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  1. Time, Consciousness and the Foundations of Science.Stephen Deiss - 2010 - Journal of Consciouness Exploration and Research 1 (5).
    This very brief but conceptually dense article provides a useful definition of consciousness, puts self consciousness into proper perspective, clarifies the nature of time, change and inertia, and ties consciousness to the foundations of physics as the inherent and fundamental process in nature. It is an implicit argument for a type of (proto) panpsychism or panexperientialism.
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  2. A Plastic Temporal Code for Conscious State Generation.Birgitta Dresp-Langley - 2009 - Neural Plasticity 2009 (482696):1-15..
    Consciousness is known to be limited in processing capacity and often described in terms of a unique processing stream across a single dimension: time. In this paper, we discuss a purely temporal pattern code, functionally decoupled from spatial signals, for conscious state generation in the brain. Arguments in favour of such a code include Dehaene et al.'s long-distance reverberation postulate, Ramachandran's remapping hypothesis, evidence for a temporal coherence index and coincidence detectors, and Grossberg's Adaptive Resonance Theory. A time-bin resonance model (...)
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  3. A Sketch of a Kripkean Theory of Consciousnes.Federico Zilio - 2021 - Universa. Recensioni di Filosofia 10 (3):273-292.
    In this paper, I will propose a provisional blueprint of the notion of consciousness. I will start an analysis of the notion from the way we generally use the term “consciousness” in our ordinary language. In this regard, I will use Saul Kripke’s direct reference theory to define the term “consciousness” in a non-descriptive way, that is, interpreting it as a rigid designator. Then, I will critically discuss the idea of a necessary a posteriori relationship between consciousness and brain activity, (...)
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  4. Bayesian Theories of Consciousness: A Review in Search for a Minimal Unifying Model.Wiktor Rorot - 2021 - Neuroscience of Consciousness 2021 (2):niab038.
    The goal of the paper is to review existing work on consciousness within the frameworks of Predictive Processing, Active Inference, and Free Energy Principle. The emphasis is put on the role played by the precision and complexity of the internal generative model. In the light of those proposals, these two properties appear to be the minimal necessary components for the emergence of conscious experience—a Minimal Unifying Model of consciousness.
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  5. The Integral Cosmology of Sri Aurobindo: An Introduction.Marco Masi - manuscript
    In the contemporary philosophy of mind and consciousness studies, views such as panpsychism or theories of universal consciousness (most notably I. Shani’s cosmopsychism and B. Kastrup’s cosmoidealism), have enjoyed a recent renaissance of metaphysical speculations in Western philosophy. Its similarities with Eastern philosophical traditions went not unnoticed. However, the potential contribution that the evolutionary cosmology of the Indian poet, mystic and philosopher Sri Aurobindo can offer to these ontologies, remains largely unknown or unexplored. Consciousness, mind, life, matter and evolution are (...)
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  6. The Integrated Information Theory Facing the Hard Problem of Consciousness.Wael Basille - 2020 - Dissertation, Sorbonne Université
    The Integrated Information Theory (IIT) formulated for the first time in 2004 by the neuroscientist Giulio Tononi, is a theoretical framework aiming to scientifically explain phenomenal consciousness. The IIT is presented in the first part of this work. Broadly speaking, integrated information is an abstract quantitative measure of the causal power a system has on itself. The main claim of IIT is the identity between informational structures and experience. The nature of this identity will be the subject of the second (...)
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  7. Consciousness Beyond Neural Fields: Expanding the Possibilities of What has Not yet Happened.Birgitta Dresp-Langley - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 12:762349.
    In the field theories in physics, any particular region of the presumed space-time continuum and all interactions between elementary objects therein can be objectively measured and/or accounted for mathematically. Since this does not apply to any of thefield theories, or any other neural theory, of consciousness, their explanatory power is limited. As discussed in detail herein, the matter is complicated further by the facts than any scientifically operational definition of consciousness is inevitably partial, and that the phenomenon has no spatial (...)
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  8. An Evidence-Based Critical Review of The Mind-Brain Identity Theory.Marco Masi - manuscript
    In the philosophy of mind, the causal relationship between phenomenal consciousness, mentation and brain states has always been a matter of debate. On the one hand, material monism posits consciousness and mind as pure brain-epiphenomena. One of its most stringent lines of reasoning relies on the premise that because a cerebral impairment, or its anatomical and biochemical modification, leads to a cognitive impairment and/or altered states of consciousness, there is no reason to doubt the mind-brain identity. On the other hand, (...)
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  9. Meaning and Context: A Brief Introduction.Cosmin Visan - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research 12 (4):356-382.
    In searching for what is the most natural way to regard the world, it will be shown that existence is an interplay between meanings and contexts. This interplay takes the form of consciousness, which arises on top of an infinite ocean of formless contexts. Various aspects of meaning and context will be explored, going through the emergent structure of consciousness, self-reference, the contradictory nature of the formless realm and love as the ultimate context for existence. Given the infinite ramifications of (...)
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  10. Daniel Dennett.David Thompson - 2009 - London and New York, NY, USA: Continuum/Bloomsbury.
  11. Global Workspace Theory and Animal Consciousness.Jonathan Birch - 2020 - Philosophical Topics 48 (1):21-37.
    Peter Carruthers has recently argued for a surprising conditional: if a global workspace theory of phenomenal consciousness is both correct and fully reductive, then there are no substantive facts to discover about phenomenal consciousness in nonhuman animals. I present two problems for this conditional. First, it rests on an odd double-standard about the ordinary concept of phenomenal consciousness: its intuitive non-gradability is taken to be unchallengeable by future scientific developments, whereas its intuitive determinacy is predicted to fall by the wayside. (...)
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  12. Brain and Mind: How Neural Networks Acquire Phenomenal Awareness by Tapping Into a Ubiquitous Field of Consciousness.Joachim Keppler - 2021 - In Alberto García Gómez, Maria Paola Brugnoli & Alberto Carrara (eds.), Bioethics and Consciousness. Newcastle upon Tyne, Vereinigtes Königreich: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. pp. 89-102.
    A novel approach to the scientific understanding of phenomenal awareness is presented that accepts consciousness as ontologically fundamental and is based on the hypothesis that the whole range of phenomenal nuances is inherent in the frequency spectrum of a ubiquitous field of consciousness. Pursuing this idea, it is postulated that the brain employs a universal interaction mechanism through which it taps into this field, thereby acquiring phenomenal qualities. I argue that the edifice of modern physics can not only offer a (...)
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  13. Quantum Information in Neural Systems.Danko D. Georgiev - 2021 - Symmetry 13 (5):773.
    Identifying the physiological processes in the central nervous system that underlie our conscious experiences has been at the forefront of cognitive neuroscience. While the principles of classical physics were long found to be unaccommodating for a causally effective consciousness, the inherent indeterminism of quantum physics, together with its characteristic dichotomy between quantum states and quantum observables, provides a fertile ground for the physical modeling of consciousness. Here, we utilize the Schrödinger equation, together with the Planck-Einstein relation between energy and frequency, (...)
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  14. Review of Daniel C. Dennett's From Bacteria to Bach and Back: The Evolution of Minds. [REVIEW]Hane Htut Maung - 2020 - Synthesis Philosophica 35 (1):267-270.
  15. Does Quantum Cognition Imply Quantum Minds?S. Gao - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (3-4):100-111.
    Quantum cognition is a new theoretical framework for constructing cognitive models based on the mathematical principles of quantum theory. Due to its increasing empirical success, one wonders what it tells us about the underlying process of cognition. Does it imply that we have quantum minds and there is some sort of quantum structure in the brain? In this paper, I address this important issue by using a new result in the research of quantum foundations. Based on the PBR theorem about (...)
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  16. Does Synchronicity Point Us Towards the Fundamental Nature of Consciousness?: An Exploration of Psychology, Ontology, and Research Prospects.B. Butzer - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (3-4):29-54.
    The topic of synchronicity has long intrigued philosophers, scientists, and the general public. However, to date very little empirical research has explored the underlying mechanisms of synchronicity. In other words, why do synchronicities occur? Are synchronicities random, or do they hold clues about the ultimate nature of reality? Drawing on theoretical and empirical research, the current paper explores the idea that synchronicity might be one way that the fundamental (i.e. ontologically primary) nature of consciousness reveals itself to us in everyday (...)
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  17. Reversed Cartesian Theater.Zi-Hao Wang - manuscript
    This paper aims to present a theory of consciousness called the reversed theater theory, which gives the phenomenal consciousness a functional role in cognition. According to the theory, there is a theater in the brain, but a reversed Cartesian theater that the actors are the consciousness and the audience is the unconsciousness; actors mechanically act according to the script, while the audience enjoys its content. When a performance is over, the audience compiles the next script based on their experience so (...)
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  18. Intuition-Driven Navigation of the Hard Problem of Consciousness.Krzysztof Sękowski & Wiktor Rorot - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (1):239-255.
    The discussion of the nature of consciousness seems to have stalled, with the “hard problem of consciousness” in its center, well-defined camps of realists and eliminativists at two opposing poles, and little to none room for agreement between. Recent attempts to move this debate forward by shifting them to a meta-level have heavily relied on the notion of “intuition”, understood in a rather liberal way. Against this backdrop, the goal of this paper is twofold. First, we want to highlight how (...)
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  19. The Biomolecular Basis for Plant and Animal Sentience: Senomic and Ephaptic Principles of Cellular Consciousness.F. Baluska & A. S. Reber - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (1-2):31-49.
    The defining principle of evolutionary biology is that all species, extant and extinct, evolved from ancient prokaryotic cells. Their initial appearance and adaptive evolution are proposed to have been accompanied by a cellular sentience, by feelings, subjectivity or, in a word, 'consciousness'. Prokaryotic cells, such as archaea and bacteria, have natural unitary, valence-marked 'mental' representations. They process and evaluate sensory information in a context-dependent manner. They learn, establish memories, and communicate using biophysical fields acting on excitable membranes. Symbiotic eukaryotic cells, (...)
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  20. Information and Integration in Plants: Towards a Quantitative Search for Plant Sentience.P. A. M. Mediano & A. Trewavas - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (1-2):80-105.
    Integrated information theory (IIT) is a candidate theory of consciousness that highlights the role of complex interactions between parts of a system as the basis of consciousness – and, due to its general information-theoretic formulation, is capable of making statements about consciousness in neural and non-neural systems alike. Here, we argue that a system radically different to a human brain, host to complex physiological and functional structures capable of integrating information, can be found in the meristems and vascular system of (...)
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  21. Plant Sentience: Theoretical and Empirical Issues: Editorial Introduction.V. Raja & M. Segundo-Ortin - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (1-2):7-16.
  22. Integrated Information Theory: From Consciousness to Its Physical Substrate.Giulio Tononi, Melanie Boly, Marcello Massimini & Christof Koch - 2016 - Nature Reviews Neuroscience 17 (7):450--461.
    Uncovering the neural basis of consciousness is a major challenge to neuroscience. In this Perspective, Tononi and colleagues describe the integrated information theory of consciousness and how it might be used to answer outstanding questions about the nature of consciousness.
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  23. Is Predictive Processing a Theory of Perceptual Consciousness?Tomas Marvan & Marek Havlík - 2021 - New Ideas in Psychology 61 (21).
    Predictive Processing theory, hotly debated in neuroscience, psychology and philosophy, promises to explain a number of perceptual and cognitive phenomena in a simple and elegant manner. In some of its versions, the theory is ambitiously advertised as a new theory of conscious perception. The task of this paper is to assess whether this claim is realistic. We will be arguing that the Predictive Processing theory cannot explain the transition from unconscious to conscious perception in its proprietary terms. The explanations offer (...)
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  24. Instrumentalist Logic of Scientific Discovery: Reflections on Dewey’s Method and its Metaphysical Foundations.Andrii Leonov - 2020 - Actual Problems of Mind. Philosophy Journal 21:2-23.
    In this paper, I attempt to clarify the heart of Dewey’s philosophy: his method (denotative method (DM) / pattern of inquiry (PI)). Despite the traditional understanding of Dewey as anti-foundationalist, I want to show that Dewey did have metaphysical foundations for his method: the principle of continuity or theory of emergentism. I also argue that Dewey’s metaphysical position is better named as ‘cultural emergentism’, rather than his own term ‘cultural naturalism’. What Dewey called ‘common sense’ in his Logic, Husserl termed (...)
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  25. Calculating the Boundaries of Consciousness in General Resonance Theory.T. Hunt - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (11-12):55-80.
    When physical structures resonate in proximity to each other they will under certain circumstances 'sync up' in a shared resonance frequency. This is the phenomenon of spontaneous selforganization. General resonance theory (GRT), a theory of consciousness developed by Hunt and Schooler, suggests that consciousness is a product of various shared resonance frequencies at different physical scales. I suggest a heuristic for calculating the boundaries and resulting capacity for phenomenal consciousness in such resonating structures. Shared resonance results in phase transitions in (...)
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  26. Quantum-Level Experience in Neural Dendrites: An Interpretation-Neutral Model.J. C. W. Edwards - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (11-12):8-29.
    It is proposed that a human conscious experience of the sort we report to each other reflects a direct causal interaction between a pattern of information about the world, encoded in a field of postsynaptic potentials, and a quantized mode of excitation occupying dendritic cytoskeleton. The requirement for a quantized account is seen simply as the need for an event of experience to be a single indivisible, but richly patterned, causal relation between information and an 'informee'. It is argued that (...)
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  27. Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness Are Empirically False.N. Greely - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (11-12):30-54.
    Higher-order theories of consciousness come in many varieties, but all adopt the 'transitivity principle' as a central, explanatory premise. The transitivity principle states that a mental state of a subject is conscious if and only if the subject is aware of it. This higher-order awareness is realized in different ways in different forms of higher-order theory. I argue that empirical studies of metacognition have falsified the transitivity principle by showing that there can be awareness of a mental state without that (...)
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  28. The Consciousness and the Role of Valorization. How and Why the Self-Awareness Subjectively Administers Consciousness.Tudor Cosmin Ciocan - 2017 - Dialogo 3 (2):157-167.
    It is most likely for anyone to ask himself at least once if it would be possible to live in a dream? Questioning the fabric of “reality” we live in consciously was one of the main doubts man ever had. It is so likely for us to answer positively to it due to so many factors; starting from the many and various facets of reality each individual envision the world, from the enormous differences we all have while perceiving and defining (...)
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  29. The Conscious Life - the Dream We Live In.Tudor Cosmin Ciocan - 2017 - Dialogo 3 (2):65-71.
    It is most likely for anyone to ask himself at least once if it would be possible to live in a dream? Questioning the fabric of “reality” we live in consciously was one of the main doubts man ever had. It is so likely for us to answer positive to it due to so many factors; starting from the many and various facets of reality each individual envision the world, from the enormous differences we all have while perceiving and defining (...)
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  30. A New Experimental Phenomenological Method to Explore the Subjective Features of Psychological Phenomena: Its Application to Binocular Rivalry.Takuya Niikawa, Katsunori Miyahara, Nishida Satoshi & Hamada Hiro Taiyo - 2020 - Neuroscience of Consciousness 2020 (1).
    The subjective features of psychological phenomena have been studied intensively in experimental science in recent years. Although various methods have been proposed to identify subjective features of psychological phenomena, there are elusive subjective features such as the spatiotemporal structure of experience, which are difficult to capture without some additional methodological tools. We propose a new experimental method to address this challenge, which we call the contrast-based experimental phenomenological method (CEP). CEP proceeds in four steps: (i) front-loading phenomenology, (ii) online second-personal (...)
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  31. Consciousness as a Mode of Being.S. Ginsburg & E. Jablonka - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (9-10):148-162.
    We suggest a teleological approach to subjective experiencing or phenomenal consciousness. Like living, subjective experiencing is a teleology-constituting mode of being, which is made up of coupled, functional processes. We explicate our notion of a 'teleological mode of being' and distinguish between three different modes: a living (non-sentient) mode of being, a sentient mode of being, and a rational-symbolic (human) mode of being, which correspond to the three levels of soul suggested by Aristotle. These evolved teleological modes of being are (...)
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  32. Two Objections to the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness.A. O. Sovik - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (9-10):186-201.
    This article discusses two arguments against the integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness. The first argument says that IIT is wrong in saying that conscious experiences are identical to conceptual structures; they are very different in many ways. The second argument says that the seeming presence of non-conscious integrated information either makes IIT falsified or unfalsifiable. The first argument seeks to show that integrated information is not identical to consciousness; the second argument seeks to show that integrated information is not (...)
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  33. Emotional Consciousness in Autism.S. Arnaud - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (9-10):34-59.
    An abundant literature on autism shows differences in emotional consciousness between neurotypical and autistic people. This paper proposes an interpretation of these results through a conceptual clarification of emotional consciousness. It suggests that autistic people generally access their emotions through a thirdperson's perspective whereas neurotypical people's emotions reach consciousness via first-person access. This interpretation is based on a model of 'emotional consciousness' that applies leading theories of consciousness to emotions as well as on research on the way autistic people relate (...)
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  34. Integrated Information Theory, Searle, and the Arbitrariness Question.Francis Fallon - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (3):629-645.
    Integrated Information Theory posits a new kind of information, which, given certain constraints, constitutes consciousness. Searle objects to IIT because its appeal to information relies on observer-relative features. This misses the point that IIT’s notion of integrated information is intrinsic, the opposite of observer-relative. Moreover, Searle overlooks the possibility that IIT could be embraced as an extension of his theory. While he insists that causal powers of the brain account for consciousness, he maintains that these causal powers aren’t tied to (...)
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  35. Integrated Information Theory, Searle, and the Arbitrariness Question.Francis Fallon - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-17.
    Integrated Information Theory posits a new kind of information, which, given certain constraints, constitutes consciousness. Searle objects to IIT because its appeal to information relies on observer-relative features. This misses the point that IIT’s notion of integrated information is intrinsic, the opposite of observer-relative. Moreover, Searle overlooks the possibility that IIT could be embraced as an extension of his theory. While he insists that causal powers of the brain account for consciousness, he maintains that these causal powers aren’t tied to (...)
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  36. Continuous Neural Spikes and Information Theory.Corey J. Maley - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (3):647-667.
    Can information theory be used to understand neural signaling? Yes, but assumptions have to be made about the nature of that signaling. The traditional view is that the individual neural spike is an all-or-none phenomenon, which allows neural spikes to be viewed as discrete, binary pulses, similar in kind to the signals in digital computers. Under this assumption, the tools of information theory can be used to derive results about the properties of neural signals. However, new results from neuroscience demonstrate (...)
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  37. The Global Workspace Theory, the Phenomenal Concept Strategy, and the Distribution of Consciousness.Dylan Black - 2020 - Consciousness and Cognition 84:102992.
    Peter Carruthers argues that the global workspace theory implies there are no facts of the matter about animal consciousness. The argument is easily extended to other cognitive theories of consciousness, posing a general problem for consciousness studies. But the argument proves too much, for it also implies that there are no facts of the matter about human consciousness. A key assumption of the argument is that scientific theories of consciousness must explain away the explanatory gap. I criticize this assumption and (...)
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  38. Analyzing the Etiological Functions of Consciousness.Dylan Black - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1:1-26.
    Scientists disagree about which capacities a functional analysis of consciousness should target. To address this disagreement, I propose that a good functional analysis should target the etiological functions of consciousness. The trouble is that most hypotheses about the etiological origins of consciousness presuppose particular functional analyses. In recent years, however, a small number of scientists have begun to offer evolutionary hypotheses that are relatively theory neutral. I argue that their hypotheses can serve an independent standard for evaluating among theories of (...)
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  39. Why Integrated Information Theory Must Fail on its Own Causal Terms.T. van Stekelenburg & J. C. W. Edwards - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (7-8):144-164.
    In defining physical (i.e. causal dynamic) units to which conscious experience is to be ascribed, integrated information theory (IIT) raises three notable requirements: (1) that a unit to which consciousness is ascribed must be defined, or circumscribed, by some intrinsic aspect or property, where intrinsic implies existing 'for itself' or 'from its point of view'; (2) that the intrinsic aspect that defines the unit to which consciousness is ascribed must be dynamic (i.e. involve causal power) rather than purely structural or (...)
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  40. Stock Returns and the Mind: An Unlikely Result that Could Change Our Understanding of Consciousness.U. Holmberg - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (7-8):31-49.
    Emotions and feelings affect economic systems. This is well known as e.g. stock markets tend to react to sudden political and emotional events. However, the link between emotions, consciousness, and economic systems at a deeper level than the aggregate resulting action of people at large is yet to be explored and understood. In this paper, a first building block is presented as it is shown that a variable derived from the random numbers obtained by the Global Consciousness Project is statistically (...)
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  41. Thick NCCs Yield Physicalist Epiphenomenalism.W. S. Robinson - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (7-8):77-94.
    'Thick neural event' is introduced to mean an event that requires firings of more than one neuron and a substantive (i.e. additional to merely temporal and spatial) relation among them. It is shown that some well regarded theories (e.g. by Lamme, Koch, etc.) strongly suggest that neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) are thick neural events. It is then shown that thin (= not thick) neural events provide sufficient causation for neural events leading to behaviour, and that there are good reasons (...)
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  42. A Mechanism for Life After Death.Paul Merriam - manuscript
    A mechanism for life after death is given.
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  43. Two Problems for Non-Inferentialist Views of the Meta-Problem.Graham Peebles - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):156-165.
    The meta-problem of consciousness is to explain why we think that there is a hard problem of consciousness. On Chalmers' view of the meta-problem, our judgments about the hard problem of consciousness arise non-inferentially as a result of introspection. I raise two problems for such a non-inferentialist view of the metaproblem. It does not seem to match the psychological facts about how we come to the realization of the hard problem, and it is unclear how the view can bridge the (...)
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  44. Headlessness without Illusions: Phenomenological Undecidability and Materialism.K. Williford - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):190-200.
    I argue that there is a version of (quasi-Armstrongian) weak illusionism that intelligibly relates phenomenal concepts and introspective opacity, accounts for the (hard) problem intuitions Chalmers highlights (modal, epistemic, explanatory, and metaphysical), and undermines the most important arguments Chalmers deploys against type-B and type-C materialisms. If this is successful, we can satisfactorily account for the meta-problem of consciousness, mollify our hard problem intuitions, and remain genuine realists about phenomenal experience.
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  45. Ignorance and the Meta-Problem of Consciousness.T. McClelland - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):108-119.
    Chalmers (2018) considers a wide range of possible responses to the meta-problem of consciousness. Among them is the ignorance hypothesis -- the view that there only appears to be a hard problem because of our inadequate conception of the physical. Although Chalmers quickly dismisses this view, I argue that it has much greater promise than he recognizes. The plausibility of the ignorance hypothesis depends on how exactly one frames the 'problem intuitions' that a solution to the meta-problem must explain. I (...)
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  46. Appearance, Reality, and the Meta-Problem of Consciousness.Giovanni Merlo - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):120-130.
    Solving the meta-problem of consciousness requires, among other things, explaining why we are so reluctant to endorse various forms of illusionism about the phenomenal. I will try to tackle this task in two steps. The first consists in clarifying how the concept of consciousness precludes the possibility of any distinction between 'appearance' and 'reality'. The second consists in spelling out our reasons for recognizing the existence of something that satisfies that concept.
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  47. The Phenomenal Powers View and the Meta-Problem of Consciousness.Hedda Hassel Mørch - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):131-142.
    The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why we have the intuition that there is a hard problem of consciousness. David Chalmers briefly notes that my phenomenal powers view may be able to answer to this challenge in a way that avoids problems (having to do with avoiding coincidence) facing other realist views. In this response, I will briefly outline the phenomenal powers view and my main arguments for it and—drawing in part on a similar view developed by (...)
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  48. First-Person Interventions and the Meta-Problem of Consciousness.C. Klein & A. B. Barron - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):82-90.
    Chalmers' (2018) meta-problem of consciousness emphasizes unexpected common ground between otherwise incompatible positions. We argue that the materialist should welcome discussion of the meta-problem. We suggest that the core of the metaproblem is the seeming arbitrariness of subjective experience. This has an unexpected resolution when one moves to an interventionist account of scientific explanation: the same interventions that resolve the hard problem should also resolve the meta-problem.
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  49. Attending to the Illusion of Consciousness.J. Dewhurst & K. Dolega - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):54-61.
    Chalmers (2018) raises three challenges for Michael Graziano's attention schema theory. Our aim in this paper is to bolster Graziano's attention schema theory with some tools and insights from the predictive processing framework, in order to respond to the challenges raised by Chalmers and more generally strengthen the theory. We will first introduce the attention schema theory and the three challenges raised by Chalmers, before outlining our application of predictive processing to the theory and how it can resolve these challenges, (...)
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  50. The Meta-Problem of Consciousness and the Phenomenal Concept Strategy.E. Diaz-Leon - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):62-73.
    The hard problem of consciousness is about how we could explain in physicalist terms why we are conscious. The meta-problem of consciousness is about how we could explain why we have a hard problem of consciousness. In this note I argue that the phenomenal concept strategy can in principle provide a satisfactory solution to the meta-problem.
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