which none of them paradigmatically fits the profile of a referential term. On the proposed framework, all four involve existential quantification but admit of uses that exhibit many of the traits associated with reference—a phenomenon that is due to the presence of what we call a ‘singular restriction’ on the existentially quantified domain. The book concludes by drawing out some implications of the proposed semantic picture for the traditional categories of reference and singular thought. (shrink)

This essay motivates a revised version of the epistemic condition of safety and then employs the revision to (i) challenge traditional conceptions of apriority, (ii) refute ‘strong privileged access’, and (iii) resolve a well-known puzzle about externalism and self-knowledge.

KANT AND HEGEL FIND THEMSELVES ON SIMILAR PATHS toward their respective goals to give a total account of reality. They share a deep commitment to science, Wissenschaftlichkeit, and raise the question: Where does science begin? Similarly, they answer: It begins with sense knowledge yet it is not founded in the senses. This essay attempts to reflect on, with the aim of cautiously reassessing, the nonsensible, universal features of sense experience from an idealist perspective. A study of the “science of sensibility,” (...) raised to new levels of interest in recent debates of how the mind works, seems to have lost nothing of its fascination, indeed urgency in contemporary discussions, in the Kant-Hegel scholarship, in the philosophy of mind, philosophy of science as well as the natural and cognitive sciences in general. (shrink)

The article approaches Salomon Maimon’s reinterpretation of the notions of the thing in itself and the given within the framework of criticism. For Maimon they do not refer to a transcendence that is directly unattainable by knowledge. In this attempt, he tries to explain the given on the basis of the action of constitutive understanding. With this, he triggers the passage from transcendental Kantian philosophy to the idealism of Fichte. Nonetheless, his position faces the subsequent problem of explaining how the (...) constitution of the given from understanding (infinite) can become compatible with the criticism it takes on. On affirming that an uncognoscible item is the basis of knowledge, namely, infinite understanding, he set aside the explanation of knowledge in terms of what is revealed in it and in doing so would be resorting to external uncognoscible conditions. (shrink)

Peirce did not achieve a final systematization of his work. Beyond the difficulties in explaining so many philosophical tools that he introduced—suffice it to mention semiotic, abductive logic, a heuristic based on continuity, scholastic realism—, there is a theoretical reason for this incompletion. All those new philosophical tools indicated a conception of synthesis very different from the one he received from Kant. Peirce did not realize the profound direction of his enquiry so that he did not directly question neither Kant’s (...) legacy on this issue nor the idea of necessity that presides over it. Starting from Peirce’s conception of continuity and change, this paper will give a new definition of synthetic and analytic judgments and reasoning, completing the picture with a third “vague” judgment and reasoning. In this new definition a synthetic judgment is a judgment that recognizes identity through changes. An analytical judgment is a judgment that loses identity through changes. A vague judgment is a judgment that it is blind to identity through changes. How do we perform synthetic reasoning? Following Peirce’s semiotic study of elements of Gamma Graphs as the sheet of assertion and the line of identity, the paper will first individuate the semiotic characteristics necessary for the recognition of identity. These characteristics lead us to discover “complete gesture” as the tool that we use in our every-day reasoning in order to acquire new knowledge synthetically. “Complete gestures” are actions through which we carry and recognize significant meanings. This new paradigm should provide an improved account of common-sense knowledge as well as of particular creative and hypothetic stages of conception in both scientific and humanistic thought. (shrink)

Wittgenstein’s use of the word ‘phenomenology’ to describe his own work in Philosophical Remarks and The Big Typescript has occasioned much puzzlement and confusion. This paper seeks to shed light on what Wittgenstein meant by the word through a close analysis of key passages in those two works. I argue against both the view of Nicholas Gier that Wittgenstein held ‘grammatical’ phenomenological remarks to be synthetic a priori and that expressed by Moritz Schlick that Wittgenstein held grammar to be tautological. (...) I also take issue with the claim by Merrill and Jaakko Hintikka that Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus ought to be regarded as a work of phenomenology. Wittgenstein’s adoption of a variant of Husserlian phenomenology, I argue, lasted no more than a few months, from February to October 1929, during which he conceived of phenomenology as something that sought to establish what one might call ‘analytic a posteriori’ truths through something like the Husserlian method of ‘bracketing’. By the end of 1929, I claim, he had abandoned that in favour of the view expressed in the slogan ‘phenomenology is grammar’, where ‘grammar’ is not confined to the tautological, but is rather intimately linked to Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘the understanding that consists in seeing connections’. (shrink)

Hans Reichenbach is well known for his limiting frequency view of probability, with his most thorough account given in The Theory of Probability in 1935/1949. Perhaps less known are Reichenbach's early views on probability and its epistemology. In his doctoral thesis from 1915, Reichenbach espouses a Kantian view of probability, where the convergence limit of an empirical frequency distribution is guaranteed to exist thanks to the synthetic a priori principle of lawful distribution. Reichenbach claims to have given a purely objective (...) account of probability, while integrating the concept into a more general philosophical and epistemological framework. A brief synopsis of Reichenbach's thesis and a critical analysis of the problematic steps of his argument will show that the roots of many of his most influential insights on probability and causality can be found in this early work. (shrink)

In his essay “Logical Empiricism”, in the anthology Twentieth Century Philosophy, Professor Feigl writes: “All forms of empiricism agree in repudiating the existence of synthetic a priori knowledge.” 2 Schlick makes the same point even more forcibly: “The empiricism which I represent believes itself to be clear on the point that, as a matter of principle, all propositions are either synthetic a posteriori or tautologous; synthetic a priori propositions seem to it to be a logical impossibility.”3 The denial of synthetic (...) a prioris is a major thesis of the logical empiricist position, being found in the writings of most of the leaders of the movement.4 The reason for its importance is fairly clear. It provides a formula on which the empiricists can base their critique of traditional philosophy. To use Ayer's phrase, denial of the synthetic a priori results in “the elimination of metaphysics”. The philosophical tradition to which the empiricists are opposed and whose “metaphysics” they wish to eliminate can be called, somewhat loosely, rationalism. (shrink)

On rationalist infallibilism, a wide range of both (i) analytic and (ii) synthetic a priori propositions can be infallibly justified (or absolutely warranted), i.e., justified to a degree that entails their truth and precludes their falsity. Though rationalist infallibilism is indisputably running its course, adherence to at least one of the two species of infallible a priori justification refuses to disappear from mainstream epistemology. Among others, Putnam (1978) still professes the a priori infallibility of some category (i) propositions, while Burge (...) (1986, 1988, 1996) and Lewis (1996) have recently affirmed the a priori infallibility of some category (ii) propositions. In this paper, I take aim at rationalist infallibilism by calling into question the a priori infallibility of both analytic and synthetic propositions. The upshot will be twofold: first, rationalist infallibilism unsurprisingly emerges as a defective epistemological doctrine, and second, more importantly, the case for the a priori infallibility of one or both categories of propositions turns out to lack cogency. (shrink)

Popper uses the "Humean challenge" as a justification for his falsificationism. It is claimed that in his basic argument he confuses two different doubts: (a) the Humean doubt (Popper's problem of induction), and (b) the "Popperean" doubt whether - presupposing that there are laws of nature - the laws we accept are in fact valid. Popper's alleged solution of the problem of induction does not solve the problem in a straightforward way (as Levison and Salmon have remarked before). But if (...) Popper's solution of the Humean challenge is re-interpreted as being close to Kant's it makes sense. Even though Popper explicitly rejects Kant's synthetic judgements a priori, it is claimed here that this is so because he misinterprets Kant's argument. If he had understood Kant correctly he should have been a modern "Kantianer"! (shrink)

Agustín Rayo’s The Construction of Logical Space offers an exciting and ambitious defense of a broadly Carnapian approach to metaphysics. This essay will focus on one of the main differences between Rayo’s and Carnap’s approaches. Carnap distinguished between analytic, a priori “meaning postulates”, and empirical claims, which were both synthetic and knowable only a posteriori. Like meaning postulates, they determine the boundaries of logical space. But Rayo is skeptical that the a priori/a posteriori or analytic/synthetic distinctions can do the work (...) Carnap wanted them to, so unlike meaning postulates, ‘just is’-statements aren’t assumed to be analytic or knowable a priori. This essay will concern the epistemology of ‘just is’-statements in Rayo’s picture. If not by a priori reflection, how can we determine which ones to accept? I’ll distinguish two competing strands in Rayo’s work. The less radical, Lewisian strand holds that the question of whether to accept a ‘just is’-statement can be addressed in a neutral, non-question-begging way, by a kind of cost-benefit analysis. The more radical, Kuhnian strand holds that there can be no ‘just is’-statement-independent, rational choice of which ‘just is’-statements to accept. I argue that Rayo faces strong internal pressure to adopt the Kuhnian picture. While it is possible for Rayo to resist these Kuhnian pressures, natural strategies for doing so leave his view more similar to Carnap’s than the above gloss suggested. (shrink)

In the 19th century, a transition took place from the classical to the modern ideal of science: Science would no longer be regarded as a categorical-deductive system of absolute truths, but instead as a hypothetical-deductive system of problematically conditional propositions. In this process, the synthetic a priori also took on more and more of the status of something problematically conditional, which could be found out and corrected empirically, and was itself even ultimately contingent upon empiricism. Along the way, it lost (...) its original purpose, namely to formulate the conditions for the possibility of objective knowledge. To the extent that one continues to attribute objectivity to scientific knowledge, however, the question of the synthetic a priori remains current. The present volume aims to trace the historical roots and varied interpretations of the synthetic a priori while also seeking new approaches toward a contemporary reinterpretation of this fundamental concept. // -/- Im 19. Jahrhundert vollzieht sich der Übergang vom klassischen zum modernen Wissenschaftsideal: Die Wissenschaft wird nicht mehr als kategorisch-deduktives System absoluter Wahrheiten, sondern als ein hypothetisch-deduktives System problematisch-konditionaler Sätze angesehen. Damit erlangt auch das synthetische Apriori mehr und mehr den Status von etwas Problematisch-Konditionalem, das vermöge der Empirie aufgefunden und nachkorrigiert wird, schlussendlich sogar selbst von der Empirie abhängt. Es büßt dabei seinen ursprünglichen Zweck ein, nämlich die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit objektiver Erkenntnis zu formulieren. Sofern man wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis Objektivität zugesteht, bleibt jedoch die Frage nach dem synthetischen Apriori aktuell. Das vorliegende Buch will einerseits den historischen Wurzeln sowie verschiedenen Interpretationen des synthetischen Apriori nachspüren und andererseits nach Ansätzen für eine zeitgemäße Reinterpretation dieses fundamentalen Begriffes fragen. (shrink)

The concept of a priori plays an important role in Kant’s entiree philosophy. However, Husserl often claimed that a genuine concept of a priori in the phenomenological sense was absent in Kant. Scheler criticized this concept of Kant just as Husserl did. All of Scheler’s ethical critiques of Kant, who is the major opponent to Scheler, are based on his critiques of Kant’s concept of a priori because, for Scheler, it is the largest absurdity of Kant’s theory that a priori (...) is equated to the formal. Scheler thus clearly delineated Kant’s transcendentalism, which seeks a priori in form. It seems that Scheler‘s comprehension and interpretation of a priori reversed Kant’s “Copernican revolution”, in contrast with which, Scheler carried ou a „Ptolemiac counter-revolution“. In fact, Scheler questioned Kant‘s transcendental-rational theory of the function of synthetic categories, which derived from the “Copernican revolution”. Nevertheless, Scheler did not want to defend the pre-Kant position, or Kant’s pre-critique period. He also did not mean simply to stress one side in Kant’s dualism , which was ignored by Kant. In fact, he wanted to question Kant’s metaphysical dualism itself. The eventual goal of his phenomenological philosophy is to reveal the uncritical presuppositions in Kant’s critical philosophy. (shrink)

A thumbnail sketch of the philosophical thinking about the a priori would surely include that it has been dominated by two major approaches: the Kantian absolute conception of it and the Millian-Quinean absolute rejection of it (section 2). Yet, one can find in the literature claims about the existence of a ›functional a priori‹, a ›relative a priori‹, a ›relativised a priori‹ and suchlike. They are all meant to carve a space between the two extremes. An important thought behind the (...) search for a middle ground is that the supposed coincidence between the constitutive and the unrevisable is wrong. The entitlement to accept a principle as being constitutive of experience prior to any empirical justification of it is compatible with an entitlement to revise or abandon such a principle on empirical grounds. If a priori principles are meant to be independent of experience, how should this claim of independence be understood so that room is left for the possibility that a principle is both independent of experience and revisable on empirical grounds (section 3)? A straightforward and natural way to approach this issue is to think of constitutive principles along the lines of Poincaréan conventions, which can be seen as delineating a new sense of the a priori – the conventional a priori principles. These are substantive principles that are constitutive of theoretical frameworks – in the sense that they define (or constitute) the object of knowledge – without being either synthetic a priori or empirical generalisations. Still, their negation is conceivable and they are revisable on empirical grounds (section 4). (shrink)

On défend ici l'hypothèse selon laquelle les relations d'idées humiennes ont pu servir de matrice à la constitution d'un a priori phénoménologique, en un sens particulier : conçues d'abord comme relations internes, elles ont dû être partiellement arrachées à un modèle représentationnel hérité de Brentano et insérées dans un dispositif ontologique, s'exprimant alors selon une modalité qui est celle du rapport d'essence. One suggests the possibility that Hume's relations of ideas must have constituted the basis of the phenomenological synthetic a (...) priori, in a specific sense : first considered as internal relations, they must have been partially snatched out of the representational context -a legacy of Franz Brentano -, beeing then expressed in terms of ontological structures, relations of essences. (shrink)

Poincaré is well known for his conventionalism and structuralism. However, the relationship between these two theses and their place in Poincaré׳s epistemology of science remain puzzling. In this paper I show the scope of Poincaré׳s conventionalism and its position in Poincaré׳s hierarchical approach to scientific theories. I argue that for Poincaré scientific knowledge is relational and made possible by synthetic a priori, empirical and conventional elements, which, however, are not chosen arbitrarily. By examining his geometric conventionalism, his hierarchical account of (...) science and defence of continuity in theory change, I argue that Poincaré defends a complex structuralist position based on synthetic a priori and conventional elements, the mind-dependence of which precludes epistemic access to mind-independent structures. (shrink)

(2014). The Temptations of Phenomenology: Wittgenstein, the Synthetic a Priori and the ‘Analytic a Posteriori’. International Journal of Philosophical Studies: Vol. 22, Continental Engagement with Analytic Philosophy, pp. 312-340. doi: 10.1080/09672559.2014.913884.

Kant's philosophy promises to explain various synthetic a priori claims. Yet, as several of his commentators have noted, it is hard to see how these explanations could work unless they themselves rested on unexplained synthetic a priori claims. Since Kant appears to demand explanations for all synthetic a priori claims, it would seem that his project fails on its own terms. I argue, however, that Kant holds that explanations are required only for synthetic a priori claims about (purportedly) experience-independent entities, (...) and that his project rests on a rationalist method of reflection that justifies certain basic synthetic a priori claims. (shrink)

We examine the sense in which logic is a priori, and explain how mathematical theories can be dichotomized non-trivially into analytic and synthetic portions. We argue that Core Logic contains exactly the a-priori-because-analytically-valid deductive principles. We introduce the reader to Core Logic by explaining its relationship to other logical systems, and stating its rules of inference. Important metatheorems about Core Logic are reported, and its important features noted. Core Logic can serve as the basis for a foundational program that could (...) be called Natural Logicism, an exposition of which will build on the (meta)logical ideas explained here. (shrink)

English title: The Problem of the Synthetic a priori Judgements According to Hermann Lotze. The present article compares Kant’s and Lotze’s concepts of synthetic judgements. Lotze’s aim is a renewing of the Kant’s solutions, what he achieves thanks to introduction of the distinction between analytic (identical) content and synthetic form of these judgements which Kant recognised as synthetic. This distinction makes possible to lay down the concept of intentional sense which has influence over Frege and Husserl.

On rationalist infallibilism, a wide range of both (i) analytic and (ii) synthetic a priori propositions can be infallibly justified, i.e., justified in a way that is truth-entailing. In this paper, I examine the second thesis of rationalist infallibilism, what might be called ‘synthetic a priori infallibilism’. Exploring the seemingly only potentially plausible species of synthetic a priori infallibility, I reject the infallible justification of so-called self-justifying propositions.

Abstract: This article contends that the relation of early logical empiricism to Kant was more complex than is often assumed. It argues that Reichenbach's early work on Kant and Einstein, entitled The Theory of Relativity and A Priori Knowledge (1920) aimed to transform rather than to oppose Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. One the one hand, I argue that Reichenbach's conception of coordinating principles, derived from Kant's conception of synthetic a priori principles, offers a valuable way of accounting for the (...) historicity of scientific paradigms. On the other hand, I show that even Reichenbach, in line with Neo-Kantianism, associated Kant's view of synthetic a priori principles too closely with Newtonian physics and, consequently, overestimated the difference between Kant's philosophy and his own. This is even more so, I point out, in the retrospective account logical empiricism presented of its own history. Whereas contemporary reconstructions of this history, including Michael Friedman's, tend to endorse this account, I offer an interpretation of Kant's conception of a priori principles that contrasts with the one put forward by both Neo-Kantianism and logical empiricism. On this basis, I re-examine the early Reichenbach's effort to accommodate these principles to the paradigm forged by Einstein. (shrink)

This article sketches out the key features of the debate on the analytic-synthetic distinction between phenomenology and logical empiricism, which took place in the early part of the twentieth century. On the one side, the author reconstructs the debate itself from an historical angle; on the other, he gives a theoretical account of the different positions and arguments. In particular, he has three main aims: a) to clarify how, according to Husserl, the analyticsynthetic opposition is to be understood as the (...) form-matter opposition; b) to show how this position has been misunderstood by neo-empiricist philosophers, in particular by Schlick in his paper against the theory of the factual a priori; c) to point out that Husserlian theory anticipates some relevant features in the matter of analyticity which will be made fully explicit only by Carnap and Quine, philosophers of the following generation. (shrink)

Subjectivists, taking the “collapse” of the observation-interpretation contrast much too seriously, are led to imagine that even perceptual knowledge is active. And therefore subject dependent. Turning the tables on this popular trend, I argue that even conceptual knowledge is passive. Kant’s epistemology is conceptual. But if also active, then incoherent. If synthetic a priori truths are to follow upon our mental activity, they were neither true nor, far less, a priori before that activity. “A priori” and “active” are contradictory attributes (...) of knowledge. As, indeed, are “a priori” and “subject-dependent” to begin with. Nothing a priori can be dependent on anything except itself, and least of all on the human subject. Kant does consider the active aspect of thought. The difference is that for him the more active it becomes, the less it is to be trusted. For we are no longer in the province of the Understanding, and its necessary truths, but in the realm of Pure Reason and its dialectical antinomies. Cognition activists who take a liking to Kant have simply mistaken Reason for the Understanding. And Reason is to Kant “the seat of all transcendental illusion”. (shrink)

Subjectivists, taking the “collapse” of the observation-interpretation contrast much too seriously, are led to imagine that even perceptual knowledge is active. And therefore subject dependent. Turning the tables on this popular trend, I argue that even conceptual knowledge is passive. Kant’s epistemology is conceptual. But if also active, then incoherent. If synthetic a priori truths are to follow upon our mental activity, they were neither true nor, far less, a priori before that activity. “A priori” and “active” are contradictory attributes (...) of knowledge. As, indeed, are “a priori” and “subject-dependent” to begin with. Nothing a priori can be dependent on anything except itself, and least of all on the human subject. Kant does consider the active aspect of thought. The difference is that for him the more active it becomes, the less it is to be trusted. For we are no longer in the province of the Understanding, and its necessary truths, but in the realm of Pure Reason and its dialectical antinomies. Cognition activists who take a liking to Kant have simply mistaken Reason for the Understanding. And Reason is to Kant “the seat of all transcendental illusion”. (shrink)

The article adumbrates the opposition between Aristotelian “metaphysical” meaning of the concept of substance and its critical relational meaning, strongly accentuated by the Marburg Neokantian School. Th is opposition was creatively developed by the aforementioned School. It starts with a critique of Aristotle and his concept of the “substance as being in itself” and proceeds to demonstrate with the reference to the Kantian transcendentalism that concept of the “substance as function” is one of the a priori rules of synthetic cognition. (...) In the Marburg School, the history of the development of these two meanings takes the form of a history of two opposing directions of the thought: dogmatic philosophy – leaning toward the former meaning, and critical – based on the latter. (shrink)

In the horizon of the Kantian theory of the reasoning problems and his auxiliary theory , can the States law fundamental juridical problem in Rechtslehre be synthesized by the question: how are the States law a priori synthetic judgments possible? On the other hand, in the matter of logical-analytical problems resolution, it is possible to operate through the analysis and synthesis method. The objective of this article is to reconstruct the possibility problem and the applicability of the States law theory (...) according to this procedure of discovery and exposition. In a wide context, the aim is to connect the Kantian Rechtslehre to the solubility theory of reasoning in general to make explicit the critical character of this late juridical work. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to reconstruct the State law Kantian theory exposed in Rechtslehre , through an analytical-logical reading key, which contains as proof proceeding the analysis and synthesis method. This investigation corroborates with the interpretation that defends the criticality this late juridical text to an extent that the State law is connected to the critical plan of the a priori synthetic judgments in general enunciation.

Kant's original version of transcendental philosophy took both Euclidean geometry and the Newtonian laws of motion to be synthetic a priori constitutive principles—which, from Kant's point of view, function as necessary presuppositions for applying our fundamental concepts of space, time, matter, and motion to our sensible experience of the natural world. Although Kant had very good reasons to view the principles in question as having such a constitutively a priori role, we now know, in the wake of Einstein's work, that (...) they are not in fact a priori in the stronger sense of being fixed necessary conditions for all human experience in general, eternally valid once and for all. And it is for precisely this reason that Kant's original version of transcendental philosophy must now be either rejected entirely or radically reconceived. Most philosophy of science since Einstein has taken the former route: the dominant view in logical empiricism, for example, was that the Kantian synthetic a priori had to be rejected once and for all in the light of the general theory of relativity. (shrink)

The present article aims at tracing Moritz Schlick's theoretical route from 1915 to 1936 - the year he was assassinated. The authors describe this route as Schlick's attempt at successively evading what one could define as two flaws in modern philosophy - the Charybdis of Kantian epistemology and the Scylla of radical conventionalism. Such an original and daring guideline also deviates from all great epistemological philosophies dating from the beginning of the century with which the Vienna Circle's founder engaged in (...) fruitful dialogue - among which Neokantianism and phenomenology, as well as Hilbertian Axiomatic or Poincaré and Duhem's doctrines. (shrink)

Kant’s analytic-synthetic distinction is often construed in terms of the question of whether or not the predicate is contained in or can be derived from the concept of the subject. Few have observed that Kant has another formulation of the distinction, a formulation that is based on the determinate-indeterminate distinction. In fact, it is this formulation that will shape the development of one of the main tasks of post-Kantian German idealism. It is my aim to explain how Kant, Maimon, and (...) Fichte each define and address the problem of the synthetic a priori in terms of the determinate-indeterminate distinction. (shrink)

El problema fundamental para que la Teoría de la relatividad pueda ser acorde con la filosofía de Kant es el de la utilización de una geometría no euclídea. Que sus principios sean interpretados como juicios sintéticos a priori es, a nuestro entender, un problema secundario. Si queremos que los principios de una ciencia de la naturaleza sean universales y necesarios sin recurrir a dogmatismos, no queda otra posibilidad que entenderlos trascendentalmente. Como se observa en el principio de relatividad, Einstein también (...) pensaba que las leyes físicas son universales y necesarias. Sin embargo, su perspectiva fue más racionalista que crítica. Sea como fuere, si los principios de la Teoría de la relatividad son a priori y enlazan sintéticamente la experiencia posible, esta teoría nos servirá para entender que las geometrías no euclídeas no son ajenas a los planteamientos de Kant, si bien requieren dar un rodeo epistemológico. La doctrina que nos permite fundamentar las geometrías no euclidianas desde la filosofía de Kant la llamamos “Álgebra de la experiencia”.The main problem for the Theory of the relativity to be in agreement with the Kant´s philosophy is the use of a non-Euclidean geometry. The fact that their principles could be interpreted a priori as synthetic trials is, in our opinion, a secondary problem. If we want that the principles of a science of the nature would be universal and necessary ones without appealing to dogmatisms, then, he have to understand them transcendentally. As in the principle of relativity it is observed, Einstein also thought that the physical laws are universal and necessary ones. However, their perspective was more rationalistic than critic. In any case, if the Theory of Relativity principles are a priori and they synthetically connect the possible experience, then, this theory will allow us to understand that the non-Euclidean geometries are not far away from the Kant´s positions, although they require to made a epistemological turn around. The principle that allows us to base the geometries non Euclidian from the Kant´s philosophy is called “Algebra of the experience”. (shrink)

This paper considers the kantian statement that the natural science, the same as the mathematics, it contains synthetic a priori judgments as principles. However, a comparative study among the principles of both sciences, as well as of the foundations of their constitution, it throws the primary ..

“Mathematics, synthetic unity and constitutive a priori”. Starting from the emphasis about the Kantian idea of the originary synthetic unity of apperception like the basic function on which rest the production of all synthetic judgment, in this paper I defend the idea of constitutive a priori of experience under the form of a similar synthetic principle but essentially formal, namely, the concept of transformation and group of transformations. To the same time, I try to show that Kant himself inspired, for (...) articulate his own position, on mathematics, especially on synthetic geometry. (shrink)

Este artí­culo considera la afirmación kantiana de que la ciencia natural, al igual que las matemáticas, contiene juicios sintéticos a priori como principios. Sin embargo, un estudio comparativo entre los principios de ambas ciencias, así­ como de los fundamentos de su constitución, arroja el resultado primario de que sólo es posible hablar de principios propiamente a priori en las matemáticas, manteniendo para los de la ciencia natural un estatus diferente. La elucidación de la naturaleza y modo de construcciún de estos (...) últimos mostrará que Immanuel Kant estaba caracterizando un proceder común en la ciencia del siglo XVIII y que aún hoy puede leerse en la práctica cientí­fica estándar.This paper considers the kantian statement that the natural science, the same as the mathematics, it contains synthetic a priori judgments as principles. However, a comparative study among the principles of both sciences, as well as of the foundations of their constitution, it throws the primary result that it is only possible to speak properly of a priori principles in the mathematics, maintaining for those of the natural science a different status. The explanation of the nature and way of construction of these last ones will show that Kant was characterizing a procedure common in the science of the XVIII century, and that today it can still be read in the standard scientific practice. (shrink)

Der Beitrag bestimmt den logischen Standort und die Funktion des ursprünglich und a priori vereinigten Willens in Kants Rechtslehre. Der ursprünglich und a priori vereinigte Wille wird von einer ursprünglichen Gemeinschaft aller Menschen am Erdboden hervorgebracht, die ihrerseits auf einem ursprünglichen Recht eines jeden auf einen Platz auf dieser Erde gründet. Das ursprüngliche Recht auf einen Platz selbst folgt aus dem ursprünglichen Freiheitsrecht. Der ursprünglich vereinigte Wille richtet sich auf die Aufteilung des Erdbodens. Dadurch wird der ursprüngliche Erwerb von Sachen, (...) insbesondere von Grundstücken, möglich. Kant formuliert diese Möglichkeit in dem Postulat des § 2 der Rechtslehre, das ein Erlaubnisgesetz der praktischen Vernunft enthält: "Es ist möglich, einen jeden äußeren Gegenstand meiner Willkür als das Meine zu haben." Das Postulat folgt nicht analytisch aus dem ursprünglichen Freiheitsrecht. Es wird durch eine reductio ad absurdum der Annahme des Gegenteils begründet und enthält infolgedessen einen synthetischen Rechtssatz a priori. Zu dem Gebot, den Erdboden aufzuteilen, kommt das Postulat des öffentlichen Rechts , das den Eintritt in den -Staat gebietet, um das Eigentum an den Sachen zu sichern. Auch dieses Postulat hat den Charakter eines synthetischen Rechtssatzes a priori. Die Gründung eines -Staats setzt den ursprünglichen Kontrakt voraus. Das Eigentum an Grund und Boden geht jeder Staatsgründung voran, weil eine Staatsgründung nur möglich ist, wenn das Volk, das einen Staat gründen will, über ein mögliches Staatsgebiet verfügt.This article examines the logical location and function of the originally and a priori united will in Kant's Doctrine of Right. The originally and a priori united will flows out of the original community of all human beings on the earth's surface, which in turn is based on each person's original right to a place on this earth. The original right to a place on the earth's surface follows analytically from the original right to freedom. The originally united will commands us to divide the surface of the earth. This will to divide the land makes original acquisition possible. Kant formulates this possibility in § 2 of the Doctrine of Right, which contains a permissive law of practical reason: "It is possible to have any external object of my choice as mine." This postulate does not follow analytically from the original right to freedom. Instead it is based on a reductio ad absurdum and thus contains a synthetic principle of law a priori. The postulate of public law is added to the will to divide the earth's surface and requires entering a juridical state in order to secure property rights to things. This postulate is also a synthetic principle of law a priori. Founding a juridical state presupposes the original contract. Ownership of land logically precedes the founding of any state, because a state can be founded only if the people intending to found it have a state territory. (shrink)

In [Laurence, Margolis 2003] the authors try - within their polemics against F.Jackson’s views in [Jackson 1998] - to decide the question whether concepts are a priori (in their formulation “to be defined a priori”). Their discussion suffers - as a number of similar articles - from a typical drawback: some problem whose solution requires an exact notion of concept is handled as if the latter were quite clear. The consequence of this ‘conceptual laxity’ is that a) the topic of (...) the discussion is not very clear (what does the phrase ‘concepts must be defined a priori’ mean?); b) the relevance of the Quinean criticism of the “second dogma of empiricism”, i.e., of Quine’s claim that “science sometimes overturns our most cherished beliefs” and therefore there is no sharp boundary between analytic and synthetic is uncritically accepted; c) no distinction is made between the question whether the relation between an expression and its meaning is a priori and the question whether the relation between a concept and the object identified by the concept is a priori. The present article intends to elucidate and then to answer the questions that can be asked when we say something like “concepts are a priori ”. (shrink)