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  1. Fairness, Distributive Justice and Global Justice.Adam Hosein - manuscript
    In this paper I discuss justice in the distribution of resources, both within states and across different states. On one influential view, it is always unjust for one person to have less than another through no fault of her own. State borders, on this account, have no importance in determining which distributions are just. I show that an alternative approach is needed. I argue that distributions of wealth are only unjust in so far as they issue from unfair treatment. It (...)
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  2. The Structure of Good.David McCarthy - forthcoming - Oxford University Press.
  3. As Good As ‘Enough and As Good’.Bas van der Vossen - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (1):183-203.
    The Lockean theory of property licenses unilateral appropriation on the condition that there be ‘enough, and as good left in common for others’. However, the meaning of this proviso is all but clear. This article argues that the proviso is centered around the Lockean theory of freedom. To be free, I argue, we must be ‘non-subjected’ in the exercise of our rights, including our rights to appropriate. We enjoy such freedom only when the ability to exercise our rights does not (...)
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  4. The Levelling-Down Objection and the Additive Measure of the Badness of Inequality.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2020 - Economics and Philosophy 36 (3):401-406.
    The Levelling-Down Objection is a standard objection to monistic egalitarian theories where equality is the only thing that has intrinsic value. Most egalitarians, however, are value pluralists; they hold that, in addition to equality being intrinsically valuable, the egalitarian currency in which we are equal or unequal is also intrinsically valuable. In this paper, I shall argue that the Levelling-Down Objection still minimizes the weight that the intrinsic badness of inequality could have in the overall intrinsic evaluation of outcomes, given (...)
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  5. Mistä puhumme, kun puhumme eriarvoisuudesta?Antti Kauppinen - 2020 - Helsinki: Kalevi Sorsan Säätiö.
    Eriarvoisuuspuheella voidaan viitata moniin eri asioihin. Usein sillä tarkoitetaan hyvien asioiden epätasaista jakautumista. Ei kuitenkaan ole itsessään huono asia, että joillakin menee paremmin kuin toisilla. Silloin kun taloudellinen eriarvoisuus on ongelma, kyse on sen syistä tai seurauksista. On kuitenkin myös itsessään moraalisesti ongelmallinen eriarvoisuuden muoto, jota kutsun erivertaisuudeksi. Siinä on kyse joidenkin herruudesta ja ylivallasta toisiin nähden tai siitä, että joitakin suositaan järjestelmällisesti toisten kustannuksella. Erivertaisuus ei sovi yhteen jokaisen yksilön moraalisen tasa-arvoisuuden kanssa, joten se on itsessään huono asia. Oikeudenmukaisuus (...)
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  6. Educational Inequality and State-Sponsored Elite Education: The Case of the Dutch Gymnasium.Michael Merry & Willem Boterman - 2020 - Comparative Education 56.
    In this paper the authors examine the role the Dutch gymnasium continues to play in the institutional maintenance of educational inequality. To that end they examine the relational and spatial features of state-sponsored elite education in the Dutch system: the unique identity the gymnasium seeks to cultivate; its value to its consumers; its geographic significance; and its market position amidst a growing array of other selective forms of schooling. They argue that there is a strong correlation between a higher social (...)
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  7. Rank-Weighted Utilitarianism and the Veil of Ignorance.Jacob M. Nebel - 2020 - Ethics 131 (1):87-106.
    Lara Buchak argues for a version of rank-weighted utilitarianism that assigns greater weight to the interests of the worse off. She argues that our distributive principles should be derived from the preferences of rational individuals behind a veil of ignorance, who ought to be risk averse. I argue that Buchak’s appeal to the veil of ignorance leads to a particular way of extending rank-weighted utilitarianism to the evaluation of uncertain prospects. This method recommends choices that violate the unanimous preferences of (...)
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  8. Profile Evidence, Fairness, and the Risks of Mistaken Convictions.Marcello Di Bello & Collin O’Neil - 2019 - Ethics 130 (2):147-178.
    Many oppose the use of profile evidence against defendants at trial, even when the statistical correlations are reliable and the jury is free from prejudice. The literature has struggled to justify this opposition. We argue that admitting profile evidence is objectionable because it violates what we call “equal protection”—that is, a right of innocent defendants not to be exposed to higher ex ante risks of mistaken conviction compared to other innocent defendants facing similar charges. We also show why admitting other (...)
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  9. Pragmatist Egalitarianism Revisited: Some Replies to My Critics.David Rondel - 2019 - Contemporary Pragmatism 16 (4):337-347.
    In this article, I reply to some criticisms of my book, Pragmatist Egalitarianism, offered by professors Robert Talisse, Susan Dieleman, and Alexander Livingston. Some of the major themes and questions I address include the following: How are conflicts between different egalitarian ideals best understood and addressed? Does the quest for equality have a fundamental locus, or are the different egalitarian variables I identify in the book, conceptually speaking, on an equal footing? What is the relationship between justice and equality? How (...)
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  10. John Stuart Mill on Luck and Distributive Justice.Piers Norris Turner - 2019 - In Ian M. Church & Robert J. Hartman (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck. pp. 80-93.
    My aim in this chapter is to place John Stuart Mill’s distinctive utilitarian political philosophy in the context of the debate about luck, responsibility, and equality. I hope it will reveal the extent to which his utilitarianism provides a helpful framework for synthesizing the competing claims of luck and relational egalitarianism. I attempt to show that when Mill’s distributive justice commitments are not decided by direct appeal to overall happiness, they are guided by three main public principles: an impartiality principle, (...)
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  11. Why Health-Related Inequalities Matter and Which Ones Do.Alex Voorhoeve - 2019 - In Ole Frithjof Norheim, Ezekiel Emmanuel & Joseph Millum (eds.), Global Health Priority-Setting: Beyond Cost-Effectiveness. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 145-62.
    I outline and defend two egalitarian theories, which yield distinctive and, I argue, complementary answers to why health-related inequalities matter: a brute luck egalitarian view, according to which inequalities due to unchosen, differential luck are bad because unfair, and a social egalitarian view, according to which inequalities are bad when and because they undermine people’s status as equal citizens. These views identify different objects of egalitarian concern: the brute luck egalitarian view directs attention to health-related well-being, while social egalitarianism focuses (...)
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  12. Consciencism, Ubuntu, and Justice.Martin Ajei & Richmond Kwesi - 2018 - Nigerian Journal of Philosophy 26:61-90.
    Mkhwanazi (2017) has argued that Consciencism is an “expression of ubuntu” and that it “represents the essential elements of ubuntu”. Both Consciencism and ubuntu, according to him, are engaged with the re-humanization of African society for they both advocate for the restitution of humanist and egalitarian principles found in traditional African societies. In this paper, we argue that while Consciencism and ubuntu share common principles, the one cannot be understood as an expression or representation of the other. Rather, the principles (...)
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  13. Relational Egalitarianism and the Grounds of Entitlements to Health Care.Brian Berkey - 2018 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 13 (3):85-104.
    In recent years, a number of philosophers have argued that much theorizing about the value of equality, and about justice more generally, has focused unduly on distributive issues and neglected the importance of egalitarian social relationships. As a result, relational egalitarian views, according to which the value of egalitarian social relations provides the grounds of the commitment that we ought to have to equality, have gained prominence as alternatives to more fundamentally distributive accounts of the basis of egalitarianism, and of (...)
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  14. Equality and Educational Justice.Michael Merry - 2018 - In M. A. Peters (ed.), Encyclopedia of Educational Philosophy and Theory. Springer.
    Taking equality seriously means that we ought to consider the ways in which persons are not only unfairly advantaged or disadvantaged from the start – e.g., through genetic inheritance, wealth, or a parent’s educational background – but also how opportunities and rewards that result from these basic inequalities are later exacerbated in the distribution of goods and opportunities. The basic point of equality as a normative principle is not that everyone have similar things or achieve similar outcomes, that would be (...)
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  15. Equality Versus Priority.Michael Otsuka & Alex Voorhoeve - 2018 - In Serena Olsaretti (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Distributive Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 65-85.
    We discuss two leading theories of distributive justice: egalitarianism and prioritarianism. We argue that while each has particular merits and shortcomings, egalitarian views more fully satisfy a key requirement of distributive justice: respect for both the unity of the individual and the separateness of persons.
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  16. May a Government Mandate More Comprehensive Health Insurance Than Citizens Want for Themselves?Alex Voorhoeve - 2018 - In David Sobel, Peter Vallentyne & Steven Wall (eds.), Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, Vol 4. Oxford University Press. pp. 167-191.
    I critically examine a common liberal egalitarian view about the justification for, and proper content of, mandatory health insurance. This view holds that a mandate is justified because it is the best way to ensure that those in poor health gain health insurance on equitable terms. It also holds that a government should mandate what a representative prudent individual would purchase for themselves if they were placed in fair conditions of choice. I argue that this common justification for a mandate (...)
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  17. Review of "The Equal Society: Essays in Theory and Practice", Ed. By George Hull, Rowman and Littlefield, 2015. [REVIEW]Valentin Beck - 2017 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2017.
  18. When Do Risky Choices Justify Inequality?Keith Hyams - 2017 - Diametros 53:60-74.
    Luck egalitarianism is the view that inequalities are justified when and only when a particular condition is met. Recent years have seen considerable debate about the exact nature of the risky choices thought by luck egalitarians to justify inequality. All positions in the debate emphasise the importance of choice, but they differ in the precise details of how choice features in the inequality-justifying condition. The present paper argues for a novel view about the conditions under which risky choices should justify (...)
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  19. A New Argument for the Irrelevance of Equality for Intrinsic Value.Stephen Kershnar & Duncan Purves - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (1):277-297.
    This paper introduces a novel approach to evaluating theories of the good. It proposes evaluating these theories on the basis of their compatibility with the most plausible ways of calculating overall intrinsic value of a world. The paper evaluates the plausibility of egalitarianism using this approach, arguing that egalitarianism runs afoul of the more plausible ways of calculating the overall intrinsic value of a world. Egalitarianism conflicts with the general motivation for totalism and critical-level totalism, which is that independent contributions (...)
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  20. Taking Risks Behind the Veil of Ignorance.Buchak Lara - 2017 - Ethics 127 (3):610-644.
    A natural view in distributive ethics is that everyone's interests matter, but the interests of the relatively worse off matter more than the interests of the relatively better off. I provide a new argument for this view. The argument takes as its starting point the proposal, due to Harsanyi and Rawls, that facts about distributive ethics are discerned from individual preferences in the "original position." I draw on recent work in decision theory, along with an intuitive principle about risk-taking, to (...)
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  21. The Priority View.David McCarthy - 2017 - Economics and Philosophy 33 (2):215–57.
    According to the priority view, or prioritarianism, it matters more to benefit people the worse off they are. But how exactly should the priority view be defined? This article argues for a highly general characterization which essentially involves risk, but makes no use of evaluative measurements or the expected utility axioms. A representation theorem is provided, and when further assumptions are added, common accounts of the priority view are recovered. A defense of the key idea behind the priority view, the (...)
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  22. Priority, Not Equality, for Possible People.Jacob M. Nebel - 2017 - Ethics 127 (4):896-911.
    How should we choose between uncertain prospects in which different possible people might exist at different levels of wellbeing? Alex Voorhoeve and Marc Fleurbaey offer an egalitarian answer to this question. I give some reasons to reject their answer and then sketch an alternative, which I call person-affecting prioritarianism.
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  23. Fairness to Non-Participants: A Case for a Practice-Independent Egalitarian Baseline.Merten Reglitz - 2017 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 20 (4): 466-485.
    Proponents of practice-dependent egalitarianism argue that egalitarian duties and entitlements only apply among participants in morally relevant practices. In this paper, I argue that these views are implausible because they allow for objectionable treatment of non-participants. I show that it is impossible, on the basis of practice-internal considerations alone, to determine the extent to which the pursuit of practices can permissibly limit the opportunities of non-participants. There are opportunities beyond the current holdings of practices to which no one has a (...)
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  24. Why Inequality Matters: Luck Egalitarianism, its Meaning and Value. [REVIEW]Alex Voorhoeve - 2017 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 3.
    I review Shlomi Segall's book 'Why Inequality Matters'. I argue that it conclusively establishes that alongside egalitarians, prioritarians and sufficientarians must sometimes regard a prospect as better (in at least one respect) when it is not better (in terms of well-being) for anyone. Sufficientarians and prioritarians must therefore relinquish a treasured anti-egalitarian argument. It also makes a powerful case that among these three views, egalitarians are in the best position to explain such departures from what is in each person’s prudential (...)
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  25. On Inequality, by Harry G. Frankfurt. [REVIEW]Jennifer Kling - 2016 - Teaching Philosophy 39 (3):377-380.
  26. Egalitarianism.Ryan Long - 2016 - In James Fieser & Bradley Dowden (eds.), Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  27. Luck Egalitarianism, Responsibility, and Political Liberalism.Ryan Long - 2016 - Dialogue 55 (1):107-130.
    Luck egalitarians argue that distributive justice should be understood in terms of our capacity to be responsible for our choices. Both proponents and critics assume that the theory must rely on a comprehensive conception of responsibility. I respond to luck egalitarianism’s critics by developing a political conception of responsibility that remains agnostic on the metaphysics of free choice. I construct this political conception by developing a novel reading of John Rawls’ distinction between the political and the comprehensive. A surprising consequence (...)
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  28. Incentive Inequalities and Freedom of Occupational Choice.Douglas Mackay - 2016 - Economics and Philosophy 32 (1):21-49.
    In Rescuing Justice and Equality, G.A. Cohen argues that the incentive inequalities permitted by John Rawls's difference principle are unjust since people cannot justify them to their fellow citizens. I argue that citizens of a Rawlsian society can justify their acceptance of a wide range of incentive inequalities to their fellow citizens. They can do so because they possess the right to freedom of occupational choice, and are permitted – as a matter of justice – to exercise this right by (...)
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  29. Incas and Aliens: The Truth in Telic Egalitarianism.Shlomi Segall - 2016 - Economics and Philosophy 32 (1):1-19.
  30. What is the Point of Sufficiency?Shlomi Segall - 2016 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 33 (1):36-52.
    Telic sufficientarians hold that there is something special about a certain threshold level such that benefiting people below it, or raising them above it, makes an outcome better in at least one respect. The article investigates what fundamental value might ground that view. The aim is to demonstrate that sufficientarianism, at least on this telic version, is groundless and as such indefensible. The argument is advanced in three steps: first, it is shown that sufficientarianism cannot be grounded in a personal (...)
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  31. Priority or Equality for Possible People?Alex Voorhoeve & Marc Fleurbaey - 2016 - Ethics 126 (4):929-954.
    Suppose that you must make choices that may influence the well-being and the identities of the people who will exist, though not the number of people who will exist. How ought you to choose? This paper answers this question. It argues that the currency of distributive ethics in such cases is a combination of an individual’s final well-being and her expected well-being conditional on her existence. It also argues that this currency should be distributed in an egalitarian, rather than a (...)
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  32. Double Counting, Moral Rigorism, and Cohen’s Critique of Rawls: A Response to Alan Thomas.Brian Berkey - 2015 - Mind 124 (495):849-874.
    In a recent article in this journal, Alan Thomas presents a novel defence of what I call ‘Rawlsian Institutionalism about Justice’ against G. A. Cohen’s well-known critique. In this response I aim to defend Cohen’s rejection of Institutionalism against Thomas’s arguments. In part this defence requires clarifying precisely what is at issue between Institutionalists and their opponents. My primary focus, however, is on Thomas’s critical discussion of Cohen’s endorsement of an ethical prerogative, as well as his appeal to the institutional (...)
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  33. Rawls's Political Liberalism.Thom Brooks & Martha C. Nussbaum (eds.) - 2015 - Cambridge University Press.
    Widely hailed as one of the most significant works in modern political philosophy, John Rawls's _Political Liberalism_ defended a powerful vision of society that respects reasonable ways of life, both religious and secular. These core values have never been more critical as anxiety grows over political and religious difference and new restrictions are placed on peaceful protest and individual expression. This anthology of original essays suggests new, groundbreaking applications of Rawls's work in multiple disciplines and contexts. Thom Brooks, Martha Nussbaum, (...)
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  34. Equality Versus Priority: A Useful Distinction.John Broome - 2015 - Economics and Philosophy 31 (2):219-228.
  35. Equality Versus Priority: How Relevant is the Distinction?Marc Fleurbaey - 2015 - Economics and Philosophy 31 (2):203-217.
  36. Equality Versus Priority: A Misleading Distinction.Daniel M. Hausman - 2015 - Economics and Philosophy 31 (2):229-238.
    People condemn inequalities for many reasons. For example, many who have no concern with distribution per se criticize inequalities in health care, because these inequalities lessen the benefits provided by the resources that are devoted to health care. Others who place no intrinsic value on distribution believe that a just society must show a special concern for those who are worst off. Some people, on the other hand, do place an intrinsic value on equality of distribution, regardless of its contribution (...)
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  37. Luck Egalitarianism.Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen - 2015 - Bloomsbury Academic.
  38. Distributive Equality.David McCarthy - 2015 - Mind 124 (496):1045-1109.
    Egalitarians think that equality in the distribution of goods somehow matters. But what exactly is egalitarianism? This article argues for a characterization based on novel principles essentially involving risk. The characterization is then used to resolve disputed questions about egalitarianism. These include: the way egalitarianism is concerned with patterns, in particular its relationship to strong separability; the relationship between egalitarianism and other distributive views, such as concerns with fairness and with giving priority to the worse off; and the relationship between (...)
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  39. On the Scope and Grounds of Social Equality.Rekha Nath - 2015 - In Fabian Schuppert and Ivo Wallimann-Helmer Edited by Carina Fourie (ed.), Social Equality: Essays on What It Means to be Equals. Oxford University Press. pp. 186-208.
    On social equality, individuals ought to relate on terms of equality. An important issue concerning this theory, which has not received much attention, is its scope: which individuals ought to relate on egalitarian terms? The answer depends on the theory’s grounds: the basis upon which demands of social equality arise when they do. In this chapter, I consider how we ought to construe the scope and the grounds of social equality. I argue that underlying the considerations social egalitarians advance for (...)
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  40. Does Luck Egalitarianism Lose its Appeal in the Face of Genetic Engineering?Areti Theofilopoulou - 2015 - Bioethica 1 (2):11-24.
    It has been suggested that the era of genetic interventions will sound the death knell for luck egalitarianism, as it will blur the line between chance and choice, on which theories of distributive justice often rest. By examining the threats posed to these theories, a crucial assumption is exposed; it is assumed that a commitment to the neutralisation of the effects of luck implies the endorsement of even the most morally controversial enhancements. In antithesis, I argue that an attractive theory (...)
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  41. Introduction to the Symposium on Equality Versus Priority.Alex Voorhoeve - 2015 - Economics and Philosophy 31 (2):201-202.
    This paper introduces a symposium on Equality versus Priority. It explains how cases involving risk are key to distinguishing these views and discusses a 'social egalitarian' critique of both 'telic egalitarians' and 'telic prioritarians'.
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  42. The Political Philosophy of G. A. Cohen.Nicholas Vrousalis - 2015 - Bloomsbury Academic.
  43. What Should Egalitarians Believe If They Really Are Egalitarian? A Reply to Martin O’Neill.Alexander Brown - 2014 - European Journal of Political Theory 13 (4):453-469.
    In his article, ‘What Should Egalitarians Believe?’, Martin O’Neill argues, amongst other things, that egalitarians should reject both Telic and Deontic Egalitarianism and that they should adopt in their place a version of Non-Intrinsic Egalitarianism, specifically, the Pluralist Non-Intrinsic Egalitarian View. The central purpose of my article is to challenge O’Neill’s assumption that he can defend each of the various propositions that make up his position simultaneously. I do this with two arguments. First, I argue that in order to justify (...)
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  44. Equality-Tempered Prioritarianism.Dale Dorsey - 2014 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 13 (1):45-61.
    In this paper, I present and explore an alternative to a standard prioritarian axiology. Equality-tempered prioritarianism holds that the value of welfare increases should be balanced against the value of equality. However, given that, under prioritarianism, the value of marginal welfare benefits decreases as the welfare of beneficiaries increases, equality-tempered prioritarianism holds that the intrinsic value of equality will be sufficient to alter a prioritarian verdict only in cases in which welfare benefits are granted to the very well-off. I argue (...)
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  45. Analogical Arguments for Egalitarianism.Christopher Freiman - 2014 - Ratio 27 (2):222-237.
    Egalitarians sometimes analogize socioeconomic opportunities to starting gates, playing fields, and the results of a lottery. A fair game is one in which all have an equal opportunity to succeed; egalitarians propose that the same is true of a fair society. A second type of argument for egalitarianism appeals to intuitions about the distribution of found resources. A just division of manna discovered on a strange planet seems to be an equal one. Both types of argument share a crucial feature: (...)
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  46. Priority and Position.Christopher Freiman - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):341-360.
    Positional goods are goods whose relative amount determines their absolute value. Many goods appear to have positional aspects. For example, one’s relative standing in the distribution of education and wealth may determine one’s absolute condition with respect to goods like employment opportunities, self-respect, and social inclusion. Positional goods feature in recent arguments from T.M. Scanlon, Brian Barry, and Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift that assert that we should favor egalitarian distributions of positional goods even if we reject equality as a (...)
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  47. Egalitarianism.Iwao Hirose - 2014 - Routledge.
    Some people are worse off than others. Does this fact give rise to moral concern? Egalitarianism claims that it does, for a wide array of reasons. It is one of the most important and hotly debated problems in moral and political philosophy, occupying a central place in the work of John Rawls, Thomas Nagel, G. A. Cohen and Derek Parfit. It also plays an important role in practical contexts such as the allocation of health care resources, the design of education (...)
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  48. A Nietzschean Case for Illiberal Egalitarianism.Donovan Miyasaki - 2014 - In Barry Stocker & Manuel Knoll (eds.), Nietzsche as Political Philosopher. De Gruyter. pp. 155-170.
    This paper draws on Friedrich Nietzsche’s work to defend the (admittedly non-Nietzschean) conclusion that a non-liberal egalitarian society is superior in two ways: first, as a moral ideal, it does not rest on questionable claims about essential human equality and, second, such a society would provide the optimal psychological and political conditions for individual wellbeing, social stability, and cultural achievement. I first explain Nietzsche’s distinction between forms of egalitarianism: noble and slavish. The slavish form promotes equality, defined negatively as the (...)
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  49. The Equivocal Use of Power in Nietzsche’s Failed Anti-Egalitarianism.Donovan Miyasaki - 2014 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (4):1-32.
    This paper argues that Nietzsche’s anti-egalitarianism depends on equivocation between conceptions of power as quantitative superiority and qualitative feeling and between associated conceptions of equality as similarity and opposition or resistance . Nietzsche’s key arguments against equality fail when applied to the qualitative form of power, since the feeling of power does not directly correlate with quantitative ability and requires relatively equal or proportional resistance. Consequently, Nietzsche’s commitment to the promotion of humanity’s highest individuals does not entail the rejection of (...)
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  50. Against Institutional Luck Egalitarianism.Rekha Nath - 2014 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 8 (1):1-19.
    Kok-Chor Tan has recently defended a novel theory of egalitarian distributive justice, institutional luck egalitarianism (ILE). On this theory, it is unjust for institutions to favor some individuals over others based on matters of luck. Tan takes his theory to preserve the intuitive appeal of luck egalitarianism while avoiding what he regards as absurd implications that face other versions of luck egalitarianism. Despite the centrality of the concept of institutional influence to his theory, Tan never spells out precisely what it (...)
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